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A. THE OUTLINE OF A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW
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Work in progress and updated in my Dropbox folder

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Please ignore unevennesses of editing and referencing. It is still very much in draft form

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Preface

There is a legacy of great Christian thinkers over the centuries. Without embarking on a full history of Christian philosophy, we might mention great Christian thinkers such as Irenaeus in the Second Century, the Cappadocian Fathers (and Mother) and, in the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus in the Western Church, and Gregory Palamas in the Eastern Church. The specific tradition within which I stand is that of John Calvin, who with Martin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli led the movement in the Sixteenth Century for the reformation of the church based on the rediscovery of the integrity of the biblical message of the good news of Christ's sheer gift of grace in his death on our behalf as the sole basis on which we can be made right with God. Calvin's distinctive contribution was the affirmation of the Lordship of Christ is over the whole of life, an insight taken up in the Nineteenth Century by the great Dutch Calvinist thinker, Abraham Kuyper and stated as the principle of 'sphere sovereignty' – that all areas of life are distinctively under Christ's rule. This insight was developed systematically in the Twentieth Century by the two Christian philosophers, Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd, both professors at the Free University of Amsterdam which Kuyper founded.

This work draws together two strands of previous research. Firstly, my research on the Trinity through the lens of the Luther theologian. Robert W. Jenson; and secondly, my study of the two leading 'Reformational' philosophers of the Twentieth Century, Dirk Vollenhoven, and his younger but more famous contemporary. Herman Dooyeweerd.

In my considered judgement, Jenson is the most notable theologian of the Twentieth Century. Even though he does not have the prominence of Karl Barth, the subject of his own doctoral research, I believe that his thinking has a decisiveness and relevance to Christian live and thought beyond the 'faith subjectivism' as Pannenberg described Karl Barth. Reading Jenson is a journey down the highway of Christian theology from the apostolic proclamation to the present day. While I am not uncritical of certain emphases in Jenson, notably a certain historicism in his account, Jensen's theological systematics, in my view, have the edge on his better known contemporaries and fellow theologians of hope, Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jürgen Moltmann. Above all, Jenson presents Jesus, and the resurrected Jesus, in an uncompromising and challenging representation of the apostolic kerygma in a way which calls for a radical regrounding and reshaping of our worldview. It is this Jesus of Nazareth, not Stalin or Hitler, or even Ghandi, in whose hands is the future of the universe, and who holds the key to its structure and constitution.

Jenson, for all his strengths, has certain weaknesses. One of them, already mentioned, is the

tendency to reduce the acts and relations of and among the Persons to their temporal expression. This is perhaps his Hegelian inheritance – nevertheless an important corrective to Barth's subjective account of revelation. The other, deriving from his Lutheran inheritance, is his almost exclusive focus on the Gospel accounts of Jesus, and his wider appreciation of the whole covenantal unfolding as we see it revealed in the entire sweep of Scripture. Again, from the Lutheran inheritance, there is perhaps the tendency to play down the role of the law as it is revealed in both the Old and New Testaments.

Here the Reformed Covenantal tradition is a valuable corrective, going back not least to Calvin himself but also drawing from the covenantal tradition from Zwingli and Bullinger, as well as Ursinus and the framers of the Heidelberg Catechism, and the tradition represented widely in Reformed thought both in England and Scotland, but elaborated especially at the Friesian seminary of Franeker by Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669) and Hermann Witsius (1636-1708). The inner-Triune covenant of redemption is an important corrective to Jenson's temporal account of the Triune relations, on the one hand, and his limitation of the account of Jesus to the 'evangelical acts' recorded in the Gospels.

Here the key link provided by Abraham Kuyper and the thinker most directly influenced by him in America, Cornelius Van Til. Central to the thought of both is the inner Triune covenant as the basis for the creation, redemption and transformation of the world (and here there is a point of contact with Jenson's short article; 'Creation as a Triune Act') it is this insight which lies behind and made possible Kuyper's enunciation of 'Sphere Sovereignty' ('Souvereiniteit in eigen kring) – the Lordship of Christ over every area of life. The Son is a full and equal participant with the Father and the Spirit in the covenant of creation and has authority as Lord of all, so that his act of redemption on behalf of all humanity has cosmic significance,

Although Kuyper's insights were worked through by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, the Trinitarian basis has been obscured, or rather distorted. In my thesis I argue that Vollenhoven's account tends to take a somewhat sequential form, with the Father as creator followed by the Son as redeemer and revealer, followed by the Sprit who actualises (or 'positivises' in Vollenhoven's terms) specific states of affairs. Dooyeweerd by contrast tended to a more vertical view, with the Son and the Holy Spirit jointly functioning as intermediaries to the Father as Origin. Neither philosopher fully account for the joint but distinct roles of the three Persons in the creation, redemption and transformation of the world fundamental to the worldview outlined by Kuyper and developed further by Van Til.

Nevertheless, what is lacking in Vollenhoven or Dooyeweerd's position taken on its own is redeemed by the strong complementarity of their respective positions -- especially when then are critically compared in the light of the Kuyperian vision. For both, Kuyper, amplified by

Van Til provides a firm base for a Christian worldview, what I call its transcendent orientation.

The two philosophers taken together also provide a systematic account of what I call the transcendental location of human life and experience, such as identified, for example, by the greatest modern Western philosopher, Immanuel Kant – even if the answers that that philosopher provides to account of human experience are not entirely satisfactory because he seek to develop his philosophy not in the light of an integrated Christian worldview (certainly not on with a Trinitarian basis), but on the basis of a dualism between nature as the object of rational investigation on the one hand, and the free exercise of human subjectivity on the other. In other words, Kant identifies for us the necessary elements of human experience, but despite his many insights, he does not have the basis to account for those elements in a systematically satisfactorily way.

It is my contention, that the only satisfactory way to account for the necessary conditions of experience - the transcendental location for any philosophy - needs to be on a radically Trinitarian basis, such as is identified by Jenson but developed more fully by Kuyper and Van Til.

Thus, what is presented here brings together insights normally keep separate, namely Trinitarian theology, especially Jenson's theology in the later tradition corrected by the Reformed theology of Kuyper and Van Til -- on the one hand; and the Reformational philosophy within the Reformed tradition of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd on the other

The former has influenced me in matters of worldview, covered in Part 1, and the latter has influenced me in terms of the constituted of a fully rounded Reformational philosophy, covered in Part Two on the other.

Part Three applied the insights from Part One and Part Two in specific contexts: within the general areas of a Christian vision on the cosmos, first; then of humanity; and finally of social entities.

<p style="text-align: center">Part A: The Outline of a Christian Worldview</p>

In this Part I shall outline the contours of a Christian worldview.

1. The Crisis of the Modern and Postmodern World

The beginning of the third millennium after the birth of Jesus brings to Christians in the West a new crisis of faith. No longer can the assurance, at least in retrospect, which seems to have characterized previous generations [...]. Not only the fundamentals, but also the very pattern of thinking which makes faith possible, are brought into question.

However, despite appearances, this crisis is not new, and its seeds were sown in the very cultural matrix within which the Christian faith was defined in the first place. Over the centuries of Christian faith, there developed a synthesis between the dominant pattern of thinking at a particular time, and the specific claims of the Christian faith. This synthesis can take many different forms. It seemed to place the Christian faith on a respectable basis in the context of the culture in which it was first proclaimed; but over time it has become clear that the cost of this synthesis has been to undermine the integrity of the very faith which is was designed to support. It is necessary to uncover the nature of this synthesis and its implications before coming to a re-statement of that faith which can provide a sounder basis, more in keeping with the radical claims of the Christian faith and the possibilities of its transformative power.

It is in the context of Western culture that the problem of how to draw out the implications for Christian thought and life is raised.

This is not to say that the West has the monopoly of Christian experience. Quite the contrary – not only is the Christian faith of a Hebrew, that is Near Eastern, character, though articulated in an essentially European cultural milieu, but, further, the centre of gravity is moving increasingly to the non-Western world: Africa, South America, and in the Twenty-First Century, China.[1] However, for many centuries, especially after the fall of the Christian heartland to Islam in the 7th and 8th Centuries, and then in the rise of what is now called 'the Modern World', the role of Europe and its colonial offshoots (in the case of North America, overshadowing the parent region) the West has decisively shaped the culture of the whole world: even in those 'non-Western' regions just mentioned, which are set to overshadow the church in those areas which are normally thought of as specially Western (i.e. Europe and

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[1] See Patrick Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (2003).

North America). For this reason, the vicissitudes of Christianity in the West have effects that flow into the bloodstream of the whole Christian church, both positively and negatively. For this reason, how the Western Church understands its own past, and in particular, the strengths and weaknesses of this working out of the implications of this Trinitarian commitment have important implications for the church throughout the world

As we shall see, at root in apostate thinking is the attempt to absolutise an aspect of the created order, and substitute it for God. The synthesis then takes this apostate philosophical starting-point, and attempts to read and understand the Christian faith in terms of this.

In the Ancient world there was an attempt to re-present the Christian faith in Greek philosophical terms, understanding that the doctrine of the incarnation was a picture of the Greek philosophical ideas of the unknowable, unmovable, God. The physical reality on which the Christian faith is founded – not least in the supreme event of the Resurrection, was spiritualized and put in a metaphysical grid.

Western thought has been distorted by deeply influential traditions, which go back to pre-Christian Greek thought but which have been synthesized with Christian thought in different ways. These distortions are:

a. Realism, and its seeming opposite ...
b. Nominalism; and a third way, alongside these two …
c. The recourse to narrative.

While these might seem be contradictory, and they are, at the same time they both derive from the same, defective, philosophical paradigm which has dominated Western thought from the time of the Greeks. To both there is a third approach, that which has recourse to narrative as the primary reality. I shall look at each of these in turn.

(a) Realism leading to Modernism

The realist strand had its roots in Greek experience where time (Chronos), the one who had swept away 'Mycenean' civilisation with the Dorian invasions, was in turn overthrown by Zeus, a 'true Father of Gods and men', fixed in the heritage of the Greeks in the epic poems of Homer and Hesiod. The gods are immortal and characterised by their detachment from the cares and toils of human affairs; but at the same time, are the embodiment of ideal human perfection, and actively take the part of those who exhibit these qualities, whom they adopt as

their protégés.[2] The role of the mythic religious pattern in classical Greek culture was much more complex than in the Near East, because of the ambiguous attitude of Greek thinkers to the gods. Olympian religion contained in its own vision the idea that the Ground of Being could be reached by an abstraction from time and its particularities.[3]

Although, the Greeks developed a sceptical attitude to their myths, the religious ideals enshrined in the myths continued to shape and express their ideals in all their attempts to understand the fundamental nature of the cosmos (a characteristically Greek concept). The Greek view is characterised by a tension between the eternal *becoming* of 'matter' and the eternal *being* of 'form'. On the one hand, 'matter', in the Greek view, expresses dynamism and vitality; on the other, 'form' expresses the ideal of perfect order and unchangeability. The older Greek nature religions of Gaia (mother earth), Uranus (the god of the skies), Demeter (goddess of crops) and Dionysus (the god of wine) had deified the matter principle as the eternal origin of all that exists; but this was contested by the culture religion of the gods of Mount Olympus, not least Apollo (the god of form). Culture religion represents the deification of the eternal, unchanging concepts of unity, truth, goodness and beauty. These involve the use of '*theoria',* of abstract thought, which is a way of entering the realm of divine eternity.

In the critical examination of received tradition, and therefore of mythic religion, the Greeks posed the question: 'How shall we know true Deity when we encounter it?' As they demythologised the expression of their thinking, they devoted themselves more and more to 'timelessness' as such, worshipping sheer 'One-above-being'.[4] The quest of Greek metaphysics was for an eternity, which could explain and render secure the present flux of human experience.[5] Within the general problematic of Greek philosophy, eternity was conceived of as immunity to time, or timelessness.[6] Parmenides provided the dictum 'What can be thought is the same as what is real', which provided a double security: that there are no limits to human understanding, and that unreality is beyond our experience, and therefore need not be feared.[7] This provides the methodological basis for the further claim:

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[2] Robert W. Jenson, 'Jesus, Father, Spirit: The Logic of the Doctrine of the Trinity', *dialog* 26 (1987): 246. See Robert W. Jenson, *A Religion against Itself* (1967) 18; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Christian Doctrine of God' (1985): 48.

[3] Robert W. Jenson, 'Karl Barth' (1989): 41; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 48.

[4] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine'   33-4. See Robert W. Jenson, 'On Becoming Man: Some Aspects' (1970): 112.

[5] Jenson, 'Jesus, Father, Spirit': 246

[6] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 34; Robert W. Jenson, *America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards* (1988) 92.

[7] Parmenides, Fragment 3; quoted in Robert W. Jenson, *God after God: The God of Past and the God of the Future Seen in the Work of Karl Barth* (1969): 11.

'Neither was being nor will it be; it is all simultaneously now'.[8]

Plato defined God as a '*nunc stans*' or 'standing present', characterized by pure changelessness in which past and future were both swallowed up.[9] Metaphysical religion divorces history from the 'real' world in that temporality is seen as deficit. Real change is seen as the opposite of substantiality.[10] The gods can be dispensed with by metaphysical religion.

Classical realism is characterised by the notion of substance. A substance possesses attributes, which can change, but the substance itself is continuous and unchanging through time.[11] All that is necessary is that there is some realm somehow outside of the categories and discrimination of time.[12] The most complete account of this was provided the Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384 – 322 B.C.). Aristotle's notion of substance is an attempt to combine form and matter in such a way as to recognize the underlying continuity of form ('substance') through the changes of matter ('accidents') to which an entity is subject. We can still find relational elements in his account,[13] but these are downgraded to being the 'least of all things' as an accident of quantity.[14] Aristotle derives what is later called the principle of individuation (*principium individualitatis*) from Hippocrates, according to whom form individualises matter. However, according to Vollenhoven, in his later thinking he reverses this, and for him, it is matter which individualises form.[15]

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[8] Parmenides, Fragment 8; quoted in Jenson, *God after God* : 12

[9] Jenson, Robert W. Jenson, 'The Body of God's Presence: A Trinitarian Theory' (1976): 85; Robert W. Jenson, *Visible Words: The Interpretation and Practice of the Christian Sacraments* (1978): 29.

[10] Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 35.

[11] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 39; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 26.

[12] Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 18-19.

[13] Aristotle, 'Categoriae' (2001): 1b.25.

[14] 'Aristotle, 'Metaphysica' (2001), 1088a.21-25; 'Aristotle, 'Analytica Posteriora' (2001): 15-24; see F. LeRon Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God* (2005): 5-6; F. LeRon Shults, *Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality* (2003): 12-15. This is also not to deny the value of the notion of virtue and character which Aristotle develops (Aristotle, 'Ethica Nicomachea' (2001): Books I to VII, 1094a-1154b 935-1058; Aristotle, 'De Poetica' (2001): 1454a-1454b 1469-1470). Nor indeed is to deny the insights of virtue ethics associated especially the name of Alisdair McIntyre (Alasdair MacIntyre, *After virtue : a study in moral theory* (1985)), and Stanley Hauerwas (Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character: Towards a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (1981)).

[15] Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey of the History of Philosophy (56b)' (2005): /12, pp. 45-46, /18, p. 54, /27, p. 67; Vollenhoven, 'The Consequential Problem-Historical Method' (2005): /23-24, 26-27, pp. 120-121, 123-124;Vollenhoven, *Wijsgerig Woordenboek* (2005): 183; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.349; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.249; 3.7 (n. 2).

The notion of 'substance' posits an underlying reality 'beneath' the appearance of things as we experience them. It was developed first in the context of Greek thought, applied in the medieval period, and taken up in a somewhat different way in Enlightenment thinking.[16]

The initial synthesis of Christianity with religion took place within the matrix of Hellenistic culture of late antiquity in which the gospel was first proclaimed. Within the late Hellenistic world, there was an agonized apprehension of the otherness of eternity from time, and of the distance of God from mundane experience.[17] There was a general crisis of religion in the late Hellenistic world. God was perceived as totally other (*totaliter aliter*) from us and this world, and as the One who rescues us from the world. At the same time, Middle Platonism expressed the need for 'God the Father of All', the only true object of knowledge.[18] To a certain extent, such a synthesis was inevitable;[19] and indeed the articulation of the doctrine of the Trinity itself arose out the meeting between Greek metaphysics and the gospel.[20]

Christianity responded to the generally perceived need for bridge entities with the message of the Resurrection, and recast the very historically defined Hebrew understanding of God in categories more amenable to the presuppositions of Hellenistic culture.. Parallels were drawn analogously but in negative ways from human experience in order to posit the eternity of God over against our temporality.[21] As Christianity struggled to assert the truth of Christ in the face of the Hellenistic problematic, negative attributes were ascribed to God with the paradox of Christ being 'as of' this unknowable, temporal divine entity, but yet temporal.[22] Attempts

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[16] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.10-13, 499-500; 3.2-10; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.9-12; 3.4-20, 26-28, 566-567; Dooyeweerd, 'De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en het substantiebegrip', *Orgaan der Christelijke Vereniging van Natuur- en Geneeskundigen in Nederland* (1940); Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip: Een critisch onderzoek naar de grondslagen der Thomistische zijnsleer 1', *P. R.* 8 (1943): 65-99; ' ... 2' *R.* 9 (1944): 1-41; '...; 3' *R.* 10 (1945): 25-48; ' ... 4' *R.* 11 (1946): 22-52; Dooyeweerd, 'Het substantiebegrip in de moderne natuurphilosophie en de theorie van het enkaptisch structuurgeheel', *P. R.* 15 (1950); Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 1'; Dooyeweerd, *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy 1: The Greek Prelude* (2004); Dooyeweerd, *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy 2: An Introduction to the Anthropology of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea* (forthcoming) see also D.F.M. Strauss, 'An Analysis of the Structure of Analysis (The Gegenstand-relation in discussion)', *P. R.* 49 (1984): 36.

[17] Jenson, *God after God* 47; Robert W. Jenson, *The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel* (1982) 60-61; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Triune God' (1984) : 117-8; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' (1992): 96.

[18] Robert W. Jenson, *The Knowledge of Things Hoped For* (1969): 26.

[19] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' 50. See Robert W. Jenson, 'Proclamation without Metaphysics', *dialog* (1962) 22-3, 25; Robert W. Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth', *dialog* 20 (1982): 37.

[20] Jenson, *God after God* : 47; Jenson, *T.I.* : 57 ff.; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 115 ff.

[21] Jenson, *T.I.* : 61-2; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 125-7.

[22] Jenson, *T.I.* : 63-4; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 118-9; Jeremy G.A. Ive, 'The God of Faith: R.W. Jenson's Critique of Standard Religion and his Temporal Account of the Trinity' (1995): 28; Jenson, *S.T.* 1:127 ff.

to overcome this paradox result either in the assertion of Jesus' 'real' timelessness as a manifestation of the eternal divine entity (modalism); or the denial of final identity of Jesus with the eternal Father (subordinationism).[23] In particular, Christianity took a fatal, but culturally unavoidable, misstep in adopting the Greek category of substance with all the embedded notion of timelessness, in its understanding of God.[24] Gnosticism, the earliest Christian heresy, adopted the Hellenistic problematic and sought to reach God above and beyond time by means of the pyramid of ontological ascent, in the process of which unsuitable manifestations of deity were first adopted and then discarded as ever 'higher' realms of abstraction were achieved.[25] It was by opposition to the Gnostic position that Christianity came to define itself.[26] As Christianity struggled to assert the truth of Christ in the face of the Hellenistic problematic, negative attributes were ascribed to God with the paradox of Christ's being 'as of this god but yet temporal.[27] Melito of Sardis states: 'The Invisible is seen .... the Ungraspable is laid hold of...., the Impassable suffers .... the Deathless dies'.[28]

Logos theology was a determined attempt to interpret the fact of the church's existence, and of reality in general, as the self-communication of God.[29] But it did not escape the Hellenistic problematic in which God's reality was understood in terms of timelessness, and in which the reality of Jesus was re-interpreted as the expression of general principles. Salvation was seen, therefore, as the bridging by God, through the act of revelation, of the gap between eternity and temporality.[30] Logos theology thus amounted to a sophisticated form of subordinationism in that the Logos is identified with the meaningful order of the world and the discourse which discloses that order. In other words the Logos is understood as the mediator or rather Mediator of deity to our world: an intelligible bridge-being between our temporality and the One whose existence is posited only by negative analogy from our being. This Mediator is an

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[23] Jenson, *God after God* : 47; Jenson, *T.I. :* 60-2; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 117-8; Jenson, *K.T.H.F.* : 26; Robert W. Jenson, *Systematic Theology; Volume I, the Triune God* (1997):94-101; Ive, 'God of Faith' :27. God is defined by immunity to time, by 'impassibility' (Jenson, *S.T. 1* : 16, 94).

[24] Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth': 34; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 26.

[25] 'Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' ' : 101.

[26] Robert W. Jenson, 'A Call to Faithfulness', *dialog* 30 (1991) : 91.

[27] Jenson, *T.I.* 63-4; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 118-9.

[28] Melito of Sardis, Antonius Caesar, 13 (quoted in Jenson, *T.I.* : 93-4); Jenson, 'Triune God' : 188; Robert W. Jenson, 'A ''Protestant Constructive Response'' to Christian Unbelief' (1989): 64; Robert W. Jenson, *Unbaptized God: The Basic Flaw in Ecumenical Theology* (1992) 120 n. 3; Jenson, *T.I.* : 64-6; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 122-4. As we shall see, attempts to overcome this paradox result either in the assertion of Jesus' 'real' timelessness as a manifestation of the eternal god (Modalism); or in the denial of the final identity of Jesus with the eternal Father (subordinationism).

[29] 'Sacraments' : 300.

[30] Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth' : 34.

'other God' but also a 'first originated being' or creature over against the Father (2nd century AD -- c. 202).[31] The idea of a mid-realm was subjected to a critique by Ireneaus, who asserted God's direct action through Son and Spirit, who are co-eternal with the Father. Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers further advanced the critique of the Hellenistic problematic. They advanced the biblical understanding of God's eternity as faithfulness to his word spoken in time, so that the attempt to find a point of mediation between our temporal lives and God was abolished.[32]

Another important influence on the Christian church in late antiquity was Neo-Platonism. There is a deeply ingrained influence of Neo-Platonism in both the Western and Eastern theological traditions. The essence of the Neo-Platonic approach is the view of the chain of being, proceeding from the quintessence of God, to the quiddity of the material world.[33] The Neo-Platonistic influence can be seen clearly, albeit in a much more moderate form, in Basil the Great, not least in his distinction between the (unknowable) essence of God and the (knowable) energies:

> The operations are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we know our God from His operations, but do not undertake to approach near to His essence. His operations come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach.[34]

In Western theology, the synthesis was reasserted and developed by Augustine. He drew together the Platonic quest of man-in-himself (the 'soul' conceived of in terms of the Greek category of substance) for the timeless, immaterial god, defined already in terms of impassibility, and the god revealed in Scripture who is identified in particular with the contingent events of Jesus' life. Augustine saw reality as a structure of levels rising from brute matter to pure spiritual reality; but he combined this vision with an understanding of reality as history within which God operated with prevenient grace, and in which the Logos became flesh. For Augustine there were two parallel ways we know God: the inner vision of the eternal truth of God, and the knowledge of the saving truth of Christ in discipleship as a response to Christian revelation.[35] Of St. Augustine, John Kok writes,

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[31] Jenson, *T.I.* : 66-9; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 118-21.
[32] Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth' : 34.
[33] Evererett Ferguson, *Backgrounds of Early Christianity* (1987): 311-312.
[34] St. Basil, Letter 234.1 Quoted in Lawrence Carrino, 'Just Say No!'.
[35] Jenson, *God after God*   20-1; Robert W. Jenson, 'Once More the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith', *dialog* 11 (1972) : 118-9; Robert W. Jenson and Eric Gritsch, *Lutheranism: the Theological Movement and its Writings* (1976): 64-8; Jenson, *T.I.* : 116-8; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 141-2; Jenson, 'Jesus, Father, Spirit' 245; Jenson, *Unbaptized God* : 123.

> One could say that in his writings two Gods appear. On the one hand there is the covenanting God of Scripture, the Lord and Creator who loves Augustine and who is loved by Augustine. . . . On the other hand, there is the neoplatonic ONE: a god who is *a self-identical, uncompounded essence, 'being' in the absolute sense.*[36]

The synthesis redefined by Augustine shaped the subsequent development of Western theology, notably with Thomas Aquinas, as John Kok argues:.

> The Thomistic proofs do not prove the existence of the Father of our Lord, but rather an aristotelian god, an unmoved mover. With the traditional attributes of simplicity, impassibility, immutability, and eternity, his conception of God too often sounds more Greek than Christian.[37]

The very pervasiveness of this Neo-Platonistic influence may create for us a blind spot in this regard, although the slight differences in the particular Neo-Platonic approaches adopted by the East and the West can illuminate their respective weaknesses.[38]

Aristotle's notion of substance, rediscovered by Thomas in the medieval period, is an attempt to combine form and matter through the use of *theoria* in such a way as to recognise the underlying continuity of form ('substance') through the changes of matter ('accidents') to which an entity is subject. But here too, through reason (the '*logos*') the human substance can realize its higher good through the contemplation of God as pure form.[39] Van Til argues that

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[36] *John H. Kok, Patterns of the Western Mind (1998)* : 86

[37] *Kok, Patterns of the Western Mind*   108. 27. Hemming notes: a distinction between theology as reflection on Christian faith and theology as part of the philosophical science of being. Heidegger points out that this distinction is maintained right up until the Middle Ages and beyond. Indeed, the distinction can be found in Aquinas, with an allusion to Book VI of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* la, q. i. a. i, resp. ad 2. 'Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.' ('Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet, differt secundum genus ab ilia theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur.')). Aquinas elsewhere distinguishes between God known through natural reason and how God is known as Trinity, within God's self. (Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae: de Veritate,* q. 10, a. 13. The title of the article is: 'Whether the the Trinity of persons can be known by natural reason'. ('*Utrum per naturalem rationem possit cognosci trinitas personarum.*'); Laurence Hemming, *Heidegger's Atheism*, Notre Dame, 2002 : 11).

[38] Here I agree in substance with Roy Clouser's critique of what he calls the A.-A.-A.(Augustine-Anselm-Aquinas), although, I would argue that Clouser has a blind spot about the problems in the Cappadocian position, and the problematical distinction developed from them by Palamas between God's essences and his energies (Roy A. Clouser, *The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious Beliefs in Theories* (2005): 219-221).

[39] Vollenhoven argues that Greek and Hellenistic 'paganism' denies the centrality of God's call upon human beings as wholes. Instead anthropology is reduced to a schema of higher or lower functions, and the redefinition

medieval scholasticism took from the Greeks a conception of the human soul as an immaterial, a-temporal and rational entity, together with a conception of the ontological gradation of reality at once in continuity and in discontinuity with the being of God.[40][41] Thomas takes up Aristotle's notion of substance, albeit stripped of its original religious basis, and then replaces Aristotle's view of God as supreme form with the biblical doctrine of God the creator. Following Plato and Aristotle as well as later Hellenistic philosophers, Thomas attempts to understand being in terms of the four eternal concepts, or 'transcendentals', as he calls them: unity, truth, beauty and goodness.[42] These transcendentals, for Thomas, define the being of all things, but only by analogy with the Being of God, where they exist in perfect form. In this latter respect, it is argued that Thomas shows the influence of neo-Platonist philosophy (in which form and matter are organised into a hierarchy of being), rather than purely Aristotelian influence. Nevertheless, it demonstrates his dependence on a schema in which the diversity of material experience is understood in terms of an underlying theoretical form – a form that gives it value and intelligibility.

The notion of the *principium individuationis*, developed by Aristotle, was taken up by Thomas Aquinas within the form/matter schema.[43] For Thomas Aquinas who takes him up in this regard in the medieval period, it is matter which individualises form.[44] In particular for Thomas, the 'rational soul' ('*anima rationalis*'), the form of humanity, is individualised by

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of individuality in terms of a notion of self-subsistent substance (Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)' : //1-2 30 (Vollenhoven quotes Dt. 32.18). Dooyeweerd argues that 'substance' in this respect accords each person or thing quasi-divine status, i.e., it is a form of idolatry (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.180-182 (not in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S. 1* ; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S. 2*: 3-11, 41-335; Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 1': 65-71, 89-99; '… Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip: Een critisch onderzoek naar de grondslagen der Thomistische zijnsleer 2 ', *P. R.* 9 (1944): 9-11, 19-25; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 15-21; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 15-22).

[40] Van Til, 'A Survey of Christian Epistemology (1969 F)' (1997): Ch. 5.

[41] Van Til, 'A Survey of Christian Epistemology (1969 F)' (1997): Ch. 5.

[42] Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 263-267; Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 1': 76-79; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (1998): 1.5, 1.11, 11.16; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, vol. 1 (1975): 1.37, 31.42, 31.60; Etienne Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (1963): 149-178, 333-340; Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals* (1996): 71-112. The Thomist 'transcendentals', seen from the Reformational position which are different kinds of relation: quantitative, analytical, aesthetic and ethical. I shall use the term 'transcendental' to refer to the necessary conditions of experience.

[43] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.475; 2.347, 349; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.509; 2.417, 419-420; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 304-313; Dooyeweerd, 'Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2': 10-16. Compare Vollenhoven (K.A. Bril and P. J. Boonstra, ed., *Vollenhoven, Schematische kaarten: filosofische concepties in probleemhistorisch verband* (2000): 297, 371, 355.

[44] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.349; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.419-420; 3.17-18 (not in *W.d.W.*); see Aquinas, *S.T.*: 3.77.72.

the human body, the matter of human existence.[45] However, according to Reformational philosophy, the *principium individuationis* cannot genuinely account for individuality, since both form and matter are universal in character; merely combining them cannot generate the 'this-ness' of individual persons and things.[46] In particular for Thomas, the 'rational soul' ('*anima rationalis*')), the form of humanity, is individualized by the human body, the matter of human existence.[47]

Thomas's addition of the category of grace to this picture only intensifies the dualism that runs through it. According to the 'natural' categories which Thomas derives from the Greeks, individual things are seen, first, as unordered matter, then given form through the process of causality (understood along Aristotelian lines[48]), and finally made sacred as objects through the infusion of grace (the latter seen as a '*donum superadditum*': 'an additional gift', i.e., additional to its original created nature). Understanding the world is left neutrally to the work of reason, supplemented by grace: 'grace' describes that which is directly revealed or provided by God, and 'nature' that which pertains to the world as one finds it through the course of everyday human investigation.[49]

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[45] Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee', *P. R.* 5 (1940): 180-182; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 334-335, 372-389; Dooyeweerd, 'Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2': 32-34; Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip: Een critisch onderzoek naar de grondslagen der Thomistische zijnsleer 4', *P. R.* 11 (1946): 22-32.

[46] Dooyeweerd, 'Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2': 20-21; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 317-319. We see a forerunner of this in Duns Scotus's notion of the '*haecceitas*'. Duns Scotus rejected the Aristotelian-Thomist '*principium individuationis*' in favour of his own position of individuality as *singularitas* ('noninstantiability'; see Effrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy* (1978): 58-65, 121-123; William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus, metaphysician* (1995): 184-187, 196-197; Timothy Noone, 'Universals and Individuation' (2003): 113-115,118-121). Dooyeweerd is not entirely satisfied that Scotus himself escapes the constants of the form/matter schema, since although '*haecceitas*' is not a form as such, he depends, he argues, on the notion of an individual substance which is 'added to' to the form/matter schema, leaving the latter intact (Dooyeweerd, 'De Idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip: Een critisch onderzoek naar de grondslagen der Thomistische zijnsleer 3', *P. R.* 10 (1945): 34-39; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 355-362). Although Scotus does not abandon the form/matter schema, yet his notion of '*haecceitas*', as that which is encountered concretely, does provide us with an insight which transcends the form/matter schema, as I shall argue. As Scotus puts it: 'individuals as such are also willed by the first cause, not as ends – for God alone is the end – but as something ordered to the end. Hence God multiplied the individuals within the species in order to communicate His goodness and His beatitude' (*Ordinatio* II, d. 3, q. 7, n. 10 (quoted in Bettoni, *Duns Scotus*: 64))

[47] {Vollenhoven, 2005 #2223}: 68-69.

[48] I.e., according to their material, formal, efficient and final causes – especially the last, where God is the final cause through the '*lex aeterna*' (Dooyeweerd, 'Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde (R.K. en A.R.S.)' in *Adviezen en Studies* (1923): 10).

[49] Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 293-343; Dooyeweerd, 'Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2': 1-40.

Thomas's account of the individual in terms of the form/matter schema is writ large in his account of human society. Thomist political theory is classically informed by the notion of natural law. Natural law is an amalgam of Stoic, Aristotelian, and neo-Platonist philosophies, combined with classical Roman law. The world is seen in self-contained terms and all events are the teleological realisation of potential intrinsic to the cosmos – more specifically, the realisation in form of previously unformed matter. For Aristotle, God is seen as the First Cause from which a chain of cause and effect proceeds. Thomism, taking further the synthesis of neo-Platonism and Christian doctrine developed by Augustine of Hippo, adds a Christian view of a transcendent God into this picture of a self-contained cosmos and then attempts to provide an account of God's action in terms of the Aristotelian framework. However, the Thomist claim that God is the First Cause gives rise to the antinomy of human freedom. On the one hand, human beings are held to have free will, and, by determining their own actions, limit God's causality. On the other hand, human beings are, by implication, unfree, since all their actions are caused by God. The only way to resolve this antinomy is to adopt a dualism in which, on the one hand, there is the realm of natural law, within which state power is exercised; and on the other hand, the realm of grace, in which human beings are brought by divine assistance, through the mediation of the church, to eternal salvation. By extension, the church, as the instrument of grace, assists human free will, and is seen as superior to the state, which is the instrument of natural law as applied in the political realm. The 'common good' is seen as the supreme objective in the political realm, but it remains an inadequate guide for the exercise of state power: it neither provides limits for the role of the state, nor the basis for non-state institutions and social entities to be accorded recognition in their own right.

Thomism, or the Aristotle-Aquinas tradition is represented in modern Christian thinking by the work of thinkers such as Maritain[50] or Gilson,[51] but also most recently, by the work of Bernard Lonergan, perhaps the most powerful thinker in the Neo-Thomist tradition, albeit in a very refined and attenuated way.

The strength of the Thomist position is the sacramental vision for the whole of life. Gilson argues that the Christian revelation is an 'indispensable auxiliary to reason' and that 'the supernatural must descend as a constitutive element, not into its texture, which would be a contradiction, but into the work of construction.'[52] Maritain suggests that philosophy, while it cannot be described as Christian by nature, yet needs to receive its orientation from

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[50] Jaques Maritain (1882-1973) deeply influenced by Henri Bergson (1859-1941) although critical of his ideas.
[51] Etienne, Gilson, (1884-1978).
[52] Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (1936) 37. Quoted by Smit, 'Catholic Conceptions' in *Towards...* : *126.*

Christian faith. Maritain develops this, particularly in the area of politics and society, ideas that have been very influential in the development of Christian Democracy. For Maritain, a new Christendom is looked forward to, which he calls the 'humanism of the incarnation'. [53]

The weakness of the Thomist vision is the division, inherited from Aquinas and the scholastics, between nature and grace. This divide is summed up by Arthur Holmes:

> Reformed theology (of the Protestant tradition from John Calvin) is dissatisfied with the Thomistic doctrine of nature and grace and stresses instead the sovereignty of God over every operation of human nature and the equally pervasive influence of sin. The problem with natural reason, in this view, is not only man's finiteness but – just as profoundly – his sin. It is a sin to assert the autonomy of philosophical reason ... and this sin perverts philosophical understanding.[54]

M.C Smit argues, further, that none of the Thomist in particular or Roman Catholic thinkers in general, can satisfactorily answer: 'Is there an intrinsic connection between Christ and history or do they merely touch each other externally?'[55] As Smit puts it:

> 'They proceed from a strict boundary between a natural order and a supernatural order'.[56]

They run between the Scylla of separation of nature and super-nature, and the Charybdis of their conflation.[57] As Smit puts it:

> '… on the Catholic view religion is never foreign to profane history, since the profane remains susceptible to supernatural elevation. But ... in its essence the profane remains inaccessible for religion'.[58]

Smit points out that Scholastic philosophy starts with being as 'the fundamental unity of everything, to which all diversity relates'.   Being has the transcendental determinations of unity, truth, beauty and goodness.[59] But the attitude to the place of Christ is qualified. Unlike

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[53] Maritain, *Humanism integral: promblèmes temporels et spirituals d'une nouvelle Chrétienité* (1936, 2nd edition: Aubier, 1947) 259. English translation by Joseph Evan, *Integral Humanism…*(New York: Scribner, 1968) 239. Quoted in M.C. Smit, 'Catholic Conceptions of History' in *Towards a Christian Conception of History* 61.

[54] Arthur Holmes, 'Christian Philosophy,' *Encyclopedia Britannica 1974* edition, vol. 4, 555-556, quoted by Roy Clouser, *Myth of Religious Neutrality* (1991/2001): 306, n. 1

[55] Smit, Catholic Conceptions of History' in *Towards a Christian Conception of History ibid :* 71.

[56] Smit, *ibid :* 72-3.

[57] ==Smit,==

[58] Smit, *ibid*: 80.

[59] Smit, i*bid*: 14.

Duns Scotus and his followers who assert the unqualified primacy of the incarnate Christ, Thomists view the primacy of Christ against the background of grace.[60] On the other hand, Léopold Malevez, a representative of the 'philosophy of progress', who conflates nature with grace. Malevez argues that:

> the physical universe is a member of the mystical Body of Christ, which is to say, it is impossible that it should not feel the effects of the diffusion of the grace of Christ.[61]

Here Smit notes that the dualism between nature and supernature is overcome only at the cost of erasing the boundaries between Christ and history by elevating the latter to the height of supernatural incarnation.[62]

The trajectory set by Aristotle, and continued through the medieval period, continued in modern Western enlightenment thought. The trajectory is not a straightforward one. For one thing the form/matter schema which dominated Aristotle's view was replaced by that of the ideal of personality within the context of a universe described in mechanistic terms. However, Aristotle's downplaying of relations was replaced by a schema which isolated the human self from the mechanistic particularity of the world, and attempted to find certainty of knowledge on that basis.

For the science ideal of the European Enlightenment, the answer to all questions is sought in logical-mathematical terms. Modernism is characterized by the supremacy of reason, or rather of Reason: the confidence that all things can be subject to the analysis and solution of the ideal thinking (and basically male European) subject. At the same time it is governed by the sense that the only entities or concepts which can be admitted to serious consideration are those which related either directly or indirectly to our individual or corporate experience. Reason and experience are the two canons of the modern world, and the major divergences in the philosophies which governed the modern world are considered questions about the respective weight to give these two elements.

René Descartes (1596-1650) famously in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641) argues for a radical dualism between two types of substance: 'extended thing' (res *extensa*) and 'thinking thing' (*res cogitans*). It was only by marking off the latter that he could, in his mind, protect the human self from the determinism of the increasingly scientific description of the world.

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[60] Smit, *ibid*: 38.
[61] 'La Philosophie chrétienne du progress' *Nouvell revue théologique,* 69 (1947), 377 f. in Smit, *Towards* 65.
[62] Smit, *Towards :* 66-7; 181-3, 76-7, 82.

The high priest of the modern science ideal was Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1714) who denied the reality of relations and saw the world made up of an infinite number of windowless 'monads' all held together according to a pre-established harmony. Accordingly the constitution of the state is then seen as a mechanism to quantify and balance out the different interests in society; or, alternatively, the means by which an enlightened despot can achieve a perfect ordering of society. Either way, individuals are finally only constituents of an overarching rational order and all relations are finally to be subordinated to the demands of the polity conceived most truly in the light of reason.

Another stream is of the Enlightenment is that represented by Isaac Newton the publication of Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727)'s *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687). Unlike Leibniz, Newton sees relations, especially kinetic relations, in absolute rather than relative terms. Specifically, for Newton, time, the very basis and ground of the principles he enunciates, is an absolute 'container' – rather than a constructed agglomeration, as for Leibmiz. Reality for Newton is not Leibniz's monadic construct, but the interaction of the basic fundamental principles bound together – for him, unlike his later interpreters – by the direct action of God.

For both Leibniz and Netwon, God has a role in the system: for Leibniz it is as the giver of the pre-established harmony of the monads, for Newton it is as the final knitter-together of the relations which govern the universe. However, both the Leibnizian and the Newtonian 'god' is a distant figure, which can be pushed further and further into the background, as his role is seen to be less necessary, reaching his culmination in the thought most notoriously of Pierre-Simon, Marquis de Laplace (1749-1827), who, as the story goes, no longer had any need for the 'hypothesis' of God.[63] According to this latter ideal, the universe is to be understood entirely as a machine, fully determined by the process of cause and effect running along Newtonian lines.[64]

The Enlightenment reached its height in the 18th Century and which centred on the concern that all natters should be made subject to what can be determined as certain by the judgment of reason, and the canons of scientific enquiry. The method of the Enlightenment was characterised by critique: the systematic examination of any given statement or belief, and the rejection of those which could not be proved along empirical or rational grounds. Three elements in particular contributed to this programme: new mathematical techniques, the

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[63] Colin E. Gunton, *The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Survey* (1998): 133. Even here, it can perhaps be argued that this did not necessarily mean that Laplace does not believe in God, only that God is not a consideration in his astronomical calculations (see Mike King, *Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief* (2007): 127-128).

[64] King, *Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief*: 142, 258.

rejection of teleological explanation and the distrust of appearances.[65] Karl Barth characterised the Enlightenment as the declaration of independence by the human subject who 'discovers his own power'.[66]

Related to the rise of the scientific method was the rise of modern historical consciousness, which has two aspects. First, there is a sense of distance from the past, according to which, unlike traditional society with its normative appeal to the ancient, the new could be discovered and embraced. Second, there was the discovery of what he calls the experience of life as a 'narrative wholeness': a sense of the self where the surprising future was no longer to be seen as a threat but as an adventure.[67]

The project of the Enlightenment was motivated by the demand for order. This did not derive from the Biblical doctrine of providence, since that would be to re-introduce religious tradition as the grounds for the programme. Rather, the inspiration of Enlightenment science was the Greek vision of the cosmos: a stable interrelation of moving parts. Together Copernican astronomy and Newtonian mechanics provided a systematic description of the universe as such a machine. It was not science itself which suggested the metaphor of machine, rather the technology which it enabled. God was conceived of as the perfect Engineer whose machine did not need his 'intervention'.[68]

The Enlightenment claimed that the sources of factual meaning were two-fold: sense data and reason: either the ideal was that the nature of things be determined either by discursive reasoning (following Descartes), or constructed out of the immediate evidence of our sense (notably the British Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley and Hume). Sense data, emphasized by the Empiricists, consisted in the isolation of particular experiences or impressions on the five senses. John Locke distinguished between primary (pertaining to substances in themselves) and secondary (the effect of these substances on our perceptions).The world so defined by secular science is divorced from personality in that it is ideally describable independently of consciousness.[69] David Hume (1711-1776) argued that we could do nothing more then

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[65] Jenson, 'Once More' : 120; Robert W. Jenson, 'On the Problem(s) of Scriptural Authority', *Interpretation* 31 (1977) : 246; p. 25; Jenson, *America's Theologian* 5; Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 26.
[66] Robert W. Jenson, 'A Dead Issue Revisited', *Lutheran Quarterly* 14 (1962): 5 There is an echo here with Kuyper's notion of 'archetype' – that which is known to God alone but is only revealed indirectly in the form of an 'ectype' (Kuyper, *Sacred Theology* (n.d.): 3.1.59, 60, pp. 96-117) : 4. See Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 21
[67] Robert W. Jenson, 'The Praying Animal', *Zygon* 18 (1983): 323.
[68] Robert W. Jenson, 'What Academic Difference Would the Gospel Make?' *dialog* 18 (1977) : 25; Robert W. Jenson, 'Toward a Christian Theory of the Public', *dialog* 23 (1984) : 191-3; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' 28, 35; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 6-8; Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 27; Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' : 96.
[69] Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 30.

record the sheer succession of sense impressions.[70] On the other hand, Descartes claimed that one should not accept any claim that could not be doubted. Reason for Descartes is elevated to a way of understanding the world independent of any need for Revelation. 'God' becomes simply a proposition in a logical argument deriving its force from the nature of human consciousness.

The notion of substance, as a key concept of the scholastic inheritance, as we have seen, also plays an important role in the thought of Descartes, for whom the thinking self intuits an underlying substance belonging to the objects of cognition in which properties inhere.[71] By this method, he comes to intuit himself as a thinking substance ('*res cogitans*') with a point of location in the physical world ('*res extensa*').[72] This move is a critical one in the shaping of modern philosophy. Substance' is a false 'solution' to the question about how the individual, encountered in naïve experience, is and can be known.[73] The notion of substance is an attempt to make the individual the bearer of his, her or its own meaning, or to ground him, her or it in some sort of pre-existent combination of form and matter.
The notion of substance involves, at least implicitly, recourse to a conception of a self-enclosed, self-subsistent entity.[74] Substances are interchangeable and capable of being defined conceptually, whereas, at bottom, genuine individuals are not.[75] The notion of substance has been deeply corrosive of genuine relationality for two reasons:

- Substances are self-contained and self-sufficient – effectively mini-gods;

- Substances are finally interchangeable – it is possible simply to exchange one substance for another as (to use a modern parable) one might exchange one oxygen atom for another.

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[70] *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40). See John Cobb *God and the World*: 131- 2

[71] Peter Markie, 'The Cogito and its importance' (1992): 150, 160.

[72] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.156, 172-174, 186, 3; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.195, 218-9, 231, 295; 3.27; Markie, 'The Cogito and its importance': 162-163. For Descartes, intuition is of a rational character, analogous to the intuition of mathematical axioms (Markie, 'The Cogito and its importance': 143-147).

[73] Vollenhoven, Introduction: §139 104; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.2; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3. 3-4.

[74] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 50; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.74.

[75] As Roy Clouser points out, every kind of substance (be it the Aristotelian ideal of a changeless core, or a modern notion of a functional constant) involves identifying certain kinds of properties or laws as the essential nature of the creatures concerned (Roy A. Clouser, 'The Uniqueness of Dooyeweerd's Program for Philosophy and Science: Whence the Difference?' (1995): 12 (n. 21)). This is not to dismiss Aristotle's intuitive insights, which, despite the shortcomings of the schema in terms of which he is operating, show an awareness of the irreducible immediacy of the individual whether as 'ἄτομον' ('undivided') or 'τόδε τι' ('this here') in the *Categories* or the *Metaphysics* respectively (Michael Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta* (2000): 130).

The problem with the notion of substance and accidents, or the subject/predicate schema, is that it reduces the problem to an impossible dilemma: either what we have are just individuals with their properties, or alternatively, one starts with properties (or universals) and then see individuals as constructed out of their properties including the property of being an individual

In all these cases, belief and the ethical commitments that flow from these were divorced from our sheer assertion of our existence. As 'Hume's law' states, one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Its method is characterized by the divorce between facts and values.[76] The divorce between facts and values is rooted in the denial of creaturely meaning to the universe. The notion, especially that of the self as substance, still plays a critical part in modern Western epistemology, even when the ontology of an underlying metaphysical substance pertaining to all things has been rejected.[77] The alternative philosophical traditions of empiricism (notably by David Hume[78]) replaced the notion of a transcendental human subject with the posit of the self as a mere bundle of sensations.

The synthesis of this movement or rather 'the inversion of all previous philosophies' was expressed in Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). Kant (1724-1804) tried to

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[76] Herman Dooyeweerd, *Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular and Christian Options* (Toronto: Wedge, 1979); H. Evan Runner, *The Relation of the Bible to Learning* (Ontario, Canada: Paideaia Press, 5th revised edition, 1982); Kok, *Patterns of the Western Mind*); Lesslie Newbiggin, *Foolishness to the Greeks* (London: SPCK, 1986); Philip Sampson, Vinay Samuel and Chris Sugden, ed *Faith and Modernity* (Oxford: Regnum Books International, 1994); J.R. Middleton and B.J. Walsh, *The Transforming Vision-Shaping a Christian World View* (USA: IVP, 1984); Evan Runner, *The Relation between the Bible and Learning* (Andrew Walker, *Enemy Territory: The Christian Struggle for the Modern World*. (Grand Rapids: Academia Books, 1987). See Anthony Thistleton article 'Truth' in the *New Dictionary of the New Testament Theology*.

[77] It is a move paralleled by the critique of the notion of substance by Heidegger and his decisive break with Husserl (Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962): H. 114-117, pp. 149-153), who, influenced by the Marburg neo-Kantians, still clung on to the notion of the transcendental Ego (Russell Matheson, *Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed* (2006): 146), although Husserl also recognises the 'surplus' which exceeds the psychological conception of the self (*Ideas* 2: 147 (quoted in Matheson, *Husserl*: 154)). However, as we shall see, Vollenhoven and, especially, Dooyeweerd followed this through in a very different way from Heidegger (see 5.2.1).

[78] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.249-265; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.289-313, 3.27; Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.' 179; John Biro, 'Hume's New Science of the Mind' (1993): 47-51; Alexander Rosenberg, 'Hume and the Philosophy of Science' (1993): 66, 69-71. Hume wrote before Kant, but it is a matter of debate whether Kant adequately addresses Hume's critique of Descartes in this regard or whether he provides an adequate basis for his 'unity of apperception' (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1999): A94/B127, A106-108, B132-143, pp. 225, 232-233, 246-252; Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (2004): 163-178).

reconcile the two approaches of the Enlightenment by suggesting that our experiences are themselves shaped by a mental framework built into us as human beings.[79] Kant's notion of the '*homo noumenon*' (the 'transcendental' subject) i.e., the recipient of sensation and the agent of rational deduction which is the necessary condition of the unification of thought and experience.[80] However, this is not merely move from externalism to internalism, but a parallel inversion from transcendental realism to transcendental idealism, combined with a move from empirical idealism to empirical realism.[81] In this way, Kant straddles both realism, considered in this section, and, as we shall see, nominalism, considered in the next section.

The intellectual tradition had profound social and political implications. The French Revolution had taken place in a social and cultural context characterised by a deepening scepticism about Christian belief, illustrated by Voltaire's imprecation against Christ and Christianity: 'Écrasez l'Infâme' ('crush the infamous one').[82] Even more profound was the scepticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) about revealed religion, combined with his radical political philosophy.[83] In the eyes of Kuyper and fellow Reformational thinkers, the worldview of the Enlightenment was marked by an unstable, contradictory and unresolved tension between the ideal of personal freedom and the science ideal characterised by mathematically quantifiable rationality.[84] Following the 'turn to the subject' initiated by

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[79] *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781); Robert Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet: A Trinitarian Theology of Atonement* (2004): 154-5

[80] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 9-14; Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 3.27-28; Dooyeweerd, *De zin der geschiedenis en de 'Leiding Gods' in de historische ontwikkeling* (1932): 11-12.

[81] The interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and indeed Kant's philosophy as a whole, needs to be undertaken with great caution, as both the Critique and his philosophy have been much misconstrued, especially in Anglo-American philosophy (Paul D. Janz, *God, the Mind's Desire* (2004): 127). Janz explains: 'we can say basically, along with Kant, (a) that scepticism is the fate of all philosophical enquiries 'into things' that give priority to the senses, and (b) that, likewise, dogmatism is the fate of all philosophical enquiries 'into things' that give priority to the intellect.' (Janz, *G.M.D.* : 129-41)

[82] Francois-Marie Arouet (1694-1778), better known as 'Voltaire'(James Byrne, *Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment* (1996): 133; see Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism* (1976): 10 (Kuyper has 'Down with this scoundrel!').

[83] Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* (1935): 278-288; Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* (1969): 1.313-324; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning om het Reformatorisch Grondmotief* (1963): 154-156, 159-166, 225, 270, 277-278; Dooyeweerd, *Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular and Christian Options* (1979): 72, 160-170.

[84] This is the 'freedom/nature' ground-motive.

Descartes, the subjective human *cogito* was asserted to be the ultimate ground of certainty, and human personality was elevated as the ultimate source of authority.[85]

Thus, the joint but competing commitments to personal freedom (seen in terms of the undermined [?] human personality) and to scientific rationality (seen in terms of the ideal of a mechanistically determined physical process) shaped the Enlightenment worldview. Between them, they entirely displaced any belief in God.[86]

The fruit of the rise of the modern world have been overwhelming and impressive. The modern world has unlocked industrial and technological power previously undreamed of. It has created the prospect even for humanity to reinvent themselves through the power of information technology or indeed through biological manipulation and genetic engineering. In the mid-Twentieth Century, science and technology seemed to open up the promise of a new utopia, with the prospect of unlimited energy, and the increasingly comprehensive control of the environment in every particular.

However, at the same time, voices of warning were raised against untrammelled exploitation of the environment. Going back to Thomas Malthus Essay's on Population,[87] and John Muir's[88] Sierra Club (founded in in California in 1892 leading to the founding of the first national park), the Clear Lake, California. In the 1950'stD.D.T. was used to kill mosquitos,but also resulted in the death of birds with the accumulation in the bodies of those organism it affected moving up the food chain to birds and humans themselves.. The dangers of this overuse were brought to public attention by Rachel Carson[89] in her *Silent Spring* (1962) where she warned against the dangers of the overuse of insecticides. This resulted in Federal banns of dangerous insecticides, including D.D.T. in 1972. In 1971, Amchitca in Alaska saw the launch of Greenpeace with the attempt by the latter to monitor underground bomb testing.This was followed by Friends of the Earth and the Word Wildlife Fund with a concern for the preservation of the environment. These were followed by the rise of Green Parties in the conventional political scene. There are the dangers of C.F.C.s to the ozone layer and the destruction of the rain forests, both affecting global atmostphere and vulnerability; both of these combined with the the general effects of industrial pollution.

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[85] René Descartes (1596-1650); see Dooyeweerd, 'The criteria of progressive and reactionary tendencies in history' in *Proceedings of the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Royal Dutch Academy of Science, May 6-9,1958* (1958): 215.

[86] Kuyper, *Lectures*: 23-24.

[87] Thomas Malthus, *Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers*. London, Printed for J. Johnson, in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1798.

[88] John Muir (1838-1914) was an environmentalist, naturalist, traveller, writer, and scientist (Wikipedia).

[89] 1949-1952 Editor-in-Chief of the US Fish and Wildlife Service.

More recently, the dangers of global warming have been pointed to – brought about not least through our heavy dependence on that central idol of the modern world: the motor car. Nuclear power has shown its dangers through both the possibility of accidents (and real occurrences such as Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, 1979 and Chernobyl in Ukraine,1986), and the difficulties and economic costs of decommissioning nuclear power stations – making the over-optimistic projections of the mid Twentieth Century look like unrealistic utopians.

The promise of the modern world had been two-edged one in its realization, On the one hand, it had delivered results so impressive and staggering that the process is now seen as irreversible. Very few (and the exceptions are few and proved the general dictum by the extent of their strangeness in the eyes of the world community at large) are so largely unquestioned as to be taken to be the very stuff of our new civilization - the one which has a claim more than any other to be a truly World civilization). On the other hand, the very power of the modern achievement had created in the heart of its greatest beneficiaries, a new sense of lack.

Going back to Hume, logical positivism (notably by Bertrand Russell[90]) sees the human being mere logical construct out of a diversity of sense impressions.[91] The sense of mystery – the inexplicable something, which seemed previously indefinable and so something other than that which we could manipulate and control, seems to have been relegated to the private imagination. Relationships themselves have become consumer commodities: to be bought and discarded at will. Alongside the process of secularization, had been the state of what Durkheim calls '*anomie*': a sense of meaninglessness, a lack of personal worth and definition. Since we can discard others so easily - especially if we are rich and powerful - so we can be discarded ourselves. Even if we are rich, who knows that we are not ourselves being used – as the whole phenomenon of the 'celebrity' culture demonstrates? If we are successful, people start to use us as another commodity for the television screens for the selling of commercial products, or even of good causes, which themselves can be just other commodity. Society them becomes fissiparous and without definition. Max Weber spoke of 'the disenchantment of the world' and with the loss of transcendence by our modern, rationalistic culture, which has 'robbed us of our gods'.[92]

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[90] Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 3.18-35 (not in *W.d.W.*).

[91] Philosophically (although not, *per impossibile*, in everyday life) Russell is working within the schema that all that there is are bundles of sense-data + logic (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*(not in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.' 178-179; see O.K. Bouwsma, 'Moore's Theory of Sense-Data' (1967)).

[92] Hugh Rayment Pickard review of Rysva Schwartz, ed,*Transcendence: Philosophy literature and theology approach the beyond* (Routledge, 2004), in *Church times*, 10.12.04

In the following two sections, I shall in turn at two parallel strands in Western thought, which have increasingly tended to displace realism: nominalism which has led to the collapse to of realistic modernism, and the recourse to narrative leading to the new quest for transcendence, which I shall address in turn in the following sections.

(b) Nominalism and the Collapse of Modernism

The other deeply entrenched philosophical tradition in modern Western thought is nominalism, most notably enunciated by William of Ockham (c. 1288-c. 1348), but it goes back a long way to the Sophists opposed by Socrates, among whom was Protagoras (c. 490-420 B.C.) who famously said 'man is the measure of all things'. Nominalism denies universals and by implication universal relations: all that that there are for nominalists are individuals (or perhaps one should say, whoever that individual thinks he or she is at that moment) and the concepts that individuals have in their minds. This is the fore-runner of relativism and its contemporary expression, postmodernism. All values are self-created and we make our own stories, or construct them out of any bits and pieces which happen to take our fancy for that moment. While we might seem all to share a common space, this is an illusion. All that we have together, finally, is shared make-believe. This includes all that we do in common, including the making of constitutions. For irrationalist nominalists, the state is *only* the individual writ large.

The crisis of authority that marks the modern world is also reflected in the nature of the church's witness: it is unclear which God is being referred to, even in Christian circles. 'God' is held to be what we make of him, since he is held to be essentially unknowable. This is nothing new. From its earliest days, Christianity had to struggle with Gnostic heresies (they were diverse and not a single system), which amounted to a denial that we could truly know God, and any true knowledge of God was unrelated to, or indeed antithetical to, the material order of the world in which we live and have day to day knowledge and experience.[93]

In Western Europe in the Modern Era, belief and spirituality became seen as a private affair, partly in reaction to the Wars of Religion between Roman Catholics and Protestants that devastated Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries, and it resulted first by allowing princes to determine their own confessional adherence, and them by democratizing it to the population at large.   It was also partly a result of the social loosening of the bonds of the highly

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[93] Roukema, Riemer, *Gnosis and Faith in Early Christianity: An introduction to gnosticism* (London: SCM Press, 1999).

controlled social order of the middle ages - a process accelerated by the mass urbanization which followed in the wake the Industrial Revolution, pioneered in Britain in the 18th Century and followed closely by the Continent of Europe and in North America, and subsequently, in the Twentieth Century, across the world at large. it was also partly a response to political developments, not least the overthrow of the Ancien Regime in France in 1789, and the ideal of a Republic government not traditional fealty, but by the according of rights and political participation to the population at large. All these processes took time to take effect, and in many case their full effect was not felt until well into the Twentieth Century, even in the West.   However, it was not the less devastating on received order and gave a death blow to the exclusive establishment of Christianity as represented in the ideal of medieval Christendom

The Enlightenment questioned the warrant which the Christian tradition might give for the religious quest, and, in general, the Enlightenment advocated the abandonment of all knowledge based on supernatural revelation.[94] The roots of this approach derived from the division in traditional Western theology between knowledge derived from 'nature' and that derived from 'revelation' (Scripture and the church).[95] The Enlightenment questioned first the assumption that our roles, or that of God, could be defined with any certainty by tradition, revealed or otherwise. Doubt was cast on the informative character of statements such as 'Jesus is risen', and whether they could be incorporated into everyday discourse in any intelligible way. Most damaging of all, the very relevance to personal experience of 'objective history', based as it is on relative historical observations, came to be questioned. This was accompanied by the rejection of any absolutes as the authoritative ground of present beliefs and personal commitments.[96] This process resulted in the displacement of Jerusalem by Athens as the arbiter of truth, as Jenson puts it:

> 'Jerusalem and Athens have gone each its own way; and after the marriage and divorce, we are in Athens' custody.'[97]

With respect to Christian revelation, the present theolegoumenon of our experience of what happened with Jesus ('the Christ') was divorced irreparably from the object of critical research ('the historical Jesus').[98] Christianity can itself function as a form of standard religion without the 'gods', by marking off Scripture, or 'saving history' or religious

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[94] Jenson, *T.I.*   132; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 150.
[95] Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 26-7.
[96] Jenson, *K.T.H.F.* : 19-20; Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 30
[97] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 37. See Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth' : 37.
[98] Jenson, 'Once More' : 120.

experience as lying somehow outside of the empirical examination which we would normally apply to temporal events.[99] There is a necessary process of distancing ourselves from the text in order for it to speak to us in its own terms. Indeed, Jenson suggests that it is the specifically Lutheran emphasis on the 'outward' as well as the 'inward' perspicuity of Scripture which made it necessary to apply rigorous historical and linguistic techniques to its study.[100]

More generally, there was the cautious broadly rationalist approach, such as was represented by John Locke, who argued:

> 'We may as well doubt of our being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right: else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles. . '[101]

One particular aspect that made the traditional view of belief in Christ unpalatable to Enlightenment thinkers was the miraculous nature of the Gospel accounts. An important figure in the questioning of the Christian claims was David Hume (1711-1776).[102]

Voltaire[103] wanted to remove what he called 'the metaphysical' from Christianity:

> 'Christianity teaches nothing but simplicity, humanity, charity; to wish to reduce it to metaphysics is to make of it a source of errors.'[104]

Thus 'metaphysical' religion was displaced in the West since the Enlightenment of the late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries by the overwhelming dominance of scientific practice as the model of knowledge, or at least useful knowledge.[105] Despite the debt the

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[99] Jenson, 'Proclamation without Metaphysics': 25; Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 18-19.

[100] Robert W. Jenson, 'The Modernity of Lutheranism' (1980) 91-3. See the newly reissued volume, *The Jefferson Bible: The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989

[101] *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, ch. xvi, 14. (A.G.N.F http://cyberspacei.com/jesusi/inlight/religion/belief/agnosticism.htm)

[102] *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (first published in 1748 under another title), and in his posthumous *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779).

[103] Pen name of Francois-Marie Arouet (1694-1778.)

[104] Voltaire, Philosophical Letters (trans Ernst Dilworth, Library of Liberal Arts), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1961): 120; Sherman, K.P.P.: 241.

[105] Jenson, 'Toward ... Public': 191; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 6.

Enlightenment owed to Greek thought, the metaphysical and scientific ways of thinking and living are irreconcilable. The empirical method demands that we detach ourselves from, and submit ourselves to, the result of a particular outcome in order to subject it to the necessary verification, unlike the metaphysical approach, where there is an attempt to supersede time by gaining privileged access to a supra-temporal realm.[106]

The Enlightenment gave rise to a form of radical questioning in which any answer, as an answer about existence, is always and methodologically renounced.[107] The scientific attitude is characterised by what Robert Jenson describes as a 'radically tentative attitude to all knowledge of common fact'.[108] The universe is conceived of simply as a present given, and the scientific method rejects teleological explanations and all conceptions based on the posit of an End.[109] Since all scientific statements must be open to revision, any 'absolute', including the concept of 'the gods' and of 'God' must be excluded on the grounds that such concepts are vacuous and irrelevant to the scientific description of the universe.[110] In the humanities, this stance is arrived at through considerations of objective history (Historie) and the pressures of the technical structuring of life. The end result of the seeming impossibility of any ultimate answers and a stance of nihilistic questioning increasingly dominates life.[111]

Jenson argues that the roots of this critique derived from the division in traditional Western theology between knowledge derived from 'nature' and that derived from 'revelation'. Doubt was cast on the informative character of statements such as 'Jesus is risen', and whether they could be incorporated into everyday discourse in any intelligible way. Most damaging of all, the very relevance to personal experience of 'objective history', based as it is on relative historical observations, came to be questioned. This 'historicism' was accompanied by the rejection of any absolutes as the authoritative ground of present beliefs and personal commitments.[112] The problem was stated by G.E. Lessing:

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[106] Jenson, *R.A.I.* 20-1; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 5.

[107] Robert W. Jenson, 'Gott als Antwort', *Evangelische Theologie* 26 (1966) : 372; Jenson, 'The Modernity of Lutheranism' 94.

[108] Jenson, 'A Dead Issue Revisited': 54. See Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 21.

[109] Jenson, 'Praying Animal': 323.

[110] Robert W. Jenson, 'Liberating Truth and Liberal Education', *Lutheran Quarterly* 13 (1961) 216; Jenson, 'Proclamation without Metaphysics' : 23-7; Jenson, 'A Dead Issue Revisited': 54; Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 20-2.

[111] Jenson, 'Gott als Antwort' 372; Jenson, 'The Modernity of Lutheranism' 92.

[112] Jenson, *Triune Identity* : 132; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 150; Jenson, *K.T.H.F.* : 19-20; Jenson, 'Karl Barth' 26-7, 30; Jenson *S.T.* 1:6-11; Ive, 'God of Faith' : 33.

'Accidental historical truths can never become proofs for necessary truths of reason'.[113]

The contradiction inherent in the concept of historically-necessary divine truths was also argued for in the pseudonymous writings of H.S. Reimarus (1694-1768), which Lessing published between 1774 and 1778.[114] Although it made Scripture dispensable as the source of final authority, it did not make either of the Old or the New Testaments of no value, as Lessing observed:

'As we can by this time dispense with the Old Testament for the doctrine of the unity of God, and as we are gradually beginning also to be less dependent on the New Testament for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul: might there not be mirrored in this book also other truths of the same kind, which we are to gaze at in awe as revelations, just until reason learns to deduce them from its other demonstrated truths, and to connect them with them?'[115]

The methodological scepticism which accompanied this process of historicism led to the text falling silent existentially.[116] This methodological scepticism arose from the 'Cartesian' premise which assumes that the meaning of texts arises from the intention of the author, which it is necessary, but finally impossible to discern.[117] Ironically, as Robert Jenson notes, far from removing the metaphysical conception of God as timeless, the radical scepticism of Enlightenment thought simply reinforced the dichotomy between God's timelessness and historical particularity. This can be seen in the axiom enunciated by Lessing:

'Only the metaphysical saves and surely not the historical'.[118]

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[113] *Theological Writings,* III, 12 quoted in Zahn,. *The Historical Jesus* (1963) 47. Sherman comments: 'That is, the 'truths of history, including historically based revelation, are too uncertain and too particular to serve as the basis for any religion that seeks to be rational and universal' (Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet* : 198).

[114] Alister E. McGrath, *The Making of Modern German Christology: From the Enlightenment to Pannenberg* (1986): 14.

[115] Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Lessing's Theological Writings* (ed. and trans. Henry Chadwick; *A Library of Modern Religious Thought*; London: Adam & Charles Black, 1956), quoted in Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet* : 198-9.

[116] Jenson, 'On the Problem(s) of Scriptural Authority' : 245-8.

[117] Robert W. Jenson, 'Can a Text Defend Itself? An Essay *de Inspiritione Scripurae'*, *dialog* 28 (1989) 252.

[118] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 35.

The historical Jesus was placed alongside all the other religious leaders of history as the exemplar of a particular ethical ideal.[119] The knowledge of events in themselves, *Historie* was to be distinguished from the significance of those events for us *Geschichte*.

We can see the influence of nominalism in (arguably) the greatest philosopher of the Western Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his trilogy: *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *The Critique of Judgement* (1790), he set out, among other things, a way of 'rescuing' human personality from what he took to be the deterministic implications of Newtonian science. His solution to this problem was to distinguish a personality free of being determined in any way by the phenomena which science could measure and calculate. This *homo noumenon* was determined purely by abstract ethical considerations, however at the cost of divorcing his conception from any actual human beings (or perhaps one might say that his *homo noumenon* is just an abstraction from the Eighteenth Century Western European educated male).

In terms of the Kantian schema, *either* Jesus' significance consists in what he did in a particular time - in which case there is no necessity for that reason that it should be significant for us today, or if it is necessarily to be significant for us today, that necessity must consist in some universal truth which it contains, and not be related in any necessary sense, to Jesus as an historical individual. For Kant, the latter option would logically be the one he would choose. In more popular terms, this meant that morality is made into a very interior thing. Belief, as Kant argues in his *Religion within the bounds of Reason alone*, cannot be based on the actual data or dogmata of revealed Religion. Rather it is to be relegated to that which can be held solely by a 'reasonable' person (effectively an educated Western European man!). Kant declared in his Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*

> 'I have found it necessary to deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*'.[120]

Kant sought to ground the norms of human interaction on what is reasonable and to preserve human freedom. It is constituted by mind engaging the world as given, freed from any notions of underlying substance – or indeed from any claims to knowledge not subject to human cognition. But at the same these claims are seen to operate in accordance with the conditions for universal truth, so that what is cognised can, with confidence, be accorded universal validity. As Kant puts it:

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[119] Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 30.
[120] http://cyberspacei.com/jesusi/inlight/religion/belief/agnosticism.htm.

'everything is actual that stands in one context with a perception *in accordance with the laws of empirical progression* ... To call an appearance a real thing prior to perception means either that *in the continuation of experience* we must encounter such a perception, or it has no meaning at all' [121]

But how can we know what is universally true for all humanity? What does it mean to be a person, irrespective of our historical specificity? Kant comes to the answers to these questions in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant outlined his categorical Imperative, a moral law which is true by necessity, since it applies to us, and is by definition constitutive of us as persons regardless of our particular historical circumstance: 'Do unto others as you would have them do to you' (since, as persons, we need to be recognised by others as such, and since moral laws must, by definition be universal in application, whatever we wish for ourselves, we must, by the logic of morality, wish for others also).This of course coincides with a central tenet of Jesus' ethical teaching, and so it would follow that it was this 'reasonable' aspect which constituted for Kant the essence of Christianity, not its historical founder. The answer is that we should desire that others should treat us as persons. If this is to be the case, and if it is to be true interchangeably, we come to the maxim that we should therefore treat them in the same way. This, Kant argues, is what it is to be a person, and to act in any other way to be act, and therefore be, somewhat less of a person.[122] However, the price of this is once again to drive meaning into the interior privacy of the human conscience and to evacuate the public realm of shared values.

In the light of the Enlightenment project, doubts were expressed about belief in a transcendent deity, or at least in one who is active in the world and in human experience. Thinkers such as Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) questioned the idea that belief in God was anything but a projection of human yearnings for meaning.[123] Feuerbach developed the concept of 'alienation'. For Feuerbach, the affirmation of God (the timeless god of standard religion) resulted in the self-negation of man because he has surrendered himself, as historical being, to a timeless idealisation of himself represented in language about God.[124]

The most extreme statement of nominalism can be found in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) with his notorious, albeit ironic, identification with the claim that

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[121] *Kant,* Critique of Pure Reason, A493, quoted in Janz, *G.M.D.* : 150. (Janz' emphasis).

[122] *Critique of Practical Reason.*

[123] Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity* (1989): Ch. 10; see Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 54.

[124] *The Essence of Christianity,* published in 1841, and translated with considerable impact into English in 1854 by the novelist George Eliot.

'God is dead'.[125] Nietzsche took this further, and enunciated the view that belief in God is antithetical to human freedom, since Christianity, in his view, is based on a falsehood. In place of the Christian faith that he rejected he set out the ideal of creating an ethic of human freedom unconstrained by the superimposition of moral requirements of (putatively) transcendent origin.[126] Nietzsche expressed his rejection of all attempts to discern order in terms of any cosmic scheme, and sought to overcome change and affirm the sheer triumph of human individuality, first in his assertion of the '*Übermensch*', free of any external ordering or subjection to universal categories; and, second, in the myth of the eternal return, staking a claim for the persistence (or at least the conceived persistence) of personality in the face of change.

Liberalism was a response to the Enlightenment critique of Christianity, but in doing so, it re-formulated Christian belief on a very different basis. A very different, but even more significant figure in developing the Christian synthesis in response to the Enlightenment was Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Schleiermacher argued that we cannot properly be said to know God, but the disjunction between our will to know God and our failure to do so can only be resolved through the exercise of our 'sense' of God in the integrated totality of our experience.[127] Like other contemporaries, Schleiermacher understood the human person to be his or her own work of art. Religious consciousness has, for Schleiermacher, the function of achieving wholeness for the human person by integrating the range of his or her experience.[128]

Schleiermacher tried to re-habilitate Christianity in the eyes of its 'cultured despisers' but at the cost of falling in the Enlightenment dichotomy of 'non-miraculous' facts (since miracles in general, and the Resurrection of Jesus in particular, because of their non-experimental nature were a great embarrassment to the modern mind) and fiat was now reduced to an inner *Gefühl*, or sense of the numinous, as Rudolph Otto was later to call it. But the terms in which

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[125] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (1974): 3.25 ,181-182; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1997): 1.Prologue 5, These words mark the boundary, before and after, according to Vollenhoven, of Nietzsche's irrationalist turn (Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek* : 291). In both these cases puts the claim into the mouths of others (the madman and Zarathustra respectively) and can be read ironically.

[126] Nietzsche is a deliberately slippery writer and uses a range of other voices. His most dramatic presentation of this thesis is in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft,* where 'the Madman' proclaims that God is dead – the corollary being that it is now up to each person, on one's own, to work out one's understanding of the world and create one's own values. This theme is also taken up in *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*: §125, pp. 181-182; Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*: §2, pp. 4-5; Ronald Hayman, *Nietzsche: Nietzsche's Voices* (1997): 3-4, 27-28).

[127] Robert W. Jenson, 'Mr Edwards' Affections', *dialog* 24 (1985): 174.

[128] Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 28-32; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 46.

Schleiermacher set out his position were determined by Immanuel Kant,[129] namely, that Christian faith cannot seek to know or claim to know anything beyond what reason determines to be true. We cannot finally know anything about God or his actions, but we can proceed upon the undoubted fact of our need to treat all others as we ourselves would have them treat us – because that is what it means to be a person.[130]

Concentrating on the universal truths of Christianity, rather on the need to believe everything recorded in the Gospels was a way to avoid having to accept this less acceptable (to Enlightenment minds) material, and yet be able to accept Jesus as one of whom one might still claim to be a follower and devotee. F.C. Schleiermacher attempted to circumvent this difficulty by locating the essential religious relationship in the God-consciousness, *das Gefühl,* of the individual: our redemption through and by Christ is effected for us as a consequence of the social and historical influence of Jesus Christ mediated through the community of faith – 'an immediate existential relationship'.[131]

The difficulty with Schleiermacher's formulation is that it places the entire burden of the significance of Christ's life, death and resurrection on the subjectivity, both individual and collective, of the believer. Schleiermacher would have little to say to those who did not share this *Gefühl* – and, unlike Kant, would not even be able to appeal to a necessary truth of human existence, of which Jesus was the supreme originator and example.
The definition of the person as a reasonable substance, which goes back to Boethius[132], is the corner stone of liberalism: '*Naturae rationabilis individua substantia*' ('an individual substance of rational nature').[133] Picking up from there, Schleiermacher went on to define 'religion' (and specifically Christianity) as a necessary component of personal life by which all other components are brought into unity.[134]

But the question suggests itself as to *why* the supreme embodiment of Spirit should be identified specifically with the received dogmas of the church about the life and work of Jesus. Thus began the quest for the historical Jesus by D.F. Strauss.[135] F.C. Baur[136] and the

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[129] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793). Sherman, Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet* : 155-6.
[130] Freidrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) This is the position he took in his first major work: *Reden uber die Religion (*1799, English translation *Religion, Speeches to its Cultured Despisers,* 1893),
[131] McGrath*, Making* : 13-15, 33; C.E.Gunton. *Yesterday and Today* : 40-43.
[132] Anicus Manlius Torquatus Severinus Boethius (c. 480- c. 524).
[133] Boethius *Contra Eutychen* III, 4 f.; in *The Theological Tractatus E.I* by H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand, *Loeb Classical Library* (London: Heinemann, 1918): 84. [Check]
[134] Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 28-9.
[135] D.F. Straus. *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, 1972; McGrath, *Making* : 35-38; I.H. Marshall, *I Believe In the Historical Jesus* : 110-113.
[136] McGrath, *Making* :38-42.

Tübingen School. Essential to this quest was the task of isolating the Jesus who taught the universal truths of Christianity, as distinct from the thoroughly miraculous and 'mythical' accretions added by the writers and the early church. Another way of approaching the problem, but from a contrary direction, was offered by Albrecht Ritschl at Göttingen, who concentrated on 'the tradition of Christ propagated by the Church', the goal of which was 'the establishment of the universal ethical fellowship *of* mankind'[137] – one could be critical of the documents of the New Testament without disbelieving the historical reality of the man Jesus.[138] This was taken further with the publication of Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums* in 1900, in which Harnack argued that the Hellenistic Influences in Christianity could be removed so that we can come to understand once more the essence of Christianity, namely: the personal realisation In Jesus of the gospel of the forgiveness from sins and the assurance of eternal life.[139] But these were understood in terms very much in keeping with the liberal prejudices of Harnack and his associates themselves. Liberalism starts thus from the essential 'reasonableness' of Christianity in terms of the person; but this reasonableness can only be discovered as we, following the example of Christ, discover the need for our dependence on God as Father. Harnack enunciated the essence of the liberal creed: the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of humanity and the overwhelming significance of the human soul. [140] G Tyrell later observed of Harnack, that the Christ whom he sees is 'only the reflection of a liberal Protestant face seen at the bottom of a deep well'.[141]

The progress of the 19th century quest for the historical Jesus did not bring any nearer the answer to the question: what the life, death and Resurrection of Jesus mean to us, because the Jesus which they purported to find simply enunciated the values they themselves wished to find, and at best their Christ was himself a myth to confirm and explicate the values to which they already aspired. There is no reason why, for the liberal scholars, the 'historical Jesus' need ever have actually lived -the idea of him was sufficient for their purposes.

The liberal view of Jesus came under attack from Johannes Weis,[142] and Albert Schweitzer[143] both of whom pointed out that the Jesus of the Gospels came preaching an apocalyptic message of an imminent coing of the Messiah and the end of the world – and not simply a general message of love and forgiveness (although this element was not denied by Weis and

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[137] McGrath, *Making* : 56.

[138] McGrath, *Making* : 36.

[139] A. von Harnack, *Outline of the History of Dogmas* (Boston. 1957) : 44;

McGrath, *Making* : 58-64.

[140] Adolf Harnack (1851-1930), *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1900, English translation, 1901).

[141] G. Tyrell. *Christianity at the Cross-Roads.* London, 1909; quoted in Marshall, *Historical Jesus* : 113.

[142] J. Weis, *Jesus Proclamation of the Kingdom of God* (London. 1971).

[143] A. Schweitzer, *The quest for the Historical Jesus* (London, 1950).

Schweitzer). Another dimension to this question was added by W Wrede,[144] with the implication that not only was the Jesus of the Gospels radically different from the picture painted by the 19th century liberals, but the very substance of it might be intrinsically unknowable, since it might *all* be a construction of the early church.[145] An extreme example of this was Ernst Troeltsch's proposal in the late Nineteenth Century (re-asserted in the English-speaking world in the Twentieth Century), that Christ is (simply) the religious inspiration with which Westerners find themselves.[146]

This was followed up by the work of the form critics: M. Dibelius and R. Bultmann, who, on the basis of their examination of the constituent units brought together in the Gospel documents, called into question the very attempt to determine the historicity of the events related in the Gospels. Bultmann especially saw the picture of Christ as portrayed in the Jew Testament as irreducibly mythical and therefore untranslatable to the modern world, all one can do is to reappropriate the Incomprehensible 'Jesus of History' by a personal, existential leap as the 'Christ of Faith' - the κήρυγμα of the individual encounter with the possibility of a gratuitous act of God exemplified in the death and resurrection of Christ - very different from the critical de-husking of the received tradition as proposed by Harnack.[147]

Bultmann's response harks back to the existentialist response by the Danish Christian philosopher and theologian Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813 –1855).[148] For existentialism, unlike liberalism, the definition of the human person is not given, but can only be discovered through the making of authentic choices, as we confront life head on in all its anxieties, taking full responsibility in ourselves for the choices that we make.

The radical scepticism by Bultmann about the possibility of the critical quest for the historical Jesus was questioned by E. Käsemann, Bultmann's pupil, at Marburg in 1953, where he suggested that the Gospel narratives might contain historical as well as kerygmatic material. Indeed the κήρυγμα itself demands that we take the historical facts of Jesus' life seriously[149] This 'new quest for the historical Jesus involves uncovering the 'Intention' of Jesus; his own

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[144] W. Wrede. The Messianic Secret. Cambridge.
[145] Marshall, *Historical Jesus* :   113-117; McGrath. *Making* : 69-66.
[146] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 46-7; Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth' : 31-2; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 32.
[147] McGrath. *Making* : 81-5.pp. 127-153; Marshall, *Historical Jesus* : 120-126, 130-136.
[148] Sören Aaby Kierkegaard (1813-55).
[149] McGrath, *Making* : 161-3.

conception of the purpose of his Ministry, and thus relate it kerygmatically to our faith as *Geschich*te.[150]

If one denies that there is such a thing as a significant religious function, that itself is to make a specific religious claim, with the implication that salvation is simply a state of mind based on a conception of God purely as a mental projection. This is the position of secularism, which attempts to relegate all religions to the private sphere and is motivated by the suspicion that there is no timeless Being for all gods to manifest.[151] Secularism is the extreme reductive outcome of the standard religious approach that understands language about God in terms of projection. One attempt to do this was that of logical positivism, which attempted to exclude any talk of God from normal conversation, and denied in a systematic way, that talk of God can have any relevance to us at all, apart from the purpose of stirring up particular emotions, useful or damaging.[152]

One contemporary critique is that of Thomas Altizer (born 1927) who argues, that we must reject the idea of Christianity as 'a backward movement to the primordial Totality'. Jenson agrees with Altizer's characterisation of religion as a retreat from time and history to timelessness (drawing on insights of Mircea Eliade [153] and Karoly Kerenyi[154]). For Altizer, Christianity is not a revelation of God's distance from history but of his identification within it. However, Altizer negates the merit of this step by identifying our understanding of God's historicity with our understanding of history as a whole. To do that, history as the sum of human experience is put in the place of God.[155]

Altizer, severs the connection between the word of God as it comes to us now and the story of Jesus of Nazareth. But this is to commit us simply to an abstract category of potential human experience with no particular, empirically recognisable content. Potential human experience as a general category, Jenson argues, no more satisfies the requirement for

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[150] J.M Robinson, *A New Quest For The Historical Jesus,* London, 1959; Marshall, *Historical Jesus* 128-30J; Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet* : 157.

[151] Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth' : 32; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 33.

[152] The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle… held that any talk about a transcendent God must be 'without literal significance.' This view was presented brilliantly, and in an uncompromisingly drastic form, by A.J. Ayer in his *Language, Truth and Logic* (2nd ed., 1946). Similar conclusions were reached less high-handedly by several contributors to *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (ed. by A. Flew and A. MacIntyre, 1955) (A.G.N.F, http://cyberspacei.com/jesusi/inlight/religion/belief/agnosticism.htm)

[153] Micea Eliade (1907-1986) 'Eliade, M. (1954) *Cosmos and History:The Myth of the Eternal Return*, trans. W. Trask, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Bryan S. Rennie: *Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996, Ch 7: 'Myths and Mythology'.

[154] Karoly Kerenyi, (January 19 1897- April 14, 1973) Hungarian philologist and philosopher, (Wikipedia)

[155] Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 25; Jenson, *God after God* : 44, 59-61.

concrete specificity than does the abstract primordial religion which Altizer, and Jenson have both rejected. Thus Altizer, despite the validity of his critique of Christianity as religion, has simply proposed then to reconstruct it as what Jenson describes as its 'negative mirror-image'.[156]

Characteristic of 'death of God' theology is the lack of any context in which any claim to faith in Jesus can have historical significance. Just as is the case with the metaphysical religion against which the 'death of God' theologians protest, 'God' has no historical purchase or verifiability. 'Death of God' theology, despite its negative value in showing the vacuity of standard religion, is that it fails to locate the object of our faith in an historically relevant and verifiable way. For example, Paul van Buren understands God as the contagiousness of Jesus' radical freedom; but this (to extrapolate from Jenson's general thesis) fails to locate God as experienceable object, and therefore leaves us with a purely abstract concept of God.[157] For Dorothee Steffensky-Sölle (1929- 2003), to take another example, God is the one for whom Jesus permanently holds a vacant place – what Jesus does for us is provisional, and depends on the timing of our response to God. Sölle refuses to specify therefore whether Jesus' actions are situated in a timeless futurity or a specific time – she holds to an ahistorical ideal rather than an historically locatable event.[158]

The 'death of God' theologians merely replace one anti-historical conception of God with a denial that God can be affirmed in any historical way at all, and so, in the final analysis, leave us with an alternatively timeless conception of reality equally lacking in historical concreteness.[159] The task is rather to affirm the god defined in historical terms in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, risen from the dead, who alone is properly the object of faith.

However, there is an alternative stream which which runs alongside the streams of realism and nominalism which flow into the rivers of modernism and postmodernism respectively – that is the stream which sees the world primarily as an unfolding narrative.

(c) The Recourse to Narrative Relativism

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[156] Jenson, *R.A.I.* : 25-6.
[157] Jenson, 'Jesus, Father, Spirit' : 248.
[158] Jenson, *God after God* : 63-6; Jenson, 'Jesus, Father, Spirit' : 243. Jenson also came to revise his own earlier position in this regard for similar reasons. He refers to what is probably *A Religion Against Itself* somewhat critically in this regard, possibly for its too easy acceptance of modern secularism on its own terms (Jenson, 'Jesus, Father, Spirit' : 248).
[159] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 35.

Seeing the world primarly as an unfolding narrative goes back to antiquity, and can be seen as a third position alongside realism and nominalism. As we shall see, it is found in Heraclitus (c. 535-c. 480 B.C.), who saw all things as governed by a single principle of change, and Empedocles (c. 492-432 B.C.), who posited a division between on one hand a body composed of four basic elements, dominated by the forces of love and strife, and an eternal soul on the other,

As we shall see, it is illuminated by the Idea of Providence, Purpose or Progress (the last a secularised version of the former two).

Among modern philosophers, G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) defined reality as history, which he understood as the self-development of thought. He was trying to find the unity of reality not as a changeless persistent entity, but in a triumphant life-history. Hegel saw God as the embodiment of the progressive historical development of the world. For Hegel, this was advanced by the dialectical relation of the subjective and the objective polarities, which resulted in the process of cumulative transcendence (Aufhebung) to realize ever greater concrete freedoms enshrined in the development of social, intellectual, and aesthetic achievements.

Hegel attempted to re-interpret classical Trinitarian theology and so definitively to re-establish the synthesis between Christianity and religion, such as the Enlightenment had called into question. God for Hegel is Spirit, which has the world for its object, and is the world in that it makes sense of the world and thus occurs in it and the development of human potential. 'Spirit' in this sense should be distinguished from 'mind' of Greek thought, in that whereas the latter understands its object, spirit intrudes itself transformingly on it.[160] For Hegel, Spirit overcomes the contingencies of history by becoming conscious of itself as object, and by overcoming the contradictions in which this resulted. In this process of self-comprehension, history realises itself. The 'logic' of this process is a definition of reality, particularly human reality, in terms of necessary development. Comprehension is achieved as a dialectical synthesis between conflicting opposites. Spirit is that by which God as Consciousness overcomes static contradictions and brings history to a new level of development by the resolution of these contradictions. But Hegel's Object of the Spirit's Consciousness remains the world (and the world as Hegel sees it).[161] That which is comprehended can only be that for which the potential already exists; so that despite Hegel's attempts to perfect a synthesis between futurity and eternity, he can only extrapolate the end

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[160] Jenson, *God after God* : 34; Jenson, *T.I.* : 134-6; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Holy Spirit' (1984): 167-8.
[161] Jenson comments ironically: 'Hegel's only real fault was that he confused himself with the last judge; but that is quite a fault' (Jenson, *K.T.H.F.* : 233, n. 327).

as the necessary unfolding of already existing potential. Therefore, Spirit, the apotheosis of history, can only be the god of past history in which all is already decided at least potentially, in other words, the now timeless god of standard religion.[162]

Hegel used his categories of *Vorstellung* ('representation') and *Begriff* ('concept') to redefine our relationship the historical Jesus. *Vorstellung,* the analytical affirmation - in this case the affirmation of the incarnation of God in Christ, is made real in its identification - *Begriff,* with the life of the historical Jesus. This abstract proposition of Christianity is mediated to us by the *Gedanke* common to all religions of the possibility [common to all religions] that Infinite Spirit (God) can be embodied in finite spirit (man).[163] In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Hegel outlines the *Aufhebung* from the naive consciousness of natural religion, where acts are performed purely ritualistically with only a minimal awareness of their interior aspect; through the expression of art, where the artist becomes aware of himself as a creative subject; to Christianity where the substance of the life of Christ, the highest manifestation of Spirit in itself - the quest of all religions – is combined with its apprehension in the hearts of believers.[164]

Hegel brought the subjective and objective together, but at the price of presenting to us a totalitarian formula (and indeed Hegel has been credited, only partly unfairly, with laying the eggs which hatched into the serpents of National Socialism and Communism respectively), and so his systematic approach has not directly been continued; and indeed the very notion of a systematic approach was called into question as incipiently totalitarian.[165] From a theological point of view, his reduction of the transcendent to the historical process itself cut his philosophy adrift from its transcendental moorings onto an immanentist sea

Karl Marx (1818-1883) protested against the alienation which results from the idealisation of the status quo as somehow having a reality independent of those who have brought it about. Religion for Marx was one form in which this general bondage to enslaving, socially-created structures is expressed. Marx relocated the quest for eternity to the historical process as a whole; since to be comprehensible, the laws of development, which were posited as governing future development, would have to be held to be valid over time, and therefore timeless.[166] Claude Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825)[167] and August Comte (1798-

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[162] Jenson, *God after God* : 34; Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 168-9.
[163] McGrath, *Making* : 33.
[164] C.E. Gunton, *Yesterday and Today* : 40-43.
[165] Karl Popper *The Open Society and its Enemies* (London: Routledge, 1945).
[166] Jenson, *God after God* : 32-3; Robert W. Jenson, 'Is there a Distinctively Christian Life-style' (1973)' 5; Robert W. Jenson, 'The God Question', *Lutheran Forum* 26 (1992) : 48; Jenson, *K.T.H.F.* : 5.

1857)[168] saw a progress in civilization, progressing from a mythical view of the world to a scientific one.

The idea of dispensing with God's agency was extended to the biological sphere by the appearance of *The Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin in 1859,[169] where the origin and development of humanity, as of all living beings, was expressed in terms of the operation of the mechanism of natural selection. Darwin himself was reluctant to draw these conclusions, but the claims were made on his behalf, not least by Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) who coined the term 'agnostic' to describe his lack of belief (rather than any active disbelief) in God or any transcendent being.[170] The view of history may vary between those who see it pessimistically, as Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) in his *Decline of the West* (1918), or optimistically, as in the Marxist view of the utopian future achieved at the end of the class struggle.

However the deification of the process of history simply resulted in the emergenece of new forms s of tyranny of a nature so horrific as to be previously undreamed of. The Russian Revolution inaugurated a regime of brutality on a such a vast scale, and then in Germany, a regime of seemingly the opposite political hue, but with the same promised for a new humanity freed from the 'shackles' of God and tradition perpetrated atrocities on a similar and even more concentrated nature. Stalin in the Soviet Union, and Hitler in Germany, were followed by Mao Zedong in China and Pol Pot in Cambodia. Nor have the new ideologies been the sole perpetrators of horrors. The collapse of the Soviet Union has ushered in a era of renewed uncertainly, with ethnic conflict

Christian historical political theory had been developed by powerful and influential nineteenth century Lutheran thinkers such as Von Savigny and Stahl; these thinkers saw the law and its authority much more in terms of the political *status quo*. The historical (or more

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[167] French socialist who fought in the American Revolution and was imprisoned during the French Revolution. He advocated an atheist society ruled by technicians and industrialist in Du Système industrielle/The Industrial Society 1821' (Hutchison Encyclopedia, 1995): 914.

[168] The founder of modern sociology (he coined the word in 1830). 'In his 6 volume *Cours de philosophie positive* 1830-42 he argued that human through and social development evolve through three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. Although he originally sought to proclaim society's evolution to a new golden age of science, industry, and rational morality, his radical ideas were increasingly tempered by the political and social upheavals of his time. His influence, however, continued in Europe and the USA until the early 20th century' (Hutchison Encyclopedia, 1995 : 260).

[169] Charles Robert Darwin, 1809-1882, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (1859). In 1858, Darwin was forced into action by the receipt of a memoir from A R Wallace, embodying the same theory (Hutchinson Encyclopedia, 1995).

[170] King, *Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief*: 148.

properly the 'historicist') approach holds to the continual changefulness of the norms which govern political life at the cost of their constancy.[171] Instead it absolutises the human capacity for cultural formation, focussed on what, in Part Two, is called the 'cultural-formative' modality.[172] All truth is seen in terms of cultural formation, and therefore, is made relative to a particular historical context.

Against the historicist position it is necessary to affirm the creational sovereignty of God over all cultures and historical circumstances. It is necessary for the norms which govern human behaviour and patterns of thought first to be grasped by the mind analytically (i.e., in a way appropriate to the logical or analytical modality), and then brought to formation or 'positivised' with a specific cultural context (i.e., in a way appropriate to the 'historical' or cultural-formative modality). However, the human role in analysis and the positivisation of norms does not mean that cultural and other norms – let alone the laws of number, space etc. – are culturally relative. In fact, all laws and norms have a universal scope. Thus in contrast with historicism, it is not necessary to abandon the notion of universality. Principles can be positivised for a specific time and place, while at the same time recognizing that the principles themselves are universal.[173]

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[171] D.F.M. Strauss, points out that cultural change has an analogy (retrocipation) to the physical (or energetic) modality, but this needs to be balanced harmoniously with cultural constancy, which has an analogy (retrocipation) with the kinematic modality. Cultural change requires cultural constancy: the latter cannot be reduced to the former or vice versa. Moreover, as Roy Clouser, another Dooyeweerdian thinker, argues, the cultural-formative (or 'historical') modality (see below) cannot be seen in isolation, but only properly in harmony with all the other modalities, including both the kinematic and the physical (Strauss *D.D.*: 271-274; Roy A. Clouser, 'A Critique of Historicism' (2000): 110-116).

[172] See 5 (b) (viii). Dooyeweerd calls this the 'historical' modality, characterized by formative control, which embraces past, present and future (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.193 (not in *W.d.W.*); M. D. Stafleu, 'Time and History in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea', *P. R.,* 73 (2008): 156-157, 163-164). For Dooyeweerd, the 'historical' is one of the modalities (see Chapter Three introduction), not, as for Vollenhoven, the overall unfolding of time. Vollenhoven, somewhat reluctantly, made use of Dooyeweerd's term 'historical' for what he preferred to call the 'form-giving' modality (Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §171 121; Vollenhoven, 'Problemen van de tijd (68b): 207-211('vormgevende'); Vollenhoven, 'The Consequential Problem-Historical Method': 104; Bernard Zylstra, 'Samevatting gesprek met Vollenhoven, 1 december 1965' in *Vollenhoven Archive* (1965)). He is careful to distinguish the 'historical' modality from what he calls the 'genetic connection' (Vollenhoven, *Introduction to Philosophy* (2005): §100, pp. 164-105 ('historische','genetische verband')).

[173] While Dooyeweerd is not entirely consistent in his statement of his position (as has been pointed out by Strauss), this insight represents a critical intellectual breakthrough (Dooyeweerd, 'De staatkundige tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij (C.H. en A.R.P) 1' in *Dooyeweerd Archive* (1923); Dooyeweerd, 'De staatkundige tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij (C.H. en A.R.P) 2' in *Dooyeweerd Archive* (1923); Dooyeweerd, 'De staatkundige tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij (C.H. en A.R.P) 3' in *Dooyeweerd Archive* (1923) W.d.W.: 2.139-227; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.192-298; Dooyeweerd, *De zin der geschiedenis*: 3-5, 16-20; Dooyeweerd, *Recht en historie* (1938): 23-28; Dooyeweerd, 'Criteria': 215-219, 221-222; see also Strauss *P.D.D* : 93-95, 290-293). Vollenhoven sees historicism not as a form of subordination of the other modalities to the 'historical' (i.e.,

Process theology sees God as being subject himself of the flow of history of the world.[174] The leading figures are Alfred North Whitehead[175] and Charles Hartshorne.[176] Process theologians see God not as a transcendent being, but one constituted by the events of the world, the source of the things (primordial in Whitehead's terminology) but also the consequence of them (consequent in Whitehead's terminology). We have no sure knowledge of God, but on the sense that somehow he/she/it is there in everything that we do and indeed in everything that happens. But there is no assurance that God is there, and he is bound by the events of the world just as we are. Although Peter Geach would be horrified to be characterised as a Process Theologian, his model of the master chess player, who anticipates and responds to our moves, and weaves them into a more elaborate plan is not too far removed from the model of God held by Process Theology.[177]

Process theology takes the natural process as its paradigm of reality. Reality, according to process thinkers is composed not of things but of events or 'actual occasions', which means that each actual occasion's character is not determined by the antecedent occasions it integrates. Rather, there is an aspect of 'event spontaneity', or even 'character spontaneity' whereby new characteristics come into being. Science cannot predict the outcome of any actual individual occasion rather than merely repeating the statistical odds of what is most likely to happen. The outcome itself is not determinable by the nature of content of our scientific knowledge. With respect to any individual there is an aspect of irreducible freedom. This process of 'event' or 'character' spontaneity, according to Process theologians, is what Christians refer to as 'Spirit'.[178] Process theology denies that creation is a particular act, but rather that is a set of continuous standing relations within the historical process itself.[179] The question is whether this aspect of natural indeterminability can sufficiently characterise God

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cultural-formative) modality as Dooyeweerd does, but as a 'levelling' process: a reduction in the status of the law of God as holding sway over the cosmos, and its particularisation or relativisation in a multiplicity of concrete situations (Vollenhoven, 'Problemen van de tijd in onze kring (68b)' (1992): 209-211; Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 184-185; Vollenhoven, 'The Consequential Problem-Historical Method': 104).

[174] Ian Barbour ,*Myths, Models and Paradigms* : 161-2.

[175] *Process and Reality* (1929).

[176] *Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature* (Chicago: Willet, Clark & Company, 1937), *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willet, Clark & Company, 1941), *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), and *Reality as a Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion* (Glencoe: The Free Press and Boston: Beacon Press, 1953); Barbour, Myths, *Models and Paradigms* 164; Charles Hartshome, *The Divine Relativity,* Yale University Press 1948 90; *Reality as Social Process,* The Free Press 1953 142; also *The Logic of Perfection,* Open Court Publishing Co. 1962, chap. 7; and *Man's Vision of God,* Willett, Clark & Co. 1941, chap. 5.

[177] *Providence and Evil* (Cambridge: CUP 58)

[178] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 170-2.

[179] Robert W. Jenson, 'Creation as a Triune Act', *Word and World* 2 (1982) : 35-6.

as we find him revealed in the person of Jesus Christ, and whether this is true to a Trinitarian understanding of God's action in the world.

The price of the god of Process Theology's involvement in the world is the abandonment of any notion of transcendence from it, and finally God is just as puzzled by the world, and hamstrung by it complexities and misfits as we are, albeit at a higher level. In the final analysis, there is no reason why it should not collapse into the polytheism of the ancient world, where the gods were nothing more than the embodiment of national ideas or the summation of race memory. Why should God be good or powerful, since the experience of the world would indicate otherwise and indeed what has such a god to tell us about the way the world is anyway?

Coming at the problem from a somewhat different angle, liberation theology theoretically puts itself on the side of social change in the face of the *status quo*, with a particular focus on the process of social and political revolution. But by making change and the *status quo* incompatible, the very creativity of the Spirit on which such a position is founded is betrayed by making the concept of change itself, be it Exodus or Resurrection, a changeless idea which is endlessly imitated according to the particular context. Once this imitation has taken up, the imitation itself then justifies the position for which the group which adopts it seeks theological justification, and, moreover, once that group is in power, the liberation for which it fought becomes the new norm for the *status quo*. By way of example, liberation was used as a justification equally by the Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa and by their African nationalist protagonists.[180] Because each revolution is limited by the conditions within which it takes place. *Liberation* can never properly be appropriated to any penultimate historical order, or else it becomes thus ossified and itself the justification for an oppressive *status quo*. Further, a particular *status quo* may indeed need defending against a potentially oppressive demand for change. Liberation theology can be a form of Montanism, the point of struggle in the church in the Second and Third Centuries and the precursor of many other 'enthusiastic' movements down the centuries. Any new 'spiritual freedom' and the rigour it, ironically, entails needs to be tempered and controlled by the apostolic witness to Christ.[181]

Yet another attempt to salvage the loss of grand narrative is that of narrative theology. In this approach, the interest is not so much in the general import and scrutinisability of a given text in general or scripture in particular, but rather in the importance of that text as story within the discourse of a specific community, in this case, that of the Christian church over the ages,

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[180] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 150-1.
[181] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 154.

so that instead of trying to explain how a particular reading occurs, the text needs to be used descriptively in a way which, in Frei's words:

> governs and bends to its own ends whatever general categories it shares—as indeed it has to share—with other kinds of reading.[182]

As he puts it in his posthumous work *Types of Christian Theology*:

> You should not ask at all... what is the meaning of a text—but rather how is the text used and in what context. That is a better, less abstract question than 'What is the meaning of the text? ... The literal meaning of the text is precisely that meaning which finds the greatest degree of agreement in the use of the text in the religious community.[183]

This means that for Frei, the text is to be seen as belonging inalienably to a given community of interpretation – and for the Christian canon that means the Christian community of faith. George Lindbeck[184] and Ronald Thiemann[185] have also emphasized the importance of narrative as a basis of the exposition of the Christian gospel. Narrative becomes self-authenticating, and the appeal is therefore no longer to 'foundational' Christian norms but, but rather to the self-interpretation of the communal traditions by the community constituted by the faith so expounded. As Lindbeck puts it, doctrines can be seen to be functioning 'as communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude and action'.[186] This cultural-linguistic model regulates truth claims by rules similar to those of grammars of speech.[187]

In the field of ethics, this has been explored notably by Stanley Hauerwas (born 1940),[188] Alistair McIntyre (born 1929) [189] and John Milbank (born 1952),[190] where the story is

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[182] Frei 'The 'Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative in Christian Tradition:' 59, 67.

[183] Frei *Types of Christian Theology* (rev. G. Hunsinger and W. Placher, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992: 16.

[184] See 'The Church' in Geoffry Wainwright, ed., *Keeping the Faith* 179-208; and *The Nature of Doctrine* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). Sheila Daveny, 'Options In Postmodern Theology' by *Sheila* Creeve Davaney, *Dialog* Volume 26. Number 3 : 196-8.

[185] *Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise* (Notre Dame Press, 1985)

[186] *The Nature of Doctrine* (London: SPCK, 1984) : 18.

[187] Trevor Hart, 'Karl Barth, The Trinity and Pluralism', in Kevin Vanhoozer, ed. *The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age*: *Theological Essays on Culture and Religion* (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge UK: Eerdmans, 1997) 125, 130.

[188] *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) and *The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Gesture of a Truthful Story' *Theology Today,* July 1985 Vol. 42, No. 2 181-2.

constitutive of the virtues which best fit that story. One of the most striking examples of the narrative approach is that of John Howard Yoder (1927-1997) in *The Politics of Jesus*[191] where he takes the story of Jesus as normative for a communal Christian ethic at variance from the power structures. This is buttressed also by the work of Walter Wink, who sees the Christian approach to be one of unmasking, and thereby disempowering the structures of human society which stand over against the self-emptying of Jesus and the community which he brought into being.[192]

More recently, with the collapse of the Marxist inspired regimes of Eastern Europe and the USSR, there has been a sense that ideology has played itself out, and, in the words of Francis Fukuyama (born 1927)'s famous article, we have come to the end of history.[193] For Fukuyama there is the progress from the 'first man' motivated by the struggle for recognition, to the 'last man' where recognition is guaranteed for all by the liberal state and where decisions are made on the national recognition of appropriate means to promote the agreed and constitutionally enshrined end of human dignity. As Fukuyama puts it:

> '… we cannot picture to ourselves a world order that is *essentially* different from the present one, and at the same time better'[194]

Fukuyama is deeply indebted to G.W.F. Hegel. Like Hegel, Fukuyama is quite content to remain within the bounds of human experience as the horizon within which the grand narrative is unfolded.

Western Christianity, increasingly isolated and beleaguered in the surrounding culture, retains the sense that the gospel of Christ is somehow still applicable to those who find themselves imprisoned in this world, whose history, no longer seen as subject to providence, is ultimately purposeless. God as a significant being is understood as having a supernatural role quite separate from the natural order.[195]

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[189] McIntyre, Alistair (1984) *After Virtue*. Notre Dame: University Press.

[190] John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*, Blackwell Publishers, 1993; *Theology, Language and Culture: the World Made Strange* by (Cambridge University) Blackwell Publishers,1996

[191] Published in 1972.

[192] Walter Wink, *Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament* (1984); *Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Forces that Determine Human Existence* (1986); *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (1992).

[193] 'The End of History?' *The National Interest* No. 18 (Winter), 21-8. See also his book *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992).

[194] The End of History and the Last Man': 46.

[195] Jenson, 'Proclamation without Metaphysics' : 25-6 ; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Kingdom of America's God', *dialog* 15 (1976) : 18-19; Jenson, 'What Academic Difference' : 27; 'Robert W. Jenson, 'Violence as a Mode of Language' (1980) : 43-4; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 34, 42-3.

Western Christianity has therefore lost its vision of the universality of Christ's action in history, in particular in relation to everyday life. Yet at the same time, there is a residual sense that Christ's action in history must be significant to us in some way. Western Christianity attempted to resolve this dilemma in the direction of either 'liberalism' or 'conservatism'. The former denies, for all practical purposes, that God does intervene and prayer is understood as the experience of our own self-help. Preaching the gospel becomes little more than moral exhortation. The latter tries to retain a significant understanding of God's action in the world by asserting that God somehow intervenes from time to time, in contravention of the law of cause and effect. In both 'conservatism' and 'liberalism' there is a sharp dichotomy between our understanding of God's action, and the natural ordering of the world.[196]

Postmodernism is characterized by the sense that the claims of modernism to comprehensive knowledge in principle and finally control of all processes, social and natural, can no longer be sustained.[197] It gives rise to the sense that truth is diverse and multi-faceted, to the extent that the confidence that any thinking or acting subject could be in the position, even in principle, to know, let alone control, his or her environment is misplaced and impossible in principle. Knowledge is fraught with the limitations that any frame placed around any truth claim, and indeed the claim that there can be any knowledge without such a frame is fundamentally misconceived. Knowledge is thus radically relative to the circumstances of the knower, and shaped and directed by the assumptions which he or she brings with him or her. Values and facts can no longer be seen as distinguishable, as modernism would claim, but are part of the same text, determined diversely by the same context. [198]

In such a situation, the values that there are, are self-denying. The supreme value is that of irony: the self-deprecating claim that all truth-claims are playful ripples in a pond of continually changing visions of reality. The greatest sin for the postmodernist is to take any truth claim too seriously, and any claim to epistemological or ethical finality is to be rejected.[199] This is not to say that there are not positive aspects of the postmodernist stance. The most important contribution of the postmodernist stance, is the re-discovery of narrative, and also of the importance of communities in which that narrative can be developed and

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[196] Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 34; Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 172.
[197] See Jacques Derrida's essay, 'Structure, Sign, Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,' in Richard Macksey and Eugene Donato, eds., *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1970) : 164.
[198] Janz, *G.M.D.* : 31.
[199] Middleton and Walsh, *Truth is Stranger than it used to be: Biblical Faith in a Postmodern Age* (.London: SPCK, 1995).

nurtured – the difficulty arising from this is the relativism and indeed thoroughgoing scepticism which this gives rise to – one might almost say that it is a 'Neo-Sophism' (represented by the person of Protagoras, who argued against Socrates, for a rejection of any absolute and universal norms).

The move from modernism to postmodernism, and the recourse to narrative, opens up a new avenue in the quest for transcendence: it is starting to take 'the other' more seriously.[200] Strictly speaking, one should speak of this as a 'renewed' quest rather than a 'new' quest. The First World War left the West reeling out its complacency, although the full effects of this disruption took some time to work through. The mass murder of the Jews and other minorities in the Second World War (and indeed the mass atrocities of Stalin, Mao Zedong and Pol Pot) raised serious questions about the 'tolerance' of the secular mind. To liberal secularism, these events raise a deep conundrum: 'negative freedom' is not sufficient if, by that, it allows sheer evil to exercise its destructive power, especially with that evil is dressed in the clothes, and nourishes itself with the food and drink of the ideal of autonomous humanity.

In a similar, although in a more specific way, the effects of the terrorist destruction of the Twin Towers of the New York Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 gave pause to the ironic playfulness in which the intelligentsia of the West had found refuge. Materialistic secularism has simply no answer to the horrors that determined and utterly fanatical assaults that can bring upon it. Putting it bluntly, the horror of 11 September, cannot simply be laughed off, ridiculed or forgotten.

The lack of an overarching conception of the social order in the form of a unified vision about the way that society should be structured and operate means that relationship function to a certain extent in a vacuum, The effect of this is the breakdown of relationships, since the institutions of family, marriage, state and church as well as the many and varied institutions of societies no longer have moral and ethical force, but are seen as purely transient and therefore without normative force.

In the West we are conscious of the breakdown of relationships and the fragmentation of society. Western influence in societies with a much stronger tradition of relationships, such as Africa, among other factors, is also resulting in a breakdown of traditional structures.

There is also the problem in Western Christian thinking, where the influence of Christian

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[200] James Olthuis, ed. *Knowing Other-wise: Philosophy on the Threshold of Spirituality* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1977); Middleton and Walsh, *Truth is Stranger than it Used to Be.*

insights in 'political' matters has been excluded through a combination of desire by Christians, in Oliver O'Donovan's pithy words, 'to instruct princes that they were dispensable to the Holy Spirit's work' with the wider context of 'rationalist conceptions of action and providence'.[201]

In reaction to this, there is the attempt, equally disastrous, to reify and indeed fossilize structures in ways that do not account for the necessary dynamism and development needed to allow relationships to function in their proper way, and grow

How to avoid the deleterious effects of these two extremes requires a fully Trinitarian vision. Relationships need to be understood as part of God's work in the world, and his provision for the good of society. The re-discovery of the importance on relationships, in the face of the current crisis, is tapping important roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The universal vision and the cohesiveness of relationships needs an understanding of the possibility and actuality of incarnation, which is neither reducible to the world, but at the same time not remote from it.

In the West, there has been a tendency to tailor the Christian understanding of relationships and social arrangements generally to what is held to be acceptable in the eyes of contemporary culture and values.

The situation is very different in what is described as the 'Two-Thirds' world, where an increasingly strong Christian presence articulated in terms of conservative theology, is becoming felt. The process of a declining church in an overwhelmingly secular society, which has come to characterise the West, is not characteristic of these countries. Nevertheless, since the West still has the overwhelmingly economic and military power, and cultural dominance, the trend of the West has been assumed for the whole world. Here the dominant paradigm is one of questioning and uncertainly, with a technological race building up ever- increasing momentum, within the vicissitudes of the economic cycles.

The digital revolution, for all the uncertainties that it has engendered, is changing the structure of the world's community speeding up transactions and shortening lines of communication in terms of time. The structure of society is changing from one dominated by the mass mobilization of labour and the predetermined production of goods, to one oriented towards the diverse demands of a fragmented and yet closely inter-connected market. The result is a two-tiered situation: on the one hand, an increasingly affluent and self-motivated

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[201] Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations* : 245.

international community, and the other, immense pockets of underdevelopment and economic oppression, and the marginalisation of those on the 'wrong' side of the digital divide.

All this reflects the rootlessness of the cultural order, and the disorientation at all levels of society. This means that the spirit that motivated the shape of the modern world is in a state of disintegration.

The challenge is to speak now in such a way that society can be influenced in a genuinely Christian way, without either, on the one hand, the domination of culture by the church (along the lines of a mediaeval model) or, on the other, mere accommodation with the prevailing secular order. The challenge is to the Christian community, which is much wider than purely to the Church as an institution.

Together, the crisis of authority, the breakdown of relationships and the collapse of eschatology amount to a thoroughgoing disintegration of Western culture where for over a thousand years it has functioned as one of the most important matrices of the growth of Christianity, and even gave rise to one of the most important expressions of Christianity (the other being the 'Caesaro-papism' of the Eastern Church). The surrounding culture in a state of disintegration, this has serious consequences for the Christian church, understood in the broadest sense.

(d) Conclusion
These different responses to the crisis of Western culture: the realist approach which sees the world as architectonic or structure; the nominalist approach which sees the world as experience; and the narrative approach which sees the world as history, all focus on different basic aspects of a response. A comparison of each of these responses indicates that in themselves they do not have the necessary philosophical resources to answer the questions, which they severally raise. It will be the argument at the heart of this work that the resources of Trinitarian theology can provide the framework for addressing these questions far more fruitfully without running into the antinomies above. As M.C. Smit puts it:

> In human existence, yes, in all creation, the purpose is not man or the creature as such, but God. This is what Gen. 1: 26 primarily teaches us … that is at the same time the essential, the real purpose of Christ's work, the meaning of the coming Kingdom, namely, the resumption of the original meaning of creation that was negated by man in his turning away from God.[202]

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[202] Smit, 'Culture and Salvation', in *Towards*: 276.

Secularism is expressed along three poles: that of fissiparous, atomized individualism; that of a universalized, homogenized, coercive collectivism and a relativising, de-racinating historicism.We need to rediscover the universal implications of the Lordship of Christ and the historically transformative work of the Holy Spirit in the midst of life.[203]

2. The Need for a Christian Worldview

What is it that unifies our worldview and forms the common basis with others in our community, or provides points of contact across communities? It is about the covenantal basis for our life. At root is the question: 'which God do you serve?' (It is about our response to the first commandment: 'you shall not have any gods but me'.)

 'Serve' here has the deep religious sense of ultimate commitment and worship. In the case of the God of Israel, revealed in the person of Jesus, thismeans loving him with our hearts, minds, strength and everthing that we are. Love of God and neighbour is the basic religious response to God's work in Christ which we are called to by God, which needs to be worked out in every aspect of our lives. But the Triune God of the Bible identifies himself, in contrast to other deities, as a loving God, finally of course revealed in the sacrifice of Christ The question of whether we love God only arises if we know *which* God will we serve. We see this Elijah's challenge to the people of Israel (and also Joshua's challenge to the Israelites in 1 Kings 18; and earlier on in Joshua 24). But this is not something we can take for granted. If we 'serve' Baal, Brahma, or Allah, our 'service' will be very different – not one of love but bargaining in the case of Baal, self transcendence in the case of Brahma, or fearful obedience in the hope of due reward in the case of Allah. While in the case of the Triune God of the Bible, the basic call to love is appropriate, this is not necessarily true of all religions – and the question of which God we serve has first to be determined. If we 'love' Baal or Moloch (and love means something very different in those cases) it is a very different matterfrom the love of the Triune God revealed in the Bible.

There is a need for a distinctively Christian 'world and life view' (or 'worldview' for short) that takes account of both the diversity and the unity of human experience in the light of

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[203] Charles Taylor in *A Secular Age* gets this exactly wrong. The real loss is not the 'abolition of the enchanted cosmos' [p. 77] but the loss of a Trinitarian world and life view. The problem was not that Christ was brought to the world [p. 94], but that he was seen as remote from it, and the work of the Holy Spirit relegated to pious sensibility. The turning point in this regard was the mid to late Seventeenth Century, not the Reformation. The problem with the Reformation was not that it happened but that it did not go far enough in transforming the philosophical and social foundations of Western thought.

God's sovereignty over every area of life.[204] One's worldview, and provides the framework and context for one's whole experience.[205]

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[204] The term used by Kuyper in his seminal *Lectures on Calvinism* (Kuyper, *Lectures*: 11-12; Peter Somers Heslam, *Creating a Christian worldview: Abraham Kuyper's Lectures on Calvinism* (1998): 88-96; David K. Naugle, *Worldview: the History of a Concept* (2002): 16-25). It is also used by the Chrisitan philoosopher, D.H.Th Vollenhoven (Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 78; Vollenhoven, 'Kort overzicht van de geschiedenis der wijsbegeerte voor de cursus paedagogiek (56b)' (1956): 1; Albert M. Wolters, 'On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy' (1989): 22, 25 (nn. 26, 27)).The notion of a 'world and life view', or 'worldview' for short, seems to have been borrowed most immediately from James Orr who made it the theme of his Kerr Lectures in 1891 (James Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World as Centering in the Incarnation* (1989)). In its wider context, the term '*Weltaunschauung'* was first used, albeit in passing, by Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* and taken up, amongst others, by G. W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Nietzsche (Naugle, *Worldview: the History of a Concept*: 55, 58, 68-107; see also Albert M. Wolters, 'On the idea of a Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy': 14-25; Jacob Klapwijk, 'On Worldviews and Philosophy' (1989): 41-55; Anthony Tol, 'Foreword' (2005): viii). I am aware of the criticism that this implicitly uses a strongly visual metaphor, but the use of 'view' is not meant to privilege the faculty of sight over any of the other faculties. The visual is selected as representative of all the other faculties (hearing, touch etc.).

[205] Vollenhoven, 'Religie en geloof (53i)', *Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte* (1953): 1; Vollenhoven, 'Schriftgebruik en wijsbegeerte (53l)' (1992) Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)' (1992); Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 444-445; see John H. Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy'''', *P.R.* (1988): 112; John H. Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture', *Pro Rege* 21 (1992): 15.

3. Reformational views on Theology, Worldview and Philosophy

In this chapter, I provide the wider background to what is called 'Reformational' philosophy, of which Dirk Vollenhoven (1892-978) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) were the leading exponents in the Twentieth Century.

The two philosophers' thought needs to be set in the context of their common debt to Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), the father of modern Reformational philosophy, and the founder of the Vrije Universiteit (V.U.) at Amsterdam at which both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven were professors. Kuyper himself was a leading figure in the tradition influenced by the thought of John Calvin (1509-1564), the founder of one of the main traditions in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century which had resulted in a broad-scale break from the authority of the Roman papacy over questions of doctrine, especially over the issue of the nature of salvation. In particular, it was Calvin's vision of the sovereignty of God over every area of life which influenced and provided the basis for Kuyper's exposition of the character and place of a 'Calvinistic' or Reformational vision,[206] not least in the face of the challenges to the Christian faith from the Western European enlightenment which came to prominence in the Eighteenth Century and which have shaped the Western mind-set subsequently.

Calvin provides a thoroughgoing re-orientation of Christian theology to take full account of God's sovereign acts in creation, redemption and the bringing of creation to its final transformation.[207] For Calvin, the world is the '*theatrum dei gloriae*' (the 'theatre of God's glory').[208] He rejects any attempt to downplay the created order as somehow of secondary significance, or indeed somehow to be negated or transcended. Two distinguishing features of the Calvinian vision, to which Calvin's theology gives rise, are: first, the recognition of the universal sovereignty of God over all things, over all areas of life and over history as a whole; and, second, the view of religion as a covenant between God and humanity.[209] In particular, the Calvinian view is that grace is the restoration by God of the created order in response to human sin and its consequences in the wider creation. The purpose of grace is not only as a remedy for sin, but also transformatively to realise God's deeper purposes. The promise of grace does not stand 'over against' nature but is God's provision with respect to sin (although

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[206] Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd followed Kuyper in the use of the term 'Calvinistic', although Dooyeweerd later preferred the term 'Christian philosophy'. 'Reformational' is a usage coined specifically to indicate the distinctive philosophical tradition which Kuyper set in train.
[207] Benjamin W. Farley, 'The Providence of God in Reformed Perspective' (1992): 87-93.
[208] Susan E. Schreiner, *The Theatre of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin* (1991): 7-37.
[209] Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte (33a)* (1933): 21.

not itself the opposite of sin: sin and grace are not ontologically equivalent or correlative – grace is the remedy for sin not its balance or corollary). While creation is fallen in every respect it is also redeemable in every respect through God's grace – total human depravity calls for total redemption not only for humanity itself but also for the effects of human depravity on the wider creation.[210]

Calvin's all-encompassing vision was inherited and developed as a social and cultural programme in the late nineteenth century Netherlands by the towering figure of Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), the father of Reformational philosophy. Kuyper sought to set out a Calvinian philosophy that responds to the challenges of the modern world.[211] He does this by highlighting the need for a distinctively Christian 'world and life view' (or 'worldview' for short)[212] that takes account of both the diversity and the unity of human experience in the light of God's sovereignty over every area of life. This is a position that Kuyper came to through a series of decisive events in his life.

(a) Kuyper's view of Theology and Worldview

Kuyper argued for a Calvinian 'world and life view' distinct from the alternative worldviews of the Greeks and the Enlightenment, and indeed from the 'scholastic' attempt at a synthesis. According to Kuyper, the distinctively Christian worldview is best expressed in the Calvinian tradition, illuminated by the Scriptures. From seeing the world as that which has order and normativity in itself, the new viewpoint sees the world as being subject to an order and

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[210] Albert M. Wolters, 'The Intellectual Milieu of Herman Dooyeweerd' (1985): 4-5; Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)* ; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2', *Polemios* 2 (1947); Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.484; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.516 (Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin, *Institutes*: 2.1.9).

[211] I shall not follow the tendency which has been dominant in Western thought to identify the 'world' with that which is external to 'me' or 'us' (whoever 'I' or 'we' might be). Rather the 'world' includes 'me' or 'us' as much as it does 'my' environment, and in relating to the world 'I' am relating to 'myself as much as to my environment.

[212] The term used by Kuyper in his seminal *Lectures on Calvinism* (Kuyper, *Lectures*: 11-12; Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 88-96; Naugle, *Worldview: the History of a Concept*: 16-25). The notion of a 'world and life view', or 'worldview' for short, seems to have been borrowed most immediately from James Orr who made it the theme of his Kerr Lectures in 1891 (Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World as Centering in the Incarnation*). In its wider context, the term '*Weltaunschauung*' was first used, albeit in passing, by Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* and taken up, amongst others, by G. W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Nietzsche (Naugle, *Worldview: the History of a Concept*: 55, 58, 68-107; see also Albert M. Wolters, 'On the idea of a Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy': 14-25; Klapwijk, 'On Worldviews and Philosophy': 41-55; Tol, 'Foreword': viii). I am aware of the criticism that this implicitly uses a strongly visual metaphor, but the use of 'view' is not meant to privilege the faculty of sight over any of the other faculties. The visual is selected as representative of all the other faculties (hearing, touch etc.).

normativity that cannot be deduced purely from its own constitution. In other words, the view of the world to which palingenesis gives rise contest the view (described as 'naturalism') that the world in itself contains its own rationale and purpose. This includes a contestation of the naturalistic attack on the authority of Holy Scripture, and the relegation, by the naturalistic perspective, to the experience of palingenesis being seen as a purely psychological or sociological phenomenon.

In particular, Kuyper notes four things which need to be taken with new seriousness: firstly, personal regeneration; secondly, its inspiration; thirdly, the final restoration of all things; and, fourthly, miracles. The Enlightenment called all these four things into question. These do not simply concern the subject matter traditionally classed as 'Theology', but all areas of life. Each area of life needs to be look at the consequences of this in terms of its own discipline, not in terms of what Theology prescribes. As Kuyper says famously, 'there is not a single inch in the whole domain of one's human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: 'Mine!'' We can only relate to God as his subjects (as we shall see, in the sense of 'subject' which means that which is subjected to something else rather that the second sense of 'subject' which as we shall see relates to the subject-side of the subject-object relationship).

God deals with sinful humanity on the same basis as he does with sinless humanity, except that the effects of sin must be neutralized (common grace) and humanity now comes to know God on the basis of saving (particular) grace. With respect to religion, God deals with sinful humanity in the incarnation, necessary for Kuyper only because of sin. Now that the created inward fellowship of humanity with God has been broken, the remedy is through the common consciousness of humanity as a whole.

With respect to faith, the turning away from God in unbelief, putting something creaturely in the place of God, requires God's act of palingenesis to turn apostasy into saving faith. The focus of this, previously in the soul is now transferred to the manifestation of God incarnate. With respect to human understanding, it is not sufficient to identify Revelation with God's saving action, to individuals, but much more widely with the historic unfolding of God's remedy in relation to humanity as a whole.

The primary intention of God's revelation in not narrowly soteriological but is that of theodicy. Revelation aims firstly, as the triumph over sin and death extending to the whole cosmos; secondly, at the reflection of the manifold wisdom of God in the mind of humanity; and thirdly, the offer of salvation to each generation. It is in the incarnate Christ that the new humanity is given its new consciousness and head. Revelation of the Logos is in the flesh (incarnatio), as well as in the word (*inscripturatio*) – both necessary in laying the basis for the

restoration of true knowledge of God, firstly, by Christ as a fully human subject and, secondly, in its perfection.

The science of theology is the task undertaken by a regenerated humanity with the Holy Spirit as the inner animator. The idea of theology is that of the knowledge of God, while the conception of theology is twofold: depending on whether it is focus on the intellectual labour itself, or the result of that labour. With respect to the former, in its broadest terms, it is the work of the logical subject of humanity (that is, Christ), by which it takes the revealed knowledge of God into its consciousness and reflects upon it with respect to the latter, as product, it is the scientific insight of the regenerated human experience and reflection into the knowledge of God. In this latter, special grace need to be seen as temporary and provisional, but nevertheless necessary. In this, there both continuity with, but as the same time a distinction from, all the other forms of religious experience gained from Christian revelation.

In his Stone Lectures On Calvinism Kuyper sets out four 'life-conceptions' which dominate the Western vision of God, humanity and the world: paganism, Romanism, modernism and Calvinism – the last of which he argues in most consistent with Scripture. Modernism, for Kuyper, attempts to build a world of its own from the data of nature rather than bow the knee to Christ. In a later lecture, 'Evolution', Kuyper sets the dogma of the Trinity – for him a foundational belief, against what he calls the 'pseudo-dogma' of Evolution – the epitome of the modernist worldview.

I shall now trace three themes common to the Reformational vision of the work of God in the world. In articulating this vision, Kuyper and those who followed him built on the strongly Trinitarian character of Calvin's theology. We can see this Trinitarian character reflected in three central themes of Kuyper's exposition: first, the integrity of all individuals before God the Father – the Father uniquely creates and calls individuals, not least human individuals as integral beings; second, the plural diversity of the created order under the rule of the Son, through whom alone all things cohere – the Son is Lord over every area of life; and third, the unfolding purposiveness of the created order through the work of the Holy Spirit, who transforms all things and brings about the new heaven and the new earth – the Holy Spirit effects the acts of creation, redemption and the bringing of all things to their state of final glory.

The first overarching theme in Reformational thought, then, is that of the integrity of the individual subject or 'subjèct' (to follow Vollenhoven's later orthography).[213] This emphasis

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[213] See Tol, 'Foreword': xxi ; Vollenhoven, *Gastcolleges Wijsbegeerte. Erfenis voor het heden* (2011): 32) for both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd of distinguishing between the 'subjèct' (i.e., that which is subjected to

on the integrity of the individual subjèct is in keeping with the broad vision of God's sovereignty over the whole of life. Just as all areas of life are to be affirmed as created by God and therefore to be valued, so too should the material palpability and individual uniqueness of ordinary things be respected and celebrated. The sacred/secular split treats some elements of creation as 'higher' and others as 'lower'. But for Kuyper, all created things are on one level *coram Deo*.[214] We see this represented in the Golden Age of Dutch painting, where the value of the individual thing, no matter how commonplace, was expressed with care and attention to detail within the overall composition. As Kuyper puts it, the Dutch school, which flourished during the period of greatest Calvinist influence in that country, opened one's eyes to 'the small and insignificant'.[215]

Each human being stands before God as a unique creature, and as such, is responsible to God for his or her actions and indeed for the basic underlying orientation which gives rise to those actions. The original relationship of human beings with God, other human beings and their environment has become distorted through sin and rebellion. Humanity is in a state of disobedience, and creation as a whole has been distorted as a consequence. However, in the midst of the all-pervasiveness of sin and its consequences in the rest of creation, each individual human being still has the responsibility to turn to God in total dependence and covenantal obedience.[216]

From a Reformational perspective, all created things have equal ontic status in that the being of all created individuals is equally and directly dependent on the Father. This vision of the direct dependence of every creature upon God contrasts with the picture of the 'great chain of being' in which God's relationship is mediated hierarchically down this chain of being from 'higher' creatures, or 'higher' created elements, to 'lower' ones.[217] Further, all entities in the world are to be understood not as phenomenal representations of an underlying reality (such as a substance), but rather as creatures called into being, and subject, moment by moment, to God's call and purpose. This does not exclude the functional differences one from another, nor that human beings and other sentient creatures have the capacity for true knowledge, and

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God's law or norm – for which Dooyeweerd sometimes uses the French 'sujet'), and 'súbject' (i.e., the 'active' or 'higher' pole of a relation or 'inter-relation'.

[214] See Mt. 6.26.

[215] Kuyper, *Lectures*: 167.

[216] Kuyper, 'The Blurring of the Boundaries (1892)' (1998): 391. Here, despite Dooyeweerd's strictures about Von Stahl's conservative influence upon Kuyper (already mentioned), Kuyper is himself critical of Von Stahl's conservatism and his too ready identification of God's providence with the *status quo*.

[217] Hendrik G. Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid: Over het Zin-Karakter van de Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd', *P.R.* 35 (1970): 26-32. See Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (1976).

(as is the case for all creatures) can truly be known. But while it is only human beings who can come to know their dependence upon God; their dependence upon God, as with all creatures, is prior to that knowledge: the (noetic) direct or indirect awareness of God arises from the real (ontic) dependence of humanity, as of creation as a whole, upon God.

The theme of the integrity of individuals before God needs to be seen in the context of the subjugation of all relationships to the sovereign rule of Christ. This is the second Reformational theme, to which I shall now turn.

The second Reformational theme, is the affirmation of the world's irreducible plurality under the rule of the Son, in whom it is created, through whom it is redeemed, and by whom it will be judged. The Son is the Co-creator and the Saviour of the world – and is the latter only because he is already the former. There is therefore no grace/nature division. From a Reformational perspective, 'grace' and 'nature' should not be set against one another – the proper distinction is between creation and re-creation.[218] '*Re*-creation' means the transformation of the first creation after the entry of sin – it is a purging of its subsequent fallenness, and a healing of its wounds, not the nullification of its original goodness.

Kuyper sees human society neither as an undifferentiated whole, nor as a conglomerate of atomistic individuals. Both the collectivist and individualist tendencies are present in unstable combination in the ideas of the French Revolution and the developments to which it gave rise. Against both collectivism and individualism, he sets out a vision of society in which there are clearly differentiated social structures, arising from the order of creation but unfolded in history, each with its own appropriate sphere of responsibility and competence. For Kuyper, all spheres of the society (family, business, science, art as well as state and church) are directly under the Lordship of the Son.[219] He calls this 'sphere sovereignty' ('souvereiniteit in eigen kring'). However, he uses the notion of 'sphere sovereignty' in various and somewhat different ways.[220] This creates difficulties, as his uses of the term are not entirely compatible with each other, certainly not in their initial exposition. There are at least three different ways in which he uses the notion.

The first sense is outlined in his inaugural address at the V.U., where he presents a theory of societal institutions. He elaborates this vision in greater detail in his 1898 Stone Lectures at Princeton, where he sets out a view of 'sphere sovereignty' in which state, church, and all institutions of society are envisaged as possessing distinctive areas of competence and

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[218] Kuyper, 'Common Grace (1902-4)' (1998): 171-174.
[219] Kuyper, 'Common Grace': 170; Kuyper, *Lectures*: 78-170.
[220] Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 154-160'.

appropriate operations according to their specific task or function.[221] He draws on the well-developed pluralist tradition in Reformed thought from John Althusius (1557-1638) on.[222].

The first sense of Kuyper's 'sphere sovereignty' was developed later by both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. Both these latter contend that Kuyper is vague and inconsistent about how the spheres were actually defined, and suggest that this lack of clarity prevents him from developing a systematic social and political theory.[223] Both give accounts of how the range of institutions in society act in accordance with universal principles, not simply as a conservative defence of existing corporate rights or practices. As we shall see, far from Dooyeweerd's advocacy of pluralism being a reactionary stance, he sets out a normative basis on which 'progressive' and 'reactionary' tendencies in the development of society can be identified, so that the former could be promoted and the latter counteracted.[224] This in turn provides the basis for a pluralistic vision of society, according to which not only the power of the state but also of any other overweening institution or element can be held in check. Only thus can there be genuine social flourishing.[225] Dooyeweerd especially develops an account of social institutions, with particular attention to the philosophy of law. Further, the way in which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd develop 'sphere sovereignty' provides more systematically for a philosophy encompassing the whole of creation rather than merely human society. In this regard, they were building on the second sense of 'sphere sovereignty' to which I now turn.

The second sense of 'sphere sovereignty', which is implicit rather than explicit in Kuyper's thinking, is of diversity as a creational principle. Although he does not number or provide us with a systematic description of them, for Kuyper there are numerous and diverse domains which govern relations among individuals: religious, political, scientific, artistic, economic,

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[221] Kuyper, *Lectures*: 79, 90-91.
[222] Johan Van der Vyver, 'The Jurisprudential Legacy of Abraham Kuyper and Leo XIII', *Journal of Markets & Morality* 5 (2002): 212-214; Max Stackhouse, 'Christianity, Civil Society and the State: A Protestant Response ' (2002): 257. However, in working out what 'sphere sovereignty' actually means, Kuyper is still deeply influenced by nineteenth century currents of thought, namely, historicism and organicism.
[223] Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 160; Dooyeweerd, '[Interview by Pieter Boeles in 1975]' (1977): 50-51; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 53-56; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 54-58; Jan De Bruijn, 'Calvinism and Romanticism: Abraham Kuyper as a Calvinist Politician' (2000); Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen in de wetenschap (59d)' (1992): 141.
[224] Dooyeweerd, 'Criteria' Vollenhoven, 'De souvereiniteit in eigen kring bij Kuyper en ons (1950n)' (1992): 36-46.
[225] James W. Skillen, 'From Covenant of Grace to Equitable Public Pluralism: The Dutch Calvinist Contribution', *Calvin Theological Journal* (1996): 67-96. For a pragmatic interpretation see Richard J. Mouw, 'Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty' (2000).

and familial. Each is subject directly to the Son and obeys its own laws of life.[226] For Kuyper, this plurality is expressed in the form of a diversity of 'creation ordinances' relevant to different *kinds of relations* (to be distinguished from the *institutional* plurality of the first sense of 'sphere sovereignty' described above).[227] The diversity of the created order depends for its true character on the rule of Christ over every area of life. Kuyper's best-known statement proclaims the need to make all aspects of life subject to Christ. As he puts it:

> '…there is not a square inch in the whole domain of one's human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over *all,* does not cry: ''Mine!'' '[228]

This is a striking vision of Christ as the ascended Lord, who rules with the authority of the Father by virtue of his status not only as the one in whom and through whom all things were created, but also as Saviour and, further, as future Judge. For Kuyper, the general principle of Calvinism involves what he calls 'the cosmological significance of Christ'. In speaking of Christ's 'cosmological significance', he has Christ's redemptive role in view, as well as his prior creative one. Christ is redeemer of all creation because he is creator of all. For this reason, Christ's work includes the '*restoration of the entire cosmos*', not simply the 'redemption of individual sinners'.[229]

From a more consistently Reformational perspective, the way that Kuyper describes the Lordship of Christ over creation as a whole is not entirely satisfactory. There are residual 'scholastic' elements in his thought, not least in his distinction between 'archetype' and 'ectype': the archetype being located in its eternal origin in God, and the ectype being the temporal expression of the eternal truth. He emphasises the role of the Son as mediator of creation, possibly at the cost of attributing to 'creation ordinances' an absoluteness that subjects the work of God to quasi-divine structures (similar to Plato's 'laws'). The Logos as Kuyper conceives it tends to be understood as an impersonal principle of a logical character, and he tends to accord the creation ordinances eternal status as universals existing alongside

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[226] Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 53-58; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 48-54.

[227] Dooyeweerd, *De beteekenis der wetsidee voor rechtswetenschap en rechtsphilosophie.* (1926): 63-64; W.J. Ouweneel, *De leer van de mens: Proeve van een christelijk-wijsgerige anthropologie* (1986): 262; Jacob Klapwijk, 'Reformational Philosophy on the Boundary between the Past and the Future', *P.R.* 52 (1987): 110-115. There was a move away from the notion of 'creation ordinances' which Kuyper and others so powerfully enunciated. This was partly in reaction to the misuse of the idea by theologians during the Nazi period, but also partly to the association of the idea with notions of supra-temporality (A. Van Egmond and Cornelis Van der Kooi, 'The appeal to creation ordinances: a changing tide', *Forum* 21 (1993)).

[228] 'Sphere Sovereignty' in James D. Bratt, ed., *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader* (1998): 488.

[229] Kuyper, *Lectures*: 118-119 (Kuyper's italics). As we shall see in the following section (1.3) this restoration is effected specifically by the Holy Spirit, but under the kingship of the Son.

God with a pre-ordained fixity. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were to critique Kuyper for this reason.[230]

However, despite their critique of these residual scholastic elements, this second, wider sense of sphere sovereignty as creational diversity was rigorously developed by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. As we shall see, their conception of 'sphere sovereignty' would later be set within the diversity of norms that govern all relationships.[231] It is complementary to the first sense of 'sphere sovereignty', which affirms the diversity of the corporate structures of society, and the need for this diversity to be respected, nurtured and protected. However, there is a third sense of 'sphere sovereignty' which has sometimes come to eclipse the other two senses as the 'the Kuyperian position'. This third sense, which I shall consider now, is of a different order to the first two, and arguably at variance with them.

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[230] Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno: toelichting op den Heidelbergschen catechismus* (1904): 1.150, 196; Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 2* (1909): §§4, 7, 14, 18, 21, 25, 26, 32, 46, 55, 60, 64; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles* (1898): §§39, 42, 49, 53, 56, 60, 61, 67, 81, 90, 95, 99. See Van Egmond and Van der Kooi, 'The appeal to creation ordinances: a changing tide'; Dooyeweerd, 'Wat de *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* aan Dr Kuyper te danken heeft', *De Reformatie* 29 (1937); Dooyeweerd, 'Kuyper's wetenschapsleer', *P. R.* 4 (1939); Vollenhoven, 'De souvereiniteit in eigen kring by Kuyper en ons (1950)'; 'Norm en natuurwet (1951)'; and 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons (1952)' (also in Anthony Tol and K.A. Bril, ed., *Vollenhoven als wijsgeer: Inleidingen en teksten* (1992): 36-46, 47-65, 64-96); John Vander Stelt, 'Kuyper's Semi-mystical Conception', *P. R.* 38 (1973): 179; Johan Stellingwerff, 'Kritiek op K. Schilder als Filosoferend Dogmaticus', *P. R.* 27 (1962): 124-125 (n. 6). Vollenhoven characterises Kuyper's position first as a 'Platonising type of speculative semi-mysticism' in a 'pure cosmological and dualistic' schema, with the eternal as 'higher' and the temporal as 'lower'. However, he sees him later becoming a 'cosmogonic-cosmological' monist interactionist (Bril and Boonstra, ed., *S. Kaarten*: 121, 256(krt #50, KL14, LVII; krt #46c; Vollenhoven, 'Historische achtergrond en toekomst', *Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte* (1970) – I am grateful to Anthony Tol for this latter reference; see also Jacob Klapwijk, 'Abraham Kuyper over wetenschap en universiteit' (1987): 71-74, 76-78); C. Veenhof, *In Kuyper's lijn: enkele opmerkingen over den invloed van Dr. A. Kuyper op de 'Wijsbegeerte der wetsidee'* (1939): 26-32; Van Til, *Common Grace and the Gospel* (1974): 35-40). According to Dooyeweerd, Kuyper's reaction to Kantian idealism was to assert a strong realism of a logical character, centred on the Son as Logos (Dooyeweerd, 'Kuyper's wetenschapsleer': 221-225; R.D. Henderson, *Illuminating Law: the Construction of Herman Dooyeweerd's Thought,1918-1928* (1994): 90-92). Henderson notes that from 1937, Dooyeweerd explicitly criticises Kuyper for his support of realism (Henderson, *Illuminating Law*: 117 (n. 209)). Vander Stelt argues that 'organic' is not a biological metaphor, but denotes a universally valid structure pertaining objectively to the entity under consideration (Vander Stelt, 'Kuyper's Semi-mystical Conception': 182-183).

[231] See Dooyeweerd, 'Introduction by the Editor in Chief ... [to *The Idea of a Christian Philosophy: Essays in Honour of D.H.Th. Vollenhoven*]', *P. R.* 38 (1973); Vollenhoven, 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons (1952k)' (1992); Vollenhoven, 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons [2]', *Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte* (1952); Tol, 'Foreword': viii-x.

This third sense of 'sphere sovereignty' can be seen in Kuyper's rectorial address of 1892, 'De Verflauwing der Grenzen' ('the blurring of the boundaries'). This sense of sphere sovereignty is what was subsequently called 'verzuiling' ('columned society'), where the only remedy for the pervasive influence of pantheism (defined very broadly) was to form an independent 'life-sphere' ('levenskring') in which educational and other institutions for each group of believers, defined confessionally, are established.[232] Here, as Heslam points out, he uses the term 'sphere' to indicate not a social institution or association, but, a 'realm of human existence' or, more specifically, a confessionally defined zone or complex of institutions and associations defined by the fundamental religious beliefs of their respective confessional communities.[233]

It is this sense of 'sphere sovereignty' as 'verzuiling' that has had the most notable impact on the social and political ordering of the Netherlands. But it is also the most problematical of the senses of 'sphere sovereignty'. It is in danger of drawing a straight line from the fundamental religious belief of the members of a given community to the corporate expression of that belief. This can result in a form of separatism along confessional lines without fully taking into account the distinctly creational structure of each of the social entities concerned.[234] It might lead to the dominance of one institution over another in a way that violates their sphere sovereignty in the first sense. For example, it might give undue dominance to the church as an institution over other institutions or associations, leading to an over-concentration on one aspect of creation at the expense of another (such as faith over justice). Also, as Heslam points out, it is unclear how it can be related to the original creation order, since the confessional diversity which arose out of doctrinal controversies (although perhaps not arising for cultural or other reasons) can only have arisen after the fall. In this regard, it seems to be in conflict also with the sense of 'sphere sovereignty' that stems from the diversity inherent in the created order itself.[235]

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[232] Bratt, ed., *Kuyper Reader*: 400-401.

[233] Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 160. 'Confessional community' means more than merely church communities. Each ecclesiastical grouping has associated cultural, social and educational structures. The Vrije Universiteit (V.U.) in Amsterdam is a case in point. Initially it was established in 1880, under Abraham Kuyper's personal influence, but was bound institutionally to the Gereformeede Kerken in Nederland (G.K.N.) from 1886 to 1999 (A. Th. Van Deursen, *The Distinctive Character of the Free University in Amsterdam, 1880-2005: A Commemorative History* (2008): 190, 444). This link was ended 1999, and after that, the G.K.N. became part of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (Protestantse Kerk in Nederland – P.K.N) founded in 2004.

[234] Kuyper speaks of the separation of different kinds of people on the basis of *palingenesis* (Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §4; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §39. I owe this suggestion to Anthony Garood).

[235] Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 160.

Despite the different ways in which 'sphere sovereignty' has been understood (and also despite the problems of the historicistic influences upon the 'sphere sovereignty', especially in its social expression) we can still trace a common theme of a creation subject to God and harmoniously diverse to the extent that it is subject to God in the different aspects of the created order. As we shall see, despite differences in the way they were influenced, both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven sought to promote Kuyper's vision of the Lordship of Christ over every area of life. Creation, although at present fallen and subject to the distortion of sin, needs to be seen in all of its harmonious diversity; and, moreover, needs to be seen in terms of the unfolding of God's purposes in history. It is this last theme to which I shall now turn.

The third theme of the Reformational vision is the affirmation of the purposive nature of the historical process. As in the first theme we see the integrity of each individual subject *coram Deo,* and in the second the sovereignty of Christ over every area of life, so in the third we see the work of the Spirit in bringing about God's purposes in and through the historical process.

The work of the Holy Spirit takes place within the context of the covenant between God and the whole of the created order generally, and with humanity in particular. Kuyper develops this first in terms of God's original action of creation effected through the work of the Holy Spirit.[236]

Thus the purposes of God are worked out by the Holy Spirit in creation as a whole. Kuyper rejects the 'Romanist' teaching that there are two spheres: the earthly and the heavenly, with corresponding human capacities, 'natural' and 'super-natural'; and the fall seen as involving the loss of the latter but not the former. In terms of the Reformational perspective, enunciated by Kuyper, there is no final distinction between the everyday and the sacred. The distinction is rather that between the *principium* of the work of the Spirit and the *principium* of the world at enmity with God. According to this understanding, miracles are marked out purely according to their revelatory power, not because they are more directly the work of God than any others.[237] Sexual and other physical appetites are not in any sense deficiencies or elements of the created order that somehow need to be transcended. The issue is not the desires themselves, but the way in which they are directed and given expression. Unlike Plato's view of reality, physicality is not seen as something from which we are to be healed or from which we are to escape,[238] but as something that needs to be redeemed, restored, and

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[236] Kuyper, *Het Werk van den Heiligen Geest* (1927): 55-78; Kuyper, *The Work of the Holy Spirit* (1946): 1.2; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek: College-dictaat van een der studenten* (1910): 3 Locus de Providentia.

[237] Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 'Locus de Providentia', §7, pp. 204-222; Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §32; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §67.

[238] See Plato, 'Phaedo' (1997): 114c, p. 197; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight of Western Thought* (1972): 167-172. Catherine Pickstock attempts to salvage Plato's account in this respect from a Christian perspective (Catherine

transformed according to God's purposes. Kuyper argues that this involves an appreciation of the 'cosmological significance' of Christ. This was something that had been lost sight of prior to the Reformation with the rupture between the life of nature and the life of grace.[239] He argues, rather, from a Calvinist standpoint that the whole of humanity is fallen in every respect, but that the full implications of human sinfulness (which left to itself would lead to the degeneracy of human life) have been kept in check by common grace. This restraint of evil is the reverse side of the coin to the unfolding of created potential. Through common grace, sin is not permitted entirely to destroy the potential of the created order. Common grace makes history possible, not, in Kuyper's words, as 'an endless, unvarying repetition of the same things', but as 'constant change, modification, and transformation in human life'. God is constantly bringing about new things by which life can be enriched; indeed, God brings to light hidden talents and develops human history by a 'regular process', securing humanity and its cultural milieu, and making possible all scientific endeavours.[240]

Redemption, then, from a Reformational perspective, is not the recovery of some lost constituent element of humanity or of the world, nor does it involve the abandonment of certain elements or features of the world. From this perspective sin is not the loss of a property or substance, or even a deficiency in being – it is a wrong orientation of one's stance towards God, and how this works out in the way we live. Faith is not an additional element in the human constitution, something to be given or restored, but a re-orientation of one's whole being to God through the redemption one has in Christ through the work of the Holy Spirit.[241] Similarly, the Christian hope is not for a future disembodied state but for the resurrection, in Christ through the Spirit, of the whole human life, bodily restored, in a transformed universe.[242] The implication of this is that Christians are called, through God's Spirit, to

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Pickstock, 'The Soul in Plato' (2003)). However, despite Pickstock's gloss, it can still be argued that the Platonic vision remains irreconcilable with the Christian expectation of the resurrection of the body, which excludes, on the one hand, any materialistic reductionism but also, on the other hand, any downplaying of present physicality or future embodiment.

[239] Kuyper, *Werk Heiligen Geest*: 79-94; Kuyper, *Holy Spirit*: 1.3; Kuyper, *Lectures*: 118.

[240] Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §25; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §60; Kuyper, *Lectures*: 122-126; Kuyper, 'Common Grace': 174-175.

[241] In this sense, 'faith' is more than what Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd would call the 'pistical' modality, and is closer to what they both call '[D]irection'.

[242] Kuyper, *Uit Het Woord: Stichtelijke Bijbelstudiën* (1873/1875/1879): 3.5.3 'De Schepping', pp. 20-21,'De Wedergeboorte der Schepping' ; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 5 'Locus de Consummatione Saeculi, pp. 313-327; Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.9.3, pp. 195-202; Herman Bavinck, *The Last Things: Hope for This World and the Next* (1996): 155-169. As Dooyeweerd puts it: 'Where one does not accept the *full* and *radical* sense of the word of Scripture: 'The Word became flesh', the scriptural *boundary* between *God* and *creature* becomes an unscriptural *separation* and *absolute conflict* between *eternity* and *time* (Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner's boek *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen*', *A.R.S.* 9 (1935): 337 ('Waar men den *vollen* en *radicalen* zin

engage in all aspects of society, alongside their neighbours, and thus realise created potential, and more than that, become agents for its transformation, through common grace. The world at large is the objective of God's final purposes and is to be subject in its wholeness to God's rule.[243] In the light of this final purpose, the development of the world has value in itself, not simply as a means to an end.[244]

Thus, through the working of the Holy Spirit in creation, the restraint of the effects of sin at large through common grace, and the restoration of humanity to full fellowship with God through special grace, Kuyper sees an overall purposiveness in the direction of history and the whole temporal process.

To sum up: the Reformational vision takes the affirmation of God's sovereignty over every area of life. This is a vision inherited from John Calvin, and is central to Reformed theology. It was re-affirmed in a comprehensive way by Abraham Kuyper, in response to the Enlightenment's scepticism about God's agency in the world, to the reorganisation of society along secularist lines following the French Revolution, and more broadly to the dualisms which variously characterised Greek, medieval and modern thought. The vision which Kuyper enunciated is a symphony consisting of three themes. These three themes are: the integrity of the individual subject before God; the irreducible plurality of the world and of society under the rule of the Son; and God's providence for the world, both for humanity and the wider cosmos, through the work of the Spirit. The three themes point to God's threefold agency in the world: the will of the Father addresses all created beings as whole entities and expresses the Father's care for each individual creature; the revelation of the Son models for us the many different ways in which the world is and should be; and the work of the Spirit transforms the world according to God's purposes. While the work of God has this threefold character, it is a work carried out jointly by Father, Son and Holy Spirit in creation, redemption and the transformation of redeemed humanity and the world.

Kuyper's lead was followed by a new generation of Reformational thinkers who continued his work. Chief among these were Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. The two philosophers were guided by Kuyper's vision of the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but sought to express this in a more consistent and comprehensive way than Kuyper himself had been able

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van het Schriftwoord: 'Het Woord is vleesch geworden' niet aanvaardde [*sic*.], werd de schriftuurlijke *grens* tusschen *God* en *schepsel* tot een onschriftuurlijke *scheiding* en *absolute tegenstrijdigheid* tusschen *eeuwigheid* en *tijd*')).

[243] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1960): 2.2.16; Kuyper, *Werk Heiligen Geest*: 2.8, pp. 72-78; Kuyper, *Holy Spirit*: 2.8, pp. 38-41; see Vincent Bacote, *The Spirit in Public Theology: Appropriating the Legacy of Abraham Kuyper* (2005): 112-116.

[244] Kuyper, 'Common Grace': 176.

to achieve. This systematic approach encompassed all areas of knowledge, and sought to address universal human experience in a much less culturally specific way than that of Kuyper.[245] Both were critical of elements in traditional Reformed theology which they felt compromised the integrity and global nature of this vision, and sought to set out a systematic philosophical structure which enshrined the Calvinian vision, but excluded those elements antithetical to it. As we shall see, neither Dooyeweerd's nor Vollenhoven's appropriations of the Kuyperian tradition were straightforward. Indeed, both came under strong criticism in the 1930s for departing from it in significant ways. However, both followed the trail blazed by Kuyper, and were inspired and shaped by the vision he enunciated.

In the section which follows, I shall look more closely at Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, as the two leading Reformational philosophers of the Twentieth Century.

(b) Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd's view of Theology and Philosophy

The issue of the relation between philosophy and theology as well as the question of the relation between religion and philosophy is a fraught and painful one in reformational philosophical circles. Suspicion of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven by their theological colleagues creating accentuated the doubts in the Reformational Community about the value of theological insights in the development of a Christian philosophy, and hardened the lines of debate – almost to the extent of creating a kind of trench warefare between the two sides of the debate.

The onslaught by 'Reformed scholasticism' on the philosophical movement led by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd occurred in the course of the 1930s. Vollenhoven's colleagues in the theological faculty at the V.U. of Amsterdam confronted him aggressively. A central target of this attack were the views Vollenhoven expressed in his book of 1933, Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, and indeed, amongst other things, an attack on Vollenhoven's critique of the soul/body dualism and his account of the 'heart' as the religious centre of human existence. The charges centred upon Vollenhoven's denial of the 'immortality of the soul', which suggests the conclusion that it was Vollenhoven (himself proxy, perhaps, for Janse) who was the real target of the attack, rather than Dooyeweerd, since it was he who primarily contested the immortality of the soul, and indeed its very existence as a substance or entity. Between 1937 and 1939, the Curators of the V.U. examined both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, and charges were brought against them by Valentijn Hepp (1879-1950), Professor of Theology at the V.U. in Amsterdam. This was

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[245] Dooyeweerd, 'Introduction by the Editor in Chief': 5-16; Dooyeweerd, 'Boeles Interview'

accompanied by an even fiercer attack on Vollenhoven by Hendrik Steen, a student of the son of Abraham Kuyper, H.H. Kuyper (1864-1945), a leading figure at the Vrije Universiteit. The public attack on Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd was accompanied by a quasi-judicial investigation of the theological positions of the two philosophers by the authorities of the Vrije Universiteit. Both professors were required to appear before the Curators, with Hepp as the major accuser. The matter was delegated, eventually, to the circle of the professors of the University for further consideration, and with the hope that it might be resolved, but the matter remained in abeyance. Despite the somewhat inconclusive outcome of the whole affair, the intervention spearheaded by Hepp against both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven left a mark in the attitude of the two philosophers to theologians.

The theological roots of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven's thought were obscured partly to avoid the polemical assaults to which both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven were subjected – but also because of a systematic attempt, especially by Dooyeweerd, to question in principle any theological scrutiny of the stated basis of his philosophical system. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven responded to this criticism and scrutiny in different way.
Ironically, it was Dooyeweerd who evinced the strongest reaction in this regard, refusing to have any philosophical statement subjected to theological scrutiny,   and he disclaims and rejects any theological examination of the expression of religious belief. Vollenhoven showed himself willing on numerous occasions (as we have seen) and indeed able incisively to defend his position against theological opponents, although he was not prepared to let historical statements of belief stand without careful scrutiny, in the light of wider scriptural affirmations, of the underlying philosophical assumptions.
It was also a matter of deep debate among the following generation of Reformational philosophers, although there is no final consensus.

(i) Dooyeweerd

 Dooyeweerd rejects any theological examination of the expression of religious belief. Augustine (354-430), who identifies Christian doctrine itself as 'Philosophia Christiana';[246]

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[246] Dooyeweerd argues that Augustine's conception represents the synthesis of the contemplation of the eternal forms (as described by Plato) and biblical revelation: in the 'scholastic' vision, the categories of unchangeability and impassibility are imported into the picture of God. This is conflated with the biblical deity, engaged with the world in and through time and incarnate in the person of the Son, who suffers and dies before his resurrection and ascension. For Augustine, the two pictures of Greek philosophy and of biblical revelation are, in Dooyeweerd's view, held together by sheer assertion (Dooyeweerd,*N.C.*: 1.177-179 (not in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, 'De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten', *P. R.* (1958): 2-3, 5-6; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: Ch. 8; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 43, 114-115; Dooyeweerd, 'Philosophie et

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who sees theology, as derived from biblical revelation, crowning the understanding of the world provided by Greek philosophy;[247] and Karl Barth (1886-1968) who sees theology as displacing philosophy as the only true basis for knowledge about God and the world.[248]

Basic religious belief (that is, the fundamental orientation of one's world and life view) is expressed in what he calls 'ground-motives'.[249] He identifies four ground-motives which

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théologie', *Revue Reformée* 9 (1958): 48-49, 55; Yasunori Ichikawa, 'Herman Dooyeweerd's view of theology as science' (1979): 33-35)).

[247] In the case of Thomas Aquinas and the medieval 'scholastics', Augustine's conception is schematised into a two-tier view of the world. In the lower sphere, the world is understood by reason, God-given but otherwise unaided. In the higher sphere, content is provided by revelation, including biblical revelation, in a manner complementary to an understanding of the world achieved by reason alone. This latter approach is called the analogia entis, the extrapolation of the existence of God from a consideration of the nature of the world. Revelation then, according to this account of Thomas, supplements what can be known by natural means. Thomas, like Augustine, subordinates nature to grace in his schema (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.179-185 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, 'Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie': 7-10; R. & S. 2: Ch. 8; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 44-45,116-118; Dooyeweerd, 'Philosophie et théologie': 49; Ichikawa, 'Herman Dooyeweerd's view of theology as science': 36-39.

[248] It might seem strange that Dooyeweerd treats Barth as a 'scholastic'. However, for Dooyeweerd, since Barth operates within the grace/nature ground-motive which characterises the scholastic position, he can be so classified – although one might, perhaps, call Barth a 'contradictory' or 'dialectical' scholastic in that Barth's model, as set out in the first volume of his Church Dogmatics, distinguished nature and grace, but sets the two in sharp antithesis. Revelation is the unmerited act of God's grace while natural reason is an apostate human project. In practice (and contrary to his own claims), Barth follows an eclectic path, within a certain, largely implicit, philosophical framework. Further, Dooyeweerd argues, he does not distinguish properly between theology as the knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, and the dogmatic science that seeks to systematize Christian revelation. Barth argues that God can be known solely by revelation and rejects the analogia entis. In its place he puts forward the analogia fidei, which, in effect, mediates one's direct relationship to God through the theoretical categories of dogmatic analysis. In contradiction of his own claim that Christian belief has no point of contact with human experience, he effectively absolutises one aspect of human experience: the faith modality (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.66; 2.34, 300-302 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 336-340; Dooyeweerd, 'Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie': 10-11, 16-17, 21, 50; Dooyeweerd, 'De wijsbegeerte der wetsideee en de ''Barthianism'' ', *P.R.* 16 (1951): 156-157 *et passim*; Dooyeweerd, 'Philosophie et théologie': 49-50, 55; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 119-120).

[249] The term 'ground-motive' is used by Dooyeweerd to designate the basic 'religious' beliefs (i.e., basic to one's personal life-stance) that shape a worldview and are foundational to any philosophical system. Dooyeweerd originally used the term 'ground theme' (Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgerig denken van het Avondland: Een bijdrage tot bepaling van de verhouding tusschen theoretische en religieuze dialectiek', *P. R.* 6 (1941). For background see Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid': 50-51; John N. Kraay, 'Successive Conceptions in the Development of the Christian Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd 2', *P. R.* 45 (1980): 22-36; Albert M. Wolters, 'Ground-Motive', *Anakainosis* 6 (1983): 1-2; Ralph W. Vunderink, 'Ground Motifs – A Modest Revision' (2000)).

have shaped Western thought and culture.[250] The Christian ground-motive, as Dooyeweerd states it, is that of creation, fall and redemption by Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word of God in the communion of the Holy Spirit.[251] Dooyeweerd contrasts this Christian ground-motive with a number of 'apostate' ground-motives. First, there is the form/matter motive that he takes to characterise the religious foundation of Greek thought.[252] Second, there is the

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[250] Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 163-164; Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophical Thought. An Inquiry into the Transcendental Conditions of Philosophy* (1948): 59-77; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte' (1962): 46-63; Dooyeweerd, 'Christian Philosophy: An Exploration' (1996): 24-35; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, Vol.1 Introduction* (2002): 48-50. It has been pointed out that Dooyeweerd's four ground-motives are similar to those identified by Abraham Kuyper in his *Lectures on Calvinism*, namely Paganism, Romanism, Modernism and Calvinism, leaving out Islamism (Kuyper, *Lectures*: 9-40; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S. 1* Dooyeweerd, *R. & S. 1*; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning* ; Dooyeweerd, *Roots* ; see Klapwijk, 'Reformational Philosophy': 109). Dooyeweerd tends to write the ground-motives as 'form-matter' etc. However, I shall use the form 'form/matter' etc. in order to indicate that they involve two dialectically opposed principles, one set over the other (see 4.2.2). While the 'ground-motives' feature as such only from the late 1930s and are not in the *W.d.W*, yet they can be traced back to Dooyeweerd's earliest thinking (see Dooyeweerd, 'R.K. en A.R.S.' 4-6, 48-49).

[251] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472 (but see below)*;* Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.60-61, 102, 113, 173-174, 177, 180, 190, 191,192, 197, 240, 244, 248, 257, 267, 280, 292, 501-502, 507, 524; 2.91, 146, 289; 3.26, 71, 169, 195, 214, 524, 582, 603; Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 169 (omitting the mention of the work of the Holy Spirit); Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*: 67-69; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte': 46-47; Dooyeweerd, 'Christian Philosophy': 24-25; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 41, 136; Dooyeweerd, *The Secularization of Science* (1954): 4; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 58-61. Dooyeweerd does not mention the 'Biblical motive of creation, fall into sin and redemption . . . . ' in *W.d.W.*(as in *N.C.*) but elsewhere he speaks of 'the Christian confession of Creation, fall into sin and redemption' (Dooyeweerd*, W.d.W.*: 2.27-28 ('de belijdenis van Schepping, zondeval en verlossing'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.30 (see also 3.147, 448, 469, 520)).

[252] **Form/matter 'ground-motive'**: Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.25, 61-68, 72, 112-113, 177-178, 180, 182, 190, 201, 360, 532, 539, 2.39, 57, 97, 144-145,154, 289, 417-419; 3.11, 13, 26, 199-200, 711, 737, 779 (none of these in *W.d.W.)*; **form/matter 'schema'/'scheme'**: *W.d.W*.:1.340, 368, 371-372, 438, 447; 2.10-12, 29, 49, 149-153, 347, 347, 442, 489; 3.95, 126, 500, 564; Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 1.374, 400, 404-405, 470-471, 479; 2.9, 12, 14, 31, 50, 208-212, 417, 419, 512, 558; 3.126, 151-152 (n. 1), 553, 640; **form/matter 'theme'**: Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.760 (not in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 164-168; Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*: 62-67; Dooyeweerd*, R. & S 1*: 3-11, 44-321; Dooyeweerd*, R. & S 2*: 247-414; Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*: 23; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.62; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte': 49-54; Dooyeweerd, 'Christian Philosophy': 27-29; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 38-41; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 14-110; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 15-36; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 50-58). Bril argues that Dooyeweerd is heavily influenced by the analyses of Friedrich Nietzsche, and Francis Macdonald Cornford (1874-1943) (K.A. Bril, 'A Comparison between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven on the Historiography of Philosophy', *P.R.* 60 (1995): 124. Full references and discussion in Yong Joon Choi, 'Dialogue and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance of Herman Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique' (2000): 77-82). Vollenhoven objects to Dooyeweerd's characterisation of Greek philosophy predominantly in terms of the form and matter themes (*C.V.C.W.*, 33 (Dec 1945); quoted in Bril, 'Historiography': 124). He himself later provided a somewhat different account, as we shall see (see Bril, 'Historiography' – this will be covered in 5.1).

grace/nature ground-motive characteristic of what Dooyeweerd calls 'scholasticism', produced by the synthesis of the Greek ground-motive with Christian revelation. (The grace/nature ground-motive differs from the form/matter ground-motive in that it allows for the genuine sinfulness of humanity – this sinfulness is seen to work in a realm somehow over and above the original constitution of the world.)[253] Finally, there is the Enlightenment freedom/nature ground-motive characterised by a dichotomy between the 'personality ideal' ('freedom'), and that of the rational and empirical analysis of the physical order ('nature').[254]

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[253] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.* :1.474-493; 2.498-500; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.65-66 (not in *W.d.W.*), 508-527; 2.565-567; Dooyeweerd, 'R.K. en A.R.S.' 6-8, 52; Dooyeweerd, 'C.H. en A.R.P. 3': 57-61; Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 169-170; Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*: 70-73; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S. 2*: passim; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 44; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte': 55-56; Dooyeweerd, 'Christian Philosophy': 29-30; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 111-142; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 111-147; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 61-63. Dooyeweerd wrote a series of articles against 'scholasticism', many of them combined in the second volume of his *Reformation and Scholasticism,* unpublished during his lifetime (Dooyeweerd, 'Boeles Interview': 54). Dooyeweerd's analysis has been discussed critically by H. Robbers (H. Robbers, 'Het natuur-genade-schema als religieus grondmotief der scholastieke wijsbegeerte', *Studia Catholica* (1948); with response: Dooyeweerd, 'Het wijsgerig tweegesprek tusschen de Thomistische philosophie en de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee', *P. R.* 13 (1948); H. Robbers, 'De Calvinistische wijsbegeerte der wetsidee in gesprek met Thomisme', *Studia Catholica* 24 (1949); with response Dooyeweerd, 'De analogische grondbegrippen der vakwetenschappen en hun betrekking tot de structuur van de menschelijken ervaringshorizon', *Medelingen der Koninglijke Akademie van Wetenschappen* 17 (1954)); H. Robbers, 'Analogie der grondbegrippen in de wetenschappen, de wijsbegeerte en de theologie', *Studia Catholica* 29 (1954); with reponse: Dooyeweerd, 'Het gesprek tussen het neo-thomisme en de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee', *Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie* 27 (1966)); and M. F. J. Marlet (M.F.J. Marlet, *Grundlinien der kalvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzesidee' als christlicher Transzendentalphilosophie* (1954); with response: Dooyeweerd, 'Het gesprek tussen het neo-thomisme en de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee'; M.F.J. Marlet, 'Wijsbegeerte der wetsidee en thomistisch denken' (1961); with response: G.C. Berkouwer, 'Identiteit of Conflict?' *P.R.* 21 (1956); and J. A. Aertsen (Jan A. Aertsen, 'Uit God zijn alle dingen: enkele overwegingen bij de 700ste sterfdag van Thomas van Aquino', *P.R.* 39 (1974); Jan A. Aertsen, *Natura en Creatura: De denkweg van Thomas van Aquino* (1982); see Hendrik G. Geertsema, 'Dooyeweerd in discussie met de rooms-katholieke filosofie' (1989); and Choi, 'Dialogue and Antithesis': 83-97). Vollenhoven gives his own account of Thomas (see Vollenhoven, *Logos en ratio; beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche kentheorie (26a)* (1926): 18-30; Vollenhoven, *W. Woodenboek*: 414-416; Vollenhoven, *Gastcolleges*: 93-4, 204-205). A somewhat different account of Thomas is given by 'Radical Orthodoxy', which follows the lead, in this respect, of Henri de Lubac (Henri De Lubac, *Mystery of the Supernatural* (1967), arguing for a continuity between grace and nature in Thomas's vision. See James K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology* (2004): 156-166.

[254] In *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, there is an extensive discussion of the rise of the 'the ground-antinomy in the humanistic cosmonomic Idea' ('grond-antinomie in de humanistische wetsidee') (1.171= Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.216) marked by the antinomic tension between the science ideal and the ideal of personality (1.151-471). However, while this is parralled in *A New Critique* (1.187-506) there are subtle differences in presentation with specific mention of what is now a freedom/nature 'ground-motive' (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.36, 62-63, 187, 190, 193, 499, 501; Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 170-171; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 1*: 17-19; Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*: 73-77; Dooyeweerd, *The Secularization of Science*: 16-24;

The relation of the ground-motives to the totality-Idea and the notion of the Archimedean point remains unclear, and indeed after the publication of *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, it has been observed that Dooyeweerd did not mention the Archimedean point again.[255] There is some evidence that from the late 1950s he either modified or clarified the position that he had seemed to hold since 1930.[256] In public, he expressed the view that he felt like 'tearing out his hair' at the way his statement of the 'supra-temporal heart' had been misunderstood.[257] This remains an unresolved and controversial element in his philosophical system.

Dooyeweerd couches in terms of 'ground-motives' – here the Christian ground-motive, and then at the human response, focussed on his account of the 'supra-temporal' heart.

The transcendent orientation of Dooyeweerd's philosophy arises from his vision of God's work in the world. For Dooyeweerd this involves the articulation of what he came to call the Christian religious 'ground-motive'. For Dooyeweerd a religious ground-motive is a basic driver of thought and action. The Christian religious ground-motive is contrasted with a number of other ground-motives such as the Greek ground-motive of form and matter, the medieval synthesis of nature and grace and the Western enlightenment ground-motive of nature and freedom. He formulates the Christian ground-motive in its most succinct form as '*creation, fall, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost*'. Dooyeweerd's formulation of the Christian ground-motive thus has a Trinitarian structure,

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Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 45-51; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 143-180; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 148-188; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte' : 56-63; Dooyeweerd, 'Christian Philosophy': 31-35; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 63-74).

[255] Kraay, 'Successive 2': 31. Kraay argues that *A New Critique* is an awkward hybrid between the Archimedean point conception found in *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, and the ground-motive conception, which was developed after the publication of the *W.d.W.* He points out that apart from the later, hybrid mention of it in *A New Critique*, Dooyeweerd's last serious exposition of the Archimedean point conception was in 1948 (Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems* Dooyeweerd writes in the preface to *A New Critique*, that while he added in new conceptions, 'I had to restrict any changes to what was absolutely necessary, if I did not want to write a new work' (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.x; Kraay, 'Successive 2': 31, 39).

[256] '[D]e religieuze concentratie juist een centrale relatie tussen het menselijk ik en de eeuwige God impliceert die nooit in de tijd kan opgaan'('just because [the heart as] the religious concentration is the central relation between the human I and the eternal God does not mean that it rises above time') (Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*', *P. R.* 25 (1960): 103).

[257] The incident in question was after a lecture in 1964, but it has been variously interpreted (D.F.M. Strauss, 'Appropriating the Legacy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven' in *Journal for Christian Scholarship* (2006): 4; J. Glenn Friesen, 'Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?' (2006): 12-21).

even though he does not draw attention to this as Vollenhoven does.[258] In this section I shall examine this Trinitarian structure in greater detail to see how adequate it is, in order in later chapters to see what the philosophical implications of the adequacy of this structure may be. I shall look at how it is unfolded through his account of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

First, with respect to the Father, Dooyeweerd tends to speak of 'the Origin' or 'the Archè', although he also refers to the 'Father' by name as well.[259] The Father as Origin is the source of all meaning – 'meaning' for Dooyeweerd comes to be his way of expressing creaturely dependence upon the Origin.[260] Humanity is the high point of God's creation, created as 'image-bearer of his divine Origin'.[261] All God's work of creation is concentrated in humanity as the *imago Dei* – the image of God.[262] Dooyeweerd thus pictures redeemed humanity's loving dependence on the Father of Jesus, just as children in a family experience their dependence on their parents.[263]

Second, with respect to the Son: just as the Father is the Origin and the Archè of creation, so Dooyeweerd sees the Son as its Redeemer. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the Son can be seen as co-creator (as in the Kuyperian vision). Unlike Kuyper, Dooyeweerd does not clearly articulate the role of the Son as the mediator of creation *per se,* that is, prior to the

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[258] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 1.61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 507; Dooyeweerd, 'Philosophie et théologie': 56; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 134, 136; see Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid': 50-54; with a response: D.F.M. Strauss, 'Herbesinning oor die Sin-Karakter van die Werklikheid by H. Dooyeweerd', *P. R.* 1971 (1971): 169-170. As we see, Dooyeweerd's formulation of the Christian ground-motive makes use of theological terminology and concepts (the persons of the Trinity, creation, sin and Christian ground-motive redemption), and indeed is creedal in form (Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 169; Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 1.507). In the parallel place in *W.d.W.* (written prior to his elaboration of his notion of the ground-motives), under 'grondmotief', Dooyeweerd merely speaks of the struggle between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Darkness (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472 ('Duisternis')). Although Dooyeweerd distinguishes between religion and faith, he still accords the faith aspect a special role in the articulation of a Christian worldview (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.227-259; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.298-330), as does Vollenhoven (see 4.1.2).
[259] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.268, 297, 469, 495; 3.214, 248, 269; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 2.149, 337, 475, 563; 3.269, 303, 304, 322, 337.
[260] Dooyeweerd, *De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer in het licht eener Calvinistische Kosmologie en Kennistheorie* (1931): 99-100 (n. 101); Dooyeweerd, *The Crisis in Humanist Political Theory as Seen from a Calvinist Cosmology and Epistemology* (2010): 84-85; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.6, 12; 2.19-22; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.4, 10, 73 (n. 1, not in W.d.W.); 2: 22-25.
[261] Dooyeweerd, 'Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, *Creatie en evolutie*)', *P.R.* 24 (1959): 116 ('beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong'). See comment by Peter Steen (Peter J. Steen, *The Structure of Herman Dooyeweerd's Thought* (1983): 62-64).
[262] Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2'.
[263] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.214; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.264 (Dooyeweerd cites Gen. 2.24; Prov. 3.12, Ps. 103.13, and Lk. 15).

fall and redemption. He tends to portray Christ's involvement in creation as redemptive and revelatory, as a *post facto* and subordinate one, rather than one exercised jointly from the beginning with the Father.[264] Through Christ we are directed to the true Origin of all things, the Creator of heaven and earth.[265] In Christ, the root of life is renewed, not just with respect to the individual human being, but also the whole of creation, which Dooyeweerd sees as concentrated in humanity.[266] By belonging to Christ, the Christian becomes engaged in a struggle with those tendencies which absolutise one or other aspect of the temporal order and which redirect it away from God, the Father as Origin.[267] Following Kuyper, Dooyeweerd suggests that through common grace the distortion of sin can be sufficiently corrected not only to make everyday life possible, but also to allow for the development of science, culture and general prosperity.[268] The opening-process under the influence of apostate ground-motives has an 'inter-modal disharmony' resulting from the absolutisation of one law-sphere at the expense of others. He states that the opening-process needs to be guided by faith in

[264] On occasion, Dooyeweerd does speak of the Son as the 'creating Word, through which all things were made' (Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 36 ('scheppend Woord, waardoor alle dingen geschapen zijn')); Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 37) but then he seems to overlook the role of Christ as the creating Word (which he has just himself mentioned) when he states: 'if one tried to conceive of common grace apart from Christ by attributing it to exclusively to God (i.e., the Father) as creator, then one drives a wedge in the Christian ground-motive between *creation* and *redemption*' (Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 37; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 37 ('Want zodra ge de gemene gratie los van de Christus poogt te vatten en haar uitsluitend op God as *Schepper* terugvoert, drijft ge een wig in het grondmotief der christelijke religie tussen *schepping* en *verlossing . . .*')). Elsewhere, the Son is called the 'new religious root of the temporal cosmos' (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.471 ('den tijd transcendeerende religieuze wortel der schepping'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.506). However, once again, is not clear whether Dooyeweerd conceives of Christ in this respect as the mediator of creation (as the wording of the *W.d.W.* would indicate) or as the redeemer of humanity (as the 'new' in *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* would seem to indicate), although the location of both creation and redemption in supra-temporality tends in Dooyeweerd to a conflation of these two roles (see D.F.M. Strauss, 'The Central Religious Community of Mankind in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea', *P.R.* 37 (1972): 58-67). On the whole he tends to see the Son in purely redemptive terms as distinct from 'God' as creator (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.32-33 (not in *N.C.*), 54 (not in *N.C.*), 64-67, 70-72, 86-87; 2.420-421, 424, 471, 482-484, 491-497, 503-508, 527; 2.30, 493; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.99-102, 105-106, 123-124; 2.32, 485-486, 489-490, 552-554, 560-565, 571-575, 593; Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 370, 372; Dooyeweerd, 'Criteria': 227). There is some force to David VanDrunen's contention that Dooyeweerd grounds common grace not (as with Kuyper), in the Son's mediatorship over creation (see 1.2) but in his role as redeemer (David VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought* (2010): 360-362; see also Jacob Klapwijk, 'Antithesis and Common Grace' (1991): 183). However, in warning about the conflation of creation with redemption, VanDrunen falls into the opposite error of dividing the Person of the Son and by ignoring the continuity of the latter's role as the creating Logos with that as the redeeming Christ, and indeed, in the Triune work of the transformation of all creation.
[265] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.557; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.633.
[266] Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2'.
[267] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.506.
[268] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2: 30-34; 234-237; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2: 32-36, 306-309.

Christ, in Whom alone is the 'consummation of meaning'.[269] The opening process is set against the struggle between the *Civitas Dei*, that is to say, God's rule in the hearts of redeemed humanity, and the *Civitas Terrena*, the dominance of apostate human tendencies which culminates in the 'definitive victory' of Christ's Kingdom.[270] Thus for Dooyeweerd the Son tends to play an intermediate role: in the first instance between the Father as Origin and fallen humanity, and then as head of redeemed humanity, bringing humanity – and with humanity the whole of the cosmos – back to the Father.[271]

Third, there is the role of the Holy Spirit. For Dooyeweerd, the Holy Spirit transforms the hearts of redeemed humanity it to the pattern of the Son, as they are directed to the Father in inner rebirth.[272] As distinct from Kuyper and Vollenhoven, he sees the work of the Holy Spirit as an almost entirely interior one, rather than in the cosmos at large, although he recognises that the effects of the work of the Holy Spirit, through its effect on human action, can have wider significance than merely for the human heart. It is through the power of the Holy Spirit and through the dynamic of prayer that the battle needs to be waged against the spirit of apostasy in human culture as a whole and in modern Western culture in particular. The biblical ground-motive can be embraced and worked through in every area of life by building up a community which gives this corporate expression.[273] Nevertheless, because it is largely confined to the hearts of redeemed humanity, Dooyeweerd tends to portray the work of the Holy Spirit in the world as indirect and posterior to both the work of original creation and that of redemption. As the work of Christ is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Father, so the work of the Holy Spirit is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Son.

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[269] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.265-268 ('zin-voleindigheid'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2. 334-447.

[270] Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'* (1967): 108 ('definitieve overwinning'). As mentioned earlier (1.1) these are terms employed by Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in his great work describing God's work through history especially with respect to the Roman Empire. Dooyeweerd is critical of Augustine for not adequately, in his view, distinguishing 'the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men' (which is how Dooyeweerd understands the *Civitas Terrena*) from the temporal Church institution (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.452; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.510). This latter identification has come to the fore with those from the Reformed position who have recently re-adopted the Scholastic/Lutheran 'Two Kingdoms' position (see VanDrunen, *N.L. & T.K.*).

[271] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.471-473, 491; 2.30-32, 222-223, 227-237, 267-268, 297-300, 347-348, 491-497; 3.448-449, 557; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.60-61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 174-175 (not in *W.d.W.*), 506-507, 522; 2.32-34, 294-5, 298-300, 337, 363-364, 418, 560-564; 3.506-507, 633.

[272] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.61, 175, 507 (none in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*': 103; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 186-189; Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid': 51.

[273] Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 2*: 5; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 11; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 12; Dooyeweerd, *The Secularization of Science*: 4.

So, for Dooyeweerd there is a vision of the unfolding of God's purposes for humanity, descending from the Father as Origin, via the Son as Word or Christ to the hearts of redeemed humanity, in communion with the work of the Holy Spirit.

For Dooyeweerd, the response to the Triune work of God is concentrated in the 'heart'. Like Vollenhoven, he holds the heart to be the centre of human existence as seen from a biblical perspective. Unlike Vollenhoven, however, he presents an account of the heart in 'supra-temporal' terms. This matter is not straightforward, and in his overall thinking it is far from clear what he means by it. I shall consider three possible renderings of his position. At times he seems to argue for each of these three renderings, and indeed at times seems to want to hold them all together. I shall show that while he tends to conflate these three renderings, it is possible to distinguish them – though not in such a way that one rendering can be hermetically sealed from another. Furthermore, it is impossible to state the question of the nature of the 'heart' neutrally, since each rendering of the question involves a commitment to one or other interpretation of what he means by the 'heart' or 'supra-temporal heart', and implies a judgement on the adequacy of that rendering. What all these renderings of his position have in common, however, is that the 'heart' is central to humanity's reception of God's engagement with the world, and the consequent transcendent orientation of humanity's stance *vis-à-vis* the world.[274]

The first rendering of Dooyeweerd's position sees his understanding of the 'heart' in noetic terms. According to this view, the heart is a 'supra-theoretical' ('boven-theoretisch') *viewpoint*: an 'Archimedean' point 'above' the diversity of the modalities from which the inter-relations between the different modalities (their antecipations and retrocipations) can be viewed. He approaches this position with the argument that by its nature philosophical thought attempts to grasp the totality of human experience as refracted according to the different, mutually irreducible, modalities. But, as we have seen,[275] this cannot be done in terms of any one of the modalities without falling into one form of reductive distortion or another. The notion of a knowing subject to which all knowledge can be presented is a chimera: such a subject cannot find its own unity and is relationally bound with the very

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[274] In my presentation of the three renderings, as with my presentation of the renderings of Vollenhoven's account of the Law in the previous section, I am not claiming that Dooyeweerd moved consciously from one to the other. There is a rough correlation between the first rendering and Dooyeweerd's 'First Way' of his transcendental critique, and between the second and the 'Second Way'. However, Dooyeweerd never fully discards any of the renderings, and seems to hold them, and articulate them, in tandem (see 2.2; and also John N. Kraay, 'Successive Conceptions in the Development of the Christian Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd 1', *P. R.* 44 (1979) and ' … 2').
[275] Chapter Three introduction.

subject matter (the *Gegenstand*) which it seeks to grasp.[276] What is needed, therefore, is an 'Archimedean point'[277] which is not itself defined or definable in terms of any of the modalities, but can be found 'above' the diversity of the modalities from which the inter-relations between the different modalities (their antecipations and retrocipations) can be viewed.[278] From this Archimedean point, the temporal diversity of the created order can be surveyed.[279] So runs Dooyeweerd's argument. But it runs into serious problems. If the heart is seen as rising above modal diversity (for example, the modalities of faith, morality, or law), then, at least noetically, it is free of the laws and norms of the modal order.[280] This contravenes Calvin's dictum: '*Deus solus legibus solutus est*'.[281] In defence of this position it might be argued that while the heart is free of the norms and laws appropriate to the modalities, it is still subject to the central religious law of love.[282] But Dooyeweerd then creates further difficulties by maintaining that the underlying religious beliefs are beyond description and not subject to analysis. For him, the heart, and the religious belief located in

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[276] See 2.2.

[277] See 2.2.

[278] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.59 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, 'Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 3': 34 (not in R. & S. 3). Roy Clouser suggests that the supra-temporal heart is a standpoint required in order to grasp the diversity of the world in a non-reductive way through 'belief', i.e., non-reductive assent (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 180-182, 271, 283, 356-357). This is also a position which has also been argued for in the past by D.F.M. Strauss (Strauss, 'Central religious community': 61), although in his more recent thinking Strauss has indicated implicitly that he now holds definitively to the third rendering (which I shall set out below).

[279] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.10-14, 33-40, 131-132, 471-473; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.11, 31 (n. 1), 55, 174, 506; 2.571; Dooyeweerd, 'De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee', *De Standaard* Wetenschappelijke Bijdragen, aangeboden door Hoogleraren der Vrije Universiteit ter Gelegenheid van haar 50-jarig Bestaan 20 October, 1930 (1930); Dooyeweerd, 'De theorie van de bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee', *Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts* 19 (1932); Dooyeweerd, 'Het dilemma voor het Christelijk wijsgerig denken en het critisch karakter van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee', *P. R.* 1 (1936): 14; Dooyeweerd, 'De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken en de grondslagen van de wijsgeerige denkgemeenschap van het Avondland', *P. R.* 6 (1941): 2.

[280] There is a certain similarity to the 'Oration on the Dignity of Man' by Pico Della Mirandola (1463-1494): ' … the Supreme Maker … spoke to [humanity]: ''… I have placed you at the very centre of the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the world contains.'' ' (J.B. Ross and M.M. McLaughlin, ed., *The Portable Renaissance Reader* (1977) quoted in King, *Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief*: 238).

[281] See 1.2. Indeed, Vollenhoven rejects an anthropology which places part of the human being above God's Law (Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §182, p. 129).

[282] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.98-100*;* Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.141-144 (not in *W.d.W.)*; 3: 71. This can be argued that it a question of freeing humanity truly to the *imago Dei* (C.P. Cronjé, 'Eerste gedagtes rondom Dooyeweerd se etiek (liefdesleer)', *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap* 16 (1980): 73-74).

the heart, are 'above' all modally-differentiated expression.[283] But this leaves unanswered the objection that since this law of love, and the heart as Archimedean point, cannot be known or expressed, all that remains is an inexpressible mystical aspiration. By claiming that this reflects a divine perspective, this is at best untestable, and, at worst, in danger of being seen as making quasi-divine claims for the human consciousness (albeit the human consciousness redeemed in Christ). [284] The problems with seeing the 'heart' in purely noetic terms leads one to the second rendering, that of seeing the heart in terms which are not a matter merely of making claims about the possibilities of human knowledge, but about the nature of the 'heart' itself.

The second rendering of Dooyeweerd's position, then, is the claim that the heart is a supra-temporal entity. Both Peter Steen (critically) and J. Glen Friesen (in advocacy) argue that Dooyeweerd conceives of the supra-temporal heart in *ontic* terms.[285]According to this rendering, Dooyeweerd sees humanity as bearing the image of God in an intermediary role between God and the rest of the created order.[286] In order to have this intermediary role, the 'heart' has somehow to be 'above' the temporal order, i.e., have a time-transcending status.[287]

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[283] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.69-70; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.57-8,104; Dooyeweerd, 'De taak ener wijsgerige anthropologie en de dordlopende vegen to wijsgerige zelfkennis', *P. R.* 26 (1961): 43; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 181; see Harry Fernhout, 'Man, Faith and Religion in Bavinck, Kuyper, and Dooyeweerd' (1975): 76.

[284] Henry Allison characterises the 'theocentric model of knowledge, as 'the ideal of an eternalistic, God's eye view of things' (Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*: 28-29; see also Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (1981): 60-64).

[285] Peter J. Steen, 'The Supra-Temporal Selfhood in the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd' (1961); Steen, *Structure* ; Ouweneel, *Leer van de Mens* ; W.J. Ouweneel, 'Supratemporality in the Transcendental Anthropology of Herman Dooyeweerd', *P.R.* 58 (1993); Philip Blosser, 'Reconnoitering Dooyeweerd's Theory of Man', *P.R.* 58 (1993): 194-199; J. Glenn Friesen, 'The Mystical Dooyeweerd Once Again: Kuyper's Use of Franz von Baader', *Ars Disputandi* 3 (2003); J. Glenn Friesen, 'The Mystical Dooyeweerd: The Relation of His Thought to Franz von Baader', *Ars Disputandi* 3 (2003); J. Glenn Friesen, 'De sleutel der kennis: Herman Dooyeweerd en Franz von Baader', *Beweging* (2004); J. Glenn Friesen, 'Dooyeweerd and Baader: A Response to D.F.M. Strauss' (2005); Friesen, 'Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?' ; J. Glenn Friesen, '95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd', *P.R.* 74 (2009).

[286] Dooyeweerd's reply to Cornelius Van Til in Jerusalem and Athens (pp. 87-89) quoted in Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 363-364 (n. 334)).

[287] Dooyeweerd, *Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer*: 113 ('De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk'; my translation); Dooyeweerd, *Crisis in Humanist Political Theory*: 97; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.14, 24, 30-33 (not in *N.C.*), 46, 55, 57, 60.64, 66, 71, 80,106,132, 407, 415; 2.51, 3.241-244, 269, 627-630; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.24, 31 (n. 1); 2.41, 53, 473, 480, 495, 496, 538; 3.88 (not in *W.d.W.)*, 297-299, 322, 781-784; Dooyeweerd, *De zin der geschiedenis*: 7; Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.' 181-182; Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het Immanentiestandpunt 1', *P. R.* 1 (1936): 4-5; Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het Immanentiestandpunt 2', *P. R.* 4 (1939): 1-5; Dooyeweerd, 'De leer van de mensch in de W.d.w.' *C.V.C.W.* 5 (1942): IV and V; Dooyeweerd, *The Theory of Man in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea: Thirty-Two Propositions on Anthropology* (1970): IV and V ;

Moreover, unlike Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd views the Christian hope, the eschaton, not as something anticipated in the future, but as the eternal destiny revealed in the present. It is the intensification, indeed the transcending, of temporal experience.[288] However, his use of the term 'eternity' with the sense of 'supra-temporality' is contestable, as are the claims he makes about the 'supra-temporal' heart on the basis of this interpretation.[289] In particular, it can be argued that the Hebrew term '*olam*', the Greek term 'αἰών', and the Latin term '*aevum*' should be read not as eternity in the sense of 'a-temporality' or 'supra-temporality', but in the sense of 'age'.[290] There is a danger of falling back into that dualism in which the

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Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 34-35; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 35; Dooyeweerd, 'Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2': 33 ('God's Oorsprongseenheid, welker beeld zich primair in der geest des mensen uitdrukt'; not in *R. & S.* 2)); Dooyeweerd, *R. & S 3*: Part 2; Dooyeweerd, 'De taak ener wijsgerige anthropologie en de dordlopende vegen to wijsgerige zelfkennis': 43('bovenlichamelijk concentratiepunt'); Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 42, 188-195; 'supra-temporal (and the integral) centre of human existence' (Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'* ('[h]et boventijdelijke (en dus integrale) centrum van de menselijke natuur'): 132; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 223; see Fernhout, 'Man, faith and religion': 73-75; Ouweneel, *Leer van de Mens*: 261-284, 326-334; Ouweneel, 'Supratemporality': 313; Blosser, 'Reconnoitering': passim; J. Glenn Friesen, 'Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The Religious Dialectic within Reformational Philosophy', *P.R.* 70 (2005): 115-118; M. D. Stafleu, 'Some Problems of Time – Some Facts of life', *P. R.* 51 (1986): 80-82; Stafleu, 'Time and History': 165; Steen, *Structure*: 127-165. However Steen notes that after 1936, Dooyeweerd 'hardly ever' refers to the religious centre as eternal, and instead uses the term 'supra-temporal' (Steen, *Structure*: 160 ('boventijdelijk')). The term 'above' is itself spatial (i.e., a concept qualified by the spatial modality) although Dooyeweerd is using it in a concept-transcending-way (Strauss, *P.D.D.*: 176-182, 199-204, 447-449).

[288] Dooyeweerd rejects the tendency of those theologians who 'identify the eschatological aspect of time with the historical and reject the supra-temporal sphere of human existence and of divine revelation' (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.33 (not in *W.d.W.*)).

[289] 'God has put eternity [*ha olam*] in the hearts [of humanity]'(Eccl. 3: 11), and 'out of the heart are all the issues of life' (Prov. 4: 23) are favourites of Dooyeweerd's (see Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W:* 1.80; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.298; Dooyeweerd, 'Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.' 181; Dooyeweerd, 'De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.' V; Dooyeweerd, *Theory of man*: V; Dooyeweerd, 'Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, *Creatie en evolutie*)': 34, 116-117 (nn. 112-113); Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'*: 102; Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 174). However, these biblical texts can be read in *religious*, i.e., in terms of the heart's Direction, rather than in ontic or noetic terms. Indeed, Dooyeweerd himself makes it clear that what he is referring to is not 'an invisible, substantial form or an abstract complex of functions' (Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 35 ('een ''onzichtbare'' vorm-substantie met een abstract complex van gevoels- en denkfuncties'); Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 35).

[290] See J. Guhrt, 'Time' in Colin Colin Brown, ed., *New International Dictionary of the New Testament* (1986): J. Guhrt, 'Time'; also Peter J. Steen, 'The Problem of Time and Eternity in its Relation to the Nature-Grace Ground-motive' (1979): 136, 142; Peter J. Steen, 'Review of Okke Jager, *Het eeuwige leven, met name in verband met de verhouding van tijd en eeuwigheid*' in *Westminster Theological Journal* (1964): 62-65; Klaas J. Popma, *Nadenken over de tijd* (1965): 246-260, 265-276 (see especially p. 248 where he discusses the notion of the 'supra-temporal heart' ('boventijdelijk hart')). See also F.H. Von Meyenfeldt, *Het hart (leb, lebab) in het Oude Testament* (1950), a thesis at the Vrije Universiteit published in 1950.

heart occupies a position 'above' the diversity of the temporal order.[291] In locating the heart at a 'supra-temporal' remove from human experience, Dooyeweerd presents us with a conception of a de-historicised human person, bearing none of the characteristics that makes each individual uniquely him or herself.[292] Most significantly of all, the directness of the relationship of creation as a whole with the Son as Logos, and with the primally nurturing Spirit, tends to be obscured in the face of his strong emphasis on the supra-temporal heart, even the redeemed human heart *as it is found in Christ*.[293] Humanity is not to be detached from its creational context, otherwise the directness of God's dealings with human being as

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[291] Steen indicates that the notion of supra-temporality was rejected by C. A. van Peursen, J. M. Spier, Hendrik van Riessen, S. U. Zuidema and K. J. Popma (Steen, *Structure*: 7, 13, 24, 30, 126, 154). The notion of the supra-temporal heart has also been rejected by James Olthuis as dualistic (James Olthuis, 'Dooyeweerd on Religion and Faith' (1985): 21, 33, 34), as also by C. T. McIntire (John Bolt, 'The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd' in *Calvin Theological Journal* (1986): 88), and Hendrik Hart (Hendrik Hart, 'Problems of Time: An Essay', *P.R.* 38 (1973)) and by Hendrik Geertsema on the grounds that it is 'anthropocentric'(Hendrik G. Geertsema, 'Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique: Transforming it Hermeneutically' (2000): 93, 97; see also Hendrik G. Geertsema, 'Comments on Friesen's 95 theses on Herman Dooyeweerd', *P.R.* 74 (2009); Gerrit Glas, 'Ego, Self and the Body. An Assessment of Dooyeweerd's Philosophical Anthropology' (1995); Gerrit Glas, 'Is Dooyeweerd a Panentheist? – Comments on Friesen's ''95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd''', *P.R.* 74 (2009)). Hendrik Hart speaks of a threatening dualism here – or rather a new dualism, since no sooner is one dualism (that between those things qualified by the faith modality and the rest) ejected from the front door that another (that between the modal and the supra-modal) comes in through the back door (Hart, 'Time'; Fernhout, 'Man, faith and religion': 74). As Gerrit Glas points out, further, there is a danger of this religious unity being considered as one between centre and periphery (Glas, 'Ego, Self and the Body': 74-76; see also Steen, *Structure*: 130-230; and James W. Skillen and Rockne McCarthy, ed., *Political Order and the Plural Structure of Society* (1991): 328).

[292] Glas, 'Ego, Self and the Body': 75-76. Vollenhoven sees Dooyeweerd as still operating within a dualistic anthropological framework in which, as Vollenhoven describes it, the heart is 'higher' than the 'lower' mantle of diverse modal functions of which it is the concentration point (Vollenhoven, 'Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)' (1992): 184; Vollenhoven, 'The Consequential Problem-Historical Method': /9, p. 104; Bril and Boonstra, ed., *S. Kaarten*: 279). Vollenhoven rejects what he takes to be Dooyeweerd's conception of the heart as the 'supra-temporal concentration point' ('Verslag van de studieconferensie op 4 en 5 januari 1943 te Amsterdam', *C.V.C.W.* (1945): 32-34; Vollenhoven, 'Divergentierapport I (53)' (1992): 115-117; Vollenhoven, 'Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)': 187; Vollenhoven, 'Problemen van de tijd (68b)': 203-205; see K.A. Bril, ed., *Vollenhoven's laatste werk, 1970-1975* (1982): 105-106; Bril and Boonstra, ed., *S. Kaarten*: 278-279; Ouweneel, *Leer van de Mens*: 346-358; Friesen, 'Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven': 113-118). J. P. A. Mekkes argues that human beings are in no way able to transcend the dynamic of their temporal existence (J.P.A. Mekkes, *Radix, tijd en kennen* (1970): 121; see also Stafleu, 'Time and History': 165; G.C. Berkouwer, *De mens het beeld Gods* (1957): 284-293; and Klaas J. Popma, *Levensbeschouwing: Opmerkingen naar aanleiding van de Heidelbergse Catechismus* (1958-1965): 6.168-169).

[293] Glas, 'Ego, Self and the Body': 75. Lambert Zuidervaart suggests that Dooyeweerd seems to confine the possibility of true knowledge to redeemed humanity (Lambert Zuidervaart, 'After Dooyeweerd: Truth in Reformational Philosophy' <http://records.icscanada.edu/ir/files/20081007-1.PDF> accessed 25 November 2008).

whole persons, as well as with the rest of creation, is attenuated. It is more helpful, therefore, to see the heart not as an entity between God and wider creation, but rather as the orientation of humanity, fully located in the temporality of the created order, towards God. This is the third rendering to which I now turn.

The third rendering of Dooyeweerd's position is one which he himself enunciates as a clarification if not a revision of his previous positions. The heart is not supra-temporal knowledge, nor an entity, but rather the *orientation of the whole person* towards or away from God. It is 'supra-temporal' not by virtue of special knowledge, or because it exists somehow above time. The 'hearts' of humanity – that is, each member of humanity considered as a whole person – are created to be relationship with God; God alone is above all time.[294] In this sense the heart needs to be seen in *religious* rather than in noetic or ontic terms.[295] It is in the heart that humanity receives its basic religious orientation or Direction. 'Direction' for Dooyeweerd, as for Vollenhoven, is that which underlies the expression of belief in human life and thought, in and through time.[296] The religious character of the human being can only be worked out temporally: *palingenesis*, implies, if not a sudden conversion experience, at least the unfolding of the effects of the Spirit's work in the life of the person concerned and the transformation of his or her character. Noetic or ontic supra-temporality

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[294] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.88 (not in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, 'Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, *Creatie en evolutie*)': 116. Dooyeweerd describes how the Origin or *Archè* is encountered and how the heart comes to rest in it (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.61, 63 (neither in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 172 (Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.1.1); Dooyeweerd, 'Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorisch Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de Grondslag der Vrije Universiteit', *P. R.* 31 (1966): 8). Dooyeweerd's account here resonates with Augustine's famous declaration: '… Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee' (Augustine, *The Confessions of St Augustine* (1907): 1.1.1, p. 1 see Steen, *Structure*: 60). Strauss argues that Dooyeweerd in 1960 should be read as claiming not that it is the central human consciousness which transcends time, only the Direction of that consciousness (Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*': 137; Strauss, *P.D.D.*: 207-208). Jacob Klapwijk argues for a reconciling formula in the Dooyeweerd-Vollenhoven controversy in the notion of a 'ek-centric' religious anthropology (Klapwijk, 'Reformational Philosophy': 118-122). Hendrik Geertsema has suggested that the Reformational stance should not be focused on the heart as a supra-temporal centre, but on the response by humanity to God's call (Hendrik G. Geertsema, '*Homo Respondens.* On the Historical Nature of Human Reason', *P. R.* 58 (1993); Hendrik G. Geertsema, 'The Inner Reformation of Philosophy and Science and the Dialogue of Christian Faith with a Secular Culture: A Critical Assessment of Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought' (1995): 24-25). M.D. Stafleu also argues for the recovery of a strand in Dooyeweerd's thinking which sees the reponse to the Origin as occurring within time (Stafleu, 'Time and History': 166).
[295] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.13; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.128; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 137.
[296] Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 45; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 29; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 29). Whether Dooyeweerd moved to hold this third (religious) position and abandoned the first two has been contested (Friesen, 'Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?'

cannot do justice to this sense of the transformation of human character in and through time, but supra-temporality considered as the 'Direction' of the heart makes perfect sense in this regard.

There are two 'main springs' that operate in human hearts, which orientate the whole person religiously. The first is the dynamic of the Holy Spirit re-directing creation, through Christ, to the Father as true Origin.[297] The second is the spirit of apostasy in the human heart from the true God. The apostate main spring cannot itself provide anything new but only distort creational reality according to the '*law* of sin': the religious misdirection of the human heart towards a pretended rather than the true Origin.[298] This involves the idolising absolutisation of an aspect, or combinations of aspects, of the created order. Since for Dooyeweerd, the whole of created reality is refracted through the human heart, for him the fall of humanity thus involves the diremption of the cosmos as a whole.[299] These two main springs are located in the 'central sphere of occurrence' – the unfolding of humanity's response to God in the struggle between the '*civitas Dei*' and the '*civitas terrena*', which as Dooyeweerd puts it: 'takes its *issue* in the history of the world'.[300]

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[297] Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'*: 21 (n. 22); Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 44 (n. 41).

[298] Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 137. There is a certain ambiguity in Dooyeweerd's position because he also states the fall means that the image of God was 'wiped out' (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.6 ('uitgewischt'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.4. Dooyeweerd refers to John Calvin, *Épitre á tous amateurs de Jésus Christ (1535)* (1929): 36 who uses the term '*effacée*'. However, this ambiguity is more apparent than real, because the image is not a metaphysical entity, but a reflection of the unity and coherence which communion with God means. Sin by contrast is characterised by a revolt against the Sovereign *Archè* by absolutising some aspects of the 'meaning' (by which Dooyeweerd means creatureliness) to the *Being* of God (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.64-65; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.100; Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*': 103; Steen, *Structure*: 80-81. Steen argues that sin for Dooyeweerd involves a loss of meaning, and since meaning is basis of the existence of the cosmos for Dooyeweerd (in contrast to the Being of God) this involves a privation of its very existence (Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*': 103; Steen, *Structure*: 80-81).

[299] In *Der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* (but not in *A New Critique)* he states: 'Our cosmos fell in Adam; all the additional creatures in one's world order were cursed in Adam. According to Scripture!' (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.65 ('Onze kosmos viel in Adam: al het in onzen wereldsamenhang gevoegde schepsel werd in Adam vervloekt. Naar de Schriften!'); see also Dooyeweerd, 'Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee (A.R.S.)', *A.R.S.(3-m)* 2 (1928): 26; Dooyeweerd, 'De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland': 11; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2').

[300] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.32 (Dooyeweerd's italics), 57 (neither in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 172. Accordingly, the *Structure* (see 3.1 footnote) of creation is itself unaffected by the fall (i.e., no aspect of it is lost – the fall is not metaphysical but religious, i.e., not a change in the *elements* of the created order, only in their *orientation*), even though the different elements are now comprehensively subject to the misdirection brought about by sin and evil though the distortion and marring of the relationship with the absolute Origin (see Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 44 (n. 41)). Religion does not add any new aspect to reality but is the

Dooyeweerd's account of the heart is not to be seen as the exercise of supra-temporal knowledge, or as an entity over and above human temporality. Rather, it is the locus of the Direction of the whole human person towards or away from God. The heart's Direction, in other words, is the deepest and basic orientation of humanity: God calls each human being in the depth of who they are, in the midst of life, and in the living community of faith. Instead of seeking to provide a God's eye view, or claiming a supra-temporal status, as a finite human creature all one can do is to encounter the Triune God through the transcendent revelation of Scripture and the inner working of the Holy Spirit as these are accommodated to the conditions of experience, including that of time. Understood in this way, Dooyeweerd's account of the heart is not necessarily incompatible with that of Vollenhoven. The main difference is that of emphasis: rather than Vollenhoven's account of the sequential unfolding of God's Law and the covenantal response to which humanity is called in response, Dooyeweerd's account of God's self-revelation and humanity's response is structured in a more hierarchical way.

To sum up: in his account of the Christian ground-Idea Dooyeweerd emphasises the role of the Father as Origin, mediated by the Son (seen as redeemer more than co-creator), with the work of the Holy Spirit largely confined to human hearts. Combined with his tendency to portray the 'heart' as 'supra-temporal', this gives his account a strongly hierarchical structure, with temporal diversity at the base. However, there may be more common ground with Vollenhoven's account of the heart than is often asserted, as we shall see. Dooyeweerd provides a number of key insights about the relation of religion, theology and philosophy. However he is inconsistent in applying his own distinctions. His ground-motives, which he claims to be religious in character, are in form either philosophical schemata, or in the case of the Christian ground-motive, theological, Dooyeweerd seeks to demonstrate that theoretical thought necessarily depends on prior religious beliefs – be they Christian or an alternative religious starting point – even if this does not seem 'religious'.

(ii) Vollenhoven

Vollenhoven identified the ways in which different religious foundations shape and structure all thought – and indeed action. In the early 1930s, Vollenhoven explicitly distinguishes between scriptural and un-scriptural ground-motives. However, it is important to note that

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relationship with the absolute Origin (Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 44 (n. 41); see Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.1.1). As Strauss points out, the religious sphere is the central concentration of those structures, and is not to be confused with any of those structures themselves. It is also what both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven call '[D]irection' (Strauss, *P.D.D.*: 196-197, 640).

the apostate ground-motives which Vollenhoven describes then are different from those which Dooyeweerd was later to set out. For Vollenhoven, they are the monistic – subdivided into pantheism and pan-cosmism; and the dualistic – subdivided into the partial cosmism and partial theism.

Compared to Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven shows more rigorously how the theological expression of basic religious commitment informs the structure of philosophical thought. As we shall see, Vollenhoven sees knowledge more as a sequential unfolding, with the heart located covenant ally in the midst of experience, from which an intuitive schema is then constructed out of the diverse percepts given by experience. It is on this basis that theoretical thought is then made possible.

Vollenhoven, like Dooyeweerd, sees philosophy as the intuitive working out of a conspectus of the whole on the basis of an underlying orientation of the heart. For Vollenhoven, philosophy is opened out, as for Dooyeweerd, by intuitive reflection on the diversity of the created order. As with Dooyeweerd, it occupies an intermediate position between the basic religious commitments on the one hand, and the special sciences (which include theology) on the other. It is the working out of a schema for the whole. Vollenhoven sees philosophy specifically charged with a conspectus of the whole in the light of basic 'religious' concerns. As we have seen,   these can be variously the quest for the originating Other, for ordering Coherence or for the Purpose of process. Philosophy attempts to make sense of the diversity of experience in the light of these through the construction of a schema.

Compared with Dooyeweerd Vollenhoven is more forthright than is Dooyeweerd in his appeal to Scripture and in his use of theological reasoning. Unlike Dooyeweerd, he is open to the role of theology in informing and shaping worldview (and, by implication, philosophy). Vollenhoven speaks of a Scriptural philosophy drawn from Scripture and nature, and later on cast his reflections in a more explicitly Trinitarian way. However, we shall see, there are problems with the way Vollenhoven himself does it, which tends to lead him in what I call a 'sequentialising' way.

However, the religious quest at the root of each of the ground-types identified by Vollenhoven provides us with a way of grounding a philosophical schema. .

More consistently than Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven provides us with a way to see the interrelation of religion, philosophy and theology. For both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, the created order takes its character from the absolute exercise of God's sovereignty. From this common point, there is divergence of emphasis. For Dooyeweerd, the human heart is the apex and fulcrum of the created order. For Vollenhoven, the created order takes its character and Direction from the unfolding of God's eternal law. Despite one or two hints about how this can work out in philosophical terms this is not yet a Christian philosophical system. Nor indeed is it something less definite such as a 'world and life view' (such as is held by Christian and other in a specific cultural system).

Vollenhoven accepts the basis distinctions but more open, than is Dooyeweerd, about the use of theological reflections in informing the character of a Christian philosophy, which identities either religious, theological or philosophical statements. Vollenhoven also provides examples of the way in which a diversity of philosophical schemas (of a similar form to Dooyeweerd's 'ground-motives', namely that of microcosm-macrocosm, upper-lower, etc.). In looking at Vollenhoven's account of the religious orientation of a Christian philosophy, I shall consider, first, the unfolding of the great narrative of the Triune work in the world and second, what that means to human beings at the centre of their life and consciousness. Vollenhoven grounds his philosophical thought in explicitly Trinitarian terms. I shall look at how he portrays the work of the three Persons in the unfolding of the great narrative of God's dealings with the world in general and, more specifically, humanity. As a trained theologian, Vollenhoven is far less reticent than Dooyeweerd, a legal scholar, about expressing himself in explicitly theological ways – although, as we shall see, some of the positions he takes are not without difficulties.

The characterization of the roles of the three Persons was affected by the shift, noted earlier, from an intra-mental to a cosmic focus. Early on, Vollenhoven sees the work of the Father as the initiator of 'ideas' within the structure of thought, with the Son as Logos underlying how these 'ideas' are assimilated in the process of human knowing, and the Spirit applying them in concrete situations.[301] In his later thinking, the focus shifts from the work of the three Persons in the intra-mental process, to the work of God in the world as a whole. He speaks of God 'Creating, Word-revealing and Spirit-guiding' ('Schepping, Logosopenbaring en Geesteleiding'), and he links these concepts to the work of the three Persons of the Trinity respectively.[302] Later, he calls these three successive stages, '[S]tates of [A]ffairs'.[303] States

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[301] At this stage in the thinking of Vollenhoven, an 'idea' is characterised as what Tol describes as a 'extra-mental archetype' or 'thing-law' of a given object (Anthony Tol, *Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy* (2010): 112; see also pp. 180-211).

[302] Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)* (1930)/Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)* (1931): §§73-75; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)* (1932)/Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (39h)* (1939): §§75-78; see Albert M. Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''', *Anakainosis* (1979): 5, 9 (n. 1). In the *Isagôgè* of 1930, Vollenhoven refers explicitly to the Heidelberg Catechism, Answer 25 regarding the Scriptural affirmation 'that these three [P]ersons are the only, true (and eternal) God' (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)*: §73('dat deze drie [P]ersonen de enige, waarachtige (en eeuwige) God zijn'); see Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.193-195).

[303] This is a special sense of '[S]tates of [A]ffairs' which I shall capitalise accordingly. Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II – Geschiedenis der wijsbegeerte na Christus. Eerste stuk: Toeneemende synthese. Deel I: De wijsbegeerte uit den tijd der patres) (41d)' (1941): 11; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-133; Vollenhoven, 'Kort overzicht (65b)': 2; Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)' ; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)' ; Vollenhoven, 'Norm en natuurwet (51h)' (1992)

of Affairs are the stages in which God's Law is expressed in the created order. Each of these States of Affairs is linked to the work of one of the three Persons of the Trinity. This takes the form of a three-stage unfolding of the Law by each of the Persons in turn:

First we see the act of creation by the Father: this is God's secret will, or creation command.[304] The Father takes the leading role in the act of creation. Within that act the Father is the Archè of all things and the giver of the initial 'creation command' ('scheppingsbevel') according to which the created order comes into being.[305] Once the primordial act of creation has been carried out, the diversity of all creatures unfolds through the address of God.[306] The Father names each individual uniquely, so constituting the 'idea' or 'structure' that gives each created thing its unique identity.[307]

Second, there is the giving of the love command by the Son applicable to humanity in general: the work of the Son is to provide the revelation of God's Law by whose light humanity can uncover the structures of creation, including the norms and laws which govern human life. This work is focused on revelation and redemption, in his offices as Logos and Christ respectively (the two offices are intertwined but distinct). In his earliest thinking, Vollenhoven sees the Son, as Logos, providing the basis on which the subject and object of knowledge can come into synthesis.[308] From the 1920s on Vollenhoven came to see the

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[304] There is an echo here with Kuyper's notion of 'archetype' – that which is known to God alone but is only revealed indirectly in the form of an 'ectype' (Kuyper, *Sacred Theology*: 3.1.59, 60, pp. 96-117).

[305] Vollenhoven, 'De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van theïstisch standpunt (18a)' (1918): 408; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)* /Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)* §73B = Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §75B ; Vollenhoven, *Gastcolleges*: 30; Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 6 (see Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 183-209, although Kuyper's emphasis there is on God's Triune counsel ('raad') rather than his command); see also Tol, *Philosophy*: 181-183.

[306] Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)*: §74A = Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §76A ; Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 6. Wolters points out that here Vollenhoven is following the traditional reformed distinction between *creatio prima* and *creatio secunda* such as in found in the writings of Vollenhoven's theological teacher, Herman Bavinck (Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 9 (n. 2); for Bavinck see 6.1). For God's speaking, Vollenhoven uses the term 'Logos-revelation'('Logos-openbaring') not in the specific sense of the second Person of the Trinity, but in the joint speaking of all the Persons (see Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 5-6; see also Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 124).

[307] Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 379; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-123; Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)': /2, p. 30; Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138, 140; Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode', *P.R.* (1961): 11; K.A. Bril, ed., *D. H.Th. Vollenhoven. The Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy* (2005): 106; Tol, *Philosophy*: 181-183 (see 3.1.1).

[308] Here he shifts his view from that which he set out in his doctoral thesis to that which he held from the 1920s on. In his earliest thinking, the Logos is that which brings norms together with judgement. In this sense, the Logos mediates epistemically between the norms called into being by Father, and the judgements made through the influence and work of the Holy Spirit (Kok, *Vollenhoven*: 24; Tol. *Philosophy*: 180-126). Looked at another way, the Logos is the one who norms the working over of experience (*empirie*) by systematic reflection (*ratio*). This connection should not be seen as a question of the Logos setting one's thinking and the order of the world in parallel (which he sees as naïve realism). On the other hand, the Logos should not be seen as an unknown

Logos as having a cosmic role as the basis for the harmony and coherence of all the modalities, rather than an intra-mental role, bringing experience and reasoning together.[309] The Logos is the revelation of the eternally begotten Son in the creative act while, at the same time, the representative expression of the common creative work of all three Persons.[310] It is the Son then, as 'the Christ' ('the anointed one'), who calls humanity through grace back to the Father.[311] As the Christ, he replaces the old office-bearer, Adam, and bears the consequences of the judgement incurred by Adam's failure. He does so both as the eternal Son and as a human being. Only as God can he reverse the consequences of the failure of Adam as the first office-bearer, and yet it needs to be as fully human that he does so.[312] The human nature the Son assumes is not an abstraction: Jesus of Nazareth is a genuine human individual. Vollenhoven argues that the incarnation needs to be understood in terms of the 'enhypostatic' identity of the Son as an individual human being – not in terms of his

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third to which *ratio* and *empirie* stand in one-to-one relation. Rather the Logos has a regulative role in that it provides the framework which makes both *empirie* and *ratio* possible (Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 409-410; cited in John H. Kok, *Vollenhoven: his Early Development* (1992): 24, 314-315; and Tol, *Philosophy*: 185-201). This is not a claim that the Logos provides the content of thought (which for Vollenhoven would be too close to the 'scholastic' notion of 'thinking God's thoughts after him'). Vollenhoven rejects 'logos speculation', the view that postulates a special connection between human thought and the divine Logos (Vollenhoven, *De noodzakelijkheid eener christelijke logica (32b)* (1932): 1-2; Vollenhoven, 'Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)', *P.R.* 13 (1948): §15 , p. 70 (*Hoofdlijnen*: 27); see Tol, *Philosophy*: 197-201, 299 (n. 125)). Vollenhoven's point seems to be that while sober exegesis *does* identify the Logos in the N.T. with the Word of the Lord in the O.T., to single out a special link between this and one's *rational* faculty (or analytical function) is to absolutise the latter at the expense of all the other faculties and aspects of one's life. It is wrong to link the Logos purely with the logical. For him it is the divine Logos who creates both the created logos (i.e., that which is of a logical nature), and the a-logical (Vollenhoven, 'Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)', *Stemmen des Tijds* 15 (1926): 388 ('alogische')). It important to note that 'non-logical' is not illogical, only subject-matter to which the distinction logical/illogical does not apply as an appropriate designation.

[309] It combines both those elements of a logical, i.e., specific to the logical or analytical modality, and non-logical character, i.e., those of other modalities (Vollenhoven, 'Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)': 388-399).

[310] Vollenhoven argues that the names 'Son' and 'Logos' need to be distinguished. The first refers to the second Person of the Trinity as eternally-begotten, the second to the name of the Son in joint participant with the Father and the Holy Spirit in the creative act (Vollenhoven, '"De logos" (38n)', *C.V.C.W.* 3 (1938): 39-41; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)* ; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: 74-76; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §§ 117, 136, pp. 78-102). However, he is not consistent in this regard.

[311] 'Levens-eenheid', pp. 124-5; Tol, 'Time and Change', p. 102. Strictly-speaking the term 'Christ' should be 'the Christ' (the anglicised Greek rendering of its Hebrew equivalent, 'the Messiah' both meaning 'the anointed one') the office assumed by the eternal Son in the act of redemption. In general, apart from where this needs to emphasised, I shall use the more generally used term 'Christ' without the definite article. 'Christians' are by extension, members of the anointed community as well as followers of 'the Christ'.

[312] *Introduction*, §124, pp. 85-88.

assumption of an 'anhypostatic' ('impersonal'), pre-given or general human nature.[313] It is only through this enyhypostatic human being, Jesus of Nazareth as the new office-bearer, head of the angels as well as the earth, that redemption is possible in that it is only through him, as its new federal (i.e., covenantal) head, that humanity truly finds its unity with God. [314] The incarnate Son is not only the bringer of redemption but also reveals the law of love, the characteristic of redeemed humanity.[315] This has implications for the laws or norms appropriate to each modality, including the modality of faith.[316] The Son who is the Logos, the basis of the created order, is present in the church as the Christ, the basis for the words and sacraments that shape the church's faith.[317] Thus, Vollenhoven sees the incarnation of the Son not only as making possible the salvation of 'souls' or separate individuals, but also as the revelation of God's Law for humanity in general.[318]

Third, the Holy Spirit puts the decree of the Father as revealed by the Son into effect.[319] This is God's effective will that realises the creative potential in specific situations:[320] In creation, the Holy Spirit first broods over the waters, leading to the unfolding of the still concealed diversity of the initial creation. Then, and in conjunction with the effecting of creation, he brings the revelation of the Logos to human consciousness, believers and unbelievers alike.

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[313] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 129-133, and (n. 188); Vollenhoven, 'Hypostasis-Anhypostasis, vooral bij de gnostiek (37n)', *C.V.C.W.* 2 (1937): 8-13; Vollenhoven, 'Anhypostatos? (40a)', *P.R.* 5 (1940): 75-76; Vollenhoven, 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons (1952k)': //6-9, pp. 3-92; Vollenhoven, 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons [2]': 3- 4; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §124, p. 187; see Sytse U. Zuidema, 'Het verschil in soteriologische waarde, toegekend aan den term ''onpersoonlijke menschelijke natuur'' in de concepties van Kuyper (– Hepp) en Bavinck (– Greydanus)', *C.V.D.V.* (1938); G.C. Berkouwer, *The Person of Christ* (1954): 313-320. Abraham Kuyper had said that Jesus Christ was not an individual (Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3, 'Locus de Christo (Pars Primo)', p. 37). Valentijn Hepp argues that the human nature of Christ cannot be distinguished by any specific characteristics (V.H. Hepp, *Dreigende deformatie* (1936-1937): 3.49).
[314] *Introduction* : §140, pp. 105-6; Bril and Boonstra, ed., *S. Kaarten*: 278-280.
[315] Mt. 22: 34-40; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 124-126; Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode': 11-12; Bril, ed., *Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy.*: 105-106 and note p. 142.
[316] Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138. In the first instance, this is worked out with respect to the súbject-pole in the post logical-modalities, but there is the wider norm of flourishing which works out in all the modalities (see Chapter Four).
[317] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)* ; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §136, pp.101-102.
[318] Vollenhoven, 'Plato's realisme (63a, slotgedeelte)' (1992): 159.
[319] Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)': /2, p. 30. In his early thinking, he sees this as taking place intra-mentally (Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 390-391, 410); Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138.
[320] Vollenhoven, 'Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)': 171-172; Vollenhoven, 'Conservatisme en progressiviteit in de wijsbegeerte (59a)' (1992): /42, p. 311; Anthony Tol, 'Time and Change in Vollenhoven', *P.R.* 60 (1995): 103; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-132; see also Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 11.

This 'double work' ('dubbele werkzaamheid') is the 'genetic deployment' ('genetische ontplooing') of the Holy Spirit .[321] Alongside this 'double work' of the Holy Spirit in supporting and carrying through the work of the Father and the Son, there is the distinctive work of 'positivisation': the application and particularisation of God's Law in specific situations.[322] The work of the Holy Spirit causes human life to flourish – including the process of biological reproduction and the development of culture and civilisation.[323] For Vollenhoven, the eschatological hope is not a move to a supra-temporal realm, as we shall see is the case for Dooyeweerd. For him, rather, the eschaton is unfolded *in* time and does not involve a transcendence *of* time. He sees a temporal continuity between the present reality and the transformed heavens and earth achieved by a combination of the direct action of God in the historical process, through the Resurrection of Jesus, and humanity's participation in that reality through the work of the Holy Spirit.[324]

So we see the sequential character of Vollenhoven's account: the work of the Father is succeeded by that of the Son, and that in turn by the work of the Holy Spirit.[325] He sees the work of the Persons as a successive unfolding, with first the Father as creator, then the Son as revealer and redeemer, and, finally, the Spirit as the agent of change and the realisation of new possibilities. This sequence is not a straightforward identification of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit – in each act led by one of the Persons the other two Persons have subordinate roles. However, while it is not straightforwardly sequential, it is sequential nevertheless, in that the identification of each of the Persons takes place primarily, albeit complexly, in the unfolding economy of creation, redemption and 'positivisation'.
The way that Vollenhoven presents the work of the three Persons in sequence – albeit a complex sequence – raises the question about how the Persons can act jointly without losing

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[321] Vollenhoven, '[Press release; lecture]: ''Bergson'' (21d)', *De School met den Bijbel* 28 (1921); Vollenhoven, 'Iets over het stelsel van Bergson', *Zeeuwsche Kerkbode* 33 (1919): 15 (I am grateful to Dr John Kok for providing me with his transcription of this manuscript); Tol, *Philosophy*: 184-185. In the versions of the *Isagôgè* between 1932 and 1939, there is a section entitled, 'The leading of the Spirit and the result of this activity' (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §78 'Het leiding van de Geest en het resultaat van deze activiteit'

[322] Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 127-128. Vollenhoven calls these three stages in the unfolding of the law as 'states of affairs'. See also Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode': 11; Bril, ed., *Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy.*: 106.

[323] Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §121, p. 82 (Vollenhoven refers to Pss. 127 and 128, and also to Dt. 7.13); Vollenhoven, 'Problemen van de tijd (68b)': 207-209.

[324] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 6 (Vollenhoven quotes 1 Tim. 3.16, Rom. 6.9 and 1 Cor. 15.33-34).

[325] Here he closely follows Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.193-194, although, as Anthony Tol points out, there important differences of emphasis, in that Kuyper tends to see God's activity as inherent in nature and he tends to formulate this in teleological terms (Anthony Tol, personal communication, 13 Jan. 2008).

their distinctions from one another. This is a matter I shall return to in Chapter Six.[326] But, for the moment, it is clear that Vollenhoven sees God's engagement with the world in Trinitarian terms. It is thus, in Trinitarian terms, that we must consider God's Law and humanity's religious, (i.e., basic covenantal) response.

For Vollenhoven, God's complexly sequential threefold action in the world, which constitutes his Law, calls for appropriate reception by humanity. He describes the Law as the 'boundary' between God and the cosmos. This was a theme for the duration of his professorship from his inaugural lecture in 1926 to his valedictory lecture in 1963.[327] Here I shall argue that this should not be understood either in ontic or noetic terms, but rather as 'religious' – to use both his and Dooyeweerd's terminology.

First then, the Law might be seen in noetic terms, providing some sort of *supra-modal knowledge*. The principal instrument which Vollenhoven offers in this regard is the principle of the exclusion of antinomies (the '*principium exclusae antinomiae*'), according to which the diversity of the law-spheres can be discerned and delineated according to a supramodal 'metalogic'. If one modality can entirely be explained in terms of another, it raises the question of the explanatory basis for that other modality; for example, if morality can entirely be explained by psychological principles, it leaves the question of how psychological principles can be explained. This process leads to an infinite regress with each level of explanation requiring a higher, meta-level, and so on. And further, the force of such principles specific to a certain modality cannot themselves be derived from those principles; for example, psychological principles cannot appeal merely to other psychological principles

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[326] Vollenhoven's identification each of the Persons with successive manifestations the work of God is in danger of portraying the Trinity in Modalistic terms, where the Persons are understood as different expressions of an underlying divine essence. Although the sequence is complex in this way, it remains true for Vollenhoven that the engagement of the Persons is sequential (Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-128). It is noteworthy that Vollenhoven argues that the early church considered the Sabellian heresy less dangerous than the Arian one, since the Sabellians at least considered the Logos to be divine, whereas the Arians did not (Vollenhoven, 'Norm en natuurwet (51h)': /5, p. 61).

[327] Vollenhoven, *Logos en ratio*: 26, 32; Vollenhoven, 'Philosophia systematica I (Kentheorie), 1926-7 (26msA)' (1926): §§1, 37; Vollenhoven, 'The Significance of Calvinism for the Reformation of Philosophy, 1 (31g1)', *The Evangelical Quarterly* 3 (1931): 392-393; Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 24-25; Vollenhoven, 'De waarheid in de Godsdienst-wijsbegeerte': 121; Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)' : *passim*; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §13, pp. 15-16; Vollenhoven, 'Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)': 82-83 (*Hoofdlijnen*: 24-25); Vollenhoven, 'Divergentierapport I (53)': 113-114; Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 79; Vollenhoven, 'Kort overzicht (65b)': 2; Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138-139; Vollenhoven, 'Plato's realisme (slotgedeelte)': 156; Vollenhoven, 'Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)': 172-173, 184; Vollenhoven, 'Problemen van de tijd (68b)': 200; Tol, 'Time': 101; Tol, *Philosophy*: 397-422. Tol points out that it was Dooyeweerd who used the term 'law as boundary' in published work (Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinism and Natural Law' (1997): 15-18; Tol, *Philosophy*: 398 (n. 331).

for their basis and justification. According to such a procedure, different forms of discourse are shown to be modally distinct, each irreducible to one another, but all subject to a higher, supra-modal Law, because of the antinomies that would otherwise arise.[328] However, privileging the logical principle of the exclusion of antinomies elevates the analytical modality (in which the logical principle of non-contradiction is located) over all the others in a reductionistic and rationalistic way.[329] Moreover, such a noetic, God's eye view, rendering of Vollenhoven's account of the Law gives rise to the objection that if the Law is supramodal or metalogical, how can it be known, and what meaningful role can it play in human life? It seems to posit some special knowledge (i.e., knowledge not subject to the laws and norms of number, space etc.), to which humanity can somehow have access. This raises the question about how the Law can be spoken of at all. We can only know the Law in terms of the different laws and norms appropriate to each of the modalities, and it is not clear at all how any kind of supra-modal knowledge of the Law can be attained.[330]

Second, Vollenhoven's conception of the Law might be read in ontic terms.[331] The problem is that to describe the Law in these terms, where the Law is seen as 'above' the world, makes the Law an *intermediary* between God and the world. Such a rendering of Vollenhoven's position compromises the directness of God's engagement with the world.[332] It displaces the role of the Son as mediator of creation, and the role of the Holy Spirit as the direct agent of God's involvement in the day to day unfolding of his purposes. Moreover, the Law then becomes a 'third thing', neither sovereign nor subjèct, neither finite nor infinite – and, indeed, neither creator nor created.[333] Up until 1932, Vollenhoven himself seems to suggest that the

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[328] Vollenhoven, 'Philosophia systematica I (26msA)' Vollenhoven, 'Significance, 1 (31g1)': 396; Vollenhoven, 'Philosophia systematica II (27ms)' (1927): §§19, 64; Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 29; Vollenhoven, 'Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)': §2B, pp. 61-62 (*Hoofdlijnen*: 16); Tol, *Philosophy*: 400-405.

[329] Whether 'rationalism' is read as the overemphasis on the analytical modality, or on laws at the expense of factuality – or both.

[330] This tendency is what Strauss calls Vollenhoven's 'quasi-monism', concentrated as it is on the validity of the law, and creation's subjection to it (Strauss, *P. D. D*: 204-205; 448-449).

[331] Vollenhoven, *Logos en ratio; beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche kentheorie (26a)*: 31.

[332] J. Glenn Friesen holds Vollenhoven to be claiming that God and the Law are somehow 'outside' the cosmos (Friesen, 'Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven': 110; see reply by Tol, *Philosophy*: 407 (n. 446)). However, Vollenhoven is careful to point out that that he is not claiming that God is *outside* the cosmos – if indeed it is possible to speak of God and the world in that way at all – only that all things are subject to God (Vollenhoven, 'Significance, 1 (31g1)': 392; Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 24-25).

[333] Michael Morbey has argued that this is the situation with Vollenhoven or those influenced by Vollenhoven in this respect (Michael M. Morbey, 'Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd and Law – A Rejoinder', *Anakainosis* 4 (1981): 8-9). Nicholas Wolterstorff argues an analogous position with respect to uncreated universals, for which he is critiqued by Hendrik Hart (Nicholas Wolterstorff, *On Universals* (1970); Hendrik Hart, 'On the Distinction between Creator and Creature: Discussion of a Central Theme in N. Wolterstorff's *On Universals*', *P. R.* 44 (1979)).

God's sovereignty in willing the Law gives the latter an ontic status, and speaks indirectly of God's relation to the cosmos as 'firm ground' ('vaste grond') or 'substance' ('substantie').[334] But this was omitted from his syllabus of 1932, possibly because it could be seen as what he called 'partial theism', according an element of the created order divine or quasi-divine status.[335]

These two renderings thus cannot provide a satisfactory account of the place or nature of the Law and each gives rise to intractable theological and philosophical difficulties. However, a third rendering, distinct from both of these (although sometimes seemingly held in tandem with them), is possible. Rather than seeing the Law either as a supramodal form of knowledge (according to the noetic reading above) or as a supra-temporal entity (according to the ontic reading), the Law needs to be seen in *religious* terms. 'Religion' for Vollenhoven in the orientation of the *whole person* towards God – this is what both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, following Kuyper, called the 'heart' in biblical terms. The heart can be God-directed or apostate,[336] according to what Vollenhoven calls '[D]irection'.[337] Vollenhoven

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[334] Vollenhoven, 'Isagôgè Philosophiae 1930-1945: Textkritische uitgave, Filosophie in de traditie van de Reformatie' (2010): §§151-152 (1932), pp. 1369-1371; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)* ; Tol, *Philosophy*: 400 (n. 433). The relevant sections (§§151-152) were among those omitted (from §147 on) from the *Isagôgè* of September 1932 (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*), and the parallel sections in *C. R. W.* (Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 49-67).

[335] See Vollenhoven, 'The Significance of Calvinism for the Reformation of Philosophy, 2 & 3 (31g2)', *The Evangelical Quarterly* 4 (1932): 129-160, 398-427; Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 73-199). After 1932 Vollenhoven quietly drops any description of the Law in terms of substance or firm ground, and thus implicitly ceases to accord the Law what might be regarded as a distinctive ontic status. The decisive turn in this regard is his deliberate omission of §§151 (latter section), 152 and 153 (beginning) from what he called 'The provisional negative result' ('Het voorlopige negatieve resultaat'). The latter comprised §§147-164 excised from his *Isagôgè* of 1932 and replaced by Part 1, Ch. 3 in the *C. R. W.* (Vollenhoven, 'Isagôgè Philosophiae Textkritische uitgave': 370-371; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: 90 (published September 1932, which refers readers to C. R. W.); Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 49-67; Tol, *Philosophy*: 400 (n. 433)).

[336] Tol states that from 1939, Vollenhoven tends to drop the terminology of 'biblical dualism' of God and the world and emphasises instead God's engagement with the world, impinging in and through the constitution of the world, summoning the appropriate human response in the choice between good and evil (Tol, 'Foreword': xxiii; see Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 40; Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 4; Vollenhoven, 'De waarheid in de godsdienst-wijsbegeerte (42l)', *Vox Theologica* 13 (1942): 114; Vollenhoven, 'Het geloof, zijn aard, zijn structuur en zijn waarde voor de wetenschap (50d)' <http://www.aspecten.org/vollenhoven/50d.htm>: 70-77; see also Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy''': 107, 110; and Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture': 12).

[337] I distinguish between '*D*irection', i.e., the basic religious orientation of human being, which I shall spell with a capital 'D'; and '*d*irection' with 'd' in lower-case which, as we have seen (3.1.2) is a component of an 'interrelation' between or among two or more individuals (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §94***; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §§85-91, 139, pp. 56-61, 104-105; see Tol, 'Time': 107). Tol calls Direction a 'holistic determination of a religious nature, affecting a human being's concrete redemptive living' (Tol, 'Foreword': xxix). Vollenhoven seems to have initially taken his notion of '[D]irection' from Driesch's notion of entelechy, although relating it to the ultimate relationship with God and although he is critical of the

sees Direction not as a feature of the created order itself,[338] but rather, in the first instance, as humanity's integral response to God's sovereignty; more broadly, it is the relation of the created order as a whole towards, or away from, God. The Direction of the heart is expressed in terms of a worldview.[339] The Christian worldview is an expression, in broad outline, of Christian religion.

Christian religion is a response to God's revelation of himself in Scripture in and through the person of Jesus Christ.[340] Here the 'faith' function has a leading role.[341] Faith refers back to the other modalities and they in turn antecipate faith as its respective substrata.[342] But even

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teleogical (Aristotelian) character of Driesch's conception. This was expressed in a lecture of 1929 published in 1930 (Vollenhoven, *De Eerste vragen der psychologie. (30b)* (1930): 20). In the 1931 *Isagôgè*, Vollenhoven says (§77) that this guidance (i.e., of the Holy Spirit) is not something of the creature. The determination of Direction is something other than the continuing in existence ('bestaansverloop') of that which is led. The following year he writes of the sharp opposition between good and evil which both resort under the '[D]irection of human life' *Isagôgè* (1932-1939): §63 = Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §92.

[338] I.e., is not about the component make-up ('Structure').

[339] Vollenhoven speaks in terms of a 'world and life view' (Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 78; Vollenhoven, 'Kort overzicht (65b)': 1; Wolters, 'On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy': 22, 25 (nn. 26, 27)). For 'world and life view' or 'worldview' see Chapter One introduction.

[340] Vollenhoven, *Logos en ratio*: 26, 32; Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 47; Vollenhoven, 'Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)': 82-83; Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': passim; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §117, p. 78; Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy''': 107-108; Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture': 12-13; Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy''': 110-111 and Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture': 14 with reference to Vollenhoven, 'Wijsbegeerte en theologie (40p)', *M.V.C.W.* 5 (1940): 5; Vollenhoven, '[Review of] *Het hart (leb, lebab) in het Oude Testament* by F.H. von Meyenfeldt' in *M.V.C.W.* (1950): 8.

[341] Faith (as governed by the norms appropriate to the 'pistic' or certitudinal modality) is not to be confused with underlying religious belief and involves the formulation of concepts which express certainty, typically theological or dogmatic statements (by 'dogmatic' is meant merely statements of one or other kind of certainty or conviction without any pejorative – or indeed approving, connotation). Religious belief, unlike faith concepts, cannot be subjected to theoretical scrutiny; and Scripture does not provide us with a ready-made theological system (Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 39-40; Vollenhoven, 'Het biblicisme, speciaal van Bengel en Oettinger (36c)', *C.V.C.W.* 1 (1936): 12; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §§11-15, 125-136, pp. 112-113, 188-198; Vollenhoven, 'Het geloof (50d)' Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 4; Vollenhoven, 'Schriftgebruik en wijsbegeerte (53l)' ; Vollenhoven, *Gastcolleges*: 215-222; Dooyeweerd, 'Biblicisme en Schriftuurlijke Wijsbegeerte', *C.V.C.W.* 2 (1937) – Dooyeweerd quotes an extract from Vollenhoven's article in *Calvin Forum,* 2, 7 (Feb. 1937), 148-149; see also Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy''': 110-111 and Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture': 14).

[342] Vollenhoven, 'Vollenhoven's Laatste Werk' (1973): 121. Vollenhoven affirms that the faith function is not lost with the fall, but is distorted and obscured like all other functions including reason (Vollenhoven, *Logos en ratio*: 32; Vollenhoven, 'De waarheid in de godsdienst-wijsbegeerte (42l)': 115; Vollenhoven, 'Het geloof (50d)'; Vollenhoven, 'Norm en natuurwet (51h)': /5, pp. 62-63; see Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy''': 108-110; and Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture': 12-14).

though faith (as we have seen, the 'highest' of the modalities for Vollenhoven) has a leading role with respect to the other modalities, the integrity and distinctiveness of each of the latter should be respected, and the faith modality opens up the other modalities analogically rather than prescriptively. [343] Moreover, a formal statement of faith, however correct, is not sufficient. As with Kuyper and Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven sees the process of regeneration (*palingenesis*) as the crucial one. It involves a turning around of the heart – it is effected directly by the Word of God as an effectual call ('*vocatio efficax*'). Regeneration, or *palingenesis,* has the effect of redirecting the faith ('pistical') function to the Word of God as expressed in the preached Word, the prediction of Christ's coming and the two-edged covenantal promise of grace and judgement.[344]

This covenantal or religious commitment shapes one's worldview, and provides the framework and context for one's whole experience.[345] Vollenhoven speaks of the covenantal relationship ('*unio foederalis*') between humanity and God.[346] This covenantal relationship concerns the submission of the human creature to God as sovereign Creator and Lawgiver.[347] Each human individual has a lifeline ('levenslijn') through time that he or she follows *coram Deo*, conversant with God's Word and guided by the Holy Spirit.[348] As we shall see, this sequential picture of the human response contrasts somewhat with that of Dooyeweerd. However, before turning to Dooyeweerd's account, I shall briefly sum up Vollenhoven's position.

We have seen how Vollenhoven portrays the Triune work of God in the world as unfolding successively in three 'States of Affairs': first, the Father's secret decrees; second, the Son's revelation of those decrees; and, third, the Holy Spirit's application of those decrees not only in turning the hearts of believers towards the Father, but also in working this out in every function of creaturely existence. Bringing this together with the discussion in this section, we

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[343] The faith modality is the highest in that it directly anticipates the transcendent, and so leads all the other modalities .

[344] *Introduction*: §125, pp. 88-90. Vollenhoven clearly differentiates faith from regeneration (Kuyper's *palingenesis* (see Chapter One introduction) in that following the Canons of Dordt (III-IV) there is a distinction between conversion (a matter of faith) and regeneration (a matter of the heart). The faith function plays a role in articulating this promise, although purely theoretical assent in terms appropriate to the faith function is not a sufficient response to God's covenantal call, nor yet an adequate expression of a covenantal relationship with God.

[345] Vollenhoven, 'Religie en geloof (53i)': 1; Vollenhoven, 'Schriftgebruik en wijsbegeerte (53l)' Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)' ; Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 444-445; see Kok, 'Vollenhoven and ''Scriptural Philosophy''': 112; Kok, 'Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture': 15.

[346] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 38; Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)': 30; *Introduction*: §115-136, pp. 79-102; Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode': 12.

[347] Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)*: §71.

[348] Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138, 140, 141, 145; Tol, 'Time': 117-118.

see that this Triune action needs to be received appropriately in human consciousness in '*religious*' terms, and responded to in every area of life. We need, then, to read Vollenhoven in such a way as to see the Law not as a special kind of supra-modal knowledge, nor as an entity between God and creation, but as God's covenantal relationship with us in the work of the three Persons. The Law (the Triune action) appropriately elicits the response of the heart, its *Direction*, which is then expressed in the integrality of everyday experience as well as its 'scientific' expression as modally-specific analysis.

(c) Outline of a Systematic Response

Philosophy arises as the conspectus of the whole, through the exercise of intuition, as the working out of Direction either in towards God, or by treating one or more aspects of creation as ultimate and so divine. Philosophy as a discipline can thus by characterised by systematic reflection upon this transcendental intuition in which perception, understanding and judgement are held together. Theology does not have the global overview of philosophy, nor is it itself the statement of the heart orientation of the human person. Rather, it is the provisional and fallible faith ('pistical') expression of religious belief within the framework of a systematic overview, such as philosophy makes possible. In other words, theology makes possible a statement of religious belief within the framework of an explicit or implicit philosophical schema.

Theology is the theoretical reflection arising from the analysis of the credal expression of basic religious belief. Credal language, in terms of both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven's account, is characteristic of the subject matter of the faith modality. The faith modality as the highest or last of the modalities is appropriately that in which basic religious commitment finds its articulation. Provided that the articulation of religious belief is not mistaken for religious belief itself, this is not necessarily intractably problematical. As Dooyeweerd points out in his reading of various unsatisfactory alternatives, theology (*pace* Augustine) is not to be identified with, seen as superior to (*pace* Aquinas), or in opposition to philosophy (*pace* Barth). It is only when the theological is either identified with, or seen as either parallel to, or replacing philosophy that problems arise. The faith modality is related to the other modalities by analogy (i.e. on the basis of inter-modal anticipations and retrocipations). In the process of doing the analysis of credal statements, the analogical relationship between the faith modality is traced with all the other modalities. Accordingly, theology as a discipline governed by the faith modality converses analogically with other disciplines governed respectively by the other modalities. As the last or highest of the modalities, the faith modality 'anticipates' (points forward to) most directly the content of religious commitment. At the same time, it also retrocipates (points back to) the other modalities. The faith modality is thus one strand in a greater tapestry, all woven together with one another by a complex skein of analogies.

The dialogue between theology and philosophy needs to be seen as a two-way process – neither is properly 'queen' of the other. The theological *expression* of those beliefs does indeed need to be distinguished from the beliefs themselves, but that expression needs to be testable in a theologically rigorous way according to the canons of careful biblical exegesis. Contrary to Dooyeweerd, it is not possible somehow to bypass careful biblical exegesis and theological reflection. The heart (supratemporal or not) is not an inside track to avoid the careful scrutiny of any statements about God or about God's relation to the world. However, Dooyeweerd is also correct in that this is not the end of the story and it needs to be recognized that biblical exegesis or theological reflection do not replace or exhaust basic religious belief. Further, the latter themselves need to be examined in terms of the deeper religious beliefs and philosophical assumptions. In other words there needs to be a continual movement backwards and forwards between the underlying religious belief located in the heart and their theological expression or biblical justification. Moreover, this basic belief needs to needs to motivate and direct not merely theology and biblical exegesis (which belongs to what Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven call the 'pistical' modality, concerning faith and certainty), but all other areas (those concerning all the other modalities). In general terms, properly understood, theology needs to be seen as opening up and guiding philosophical understanding. In particular, theology can help to guide one's understanding of God as creator, redeemer and transformer through the concerted and joint act of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. However, this should not properly prescribe the content of philosophical understanding, only help to illuminate an appropriate regulative framework. In particular, theological insights can help to illuminate the need for a perichoretic approach, drawing on the insights from the concert between the Persons of the Trinity in their joint engagement with the world in its creation, redemption and transformation.

All theological statements in general, and credal statements in particular, anticipate directly the religious roots of human striving.[349] As I have argued drawing on Vollenhoven's consequentially problem historical method, a number of basic religious quests can be identified: the quest for the originating Other, the quest for structuring Order and the quest for Purposive process. As such, I would argue that the doctrine of the Trinity is the foundational Christian doctrine because it anticipates most directly the religious quests of Origin, Coherence and Purpose which together, to a greater or lesser degree and in varying emphases, are the are the Direction of the human heart in its basis disposition.[350] Further the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be reduced to theoretical conceptuality because it rests on the identity of

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[349] 'Directly' because the faith modality is the final and leading modality for both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.

[350] It also points back to the numerical modality, the first (numerical) modality with the categories of unity and plurality, but, as has been pointed out, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot itself be accounted for in numerical terms without falling into the absurd claim that $1+1+1=3$.

the concrete individual, the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and the actual events of his birth, ministry death resurrection and ascension as well as the real relations through his mother Mary with humanity and the whole created order. In other words, far from being an abstract concept, the Trinity is rooted in the experience of his contemporaries, especially those authorised by him to hear witness of his person and life, and also in the life of the world. Far from being a conceptual afterthought, or a second-order belief, the doctrine of the Trinity is foundational to all other Christian doctrine, because *Christian* doctrine needs to take as its starting point the premise of God made flesh in the person of the Nazarene.

More generally, as creatures, we necessarily use terms that derive their meaning from aspects of the created order, whether we choose to describe God in terms of his activity in the created order (God's self-revelation in history), or in terms of his dissimilarity or detachment from the created order (God's supratemporality, impassibility, infinity). [351] All descriptions of God: as creator, redeemer, judge, provider etc. all similarly point back variously to different modalities (for example, god as creator or redeemer retrocipates the historical or cultural-formative modality, God as judge the juridical, as provider, the economic etc.) from their location, as statements of faith, in the faith modality. But this is simply to recognise that human beings are creatures, as is the language we as human beings use. As D.F.M. Strauss puts it: God's transcendence can only be approached 'from within', that is, in terms located within the created order, not in terms which somehow try to escape its bounds. [352] Theological

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[351] D.F.M. Strauss, 'Is it possible to do Theology without Philosophical Presuppositions?' *Acta Theologica* 22 (2002); D.F.M. Strauss, *Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines* (2009).

[352] D.F.M. Strauss points out there a procedure, which he calls 'theo-ontology' whereby characteristics of world order are distilled and applied to descriptions of God and then the description of God is used as the basis for understanding the world. This is of course a circular process. However, I would argue that this is an unavoidable procedure and applies to even the thinnest and seemingly least creation-loaded descriptions of God. For example, to call God Creator is to describe God in cultural-formative terms (or what Dooyeweerd calls the 'historical' modality), for example implicitly drawing picture of potter and clay, or any other similar cultural formative act. However, this is not an empty procedure, because the particular conception of the world which results, i.e. that it is *created*, rather than the outcome of chaos of chance, *does* significantly affect one's conception of the world. It is not an empty or necessarily *viciously* circular exercise (and the caveat that this is *creatio ex nihilo* marks out that we are using 'creation' as a limiting narrative rather than a fully adequate description of God and the act of creation) if each time round the circle there is a deepened grasp on the richness of experience in the light of deepened reflection on the questions of transcendence, structure and process as these enrich the conception of God which results. Where the procedure *is* viciously circular is if we are unaware or deny that the terminology we are using in respect of God is itself theo-ontological and unwitting use it to 'baptise' certain features of the world, and so allow one aspect to control one's understanding of God and thus of the world. For example to privilege one's characterisation of God as Creator over other descriptions of God (as loving redeemer, for example), is to allow both one's theology and one's conception of the world unduly to shaped by a certain aspect, in this case, the cultural-formative aspect. Further, as Strauss points out, it is not possible to short-circuit this process by resorting to 'negative' theology. For example, we cannot call God

reflection needs to be aware of its own assumptions, as they are brought to light in dialogue with other disciplines. The articulation of basic religious belief needs to be subject to systematic Christian (and indeed as I argue Trinitarian) theological analysis and reflection; but that theological reflection itself needs to answer rigorously to Christian philosophical analysis, deriving from a basic Christian belief. Both theology and philosophy need to flow from, and be consistent with underlying Christian belief, as it is held in the direct and utter dependence of each Christine individual upon the Father of one's Lord.

To sum up, while it is important to see the distinction between religion, as the basic Direction of the human heart, philosophy, as the intuitive conspectus of the whole, and theology, as the specific application of theoretical reflection with respect to the faith modality. At the same time, it is also important to see the mutual inter-dependence of religion, philosophy and theology. It is on the basis of the religious dispositions of the human heart, in the face of the whole sweep and diversity of experience, that the intuitive conspectus of the whole, which is philosophy, is constructed. Similarly, theology, as a specific discipline, is conducted within the framework of philosophy.

However, there is a two-way (indeed multivocal) dialogue in all respects. Christian theology, insofar as it grounded in the encounter with the concrete individual, Jesus of Nazareth, and the actual events of his life, death, resurrection and ascension, cannot properly be reduced to pure conceptuality. Also, as the faith modality, it reaches out directly to the religious underpinnings of all human experience, and the reflection upon that experience, namely in the quest for the Origin, Coherence and Purpose of all things. In this regard theology anticipates the religious basis of thought in the face of the concreted encounter with the incarnate Logos. At the same time it also reaches back to all the prior modalities of theoretical thought (number, space etc.) without which any articulation of theological statements of any kind is impossible. In this regard, analogy (or indeed metaphor or parable) is not to be seen as an inside track to the eternal (along scholastic lines), but the normal thread which draws together discursively incommensurable but mutually enriching forms of discourse, among which the language of faith is one form of discourse among many. All,

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'uncreated' except by drawing on the notion of 'creation', i.e. by distilling an aspect of the world, putting it in negative terms, and then applying it to God. A similar danger exists with the notion of infinity, if infinity is understood in negative terms, leading to impossible conundrums, for example in the discussion of the incarnation. These procedures tend to lead to a further danger of 'onto-theology': that is of treating God as a substance who can be approached by the *via negativa* of cumulatively removing any attributes or conceptions we have of God until we are left with the contemplation of God purportedly as pure being. However, all that this procedure will leave us with is a notion of God arrived at as the result of one's own ratiocination, imagination or piety, rather than God as revealed in Scripture (with language as creation-loaded as any scriptural description of God necessarily is) (Strauss, 'Theology'; Strauss, *P.D.D.*)

properly regarded, point towards to the whole and the religious basis of the whole as the whole is drawn together. But the whole is not to be seen as other than life of the world but the very warp and weft of life itself as the whole is drawn together by the covenantal response (positively or negatively) from the centre of that life by humanity to God.

'Trinity', 'creation' and 'redemption' are all terms qualified by the faith modality, but the fact that they are does not exhaust either their meaning with respect to the other modalities, to the wider philosophical schema in terms of which they are articulated, or their deeper implications as articulations of the religious belief that shapes one's overall understanding of the world. Terms qualified by the faith modality retrocipate (that is point 'back' to by analogy) the other modalities. Further, the systematic articulation of theological dogma (like the systematic articulation of any other discipline) reflects a wider philosophical schema. Finally, theology becomes religion when it ceases to be judged on the basis of it systematic adequacy (as in the discipline of systematic theology, or what Dooyeweerd calls 'dogmatology) or its confessional soundness (as in ecclesiastical statements of faith), but transforms the whole life and worldview, and such has implications for every area of life.

Theology or biblical exegesis is not being claimed here to be the sole repository of Christian thought, or even *primus inter pares*. It does not prescribe the form of discourse for other disciplines, but engages with other disciplines as a dialogue partner, looking critically at the structure of the beliefs that the other disciplines anticipate.[353][354]

More generally, religion is the extension of any insight, be it theological or any other area, to a stance that affects every area of life in a comprehensive and all-directive way.

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[353] For a more constructive view, see Klaas J. Popma, *De Plaats der Theologie* (1946): 20-27.
[354] For a more constructive view, see Klaas J. Popma, *De Plaats der Theologie* (1946): 20-27.

4.   The Need for a Trinitarian Basis for a Christian Worldview

A Christian worldview involves a vision of the Lordship of Christ over every area of life. Creation, although at present fallen and subject to the distortion of sin, needs to be seen in all of its harmonious diversity; and, moreover, needs to be seen in terms of the unfolding of God's purposes in history.

A Christian worldview has its transcendent point of reference in the revelation of God as Trinity: the Father who calls all things into existence, the Son through whom all things were created and hold together, and the Holy Spirit who transforms all things and brings them to their final destination. All three Persons participate together in the creation, redemption and the bringing about of the new heavens and the new earth.

[here I need to show the importance of the Trinity vis a vis monadic conceptions of God - it is about understanding that love is at the heart of who God is Story of someone who moved away from seeing God as a distant, authority figure, but as being drawn into the love of Father, Son and Holy Spirit]

The Bible presents us with the Trinity throughout at the heart of the Christian faith – not as an abstract doctrine, but the living basis for our life and witness.

(a) The Revelation of God as Trinity

Considerations of the Trinity arise firstly out of the encounter with Jesus Christ, as we find him witnessed to in Scripture, and through our personal experience. The doctrine of the Trinity was formulated under the pressure of the different heresies which Hellenism generated, but with regard to the closely-woven claims about Jesus embedded in Scripture. The claim to the divinity of Jesus with the Holy Spirit, alongside that of the Father (which is what the Trinity is all about) is woven into the New Testament, [355] the apostolic record, which in turn unfolds the cumulative record of the Old Testament.[356]

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[355] Arthur W. Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament* (1962): 30-234; Ben Witherington and Laura M. Ice., *The Shadow of the Almighty: Father, Son and Spirit in Biblical Perspective* (2002): 1-147; Gerald O'Collins, *The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity* (1999): 11-83. Mt. 1.17, 20; 2.4, 6, 11, 15; 3.11; 4.1; 7.21-23; 10.1, 20, 32-33, 40; 11.25-27; 12.18-21, 28, 31-32; 14.33; 16.16-20, 27; 17.2-9; 18.10, 19-20; 19.17; 20.28; 21.33-44; 22.43-45; 23.9-10; 24.5; 25.31; 26.29, 39, 42, 53, 63-64; 27.43, 46, 54; 28.17-20; Mk 1.1, 8, 10-12, 24; 2.7, 10; 3.11, 29; 8.29, 38; 9.7; 10.18, 40; 11.17, 25, 26; 12.26, 36, 37; 13.11; 14.36, 61-62; 15.39; Luke 1.15, 31, 32, 41, 67, 78, 80; 2.11, 15, 26, 27; 3.16, 22; 4.1, 14, 18; 5.21; 8.39; 9.20, 33, 35; 10.21, 22; 11.13; 12.10, 12; 20.37, 41-44; 22.42, 69, 70; John 1.1, 2, 10, 14, 18, 32, 33; 3.5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 31, 34, 35; 4.23, 24-26, 42; 5.17-23, 26, 30-31, 36, 37, 39, 43, 45; 6.27, 32, 37, 44-46, 57, 62, 65, 69; 7.16, 28, 29, 33, 39; 8.16, 18, 28, 38, 42, 54, 58; 9.4, 35, 37; 10.15, 17, 18, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 38; 11.25-27, 41; 12.26-28, 44-45, 49, 50; 13.1, 3, 31, 32; 14.2, 6-13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 31; 15.1, 2, 8-10, 15-16, 21, 23-

We have first the witness of the apostles (women and men) that Jesus rose from the dead according to the Scriptures (i.e. the Hebrew scriptures) which predicted that God would not have his Holy One see corruption (Psalm 16:10 quoted by Paul in Acts 13:35). Christians believe that Scripture itself is written by human beings but God-breathed ('theopneustos'),[357] and the claims about the divinity of Jesus arose by recourse to the whole thrust and character of Scripture in response to the claims of the risen Christ. The whole burden of Paul's preaching was God (the Father)'s vindication of Jesus as Redeemer. Paul consistently refers to Jesus as Lord (i.e. Yahweh) – the One who the covenantal redeemer of Israel and progressively revealed as universal sovereign,Jesus is not just a 'divinised man' (theios aner) in Greek terms; but rather the fulfilment of God's promises to David, unfolded progressively. David is an anointed one (mashiah), but there is an anointed One to come who will have divine status. Jesus raises the question regarding Psalm 110 – 'how could the Spirit lead David to call the Messiah his Lord?'

24, 26; 16.3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13-17, 23-25, 28, 32; 17 (whole chapter); 18.11; 20.17, 21, 22, 28, 31; Acts 1.4, 5, 7, 8, 16; 2.4, 17, 18, 22, 24, 33, 34, 36, 38; 3.13, 14, 20; 4.8, 31; 5.3, 4, 9, 32; 6.3, 5; 7.51, 55, 56; 8.15, 17, 18, 29, 37, 39; 9.17, 31; 10.3, 4, 19, 20, 38, 44, 47; 11.12, 15-16, 24; 13.2, 4, 9, 33, 52; 15.8, 10, 11, 28; 16.6, 7, 10; 17.29, 31; 19.2, 6, 21; 20.23, 28; 21.4, 11; 26.22, 23; 27.23; 28.25; Rom. 1.3, 4, 20; 4.24; 5.1, 5; 6.4, 11; 8.1, 3, 5, 9-11, 15, 16, 26; 9.1; 14.17, 18; 15.6, 8, 13, 16, 30; 1 Cor. 1.1, 2-4, 9, 30; 2.4, 10-14; 3.16, 23; 6.11, 19; 11.3; 12.3-6, 12; 15.15, 24-28, 57; 2 Cor. 1.19-22; 2.14, 15, 17; 3.3, 17, 18; 4.4-6; 5.5, 18-19; 11.31; 13.14; Gal. s 1.1, 3; 3.2, 14; 4.6; 5.17, 22, 25; 6.8, 18; Eph.1.1, 3, 13; 2.10, 12, 16, 18, 22; 3.5, 14, 16, 19; 4.3-6, 30, 32; 5.2, 5, 18, 20; 6.6, 18, 23; Phil. 1.2, 11, 19; 2.1, 11; 3.3, 9, 14; 4.7, 19; Col. 1.1, 3, 15; 2.2, 9; 3.1, 3, 17; 4.12; 1 Thess. 1.1, 3, 6; 3.11, 13; 4.8; 5.9, 18, 19; 2 Thess. 1.1-2, 12; 2.13, 16; 3.5; 1 tim.1.1-2; 2.5; 3.16; 4.1, 10; 2 tim. 1.1, 2; 4.1; tit. 1.1, 3, 4; 2.10, 11, 13; 3.4-6; Phil. 1.1; Heb. 1.1, 2-6, 8, 9, 13; 2.4, 9; 3.7; 4.14; 5.5, 8, 10; 6.4-6; 7.3, 25; 9.14, 24; 10.12, 15, 29; 11.25, 26; 12.2, 23, 24; 13.8, 20; James 1.1; 1 Pet. 1.2, 3, 11, 12; 2.5; 3.18, 21, 22; 2 Pet. 1.1, 2, 17, 21; 1 John 1.1, 2, 3, 7; 2.1, 20, 22-24; 3.2, 24; 4.2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15; 5.1, 5-8, 20; 2 Jn. 1.3, 9; Jude 1.1, 4, 20, 21, 25; Rev. 1.1, 2, 6, 8, 10; 2.7, 11, 17, 27, 29; 3.1, 5, 6, 12, 13, 21; 4.2, 5, 8-11; 5.5, 6, 8-10, 12, 13; 6.1; 7.9-10, 17; 11.11, 15; 12.4-5, 10-11, 13, 17; 14.1, 4, 10, 12, 13; 15.3; 17.14; 19.10; 20.6; 21.1-8, 22; 22.3, 13, 16-17.

[356] Gen. 1.1, 2; 3.22; 6.3; 11.7; 18.1-5, 8, 9-33; 22.8, 11, 12; 24.1-27; 49.10, 24; Ex. 2.24; 3.14-16; 4.5; 23.20-23; 29.45, 46; 31.1, 3; 32.34; 33.14, 19; 34.5, 6; Num. 6.24-26; 10.10; 11.25, 29; 15.41; 22.22-35; 24.2, 17, 18; 27.18; Deut.4.24-35; 6.4; 7.9; 18.15; Judges 3.10; 6.34; 13.25; 14.6, 19; 15.14; 1 Sam. 10.6, 10; 16.13, 14; 19.20-24; 1 Kings 17.10-24; 2 Kings 19.15-19; 2 Chron. 15.1; 18.23; 20.14; Neh. 9.20-30; Job 4.15; 19.25; 27.3; 32.8; 33.4, 23-25; Ps. 2.2, 7, 12; 8.5, 6; 16.10; 22.1-31; 29.3; 45.6-7; 50.5-6; 51.11; 72; 74.2; 77.13; 78.54; 84.8; 89.18; 95.3; 96.4-5; 110.1, 4; 118.22; 132.11, 17; 135.19, 21; 139.7; 143.10; 146.5; Pr. 1.23, 8; 30.4; Eccl. 11.5; 12.11; Isa. 6.3; 7.14-16; 8.14, 18; 9.6, 7; 11.1-5, 10; 12.2; 19.20, 25; 22.21-25; 25.9; 26.4; 28.16; 30.1; 32.1-4, 15; 33.22; 40.3-5, 7, 10, 11, 13; 42.1-16; 43.3, 10- 12; 44.3; 45.15; 48.12; 49.6-9, 16, 26; 53; 59.19-21; 61.1; 62.2, 5; 63.1-8, 10, 11, 14; Jer. 30.5, 9; 31.31-34; 33.15-17; Ezek. 1.12, 20; 2.2; 3.12, 14, 24; 8.3; 11.1, 5, 24; 17.22-24; 34.23-24, 31; 36.27; 37.1, 14; 39.29; 43.2-5; Dan. 2.28; 3.25; 7.27; 9.24-26; Joel 2.27-29; Amos 9.11; Mic. 2.7, 13; 3.8; 4.1-8; 5.2-5; 7.7; Hag. 2.5; Zech. 3.8; 4.6; 6.12, 13; 7.12; 11.12-13; 12.8, 12; 13.1, 6-7; 14.4, 5, 9; Mal. 3.1, 3; 4.2-3, 5-6.

[357] 2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Peter 1.21.

Claims of the divinity of Jesus are blasphemous to the Jews, who cannot accept that Jesus can be divine since there is one God (although as has been pointed out, the central Jewish affirmation that God is 'ehud' is not that God is an arithmetic monad but God is a unity); while the very idea of God incarnate is foolishness to the Greeks – who were happy enough to live with the fables of gods taking on human form, or of human beings being divinised – but the claim that divinity itself (which for the Greeks is unknowable, unchangeable, impassible) should be subject to the sufferings of the cross is philosophically absurd in Greek eyes (1 Cor 1:23).

If Jesus is truly God, as is claimed in Scripture, most graphically in the Fourth Gospel, but throughout the New Testament, there must be a sense in which he is both the same, and yet different from the Father who sent him to us, and to whom he teaches us to pray. Then there is the Spirit, whom Jesus promises, who again, is identified with Jesus and yet is distinct from him. This is against the background of the extensive use, throughout the Old Testament, of terms such as 'Word', 'Spirit' and 'Wisdom'.

The articulation of the doctrine of the Trinity developed under pressure from Greek thought, which constantly tried to accommodate the apostolic witness to their ideas. The Gnostics tried to accommodate it through dualism, playing down God's engagement with the material world. Allied to this were those who said that Jesus only seemed to be human (Docetism) or was a human being adopted at divine by God (Adoptionism); or those who tried to say that there was an unknowable substance to God only revealed in different ways (Monarchian Modalism), or that Jesus was a sort of intermediate being between God and humanity (Subordinationism). It is against this last that the Niceno-Constantinopolitan was directed. The whole thrust of this was to defend the basis sense of Scripture that only God redeems and that Jesus, as fully human, is also God – and yet eternally distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Calvin argues that God's Triune nature is:

> ….a special work to distinguish himself more precisely from idols. For he so proclaims himself the sole God as to offer himself to be contemplated clearly in three Persons. Unless we grasp these, the bare and empty name of God flits about in our brains, to the exclusion of the true God.[358]

There has been a rediscovery of the centrality and implications of the doctrine of the Trinity in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, especially in the Western Church (where it tended

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[358] Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.13.12.

somewhat to be pushed to one side – unlike in the Eastern Church, where there has been much deeper and more extensive reflection on the Trinity, not least by the 'Cappadocian Fathers' – Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus). The being (ontology) of the Trinity consists in the relations of the Persons – the Persons are mutually dependent (*pace* subordinationism) and eternally distinct (*pace* monarchian Modalism). This is not something which arises from creation – the Triune being is not dependent on creation or redemption, but is revealed 'economically' (as theologians say) through creation and redemption. Of course we can only know God through creation, but we have God's self-attesting revelation that he is Triune. There are no categories of being to which God needs to conform – but God reveals himself finally and authoritatively how we are to speak of him, and that it true; and it is that truth which is the key to the universe. We know God himself because we know Jesus, whose fully human personality is at one and the same time, the personality of God.[359]

All that we know or can know of God is that he has revealed himself in the person of Jesus. In other words, our knowledge of God is first of God as Trinity (which is the deeper logic of the affirmation that 'Jesus is Lord'), and then of God who created the world. We cannot move immediately to the affirmation that God created the world, because it is only within the framework of our affirmation that God is Trinity that we can affirm that God created the world. Otherwise, that would be what is called 'theo-ontology' – the projection of our own temporal reflections onto a notional eternity. The following propositions need to be born in mind:

1. The Trinity is how God reveals himself. It is a limiting idea in that it forbids us to think other of God than how he reveals himself.

2. The presumption of a disjunction between who God is and how he reveals himself is something we impose on God (it is what Calvin calls a 'bare and empty name' which 'flits around in our brains, to the exclusion of the true God.' (*Institutes* 1.13.2).

3. It is not permitted to speak of God as 'originating essence' or in any other similar way. This is to impose an essentially Unitarian construction on our understanding of

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[359] Jürgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God* (1981); Jenson, *Systematic Theology*; Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*; Colin E. Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity. The Bampton Lectures 1992* (1993); Thomas F. Torrance, *The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being, Three Persons* (2001); Karl Rahner, *The Trinity* (1970); Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ* (1984); John D. Zizioulas, *Being as communion: studies in personhood and the church* (2004). Trinitarian thinking has always retained a prominence in the Greek and Russian Orthodox church which has not always been true in the Western churches. (Vladimir Lossky, *Orthodox Theology: An Introduction* (1980))

God. It is contrary to divine self-revelation to say that in effect that God is 'essentially' monadic but 'energetically' or 'economically' Triune.

4. To say that God could or could not be other than the Trinity is to impose inappropriate categories upon God. While the alternatives of necessity and contingency are characteristic of the created order where characteristics are predicated of these things to which they pertain, to say that characteristics are predicated of God is inappropriate: God simply is who he says he is.

5. There is both continuity and discontinuity between God and the world. The world reflects the Trinitarian character of God, and yet God is entirely other in relation to the world. That God is Trinity is not derived from the world, and yet, since the world is created by the Triune God, it is to be expected that the world is Trinitarian in character.

6. To accord eternity or a-temporality to any aspect of the created order is to compromise the temporal character of the universe. Time does not stand over against the rest of the created order – it comes into being as occurrence. 'The beginning in Gen 1:1 – also John 1:1 and Proverbs 8 – is originally not part of the created order but is rather the eternal Son in whom all things are created, and in whom all Wisdom (that is the Holy Spirit) is possessed.

7. God is Creator (with a capital 'C' indicating *creatio ex nihilo*) but this is not an adequate description of God as God, since that would make God dependent on the world for who he is (since it is not possible to be a Creator without a creation). If being Creator is what makes God god then God cannot be god without creating, i.e. God has to create in order to be god, in other words, since God is none other than God, God has to create.

8. By contrast, to define God as Trinity means that God does not have to create in order to be god. Creation is not *per se* part of God's definition as divine, since God's self-definition is on the basis of the inter-dependency of the Three Persons – there is no infinite regression of ontological dependency but only a closed ontological circle (i.e. with each of the Persons being eternally dependent on each of the other two – they are not dependent on any other entity or 'originating essence' apart from themselves). As Triune, God is always divine, regardless of whether he creates or not.

9. The fact that in both instances (i.e. with respect to God as Creator and God as Trinity) we have to use created language, albeit inadequately, to describe the reality of God does not reduce God to the created order. The reality of God, be it as Trinity or as Creator, cannot be reduced either to the numerical or formative modalities.To

say that because we can only speak of God in created terms that God is thereby reduced to created forms is a fallacious argument. That is to confuse our speech about God with God's sovereign self-revelation. Because God reveals himself as Trinity in created terms does not mean that God's freedom consists in our freedom to speak of God other than as Trinity – rather God's sovereignty requires us to speak about God as Trinity, and not as any of our projections about God be it as 'created essence' or in any other way. God certainly defines himself with respect to us as Creator – but if that were purely the case it would be impossible to know him. It is only through the Son that God can be known (this is true implicitly in the Old Testament and explicitly in the New Testament).

The Trinitarian worldview allows us to conceive of God as at once faithful in his dealing with the world in general, and humanity, and yet not dependent on the world for his existence. In this respect it provides a radical alternative to two ways of thinking which have tended to dominate Christian and other thinking, and yet, I argue, fall short of a full-satisfactory Christian position.

(b) Modalism, Subordinationism and Perichoresis

The problem in any formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity is to be true equally to the unity and the diversity of God. There are two broadly acknowledged errors to avoid.

(i) Modalism

The first distortion is that of 'Modalism': the depiction of God in terms of successive appearances by an underlying somewhat or something without allowing for the distinctive operation of each of the three Persons at any one time . An early representative of which was Praxeas (fl. c. 200), a follower of Sabellius, of whom little is known. Tertullian under the influence of the Hebrew Scriptures provided a trenchant critique of the language of timelessness that motivated Modalism.[360]

The most common form of Modalism in the understanding of the Trinity is, following the method of appropriation to ascribe the act of creation exclusively to the Father, that of redemption to the Son and that of sanctification to the Holy Spirit, as Kuyper describes it:

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[360] Tertullian, *Adversus Praxean* 3; Jenson, *T.I.* : 69-74. See Jenson, 'Triune God' : 122-3.

'the deeper insight into the mystery of the adorable Trinity was gradually lost, and the pulpit's touch upon it became both rare and superficial, the Sabellian error naturally crept into the Church again, viz., that there were three successive periods in the activities of the divine Persons: First, that of the Father alone creating the world and upholding the natural life of all things. This was followed by a period of activity for the Son, when nature had become unnatural and fallen man a subject for redemption. Lastly, came that of the Holy Spirit regenerating and sanctifying the redeemed on the ground of the work of Christ. According to this view, in childhood, when eating, drinking, and playing occupied all one's time, we had to do with the Father. Later, when the conviction of sin dawned upon us, we felt the need of the Son. And not until the life of sanctification had begun in us did the Holy Spirit begin to take notice of us. Hence while the Father wrought, the Son and the Holy Spirit were inactive; when the Son undertook His work, the Father and the Holy Spirit were inactive; and now since the Holy Spirit alone performs the work, the Father and the Son are idle. But since this view of God is wholly untenable, Sabellius, who elaborated it philosophically, came to the conclusion that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were after all but one Person; who first wrought in creation as Father, then having become the Son wrought out one's redemption, and now as the Holy Spirit perfects one's sanctification.'[361]

The Persons to which they bear witness cannot be collapsed into one, and yet are inseparable and have equal ultimacy.

(ii)   Subordinationism

The second distortion is that of 'subordinationism': the separation of the persons of Son and the Spirit from the centre of the Godhead, which then tends to be reserved exclusively for the person of the Father. This involves the identification of Christ as the principle of the created order, thus blurring the distinction between Creator and creation. As Cornelius Plantinga puts it:

> What is … heretical is belief in three *ontologically graded* distinct persons. It is Arianism that Hilary, Augustine, and the Cappadocians identify as pluralist heresy. For if Sabellians confound the persons, Arians are said to be guilty of 'dividing the substance.'[362] Arianism, as Jaroslav Pelikan points out, thus became the standard

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[361] Abraham Kuyper, *Work of the Holy Spirit*, Ch. 3.
[362] As in the Athanasian Creed, vs. 4. See also Hilary of Poitiers, **De Trin.** 1.11.17; Augustine, *De Trin.* 7.4.9; Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eun.* 2.6.7.

tritheist heresy because, despite Arius's own insistence on the unity and simplicity of God, Arians worshipped Christ and the Spirit and baptized in their names *while refusing them full ontological deity.* This, as Gregory of Nyssa says, makes the Son a 'bastard' and the Trinity a pagan 'plurality of gods.'[363]

This is the result of not thinking radically enough in a Trinitarian way. In other words, subordinationism results from identifying Christ in an isolated way with creation, rather than understanding Christ's role in creation as bound up with his relation to the Father and the Spirit. If as has been argued, that relationship is internally secure through the definition of the Son intentionally by the Father, and of his marking out extensionally by the Spirit, then there is no question of Jesus being understood to be anything other than God.

As Del Colle points out, Gregory of Nazianzus replied to the Arian criticism that if the Father signified either the essence or action of God, the Son could not be his equal in deity, with the following:

> O men so subtle! The name of the Father signifies neither essence nor action but it indicates a relation, that which the Father has towards his Son or the Son towards his Father.[364]

It is for the same reason that dynamically, as we shall see, it is through his relation with the Spirit that Jesus is the wisdom and power of God: that is, Jesus cannot be identified as an abstract principle, i.e. truth, but rather he is One who is known and active through the declaration of the Father and the operation of the Spirit

The diversity of God is undermined by Modalism, while the unity of God is undermined by subordinationism. Both Modalism and subordinationism derive from misplaced attempts to safeguard the transcendence of divinity defined in terms of a-temporality. Modalism does this by divorcing the inner being of God, thought of as an unknowable substance, from God's temporal manifestations. subordinationism does this by placing usually the Son (and by implication the Holy Spirit) on a putative ladder of being and linking the knowable temporal to the unknowable a-temporality as which God is conceived.[365]

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[363] Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine,* 5 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971-1989), 1.200. *Contra Eun.* 1.19. (Cornelius Plantinga, 'Social Trinity and Tritheism': 34).

[364] St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Patrologia Graeca*, J. P. Migne, Paris 1857-1866): 36, 96; Rouet de Journel, M.J., S.J., Enchiridion Padrisdicum. Rome, 1966): 990. Quoted in de Margerie, *The Christian Trinity in History*: 135 (Del Colle, *Christ and the Spirit*: 18).

[365] Jenson, *T.I.*: 64-84.

*(iii)*The Need for Perichoretic Adequacy

There are two approaches to the triune diversity: in both, from a Trinitarian point of view, God's relationship with the world is one of love.

The first approach deriving from the Latin-speaking West. This starts from the unity of God, and then attempts to map out from this the diversity of persons, usually in terms of God's successive acts. This is known as the method of appropriation. In other words, of identifying ''appropriately '' the role which belongs to each person. The difficulty with this approach is that at the centre of its understanding of God is an unknowable substance that is finally unknowable and indeed, for all we know, impersonal, certainly not capable of being engaged with in personal terms. The endemic problem of the Western theology has been that of Modalism, and indeed, it is a tendency that the approach of appropriation can naturally lead to this, since it does not give any account of the distinctive persons, except as manifestations of an underlying monad.

The approach deriving from the Greek-speaking East is that of Perichoresis, initially used in the context of Christology to describe the relation between the divine and the human natures of Christ. It has been objected that the approach of Perichoresis is a footnote or an afterthought to the theological method, but although its explicit application to Trinitarian thinking is comparatively late (John of Damascus 8th Century), yet it takes us to the heart of God as persons-in-relationship, putting communion rather than an unknowable somewhat at the heart of who God is, as is expressed supremely in the vision of Jesus' high-priestly prayer in John 17.   Although more complex, I would like to suggest that this offers much richer possibilities. The perichoretic approach begins with the notion of communion, and it is the love of the persons one for another, which flows out into the relation of love, which God has with the world. The Eastern approach does incline towards Subordinationism: it fits into its unity of God in the Father alone, but this need not necessarily be so if the relations are fully mutual.

The term '*perichoresis*' describes the process whereby the Persons of the Trinity indwell one another and are involved with one another, each retaining his own distinctiveness, in their joint 'economy' (their work in the world). In terms of the work of each of the Persons is given equal and conjoint weight, so correcting the distortions which emphasis on one or other of the Persons to the exclusion of the others results in. The operation of the persons is not sequential but joint and simultaneous. The joint operation of the persons is exercised as *perichoresis:* the interchange and the giving way of one another, and their mutual authorization, realization and empowerment of one another. For human beings, this means that first we are individuals called into being by the will of the Father; second that

we are bound together in a rich tapestry of different relations, as the Son is in relation to the Father, witnessed to by the Spirit.

The perichoretic model is by no means foreign to the Calvinian tradition.[366] Calvin argues that the Son and the Spirit are equally active in creation, and that each Person is God in his own right, not successive manifestations of God. [367] Calvin quotes Gregory of Nazianzus with approval:

> I cannot think of the One without immediately being surrounded by the radiance of the Three; nor can I discern the Three without at once being carried back to the One.[368]

The term '*perichoresis*' describes the indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity one with another: each retains its own distinctiveness in their joint 'economy' or work in the world. In terms of the perichoretic vision, the divine status and distinctiveness of three Persons of the Trinity are each recognised with respect to the immanent Trinity, and, with respect to the economic Trinity, their common action but distinctive roles. '*Perichoresis*' ('περιχώρησις') derives from '*chora*' ('χώρα'), Greek for 'space', or '*chorein*' ('χωρεῖν') which means 'to

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[366] See Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.13.12 (also 14.12.16, 16.17). Torrance points out that Calvin uses Cyprian's notion of *in solidum* from Cyprian, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*: 3 and 5 ff. He also quotes from Augustine *De Trinitate* 6.8.8 also 6.10.12: 'In the supreme Trinity one [Person] is as much as three together, nor are two anything more than one. And they are infinite in themselves, so both each are in each, and all are in each, and each in all, and all are one' (Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 201).

[367] Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.13.22.

[368] Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.13.16, 11.13.17; John Calvin, *Commentary on the Gospel according to John*, vol. The John Calvin Collection (1998) on 1: 1; Calvin, Epistle: 607; Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 112, 201; Philip Walker Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response: Calvin's Trinitarian Understanding of the Divine-Human Relationship* (1995): 42-43, 124, 161 (n. 133), 206 (n. 125). The notion of '*perichoresis*' is associated with the Eastern (Greek) rather than the Western (Latin) theological tradition. The contrast between the Eastern (Greek) and the Western (Latin) views of the Trinity is associated with the 'paradigm' associated with the name of Théodore de Régnon (1831-1893; see Théodore De Régnon, *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité* (1892-1898)). De Régnon has, however been subjected to close critique by Michael Barnes (Michael René Barnes, 'De Régnon Reconsidered', *Augustine Studies* 26 (1995)), and Lewis Ayres (Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (2010)). Whether or not the contrast suggested by the 'de Régnon thesis' and asserted more recently by Colin Gunton (Colin E. Gunton, 'Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43 (1990)) is correct, the insights of the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil of Caesarea (330-379), Gregory of Nazianzus (329-c. 389) and Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-394) complement the position of Augustine (354-430), whose theology has been dominant in the Western theological tradition, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. The issue of the precise patristic provenance of the insights drawn on here (whether they are exclusive to the Eastern tradition, or whether shared between East and West) is secondary to the value of the insights themselves as they are rooted in a biblical vision of God and taken up, as here, by John Calvin within the Reformed tradition.

contain', 'make room for' or 'to go forward'. It was originally a christological notion in which the two natures of Christ are seen in relation to one another. The use of the term '*perichoresis*' with respect to the Trinity seems to have originated with Pseudo-Cyril and was later used in the dogmatics of Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus.[369] The perichoretic approach is based on the notion of communion and the interplay of distinct Persons in mutual interdependence, working lovingly and harmoniously within a common field of action.[370] Thus, this approach gives the work of each of the Persons equal and conjoint weight, correcting the distortions that result from over-emphasising the one or the other.

A perichoretic understanding of the Trinity grounds the diversity of the whole in the unity and *vice-versa*. In terms of this picture, each of the Persons is dependent on the two others in the divine economy. Thus *perichoresis* affirms the joint yet distinctive work of the Persons at every point, and the way that this distinctiveness is grounded in their mutuality and common divinity. The Persons are in relationship with one another – distinct yet mutually interdependent.

(c) Three Paradigms of the Trinity

In this section, I interact with a number of thinkers, some on the highways of theological thought, others more obscure or even eccentric, not with a view to providing an authoritative account of their thinking, but rather of drawing on their insights. Of necessity the review which follows may not do justice to the full complexities of their thinking, and indeed almost certainly does not, not least, one might say, because the very richness of the world created by God cannot be properly squeezed into an analogical mould, especially those (as I shall argue)

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[369] Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 102, 170-202; Thomas F. Torrance, 'The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Gregory Nazianzen and John Calvin' (1994): 32-38; Moltmann, *T.K.G.* : 148-150; 174-176; Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many*: 152-153, 163-179, 212; O'Collins, *The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity*: 131-133, 206; Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* (2003): 4.93-94; Stanley J. Grenz, *Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology* (2004): 81-83, 98-99, 119, 123-130, 208-215, 218-219; Lane G. Tipton, 'The Function of Perichoresis and the Divine Incomprehensibility', *W.T.J.* 64 (2002): 290-296; Jeremy G.A. Ive, 'Relationships in the Christian tradition' (2005): 52-53. Karl Barth sees a *perichoresis* of Father, Son and Holy Spirit being worked out in the Christian attitude of faith, obedience and prayer (Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics, III/3* (1961): 245-246; Soonseok Oh, 'Barth's Trinitarian theology : a study in Karl Barth's analogical use of the pattern of ''perichoresis'' and the relationship between divine action and human action in the ecclesiastical context' (2003): 172-208). Karl Barth sees a perichoresis of Father, Son and Holy Spirit being worked out in the Christian attitude of faith, obedience and prayer (Barth, *Church Dogmatics, III/3* : 245-6; Oh, 'Barth's trinitarian theology' : 172-208.
[370] See Gunton, *The One, The Three and the Many*: 152 ff.

which are less than satisfactory, and the sheer sensitivity of any thinker, especially a great one, must stretch to the limits the constraints of any controlling schema, however powerful. I shall be looking below at three paradigms that correspond appropriately with a focus on the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively.

The first paradigm is the ''existential paradigm'': it is focused on the dialogical relationship with the Father. Under this paradigm I identity the philosophical approached of Paul Tillich and John Macquarrie, and also the writing of Barth in his *Epistle to the Romans*. It is also in keeping with the Augustinian ''psychological analogy of the Trinity'', which is term has been so fundamental in shaping the thinking of Thomas Aquinas as well as theologians such as Bernard Lonergan.

The next paradigm, which is primarily Christologically-focused, is the ''salvation historical paradigm''. I identify the writing here of Karl Barth in his Church Dogmatics, and also, in a different way. The basis of this is the finished work of Christ, considered as an event of universal, effectively supra-temporal, significance.

The third paradigm I identify is ''the temporal paradigm''. The best example of this is the theology of Robert Jenson, but less purely, Wolfhart Pannenberg (who straddles this and the ''Salvation-Historical paradigms'', as well as Jürgen Moltmann. This paradigm stresses the aspect of futurity, especially as it is revealed in that the work of the Holy Sprit.

None of these paradigms is wrong as such, but I want to argue that they are incomplete, and involve theological distortions if taken on their own. Each has distinctive insights which need to be held together to get an integrated picture.

In general, the representative figure chosen to signpost the different paradigms are not purely one or other paradigm. For example, while I take Karl Barth as representative the salvation-historical paradigm, in his schema of revelation, he has strong elements of the existential paradigm. Wolfhart Pannenberg expresses himself within the tradition of the salvation-historical paradigm, following Barth to this extent, but methodologically lays the foundations for the temporal analogy of which Robert Jenson is a much purer representative.

(i)   The Existential Paradigm

The Existential Paradigm can be seen in the 'psychological' analogies advanced especially by Augustine of Hippo; namely, it focuses on the human mind as the reflection of God's character, and locates the search for analogies there.[371]

Origen (c.185 – c. 250) thought of a cycle of being in which the Father generates the Son, and the Holy Spirit follows this through. According to Origen, the Son proceeds from the Father in the same way as the will proceeds from reason.[372]

Athanasius describes the relation of the Father, Son and Spirit as that of the Father as fountain, the Son as river and the Spirit as that which we drink.[373]

For Augustine:

> 'The presence of past things is memory, the presence of present things is immediate apprehension, the presence of future things is expectation'.[374]

Augustine suggested appropriations drawn analogously from human experience in order to understand the Trinity, such as: being/knowledge/love, lover/loved/love, and memory/knowledge/will. Since extent they belong to our understanding of him.[375]

Augustine's position is mediated by that of Aquinas, who distinguished between understanding and will as the two aspects of God's working,

It is also reflected in the tradition of the Eastern Church where Gregory of Palamas's solution to the *filioque* that the Spirit is linked essentially to the Father but is linked energetically with the Son.[376]

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[371] Lonergan, ''Consciousness and the Trinity'': 127-8.

[372] *De Princ*. 1, 2, 6 ANF; see Quasten, *Patrology*: 77. Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*: 2.452

[373] *Ad Serapione* Letter 1:19. See C.R.B. Shapland, translator, *The Letters of Saint Athanasius concerning the Holy Spirit* (London: Epworth Press, 1951): 111-112.

[374] *Confessions*: 20.26, ref in Jenson, *ST:* 2.34- 35. Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*: 3.80-95: Pannenberg; *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*: 78f.; Michael Hanby, 'Desire: Augustine Beyond Western Subjectivity' in *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds. London and New York: Routledge, 1999): 109-126; Charles Sherrard MacKenzie, *The Trinity and Culture* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1987); David S. Cunningham, 'What's [Not] New in Trinitarian Theology,' *Reviews in Religion and Theology* (1997): 14-20; David S. Cunningham, 'Trinitarian Theology since 1990' *Reviews in Religion and Theology* (1995): 8-16; and David S. Cunningham, *These Three are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). Robert Markus, *The End of Ancient Christianity* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990] 73-83; Charles Norris Cochrane, '*Nostra Philosophia*: The Discovery of Personality', chapter XI in *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957): 399-455; 'The divine persons share a unity of will akin to humans. They are a ''society of love'' (*De Trin.* 4.8.12; Jeffry Meyers, *Some Prima Facie*: nn. 36, 46).

[375] Jenson, *T.I.* : 127-31; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 144-5.

It was taken by G. W. Leibnitz (1646-17160 who described the Trinity as force, intellect and will, and Gottfried Lessing (1729-1781) who defined the Trinity as an eternal act of self-knowledge.[377] It was also advanced by Ludwig Feuerbach who sees it as the secret of communal and social life.[378]

Christ, in the tradition of Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Harnack is divine to the extent that he embodies these ideals in his dependence on God as his Father - a dependence that we are all called to.
Paul Tillich focuses on the calling and vulnerability of the individual Christian before God (defined in terms of his or her experience). Tillich puts it views God as 'the Ground of Being' the expression of ideals which we hold to be fundamental, and so give meaning to our lives. These ideas are self-validating and therefore transcendent.

The relation with existentialism lies in the notion of committed encounter. This is best expressed in the work of Martin Buber, where personal relation ('I-thou') is described as being qualitatively different from our relation to things ('I-it'). There is headiness in our relation with God which makes it impossible to reduce him to being simply part of the furniture of our world.

This has also great similarity to the thinking of Bernard Lonergan.[379] Lonergan has an implicitly Trinitarian structure to his analysis along the lines of the existential paradigm. His triadic structure of knowing: experience, understanding and judgment, has its roots in the Augustinian psychological analysis of the Trinity. For Augustine, the threefold structure of knowledge: memory, understanding and will. Lonergan's emphasis on experience rather than memory and judgment rather than will, but it amounts to the same thing. For Lonergan, the focus is on the present experience rather than the more static model used by Augustine.

Dorothy Sayers in her *The Mind of the Maker*[380] draws directly on the Augustinian paradigm of idea, energy and power. The picture she draws upon is specifically that of an author, who

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[376] See Alister McGrath, *Theology: An Introduction* and Jenson's account in his *Systematic Theology* Vol. 1.
[377] See Samel M. Powell, Comprehending the Divine Mystery: The Trinity in German Thought (CUP); BB Warfield in *International Dictionary of Theology*: 436-8.
[378] 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future', Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1986 [1843] 72; Van A Harvey, *Fuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion* (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Paul Cecil ''Inter-subjectivity and process categorization: co-agency in a unitive paradigm'' (MA Dissertaion: Literature, Religion and Philosophy, University of Sussex, August 1999): 10-11.
[379] Lonergan, *Insight*: 319 ff,; see Meynell: 6,7, 10, 48-50, 83.
[380] London: Methuen, 1941, sixth edition, 1942

has an idea, works it out and then flows back to the author from the liveliness of the achievement.[381]

This is the paradigm advanced by William Temple,[382] John Macquarrie.[383] Arguably the most powerful exponent of the existential paradigm is Metropolitan John Zizioulas.

Cornelius Van Til also used the analogy of the Father as intellect, with the Son and the Spirit seen as equivalent to will and emotion.[384]

a. The Father - Primordial

For Origen, the characteristic of the Father is that of mind. For him, God the Father is not describable in ordinary language. He is ordinarily unknowable because he has a different mode of being known from our everyday objects of apprehension. Origen's conception of the Father is of sheer mind, utterly removed from the temporal world, and utterly undifferentiated. He can thus only be apprehended intellectually rather than through the senses. Only those who are perfected in virtue can apprehend God through the necessary intellectual mode, and none in this life can be so perfected.

Origen was followed in this respect by Augustine.[385] Augustine ascribed the characteristic of memory to the Father (memory being the faculty which recovers, and preserves, the past), or 'power' according to Thomas Aquinas.[386]

Tillich speaks of God (the Father) as 'being-in-itself' or (famously) as 'the ground of being'.[387] T.F. Torrance articulates the position as follows:

> 'the Father who is the one and only Father Almighty, who mysteriously exist and moves eternally in himself alone, but who is also the source of all other beings…'[388]

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[381] *The Mind of the Maker*: Ch. III, see. p. 28
[382] *William Temple, Christus Veritas (1924)*
[383] *Principles of Christian Theology* (1966). See Alister McGrath, Christian *Theology: An Introduction* 264-5.
[384] Introduction to Systematic Theology 32; see Frame, Cornelius Van Til: 114.
[385] Reshaped by F.W. Robertson, according to Nathan Wood, *Secret of the Universe:* 61.
[386] Ref?
[387] *ST* 1:235-49; quoted in Mark Kline Taylor, *Paul Tillich* (Collins, 1987): 163-176.
[388] *Christian Doctrine of God*: 220.

Sayers' picture of the 'Creative Idea' in the mind of the author: 'passionless, timeless, beholding the whole work complete at once, the end in the beginning'

Nathan Wood suggests that it is nature 'the innermost, fixed and supreme vantage point from which I see all things' [389] which 'sends out the personality with the name of the person upon it.' Contrary to the temporal paradigm below, he sees the role of the Father as being that of the future rather than the past, because, as he puts it: 'The Past issues, it proceeds from the Future through the Present'.[390]

The Father for John Zizioulas is the 'ground' of God's being – or the ultimate reason for existence.[391] For Zizioulas:

> 'the final assertion of ontology in God has to be attached not to the unique *ousia* of God but *to the Father*, that is, to a *hypostasis* or person'.[392]

For Macquarrie, the Father is posited as the source of being.[393]

b. The Son – Expressive

According to Origen, we can only apprehend God through the eternal Son, the Logos, who is the image of God. By 'image' Origen means both the Son's ontological dependence on the Father, and the Father's self-expression: the Son is the ectype of the Father's prototype. He notes further that, for Origen, the Son is the Father's relatedness to the world: it is through the Father's knowledge of himself in the Son that all things come into being as images of the Image of God, and it is through the Son that all things are brought back to the Father. The human soul is an image of the Son in a special way, being made in principle one spirit with him. The soul of the man Jesus was united in a special way with that of the Logos, so that through him all human souls can be united with the Logos and through him to the Father. The sensorily apprehendable acts of Jesus are signs analogically of the acts of the eternal Son which allow us to glimpse the transcendent, and so lead us to that of virtue which will allow us to know God the Father through the eternal Son at the last.

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[389] *Secret of the Universe*: 85-6.
[390] *Secret of the Universe*: 45.
[391] *Being as Communion*: 89.
[392] *Being as Communion*: 88.
[393] Principl*es of Christian Theology,* McGrath. *Christian Theology*: 265

The inspiration for Origen's account is Plato's analogy of the craftsman, such as found in the Timaeus, by whom the cosmos is made like a work of art as the sensible image of God's form, the latter being in itself unknowable. The form or spiritual image is the prototype for that which is made. He describes further how the 'two-level' ontology of classical Platonism was modified in Hellenistic Platonism by the idea of several levels, each related to the level below on the basis of prototype to ectype, 'Image' became the chief category for the mediation of time and eternity. The vision was thus of a hierarchy of being descending from God to the material world with the Son and the Spirit immediately below the Father. Origen took the Hellenistic desire for a bridge-being, and thus posited the identification of Jesus with the Logos-Image, the bearer of the transcendent god's self-knowledge, as has been described. For Origen, what we can say about Christ cannot fully be reconciled with our historical experience, but must be expressed in its own language.

In the Augustinian analogy of knowledge: the Son corresponds to the discerning of the constitution of the world as it exists in the mind of the Father.

In Sayers' picture it is the working out of the idea by the author, the 'Energy': 'begotten of that idea, working in time from the beginning to the end, with sweat and passion, being incarnate in the bond of matter'.[394] Sayers clarifies what she means: 'I ought perhaps to have called [him/it?] 'the Activity''.
Nathan Wood speaks of the Person, 'that which is seen by others [and...] by myself.   It 'sends out his personality [...] from his inner nature'.

Zizioulas sees Christ as the expression of God's will, and his resurrection as the identification of truth and being.[395]

For Macquarrie, the Son is the expression of Primordial Being in the world.[396] Tillich speaks of New Being in Christ whereby estrangement is conquered.[397]

(a) The Spirit – Unitive

For Origen, the Eschaton, when we shall see 'face to face', provides the reality of which historical events are images. Theological speech, inspired by the Spirit, is the dynamic which leads forward to the coming of the Eschaton, although the final vision to which this tends is

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[394] *Mind of the Maker*: 28, 29-30, also Ch. IV.
[395] *Being as Communion*: 108.
[396] *Principles of Christian Theology* (McGrath, *Christian Theology*: 265).
[397]   *ST*: 2.13-36, quoted in Taylor

essentially wordless and transcendent. The speech inspired by the Spirit moves us forward to God by an ever deepening of symbolic reference as the direction of revelatory history moves, in the Last Exodus, from the outer to the inner humanity of Christ, then through his divinity to the Father.[398] The Spirit for Origen is the One given eternally by God through whom the fulfilment of holiness is mediated to those who are to be saved, and by whom they come thus to final knowledge of the Father through the Son. The Spirit has thus an eschatological function: it is he who draws history forward through the sanctification of the elect.[399] The Spirit is identified with love in Augustine's analogy – a view taken up also by Thomas Aquinas.[400]

For Tillich, Spirit is the divine presence in creaturely life realising the Kingdom of God through the fulfilment of temporal life in Eternal life.[401]

As Karl Barth puts it: 'The Spirit of God is his freedom to be present to the creature and therefore to be the life of the creature';[402] or as T.F. Torrance puts it: 'an analogical correspondence of opposites into which we are brought by the power of the Creator Spirit, but is one posited by his Grace that does not disintegrate into nothingness.'[403]

In Sayers' picture, it is 'Creative Power': 'the meaning of the work and its response in the lively soul'.[404] For Nathan Wood, it is 'Personality' [Wood's capitalization], 'that by which a Person is known [...] as I touch, affect and influence others and am known by them. It is equally that through which I know myself'.[405]

For Zizioulas, the Holy Spirit is 'the person of the Trinity who actually realises in history that which we call Christ, this absolutely relational entity, our Saviour'.[406]

The Spirit for Macquarrie, in his *Principles of Christian Theology,* is the one who draws all things together.[407]

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[398] Jenson, *K.T.H.F.* 41-51; Jenson, *God after God* 20.
[399] Jenson, *T.I.*: 76; Jenson, 'Triune God': 124.
[400] Augustine The Trinity, Book V:3:12 *Scriptum super Sententiis,* 1, d. 31, q. 1&2 reference in Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 200; Kamphof, ''Triunity of Life'': 10.
[401] *S T* 3:107-10; quoted in Taylor: 235-6.
[402] *CD:* 1.1, p. 450, also p. 472. Reference in Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 218, n. 26.
[403] *Christian Doctrine of God*: 200.
[404] *Mind of the Maker*: 28, also pp. 30-32.
[405] *Secret of the Universe*: 86.
[406] *Being as Communion*: 111.

(b) Review

This paradigm risks of running into subordinationism since, the Persons of the Son and the Spirit are in some sense dependent on the world for their distinctiveness, while the Father is the source both of the being of the world and of the Son and the Spirit.
This brings us back to the dominant characteristic of the existential paradigm, as drawing on the character of the Father for is overall focus.

Barth straddles this paradigm and the next one under consideration, that of the salvation-history has definite subordinationistic features, it is also Modalistic, in that it falls back on one centre of consciousness as its model of God, and indeed has affinities of Barth's formal definition of the Trinity as Revealer, Revelation and Reveal ness.

The working of God is seen in terms of encounter: and we are, in the existential analysis, assumed to reflect the constitution of God, with the different faculties corresponding to the operation of the different Persons of the Trinity. The shortcoming of the existential approach is that it does not sufficiently account for the being or the history of the world, but only of our knowledge of it. It is rich in that is shows us how we are, but the picture of that identity is a strangely disembodied one. Embodiment is not purely an intellectual process but needs to be opens up in a pre-logical way through the uncovering of the pre//logical or pre- conscious subject-object relationships

We are in relation to things before we can be said to know them. For this reason the existential paradigm doe not produce a fully integrated basis for our understanding of the world, and it will be argued, for all its insights, of God as Trinity.
The incarnation of Christ is not simply a matter of experience or understanding or judgment, but of self-giving; of making himself to be an object for us. Jesus is not a pure logical in the rationalistic sense, although he is, as Pascal point out, the reason for the world) itself a powerful statement of an existential approach to the understanding of the Trinity. The Spirit is not simply the giver of the experience which is presented to us but the genuinely 'unsurpassable one') as Robert Jenson puts it, drawing on isights from Gregory of Nyssa puts it.[408]

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[407] McGrath, *Christian Theology*: 65.
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(ii)   The Salvation-Historical Paradigm

The second paradigm of the Trinity is the salvation-historical paradigm,[409] focuses of the
eternal purposes of God for the world in the election before all time by the Father of Jesus
Christ. To a certain extent it might be argued that this is the approach focused on the
unfolding, traceable through Irenaeus to figures such as John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards.
Within the Reformational tradition it is held by Herman Dooyeweerd.

As well as contributing to the existential paradigm, as we have seen Origen is the notable
figure in setting out a Christ-centred understanding of history as a response to the intellectual
crisis of the late Hellenistic world, where the proclamation of gospel, based as it is on the life
of the historical Jesus, and the Hellenistic ideal of eternity encountered one another
irreconcilably. Origen among the Fatherss developed a thoroughgoingly Christological
understanding of history, but in the last analysis, there remains an ambiguity at the centre of
these accounts which cannot be reconciled with the radically historical nature of the Christian
revelation, based as it is on the person and acts of Jesus of Nazareth. Nevertheless, even if
his account is largely more consistent with the existential analogy, Origen retained an
important insight that the story of the historical Jesus is not incidental to history but
constitutive of it. It is what we know of the Jesus event which provides a key to the course of
history as a whole.[410]

The Cappadocian Fathers took Origen's 'vertical' understanding of the relations of the
Trinity and recast this understanding 'horizontally' in terms of God's mutual relations within
his life, within which our future happens, leading to an understanding of the Trinity as being
at once the narrative of God's history and ours, rather than an upward convergence.[411] The
Cappadocians did not, however, follow through this revised understanding of the Trinity but
stopped short of identifying the relations of persons of the Trinity with the historical events
themselves, and tended to take refuge in describing the Triune relations in terms of mystery.
Moreover, although the Cappadocians overcame the subordinationism arising from the
time/eternity problematic which Origen inherited from Hellenistic philosophy, and within
which he worked, they did not, according to Jenson, overcome the subordinationism which
arose from the location of deity at the beginning rather than the end of history (with the
consequent tendency to ascribe primacy in deity to the Father).[412] Nevertheless, from the

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[409] The origin of the term goes back to the Nineteenth Centgury: W.Vatke, a disciple of Hegel,in his *The
Religion of Israel*, 1835. 2). J.T.Beck (1804-78) 3); J.von Hofmann(1810-77) (William G. Most, *The Living
God*, 1993).
[410] Jenson, *T.I.* : 77-89; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 124-7.
[411] Jenson, *T.I.* : 106-7; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 130; Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' :101
[412] Jenson, *T.I.* : 108, 142; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 156.

Cappadocian Fathers, Jenson finds a key for a critique of Origen's analogical understanding the Christ-event. The Triune reality of God is not apprehended through an ontological ascent *via* the divinity of Jesus, but Jesus in his narrative totality is God together with the Father and the Spirit. In other words. God thus is to be known directly in the person of Jesus, and not merely by analogy.

The Salvation-Historical paradigm is explicitly set out in the Heidelberg Catechism (Q. 24), taking note of the Apostles Creed, which is divided:

> 'in three parts: the first is of God the Father and our creation; the second, of God the Son and our redemption; the third, of God the Holy Ghost and our sanctification'

In Barth's theological vision, all is subsumed under the election of Jesus Christ by the Father in the supreme redemptive act of the cross and resurrection. The strength of this vision is the unified and systematic understanding it provides through the lens of God action in the world in Jesus. The weakness, as has been powerfully argued by Robert Jenson, is its essentially static quality, which tends to consign history (that is 'everyday' history – *historie*) to the secondary stage to that of the primal salvation event which gives all other events their significance (*geschichte*).

For Barth, the person of Christ is the key to our understanding of God's purposes in creation and redemption. He notes how, in his mature theology especially, Barth developed the position that our likeness to God is not mediated through the recurrent events of nature, but through the unique historical event of Jesus.[413] As has been seen, for Barth, Jesus Christ as historical event is the ontological foundation for all reality other than God. God's giving of himself in Christ is *the* act in which he is the god he is.[414] Barth maintains that in all eternity. God purposed that in Christ, fallen human beings yet to be created would be redeemed.[415] This eternal covenant of redemption is the ground and possibility of creation, which reflects outwardly what the covenant of redemption has already established.[416] Barth sees the historical act of redemption taking place analogously with the eternal one.[417] For Barth, Jesus' time bounds our time. It is a prototype of ours; an image which Jenson finds very close to the Platonic image of timeless eternity.[418] Here there is an ambiguity in Barth's thinking,

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[413] Jenson, *God after God* : 75-8; Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' 138.
[414] Review of Norris, *Manhood and Christ* in *dialog* 3 (Autumn, 1964): 307; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' 47.
[415] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 137.
[416] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 47-8; Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 42.
[417] Robert W. Jenson, *Alpha and Omega: A Study in the Theology of Karl Barth* (1963) 167-8; Jenson, *God after God* : 133
[418] Jenson, *God after God* : 152.

because Barth is saying that Jesus' time is both his being of the eternal Being of God, and his historical life. For Barth, Jesus' historical life is the Being of God, but analogously an eternal act which takes place as a parallel analogy to the historical event of Jesus.[419] Barth, holds to the view that everything which happened in the history of Jesus, happened in (pre-temporal) eternity.[420] God's acts in the life and work of Jesus were the *implementation* and *revelation* of an eternal act of choice.[421] The *fact* of reconciliation is accomplished in eternity, but the *knowledge* is revealed in temporal history in Christ.[422]

Despite his deep indebtedness to Barth's insights, R.W. Jenson rejects Barth's Christological analogy because he maintains that it retains an ambiguity at the centre of his theology. In terms of this analogy, Christ tends to be understood more as image than as event, even though Barth replaces the metaphysical analogy of being with a Christological one. It is not clear whether it is the atemporal divine Son who came to be Jesus, or the man Jesus who has been taken into pre-temporality.[423] In setting the primal act of election of Jesus outside of (narratable) history, although implemented within it, Jenson sees in Barth an irreconcilable contradiction between his conception of the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth as an historical person, and his implicit conception of God as atemporal.[424] According to Jenson, despite Barth's programme of understanding universal history in terms of the relations between the persons of the Trinity, nevertheless, finally Barth capitulates to the conception of timeless deity. The difficulty which Jenson finds in Barth is his conception of Christ as eternally prevenient in his primal reality, as the second instance, in his humanity, of his previously existing divinity. Jenson thus observes a tendency in Barth's theology for Christ's image to be understood as the persistence of the beginning rather than genuine 'becoming' through the drawing forward of history from the end.[425] As Jenson puts it:

> 'Barth's retention of the received dogma of essentially protological eternity means that he can work out the ontic priority of Christ [...] only by allowing the church's witness only the status of reflection of Christ's Word, not the status of Christ's Word itself.'[426]

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[419] Jenson, *God after God* : 132-3.
[420] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 78-9.
[421] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 85.
[422] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 162.
[423] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' 138.
[424] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 84-90; Jenson, *God after God* : 28.
[425] Jenson, *T.I.* : 180 (not in Jenson, 'Triune God').
[426] Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth': 36.

This understanding in Barth comes about, Jenson maintains, through Barth's automatic epexegesis of 'eternity' as 'before all time', rather than, as Jenson would have it, 'after all time'.[427] Jenson understands the election of Jesus through which the creation, redemption and reconciliation of the world to take place as the historical achievement of God in his *futurity*: not through God's primal act of election. Jenson's critique of Barth in this respect can be paralleled by his critique of Origen. Jenson argues that Barth is in danger of removing reconciliation - the inner reality of Jesus' life – from our history. The temporal event of the gospel, that is, the historical narrative of Jesus of Nazareth as we have it given to us by word and sacrament cannot, for Barth, itself be the eschatological reality. For Barth, it is the revelation of an already accomplished eschatological transformation.[428] Jenson argues, against this, that we must locate God's will in the chronologically and geographically fixable event of the life of Jesus of Nazareth.[429] He proposes that the history of God with man in Jesus Christ is not primarily God's history with man-in-Christ, but the history of God-in-Christ with mankind.[430] For Barth, according to Jenson, the inner Trinitarian relations between the Father and the Son are 'imitated' by that between the Father and Jesus; and Jesus' deity is imitated by his humanity. These are analogies between relational *events.* Jenson argues that if this approach is taken to its logical conclusion, it will undermine the analogical framework within which it is being constructed and show its inadequacy.[431] He maintains that if all the Triune relations involved are taken into account, a very different picture emerges. According to Jenson, Barth notably leaves the Holy Spirit out of his account, and thus loses the aspect of futurity which is the key to seeing the act of election as one in which the man Christ *will* be the final determination of our lives.[432] That, as has been seen, for Barth Jesus' Resurrection appearances speak of a 'present without a future', raises a difficulty, which Jenson points out, that God is seen both to be in our history and to be absolutely free and transcendent from it. As will be seen, this retains the fundamental flaw in Christian theology arising between the synthesis between the god of standard religion revealed in terms of the 'standing present', and the historically revealed god of faith. Jenson thus argues, *per contra*, that Jesus' Resurrection appearances point to his futurity. They are pure promise. The Resurrection is the promise that the future is not closed by the achievement of perfect mutuality.[433] For Jenson, the essence of a Trinitarian understanding

[427] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 162-3; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' 48
[428] Robert W. Jenson, 'On Infant Baptism', *dialog* 8 (1969): 215
[429] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* l63.
[430] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 168; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' 48.
[431] Jenson, *God after God* : 155.
[432] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 8; Robert W. Jenson, 'You Wonder Where the Spirit Went', *Pro Ecclesia* 2 (1993) 300-4.
[433] The 'antimony of hope'.

==rests in God's futurity.== It is the future aspect of his coming to us which makes God transcendent.[434]

Barth famously rejected the *analogia entis:*[435] the attempt to come to a knowledge of God, albeit incompletely, from a consideration of the natural order. Barth says, a 'natural union with God or knowledge of God on the part of man in himself as such'[436] is not possible His basic interpretation is that one finds God in the cosmos only because He is projected onto nature from the central revelation in Christ. Berkouwer says of Barth here:

> 'There is no original revelation of God through the work of his hands: the text of the cosmos is itself dumb, but the light of revelation in Christ shines into the cosmos and only then does the Scripture speak of a subsidiary line.'[437]

As Gregg Strawbridge comments:

> [Barth] not only rejects natural theology, normally understood as a knowledge of God deduced from general revelation, but its foundation, the revelation of God in the natural order. To Barth, any revelation which is not 'in Christ' becomes an idol by making competitive claims for the knowledge of God. And any revelation of God which is not redemptive is not a revelation at all.[438]

In the Barmen Declaration,[439] Barth rejected any attempt to speak in terms of creation ordinances, given their terrible distortion and abuse in the hands of the 'German Christians' Methodologically, there is very little room for a doctrine of creation as such in Barth's theological system, except as a subcategory of God's great redemptive plan in Christ.[440]

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[434] Jenson, *God after God* : 153, 155, 157, 161-2; Robert W. Jenson, *Story and Promise: A Brief Theology of the Gospel about Jesus* (1973) : 45-6; Robert W. Jenson, 'Jesus in the Trinity: Wolfhart Pannenberg's Christology and Doctrine of the Trinity' (1988): 191.

[435] See Klapwijk, 'Reformational Philosophy on the Boundary …': 115

[436] Barth, K., *Church Dogmatics*, 2.1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957): 57-58.

[437] Berkouwer, G.C. (1955). *General Revelation*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans: 30.

[438] Karl Barth's Rejection Of Natural Theology Or An Exegesis Of Romans 1:19-20 (A paper presented at the 1997, Evangelical Theological Society Meeting in San Francisco) Gregg Strawbridge, Ph.D.

[439] ==Reference?==

[440] See Neil MacDonald, 'Divine Speaking as Godly Action in the Old Testament Narrative: The Metaphysicas of Exodus 14' (in Craig Bartholomew, C Stephen Evans, Mary Healey, Murray Rae *''Behind the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation* (Paternoster Press, 2003)): Von Rad in his paper in 1936 'the Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation' argued that the doctrine of Creation was ancillary to the doctrine of creation in Israel's scripture and history (Von Rad ''The Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation'' in The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (London; SCM Press, 1986): 131-43; [p. 474]. Barth in Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM Press, 2001) states ''the confession does not sepak of the world,

Barth has a deep suspicion of any attempt to understand the world, or to any project to set out Christian values. For him, this is to make our faith *vorhanden* that is something subject to our control and manipulation. This suspicion which Barth has arose from his reaction to the liberalism of the later 19th and early 20th centuries, which attempted to redefine the Christian faith in terms which were more acceptable to the surrounding culture. This meant that the idea of faith in God could be made subject to culture and fitted into whatever understanding we might have of it.

Barth's reaction itself is in danger of throwing out the very things that he is trying to protect. Faith becomes something reduced to human proportions. In trying to construct an antithesis to this position, Bath in effect makes culture separated but autonomous, so that it is not at all clear how faith affects the way we understand the world or the stances we take. Faith for Barth can only function as the 'no!' to culture and the presentation of salvation as that to which we can give pure assent – it is reduced to an existential act. The reason for this is, is not clear. We can only respond antithetically to our given situation - saying what is not true. We are not able to give a positive alternative to that which we oppose. We need to have a middle possibility: at once to assert the transcendence of God, but at the same to indicate in concrete terms which this means for our understanding of the world's constitution, the nature of humanity and the way in which society is organized and is and should develop. In other words, insofar as he is operating within the existential paradigm, Barth, cannot take account of the ontic coherence of the world in Christ, or the way this is opened up by the work of the Holy Spirit (Barth notoriously does not take into account the role of the Holy Spirit in the work of God.)

Barth also cannot give us an adequate account of creation as creation – that is as creation as a distinct act. Creation is reduced to the first act of redemption, or, in cultural terms, to the *praeparatio evangelica* – although in the latter respect, he cannot account for what there should be such, other than the naked encounter with God to which we are all called. That there needs to be such an encounter is true, but there needs to be a fuller account of what this involves. Smit points out that Barth's schema leads him to the conflation of creatureliness

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or at all events it does so incidentally when it speaks of [God the creator] of heaven and earth. It does not say, I believe in the created world, nor I believe in the word of creation. But it says, I believe in God the Creator'' [p. 475] But in CD 3.1 – Barth says that belief in God the creator as belief in God who determines himself to be the creator. He determines himself as the creator of the world; therefore he is the creator of the world – God speaking in the context of Barth in dogmatics in creation is God recording himself to be the creator (CD III/1, 110, 115) which means , for Barth, that God determines himself to be the creator. He does this by divine speech (see Neil MacDonald, *Karl Barth:* 135-92; also and the N.B. MacDonald, Karl Barth and the Strange New World within the Bible: Barth, Wittgenstein Matadillemas of the Enlightenment (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000) [p. 476]

and sin because it creation *per se*, not its fall into sin, which gives rise to the opposition between God and creature, because everything '*in-itself*' is bereft of all meaning, but only as it is redeemed in Christ.

For Barth there are three times: created time, fallen time and revealed time - the last constituted by God's coming to us in our own time in the person of Jesus Christ. The time that God creates from himself in the person of Jesus becomes our time.[441] Barth operates with a sharp distinction, indeed a dualism, between *Historie* – temporal, created history, and *Geschichte* – the history of God's action in Jesus Christ.[442] For Pannenberg, unlike Barth, this achievement is located in the first instance in everyday, historical time rather than eternity (which for Pannenberg is futurity which almost places him under the temporal paradigm considered below; but he holds his tendency towards the temporal paradigm in tension with the salvation-historical, for which reason he should be regarded rather as an exponent of the salvation-historical paradigm). But for Pannenberg as for Barth, the effect is the same: to locate the key to the Triune relationships in the work of Jesus (be it effected first eternally – as for Barth, or historically – as for Pannenberg).

T.F. Torrance puts it:

> 'the Triune Creator is present to us in such an immanent way as to realise in our human existence the creative, reconciling and personalizing power of the Word and Sonof God incarnate in Christ Jesus the Light of the world…'[443]

Pannenberg also partially holds the paradigm, but whereas for Barth it comes 'from above', for Pannenberg it comes 'from below'.[444] For Pannenberg the approach cannot simply be 'from below' because that would be to ignore the relationship of Jesus to the Father.[445] Indeed especially for the later Barth, it was the particular humanity of Jesus that gives him his divine identity.[446] Nevertheless, it is a question of starting point, and it may be suggested that each starts at the opposite pole from the other. In the work of the Trinity In the world *ad extra*, Pannenberg sees a progression, uses a schema similar to the salvation-history formulation of Irenaeus,[447] and attributes creation to the Father, reconciliation to the Son and

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[441] Fergus Kerr, *Immortal Longings*: 30-1 ref to Barth *CD*: 1.2.1 pp. 47 ff. and 55.

[442] Smit, ''Modern Protestant Conceptions of History'', *Towards*: 179-80.

[443] *Christian Doctrine of God*: 200.

[444] Pannenberg, *The Apostles Creed* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972): 172-4 (*GST* 2 p. 124 ff, refer Greene, 'Doctrine of God' 358-9). Look at Pannenberg, *GST*, and 1:305 ff. for his development of the appropriation of the persons to the salvation-historical acts.

[445] *GST* 2:131; see Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 95.

[446] Karl Barth, *The Humanity of God* (London: Collins, 1961).

[447] O. Cullmann, *Christ and time* (London, SCM Press, 1971): 56-7.

redemption to the Spirit.   As Marion Gray points out, Pannenberg is deeply indebted to the understanding of time by Plotinus:

> 'Pannenberg conceives of the relationship between eternity and time in the same way as that between the Infinite and the finite: thus eternity is not the negation of time, but is 'the presupposition of understanding it.'[448]

This idea originates in the work of Plotinus, whose treatment of time and eternity in the *Enneads* [449] is the basis of Pannenberg's thinking on this subject. Pannenberg rejects the traditional idea of time and eternity being opposites, for example as described in Augustine's *Confessions*, because it is based on the Platonic notion of eternity as timeless, which does not cohere with the biblical view of God's eternity.'[450]   The insight given by Plotinus is that eternity is 'the whole all at once' and 'must be thought of as without extension or interval'. The life that is eternity:

> 'abides in the same, and always has the all present to it, not now this, and then again that, but all things at once, and not now some things, and then again others, but a partless completion, as if they were all together in a point, and had not yet begun to go out and flow into lines; it is something which abides in the same in itself and does not change at all but is always in the present, because nothing of it has passed away, nor again is there anything to come into being, but that which it is, it is'.[451]

This is reflected in Pannenberg's statements that:

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[448] Pannenberg; ST 1: 403

[449] Plotinus, *Enneads*, 6 vols., E.T. A. H. Armstrong (Loeb Classical Library; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1967). The main treatment of time and eternity is in Book 3, ch.7

[450] Pannenberg; S.T 1: 403. Compare Oscar Cullman, *Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History* (1962).

[451] Plotinus, *Enneads,* 3.7.3,18-23. Marion Gray comments that time, for Plotinus, is the outflowing of eternity as separate moments. time is effectively the infinite dissolution of eternity into a sequence of individual moments, related only by their reference to the whole. time is an image of eternity (Plotinus, *Enneads*,3.7.11,19). The separation into parts has come about because of the desire of the World-Soul (Mind or *Nous*) to have control over its own life in distinction from the life of the One in whom eternity is a whole (Plotinus, *Enneads*, 3.7.11,14-19). In the Neoplatonic account of reality, the sensible world (i.e. the physical universe) exists within the World-Soul, thus the world of human experience lies in the time created by the World-Soul's ''fall'' from the life of the One. (Plotinus, *Enneads*,3.7.11, 34-36). If the World-Soul could leave the activity which creates time, time would cease, because it is the life of the World-Soul which generates time (Plotinus, *Enneads*: 3.7.12, 20-23).

'Eternity is the unity of all time, but as such it simultaneously is something that exceeds our experience of time.'[452] 'The eschaton marks the end of time, since it 'is to be seen as the event of the dissolving of time in eternity.'[453] And further: 'God is eternal because he has no future outside himself.'[454]

Marion Gray points out that Pannenberg argues that time has been incorporated into the life of God, through the economic Trinity and the events of salvation history.[455] As she notes, the three Persons and the relationships between them are constitutive of the Trinity throughout the economy of salvation.[456] As Pannenberg puts it:

'creation is brought into the relations of the Trinitarian persons and participates in them.'[457] '[The] monarchy of the Father is not the presupposition of but the result of the common operation of the three Persons. It is the seal of their unity.'[458] 'On the basis of the historical relation of Jesus to the Father we may say this of the inner life of the Triune God as well.'[459]

As Elizabeth Johnson points out with respect to Pannenberg:

'It is only in relation to the Christ event that reality conceived as history first receives its wholeness, receives its structure and meaning as a whole, *is* a whole.'[460]

The salvation-historical paradigm takes the order of relations between the Father, Son and Spirit as appropriate respectively to the successive acts of creation, reconciliation and

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[452] Pannenberg; Wolfhart; '*What is Man*'; p.74. Colin Gunton remarks that he is 'not convinced by Pannenberg's attempt to find an orientation to the future in Plotinus' philosophy of time'. (*The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study*' (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998): 33, n. 32. Thanks to Marion Gray for this reference.

[453] Pannenberg; ST 3: 607.

[454] Pannenberg; ST 1: 410.

[455] Pannenberg; *Theology and the Kingdom of God*': 62

[456] Pannenberg; ST 1: 308ff

[457] Pannenberg; ST 1: 328.

[458] Pannenberg; ST 1: 325.

[459] Pannenberg; ST 1: 324.

[460] E. Johnson, 'Resurrection and Reality in Pannenberg': 11. She quotes from Pannenberg; BQT1: 94 n. 20 'It is the particularity of the event of Jesus that through it for the first time the totality of reality was constituted as a whole …. History receives its wholeness for the first time precisely by the fact that the end of history, which occurred in an anticipatory way in the claim and destiny of Jesus, comes into view …' (With thanks to Marion Gray).

redemption.[461]   This is not to exclude the other Persons from each of the acts so correlated. And indeed as will be seen below, for Pannenberg, in each of the acts of salvation-history, the role of the persons so distinguished is complemented inter-dependently, by the work of the other two[462] but it is suggested, according to this paradigm, that the distinctiveness of each of the persons can be marked out by correlating each person with the act which most closely matches their role within the Trinity.[463]

The transcendent orientation of Dooyeweerd's philosophy arises from his vision of God's work in the world. For Dooyeweerd this involves the articulation of what he came to call the Christian religious 'ground- motive'. For Dooyeweerd a religious ground-motive is a basic driver of thought and action. The Christian religious ground-motive is contrasted with a number of other ground-motives such as the Greek ground-motive of form and matter, the medieval synthesis of nature and grace and the Western enlightenment ground-motive of nature and freedom. He formulates the Christian ground-motive in its most succinct form as '*creation, fall, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost*'. Dooyeweerd's formulation of the Christian ground-motive thus has a Trinitarian structure, even though he does not draw attention to this as Vollenhoven does.[464] He has a vision of the unfolding of God's purposes for humanity, descending from the Father as Origin, via the Son as Word or Christ to the hearts of redeemed humanity, in communion with the work of the Holy Spirit.

a.   The Father – Creation

The early John Calvin also, who says, somewhat ambiguously, in his 1536 Institutes:

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[461]   Barth, *CD,* 1.1 section 9.2 'Trinity in Unity' 353 ff; cf. 579 ff. Reference in T.F. Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 200, n. 133.

[462]   *GST* 2:175, see Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 192.

[463] Oscar Cullman, *Christ and time* (London: SCM Press, 1971): 56-7. Pannenberg, *ST*, 2:6; also *ST* 2:125, ref Jenson, 'Jesus in the Trinity' : 189-90.

[464] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 1.61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 507; Dooyeweerd, 'Philosophie et théologie': 56; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 134, 136; see Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid': 50-54; with a response: Strauss, 'Herbesinning oor die Sin-Karakter van die Werklikheid by H. Dooyeweerd': 169-170. As we see, Dooyeweerd's formulation of the Christian ground-motive makes use of theological terminology and concepts (the persons of the Trinity, creation, sin and Christian ground-motive redemption), and indeed is creedal in form (Dooyeweerd, 'De vier religieuze grondthema's': 169; Dooyeweerd, *N.C*: 1.507). In the parallel place in *W.d.W.* (written prior to his elaboration of his notion of the ground-motives), under 'grondmotief', Dooyeweerd merely speaks of the struggle between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Darkness (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472 ('Duisternis')). Although Dooyeweerd distinguishes between religion and faith, he still accords the faith aspect a special role in the articulation of a Christian worldview (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.227-259; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.298-330), as does Vollenhoven.

'…the Father is particularly called Creator of heaven and earth because ... of the distinction of properties, whereby the beginning of activities, whereby the beginning of acting is referred to the Father that he may indeed be said indeed to act by himself, but through the Word and Wisdom, yet in his Power'.[465]

In this paradigm, the Father is 'appropriately' associated with the act of creation in that as the Father begets the Son in the internal constitution of the Trinity, so in the act of the Trinity ad extra the act of creation corresponds most closely with the relationship of originating.

Barth rejected the view that 'exclusively God the Father is the creator';[466] nevertheless, Barth's account understands the role of the Son simply as the object of the Father's work, and not as the subject of the act of creation. However in the work of creation, the Father remains dependent on the Son and the Spirit, who will glorify the Father as the creator of the world in the arrival of the kingdom.[467]

As T.F. Torrance puts it:

'...Creation arises ... out of the Father's eternal love of the Son, and is activated through the free ungrudging movement of that Fatherly love in sheer grace which continues to flow freely and unceasingly toward what God has brought into being in complete differentiation from himself.' [468]

As Pannenberg puts it:

'the Christian church confesses the Father as the Creator of the world, not the Son, for the only content of the work of the Son is to serve the Father and to bring in his kingdom'.

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[465] *Ad patrem adendi prinicipium referetur, ut ipse quidem proprie agree dicatur, sed per verbum ac sapientiam suam, sed in virtute sua.* (*Opera Selacta*, I: 77). Butin notes here that *verbum* and *sapientia* were used as titles for the Son and *virtus* for the Spirit. By the 1559 *Institutes* (I.13.24), Calvin had modified his position. Butin notes that Calvin says explicitly, ''..the power of creating was common to the Father, Son and the Spirit – common also was the authority to command…'' (I.13.24). Butin sees here a similarity to that of Basil (cf. Epistle 189.7 *NPNF*, 2nd series VIII: 231) (Butin, *RRR* 159, n. 25) and further, Calvin states: ''God has so spoken that the Word might have his share in the work [of Creation] and that in this way it might be common to both Father and Son'' (1559 Institutes I.13.7) (Butin, *RRR* 167, n 3) Butin points out that Calvin studiously avoided using the term ''Father'' and ''Creator'' as synonyms (*RRR* 56]. Despite the title of Book I, Calvin is clear that creation is the joint work of Father, Son and Spirit (*I.13.7; I.13.24; I.14.2; I.14.20 and Comm. Genesis on 1:1-3, Comm. John on 1:3-4 (RRR* 168, n. 9). See Gunton, *The Triune Creator* who says Calvin's legacy is ''somewhat ambiguous'' in his tendency to narrow the scope of theology to its ''anthropological relevance'' (see pp. 150-54 further).
[466] *CD*, 3.1: 49.
[467] *ST* 2:125 in Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 192.
[468] *Christian Doctrine of God* : 209.

For Pannenberg, God chooses to realise his own autonomy through the freedom of his creation, giving it the status of his covenant partner.[469]

With respect to the Father, Dooyeweerd tends to speak of 'the Origin' or 'the Archè', although he also refers to the 'Father' by name as well.[470] The Father as Origin is the source of all meaning – 'meaning' for Dooyeweerd comes to be his way of expressing creaturely dependence upon the Origin.[471] Humanity is the high point of God's creation, created as 'image-bearer of his divine Origin'.[472] All God's work of creation is concentrated in humanity as the *imago Dei* – the image of God.[473] Dooyeweerd thus pictures redeemed humanity's loving dependence on the Father of Jesus, just as children in a family experience their dependence on their parents.[474]

b. The Son - Reconciliation

In this paradigm, the role of Christ in the creation and the universe is subsidiary to his role as redeemer, as H.R. Mackintosh puts it:

> '[Christ's] function as Creator is proleptically conditioned by his achievement as Saviour'.[475]

The Son is 'appropriately' the redeemer, in that it is through the sacrifice of the incarnate Son that reconciliation between God and humanity is accomplished.
For Barth, Christ is the archetype of all creation to which created reality is related analogically. As Smit sums it up, for Barth:

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[469] *GST* 2:125-6, 144-5; *HNEH* 45-62; 82-111. Ref. in Greene 'Doctrine of God': 192.

[470] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.268, 297, 469, 495; 3.214, 248, 269; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 2.149, 337, 475, 563; 3.269, 303, 304, 322, 337.

[471] Dooyeweerd, *Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer*: 99-100 (n. 101); Dooyeweerd, *Crisis in Humanist Political Theory*: 84-85; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.6, 12; 2.19-22; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.4, 10, 73 (n. 1, not in W.d.W.); 2: 22-25.

[472] Dooyeweerd, 'Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, *Creatie en evolutie*)': 116 ('beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong'). See comment by Peter Steen (Steen, *Structure*: 62-64).

[473] Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2'.

[474] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.214; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.264 (Dooyeweerd cites Gen. 2.24; Prov. 3.12, Ps. 103.13, and Lk. 15).

[475] *Doctrine of the Person* (Edinburgh: 2nd edn, 1913) 170, quoted in Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God* 204, n. 1.

'When we call creation good [?we] do so not because it is good in itself but only because Christ can make use of it as his instrument and because it finds it ground and goal in him.'[476]

As he puts it further:

'Human, temporal history, even if it were without sin, is without meaning; but history *mirrors* the passion and death of Christ'[477]

As Pannenberg puts it:
'It was only as the mission of Jesus met with rejection by his people, and he went to the cross and passion, that he became the Saviour of the nation. Only as the crucified and risen Lord is he the new and eschatologically definitive man'.[478]

He adds:

'The Easter event definitively decided the personal identity of Jesus as the Son of God, but in the light of that event he was the Son of God from the very beginning of his earthly course, and even from eternity'.[479]
This is in the context of future expectation, since, as he goes on to warn:
'In the debate about the figure of Jesus it is of decisive importance that we should not put his person at the centre. The centre rather is God, the nearness of his rule, and his fatherly love'.[480]

In Jesus, the Son of God can only appear in the history of the world by taking on himself the sin of humanity and suffering separation from the Father and the Spirit, so concentrating in himself the proleptic realisation of the Kingdom.[481] In other words, for Pannenberg it is in the carrying out and achievement of his mission, and supremely in the event of the Resurrection, that the distinctiveness of the Son from the Father and the Spirit is realised. It is the Resurrection that establishes the unity of Jesus with the God of the Kingdom.[482]

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[476] Smit ''Protestant Conceptions of History'' in *Towards*: 174.
[477] Smit ''Protestant Conceptions of History'' in *Towards*: 175.
[478] *ST*, 2: 311-2.
[479] *ST*, 2: 319.
[480] *ST,* 2: 335.
[481] *GST*, 2:126-7, 142 Refer in Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 197-99.
[482] *JGM*, 135-8; *RaH*, 5-7. Ref. in Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 101

Pannenberg argues that according to Romans 1:3-4, by the Resurrection, 'Jesus was instituted into the dignity of divine sonship'.[483] His role in creation, as distinct from the Father, is read back from his salvation-historic achievement given force through the Resurrection. Similarly, his role in the latter defines his role in the consummation of all things that the Spirit is effecting. For Pannenberg, Jesus as the Son of God only expresses the reality of God in an anticipatory way, since it is dependent on the work of the Spirit in the realisation of the Kingdom in the history of the world and of the divine community including the Father and the Son.

Second, with respect to the Son: just as the Father is the Origin and the Archè of creation, so Dooyeweerd sees the Son as its Redeemer. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the Son can be seen as co-creator (as in the Kuyperian vision). Unlike Kuyper, Dooyeweerd does not clearly articulate the role of the Son as the mediator of creation *per se,* that is, prior to the fall and redemption. He tends to portray Christ's involvement in creation as redemptive and revelatory, as a *post facto* and subordinate one, rather than one exercised jointly from the beginning with the Father.[484] Through Christ we are directed to the true Origin of all things,

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[483] *ST*, 1: 264

[484] On occasion, Dooyeweerd does speak of the Son as the 'creating Word, through which all things were made' (Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 36 ('scheppend Woord, waardoor alle dingen geschapen zijn')); Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 37) but then he seems to overlook the role of Christ as the creating Word (which he has just himself mentioned) when he states: 'if one tried to conceive of common grace apart from Christ by attributing it to exclusively to God (i.e., the Father) as creator, then one drives a wedge in the Christian ground-motive between *creation* and *redemption*' (Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 37; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 37 ('Want zodra ge de gemene gratie los van de Christus poogt te vatten en haar uitsluitend op God as *Schepper* terugvoert, drijft ge een wig in het grondmotief der christelijke religie tussen *schepping* en *verlossing . . .*')). Elsewhere, the Son is called the 'new religious root of the temporal cosmos' (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.471 ('den tijd transcendeerende religieuze wortel der schepping'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.506). However, once again, is not clear whether Dooyeweerd conceives of Christ in this respect as the mediator of creation (as the wording of the *W.d.W.* would indicate) or as the redeemer of humanity (as the 'new' in *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* would seem to indicate), although the location of both creation and redemption in supra-temporality tends in Dooyeweerd to a conflation of these two roles (see Strauss, 'Central religious community': 58-67). On the whole he tends to see the Son in purely redemptive terms as distinct from 'God' as creator (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.32-33 (not in *N.C.*), 54 (not in *N.C.*), 64-67, 70-72, 86-87; 2.420-421, 424, 471, 482-484, 491-497, 503-508, 527; 2.30, 493; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.99-102, 105-106, 123-124; 2.32, 485-486, 489-490, 552-554, 560-565, 571-575, 593; Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 370, 372; Dooyeweerd, 'Criteria': 227). There is some force to David VanDrunen's contention that Dooyeweerd grounds common grace not (as with Kuyper), in the Son's mediatorship over creation (see 1.2) but in his role as redeemer (VanDrunen, *N.L. & T.K.*: 360-362; see also Klapwijk, 'Antithesis and Common Grace': 183). However, in warning about the conflation of creation with redemption, VanDrunen falls into the opposite error of dividing the Person of the Son and by ignoring the continuity of the latter's role as the creating Logos with that as the redeeming Christ, and indeed, in the Triune work of the transformation of all creation.

the Creator of heaven and earth.[485] In Christ, the root of life is renewed, not just with respect to the individual human being, but also the whole of creation, which Dooyeweerd sees as concentrated in humanity.[486] By belonging to Christ, the Christian becomes engaged in a struggle with those tendencies which absolutise one or other aspect of the temporal order and which redirect it away from God, the Father as Origin.[487] Following Kuyper, Dooyeweerd suggests that through common grace the distortion of sin can be sufficiently corrected not only to make everyday life possible, but also to allow for the development of science, culture and general prosperity.[488] The opening-process under the influence of apostate ground-motives has an 'inter-modal disharmony' resulting from the absolutisation of one law-sphere at the expense of others. He states that the opening-process needs to be guided by faith in Christ, in Whom alone is the 'consummation of meaning'.[489] The opening process is set against the struggle between the *Civitas Dei,* that is to say, God's rule in the hearts of redeemed humanity, and the *Civitas Terrena,* the dominance of apostate human tendencies which culminates in the 'definitive victory' of Christ's Kingdom.[490] Thus for Dooyeweerd the Son tends to play an intermediate role: in the first instance between the Father as Origin and fallen humanity, and then as head of redeemed humanity, bringing humanity – and with humanity the whole of the cosmos – back to the Father.[491]

c. The Spirit – Redemption/Consummation

In terms of this paradigm, the Spirit is seen as the consummator of Creation, just as (certainly in the Western, Augustinian picture) the Spirit is seen as the bond of love between the Father and the Son. The role of the Spirit is notoriously absent in Barth,[492] but in Pannenberg, who gives the Spirit a key role, is it he who draws creation forward to the

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[485] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.557; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.633.

[486] Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2'.

[487] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.506.

[488] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2: 30-34; 234-237; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2:.32-36, 306-309.

[489] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.265-268 ('zin-voleindigheid'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.334-447.

[490] Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'*: 108 ('definitieve overwinning'). As mentioned earlier (1.1) these are terms employed by Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in his great work describing God's work through history especially with respect to the Roman Empire. Dooyeweerd is critical of Augustine for not adequately, in his view, distinguishing 'the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men' (which is how Dooyeweerd understands the *Civitas Terrena*) from the temporal Church institution (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.452; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.510).

[491] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.471-473, 491; 2.30-32, 222-223, 227-237, 267-268, 297-300, 347-348, 491-497; 3.448-449, 557; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.60-61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 174-175 (not in *W.d.W.*), 506-507, 522; 2.32-34, 294-5, 298-300, 337, 363-364, 418, 560-564; 3.506-507, 633.

[492] Jenson, ''You wonder where the Spirit went'', *Pro Ecclesia,* 2, 3 (Summer, 1993), 296-304.

conclusion of all things.   For Barth, the resurrected Christ lives in eternity, whereas for Pannenberg, he is located proleptically in futurity - and for Pannenberg this is primarily an act effected by the Spirit.

For Dooyeweerd, the Holy Spirit transforms the hearts of redeemed humanity it to the pattern of the Son, as they are directed to the Father in inner rebirth.[493] Unlike Kuyper and Vollenhoven, he sees the work of the Holy Spirit as an almost entirely interior one, rather than in the cosmos at large, although he recognises that the effects of the work of the Holy Spirit, through its effect on human action, can have wider significance than merely for the human heart. It is through the power of the Holy Spirit and through the dynamic of prayer that the battle needs to be waged against the spirit of apostasy in human culture as a whole and in modern Western culture in particular. The biblical ground-motive can be embraced and worked through in every area of life by building up a community which gives this corporate expression.[494] Nevertheless, because it is largely confined to the hearts of redeemed humanity, Dooyeweerd tends to portray the work of the Holy Spirit in the world as indirect and posterior to both the work of original creation and that of redemption. As the work of Christ is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Father, so the work of the Holy Spirit is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Son.

d. Review

With respect to salvation history, it is important to see the involvement of all three Persons at every stage.

It needs to be affirmed firstly that all three Persons are present in creation. It is through the call of the Father that things are given their distinctive calling or individuality. It is through the identity of Son that the creation has coherence. It is through the opening up of the Spirit that things have concreteness, or particular dynamic.

Further, it is important to see the Atonement as a Triune act. Michael Wilcock provides a fascinating exposition of Luke 15 in this respect: with the parable of the shepherd and the lost sheep illustrating the role of the Son, the woman with the lamp that of the Spirit and the

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[493] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.61, 175, 507 (none in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*': 103; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 186-189; Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid': 51.
[494] Dooyeweerd, *R. & S. 2*: 5; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 11; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 12; Dooyeweerd, *The Secularization of Science*: 4.

waiting father (in the 'Prodigal Son') that of the Father.[495] Within the last it may perhaps be suggested that there is also a Trinitarian character to the three gifts given by the father to the returned son (Luke 15:22): the robe of status in the Son, the ring as bearing the authority of the Father and the sandals of freedom from the Spirit. It is achieved in response to the call of the Father back to relationship with himself, the self-giving of the Son, and the winning of the victory over sin and death by the Spirit, and it is through the Spirit that the sacrifice is presented to God (Heb. 9:14).[496] Finally, sanctification is a Triune process as we are drawn closer to the Father, through the enabling work of the Spirit into the 'measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ' (Eph 4:13).

The salvation-historical paradigm is a strongly Christocentric approach. It is through the incarnation of Jesus that it takes its character: embodiment is the way in which the divine relations are structured. This gives it a somewhat static character.   The critique which Jenson makes of Origen can also be made of Barth: that it proceeds from the understanding of Christ as image, a static intermediate figure between the a-temporality of the heavenly order and the changeability of the historical process.[497]

The fundamental critique of the salvation-historical approach, such as when it is advanced by Barth, is that the relation to the historical process remains analogical: it is as if there is playing out in history what has already been decided in the heavenly realms.[498] It is important to note here the *caveat* that Pannenberg makes, namely that Christology can only be understood to be a function of soteriology (pace what is often contended) in the sense that salvation can only be found in the work and history of Jesus.[499]

The salvation-historical paradigm also tends towards Modalism, in that it is not so much the work of the diversity of persons acting together as a series of actions by one entity. The fact that Barth suggested the use of the term τρόπος ὑπάρξεως ['mode of being'] for person is suggestive of this.[500] Note however, that this term derives from the Cappadocian Fathers.[501]

(iii)   The Temporal Paradigm

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[495] *The Message of Luke* (IVP, 1979): 149-57.

[496] I owe this point in conversation to the Revd Dr Alec Motyer.

[497] Robert Jenson, see Ive, 'God of Faith' : *passim.*

[498] Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* : 78-9; 84-90, 162-2, 167-8; see Ive, 'God of Faith' : 107-110.

[499] *ST* 2: 398.

[500] *CD* Refs ?

[501] See T.F. Torrance *The Doctrine of God*: 126-7, 177.

The third Trinitarian paradigm is the temporal one represented in the thinking of the 'theologians of hope': Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg and Robert Jenson which stresses the working out of God's purposes in history but also within the Reformational tradition of Dirk Vollenhoven,

The temporal paradigm takes the process of history seriously. Time is not just the continuation of the past through the present into the future (the *futurum* as Moltmann puts it; but is opened up in a radically new way through the promise of God in Christ as the *adventus,* the One who is to come, who has broken into the present from the future supremely through the event of the Resurrection.

A seminal exponent of the temporal understanding of the Trinity was G.W. Hegel, as David Vincent Meconi describes it:

> 'For Hegel, the Trinity is nothing other than God's self-explication in history. Unlike many contemporary thinkers who have rebelled against the Hegelian legacy, Hegel himself stressed God's dependence on the created order as the divine 'developed' according to the concepts of universality (God as eternal idea), particularity (God's sensible appearance in creation, culminating in the person of Christ), and individuality (the Holy Spirit's reconciling creation with God).'[502]

The problem that Pannenberg was confronting in his theological work was that of the divorce, both in contemporary theology and in contemporary secular thinking of our understanding of God from the day-to-day categories of experience. If God is transcendent, as the theologians, not least Karl Barth teach, how can we know him, and what does this mean for our lives? As Pannenberg points out, it does not help for dialectical theology, of which Barth Is a leading representative, merely to accept atheistic arguments and then 'trump' then by a radical belief In revelation. Atheistic arguments need to be met head on in terms of the categories of history that they themselves accept.[503]

Pannenberg's programmatic work, *Revelation as History*, set out the key tenets of his distinctive theological method. Rather than trying to understand who God is apart from history, Pannenberg argues that it is only through history that we can come to an understanding of who God is. God for Pannenberg, is characterised by futurity; we do not come to know him through any privileged manifestation he may make of himself to us,

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[502] Samuel M. Powell, 'Review of *Comprehending the Triune Mystery: The Trinity in German Thought'* (Cambridge University Press*),* First Things 116 (October 2001): 54-57.

[503] *Basic Questions in Theology III* (London, SCM Press, 1973): 87-8, 99-115; 'Can Christianity do without an Eschatology?', in SPCK, *Theological – Collections*, 13 (1970): 25-34? Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ* (London: SCM Press. 1983): 61-2.

rather, it by his demonstration in and through history to us that he is always future to us, and that this future is guaranteed, that we know he is indeed God.[504]

Pannenberg's understanding of God and thus of the Trinity, begins with the recognition of the simultaneous identity with yet differentiation from the Father of the Son. His Christology is prior to, and at the heart of, his understanding of the Trinity.[505] In *Jesus - God and Man*, Pannenberg initially advocated a Christology 'from below', which moves from an appreciation of an historical Individual to a recognition of his divinity.[506]   In 'Christologie und Theologie', however, he rejects any attempt to understand Christ 'from below' —that is independently of his relationship with the Father, because that would ignore the relationship, as one, of Jesus and the Father; but equally rejects a Christology 'from above', because that presupposes a Trinitarian God complete in himself, whose relationship with Jesus of Nazareth would be purely contingent.[507]   Rather, Pannenberg affirms:

> 'Jesus of Nazareth is inconceivable without the message of the Father and his coming Kingdom.'[508]

In the 'Christ event', that is the historical life, death and resurrection of Christ, God is put to the test. Jesus staked his life on the fact of his identity with the Father in his proclamation of the Father as the one who was the power of the future; and in the fact of his resurrection (in fulfillment of prophecy) this identification was vindicated retroactively.   The identification did not consist in the promotion of himself, but in his total self-surrender to the Father.[509] In this act of surrender and vindication, it was not just the identity of Jesus with the Father that was at stake, but the very trustworthiness of that which he was proclaiming: the futurity of God in. his Kingdom – something intimately bound up with the whole history of Israel as God's redeemed people.   God was able to save Israel, and by extension, is able to save all people, because he is the one who has power over the future.[510]

Pannenberg uses the concept of God's *venturus* in this regard; God is the one who is the 'coming one'. As Christians, identify the one who is coming to be our judge, with our risen

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[504] *Revelation as History* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1979).

[505] Jesus God and Man (London: SCM Press, 3.968): 158-60, 169.

[506] Jesus God and Man: 33-37.

[507] *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie* II (Gottingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1980): 129-146; Timothy Bradshaw. *Trinity and Ontology*, (Edinburgh: 'Rutherford House Books, 1968): 275-8.

[508] *Grundfragen systematic theologie II*: Colin J. Greene, 'The Theology of God in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg', (Nottingham University: unpublished dissertation, 1982): 94.

[509] Basic Questions in Theology (London; SCM Press, 1971): 249

[510] Theses 4 and 5 in *Revelation as History*: 139-48; *Jesus God and man*: 53-114, 135-8, 334-337; *Basic Questions in Theology II*: 246-9; *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie II*: 125; Bradshaw, *Trinity and Ontology* 285-8, Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 100-103.

and ascended Lord, who is at present hidden from us, but of whose return we are assured. This is the true understanding of 'eternity' - not a state somehow removed from history, but the 'vertical dimension' of our present life which 'lies in the hiddenness of God whose future is now already present for our lives.[511] In this process, Pannenberg attempts to avoid representing the different Persons of the Trinity simply as modes of God's being by emphasising the unity in diversity of reciprocal relationships drawing on the Eastern (Cappadocian) doctrine of procession, the Western (Augustinian) relational theory, and the Hegelian theory of the self-sublimation of the Three Persons in the Unity of God, [512]
For Pannenberg, the Trinity is the way God achieves self-realization through his participation in creation.   The Father brings creation into being as a covenantal partner in free relationship with himself, but in differentiation from himself and with the ability to fall into sin (which Pannenberg defines in primarily ontological terns as the failure of Adam rightly to differentiate himself from God).   The Person of the Son of God is incarnated and, on the cross, takes upon himself the suffering of creation, thus taking the differentiation of creation from God into the heart of the Trinity.   The Spirit in turn realizes in the history of reconciled creation as the expression of the community of the Son and the Father.[513]
The differentiation of the Persons within the Trinity has for Pannenberg a strongly temporal aspect:

> 'That God's deity is yet at stake within history, and that God's future reality
> nevertheless is already at work in the process of history - both are enabled by the
> doctrine of the Trinity that is expressed through the tension between the creative acting
> of the Father and his relatedness to the working of the Son and the Spirit towards the
> realization of the Reign of God as his presence in creation, and creation in. him,
> without dissolving their distinctiveness.' [514]

As Brian Walsh points out, Pannenberg's thought is fundamentally 'genetic' (that i.e. it posits change to be the essence of life not merely its surface) rather than 'structural' that is, it analyses thought in terms of its static structure and order). [515]This is the most problematical aspect of Pannenberg's thought, since it creates grave difficulties for us in our understanding of God as Trinitarian in being and not just provisionally for the duration of history (and

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[511] *The Apostle's Creed* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972): 172-4.
[512] *Jesus – God and Man* 179-83; *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie* II 122-8; *Theology and the. Kingdom of God.* p. 62; Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 179-209.
[513] *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie* II: 125-7, 139, 142,144-5; *Basic Questions in Theology II*: 248-249? Bradshaw, *Trinity and Ontology*: 238-43. 284-300; David P.Polk, On the Way to God (University Press of America, 1989) : 280-4; Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 193-200.
[514] *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie II*, 125-7; translated by Polk, *On the Way to God*: 284.
[515] 'Pannenberg's eschatological ontology', *Christian Scholar's Review,* XI, 3 (1982): 234-7.

Pannenberg is himself concerned, as we see from the preceding quotation, that the distinctiveness of the Persons of the Trinity should not be dissolved).

There is a tension in Pannenberg, since there is a sense for Pannenberg that just as Jesus has vindicated his identity with God retroactively through the resurrection, so he is freed to share in the futurity of God through the ascension: in other words, it is as if futurity is something which Jesus assumes through the process of history, rather than possessing it already by right. This sense of provisionality made permanent is not particular to the Son, however -the Father and the Spirit share it as well in their common participation in the vindication of the reality of the Kingdom which Jesus realised in his resurrection.

> We need to see history moving forward in the light of the fact of the Resurrection to its ultimate destination. [516]

While Pannenberg uses, as we have seen, primarily the salvation-historical paradigm, he also formulates the temporal paradigm, which he uses tangentially with the temporal paradigm, for example, he states:

> The Trinitarian distinctions are based on the difference between past and present, ... future and present - and consequently the persons of the Trinity are comprehended in the unity of God.[517]

and elsewhere:

> 'Only in the dual reference to the origin of the world and its future completion is the God revealed in the unique history of Jesus, truly God'.[518]

Pannenberg goes so far as to say: 'The very essence of God implies time'.[519] Or, as Jenson puts it:

> 'The difference of past and future, and their meeting in a specious present is the one unavoidable metaphysical fact, the fact of temporality…. The specificity of the Triune

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[516] Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 259-62; *Theology and the Kingdom of God*: 62, 71, 134; Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology II*: 240, 240; *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie II*: 201; Sytematischer Theologie I, pp, 59 ff.. 421, 455; Schwöbel, 'Wolfhart Pannenberg': 270-279.
[517] *TKG*: 71; refer Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 114.
[518] GST 2:129; refer Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 187.
[519] *TKG* 62. Reference in Greene, 'Doctrine of God'.

God is not that he is three, but that he occupies each pole of time as a *persona dramatis* …'.[520]

He goes on to say:

> '[the work of creation] is done between all temporal dimensions by the three Persons of God. God the Father is the sheer given of creation; God the Spirit is the perfecting Freedom that animates creation; God the Son is the mediator of creation'.[521]

This dynamic is uncovered by Jürgen Moltmann, who distinguishes between *futurum* and *adventus:* the former being the extrapolation of a hypothetical future from present circumstances, while the latter offers a much more radical disjunction from the present in way the future hope (founded in the Resurrection of Jesus) breaks into the present.
Like Pannenberg's, Moltmann's understanding of the Trinity is a result of the struggle with the problem of an a-historical Christianity created by the legacy of Bultmann and Barth. However, much more directly than Pannenberg, Moltmann has attempted to take account of the legacy of Karl Marx, and the critique of Christianity by political as well as philosophical atheism.[522]   On the other hand, he is closer to Barth over against Pannenberg in his rejection of any attempts at a natural theology, and in his espousal of a strongly dialectical account of the relationship between God and creation.[523] The question which he attempts to deal with is not only what God means to our contemporary categories of experience, but also bow this can have political expression. Initially, the Trinity did not have so great a role inhis thinking, but increasingly it came to have greater and greater centrality.   The fullest exposition of Moltmann's understanding of the Trinity i.e. in his *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God* followed up by *God in Creation*, but it needs to be read in conjunction with his understanding of the action of the Trinity in the act of crucifixion, as set out in The Crucified God., and the work of the Spirit in the Church in *The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit*.
Like Pannenberg, Moltmann starts with a particular conception of the future as the way of understanding what the Trinity means. Unlike Pannenberg, Moltmann sees the future not so much as what determines the present, but rather that which events can liberate us to enjoy. Both stress the provisionality of the present, but for opposite reasons; for Pannenberg the present i.e. provisional because it is ontologically dependent on the future, for Moltmann, the present is provisional because its order can 'be overcome and negated.[524] It is important to

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[520] *ST* 1: 89.

[521] *ST* 2: 25.

[522] John J. O'Donnell. *The Mystery of the Triune God* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1988): 14-16.

[523] *The Crucified God (*London: SCM Press. 1&73): 25-8; Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ* (London: SCM Press, 1988): 60-1.

[524] William J. Hill, *The Three-Personned God* (Washlnton D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 1982): 167-9.

note that, as with Pannenberg anything achieved within the present is simply provisional upon its final consummation, 'that God will be all in all'.[525]

Closely related to his understanding of the provisionality of the present is Moltmann's understanding of the vulnerability of God in the present.   The crucial feature for Moltmann, as for Pannenberg, is that the Trinity is involved in the world, but Moltmann goes beyond Pannenberg in stressing that God, as a Trinitarian community, participates in the suffering of the world.   Whereas Pannenberg stresses the victory of God in Christ through the resurrection, it is the cross of Christ that Moltmann emphasizes.   On the cross, the Father as well as the Son suffers grief and separation.   Moltmann points to the Greek word used, *paradidomai* ('hand over'), which implies that the Father hands the Son over, and in the process the Trinity is rent asunder. For Moltmann, like Pannenberg, the Resurrection of Jesus from the dead is an event of eschatological promise, but it takes its force from the fact that it is the culmination of God's radical identification with the world.[526]

> ...the death of the Son is not the 'death of God', but the beginning of that God event in which the life-giving spirit of love emerges from the death of the Son and the grief of the Father.[527]

The vision of the Trinity that Moltmann is thus presenting is that of triumph through vulnerability.   He has reversed the question about what the cross of Christ means for the world, and is now asking what it means for God himself.

There are difficulties remaining at this point, because what is being presented in effect is theodicy, that is, how do we justify God's actions in the light of the suffering of the world - rather than the setting out the economy of God's dealing with the world.   It does have a prophetic implication, in that it gives us an example of self-emptying action which we ourselves need to be prepared to emulate.   But it does not illuminate us, beyond our insight into that particular moment (albeit the decisive moment), about the way God deals with the world as a whole, and what this means for society in general.   It does not tell us about the particulars of historical development, namely how the opportunities opened up for us by the vindicated sacrifice of Christ within the Trinity are to be realized.   Paradoxically, by the very assertion that God is taking the experience of the world in his inner life, Moltmann re-asserts the duality of God's relations ad intra and his relations ad extra, since with the crucifixion it

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[525] Moltmann, *Theology of Hope* (London: SCM Press. 1967): 224.

[526] Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*:165-202; Moltmann, *The Crucified God*: *200-90;* Richard Bauckhami. Moltmann (Baslngstoke; Marshall Pickering. 1987): 32; Bauckham, '''Only the suffering God can help'': divine passabillty in modern theology', *Themelios,* 9, 3 (April 1984): 10-12; O'Donnell, *The Mystery of the Triune God*: 60-63.

[527] Moltmann, *The Crucified God*: 252.

is as if we are spectators at an inner Trinitarian drama played out against the backdrop of the world. However, contrary to this understanding Moltmann asserts:

> 'The history of God is then to be thought of as the horizon of this world: the world is not to be thought of as the horizon of his history.'[528]

Thus, Moltmann attempts to resolve this dilemma by giving the divine drama a panentheistic twist.   The crucifixion of Christ is not so much an event in history, as an event within which history is contained.[529] (Here the similarities with Pannenberg's proleptic understanding of the resurrection are striking.)   The question is; if history is conditioned by an event within itself, to what extent can that event be regarded as purely historical?   If it is purely historical, then history Is conditioned by itself, and we are left with pantheism, which is not what Moltmann would want to assert – although O'Donnell is of the opinion that Moltmann comes near to this.[530]   Therefore we are left with the event being understood as historical and. something else; and it is that question about Its 'something-else-ness' which forces us back: to the picture of God's own inner history, and his outer acts in the history of the world somehow running in parallel, but with the relationship between them still undefined, Elsewhere, Moltmann describes the Trinitarian economy in terms of his model of 'eschatological Christology'.   Christ stands as an instrument of redemption over against his people in the name of God'.[531] The resurrection of Christ results in the pouring out of the Spirit, who opens up anticipations of the Kingdom of God 'within the limited possibilities of history':[532]

> 'Out of this happening between the Father and the Son the surrender itself emerges, the Spirit which accepts the forsaken, justifies the godless and makes the dead alive.'[533]

The cross releases the outpouring of the Spirit on the world in healing and reconciliation.[534] Despite the economy of the Spirit in the world within the model of his eschatological Christology, in terms of God's inner history, Moltmann's .account of the relations of the Father and the Son in the crucifixion event does not give us any clear understanding of the

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[528] *The Crucified God* : 219.
[529] *The Crucified God*: 246.
[530] O'Donnell, *The Mystery of the Triune God*: 38.
[531] Pinchas Lapide and Jürgen Moltmann, *Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 1979): 62-3.
[532] *On Human Dignity, Political Theology and Ethics* (London: SCM Press, 1984): 109; O'Donnell, The *Mystery of the Triune God*: 133-134.
[533] *The Future of Creation*: 73.
[534] O'Donnell, *The Mystery of the Triune God*: 72-3, 78-9.

distinctive work of the Holy Spirit within the life of the Trinity.   At most, the Spirit seems to be the dialectic of the process whereby the relationship of the Son and the Father Is re-asserted and transcended through their mutual process of pain and separation (similar to Augustine's *vinculum caritatis*).[535]   It is not clear; however, what role the Spirit plays as a distinct Person of the Trinity in the redemptive act.

To some extent, these questions are answered in *The Church in the Power of the Spirit*. Here he sees the Christian church, as an expression of the work of the Holy Spirit in God's economy. The role of the Spirit is characterised by the activity of glorification of the Father and the Son in creation.   Here Moltmann shows, once again, a strong affinity with Pannenberg with his suggestion that it is the need for the attestation of another 'witness' that makes the Spirit a distinct Person of the Trinity rather than simply an emanation of the Father and the Son.[536]

In *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God*, Moltmann provides further answers to the question of God's economy, as well as a more fully Trinitarian understanding of God's inner history, at least in part, by the development of his understanding of the Trinity beyond the vulnerability to the world which it brings to the heart of the Godhead, to the assertion its intrinsically social character:

> 'The New Testament talks about God by proclaiming in narrative the relationships of the Father, the Son and the Spirit which are relationships of fellowship and are open to the world. '[537]

Already in *The Church in the Power of the Spirit*, Moltmann described the divine life ae an open circle.   For Moltmann, the unity (or rather 'unification') of God proceeds out of his plurality as community.   In the same way, humanity, as the *imago trinitatis* needs to recognise its communlty and achieve true fellowship and unity - as Moltmann encapsulates it; 'The Holy Trinity is our social programme.[538]   In *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God*, Moltmann goes further, and argues that a Trinitarian understanding of God Is more conducive to an egalitarian society then is a unitarian *one,* since the latter is based on a monarchical model of God'a work in the work rather than a commutarian one. He argues that ''monotheism', the idea that the cosmos has a monarchical structure, leads naturally to

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[535] *De Trinitate*: 5.11.12, 8.10.1,. 8.12.14.

[536] *The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit* (London: SCM Press, 1977): 57-60; Hill, *The Three-Personned God* : 167.

[537] The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (London: SCM Press, 1981) :   64.

[538] *The Church in the Power of the Spirit* 55-6; with Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, .*Humanity in God* (London: SCX Press, 1983): 104; O 'Donnell, *The Mystery of the Triune God*: 107-9.

political centralisation of power, the domination of men over women and the despising and abuse of the body (since relationships are seen as involving power over other people and their reduction to objects or tools). A proper understanding of the Trinity should lead to a true understanding of freedom - not as the power to control others but the experience of community and fellowship grounded in mutual respect. This is something we take from the example of the Father, who made himself vulnerable through the sufferings of the Son, and the Spirit who works out the consequences of that experience in fellowship with us. Moltmann also questions the exclusively male imagery with which traditional theology has chosen to portray the Trinity; rather, be would argue, we should see elements of femininity in the nature of all three Persons; not least that of the Holy Spirit.

Moltmann develops his ideas of the social implications of the Trinity with respect to the whole creation in *God in Creation*. The three Persons of the Trinity operate together not only in the act of redemption, but their action in that regard is based on their prior joint action in the act of creation. In terms of the Sophia Christology, Christ is seen as both God's Son and his eternal wisdom;while the eschatological experience of the empowering Spirit points to his prior Involvement in the act of creation as the efficacious power of the Creator. Here Moltmann gives an account of the operation of the Spirit in 'universal history', not just in 'salvation history', which is very similar to that of Pannenberg. Like Pannenberg, however, at the same time he tends to fall back on the 'salvation history' model to assign the relative primacy of the three Persons In God's economy (Father; creation; Son: redemption; Spirit: glorification), in his attempt to retain the transcendent character of God's relationship with the world and not to fall into a pantheistic or a merely 'differentiated panentheistic' account (which merely sees creation as a web of interconnected processes).[539]

This bring us back to Moltmann's understanding of the historical process. As with Pannenberg, here the crucial distinction between *futurum* and *venturus* cones into play. The former is an extrapolation from the past and the present, while the latter is something which can bring something radically new. Christian hope is the anticipation of God's ventures as it comes to us in the resurrection of Christ.[540] The *venturus* of universal history is thus made possible by the *venturus* of the Trinitarian history of God.[541] As with Pannenberg, however, we need to clarify what this means when that which is anticipated has arrived. Moltmann has tended to couch his account in theodicic terms, rather than in Pannenberg'a ontological terms - but the difficulty reduces to the same question: when the effects of the victory of the resurrection over separation of the Son from the Father in the cross have run their full course

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[539] Moltmann, *God in Creation*: 94-103.
[540] *The Future of Creation*: 29-30, Bauckham *Moltmann*: 43-5.
[541] Moltmann, 'The Trinitarian history of God', Theology, 88, No. 666 (Dec, 1975): 632-46.

in the release of the Spirit (that is with the ushering in of the eschaton), what will be the reality of the Trinity then? As with Pannenberg, for Moltmann the differentiation between the Persons of the Trinity consists in the tension between present and past in the transcendence of the dialectical tension between suffering and victory. Once that tension is finally overcome, how can we then open up the possibility for the possibility of anything genuinely new, because the differentiation within the being of God *vis a vis* the world (which Is what counts for Moltmann), will no longer exist.

The most radical exponent of this position is arguably Robert Jenson, who sees the futurity of God's action as constitutive of the gospel in that it offers the impossible (justification for the unjust) on the basis of the power of God breaking through into the present.

Time for Jenson, is not only the unfolding direction of the created order but part of the constitution of divine being itself, as he puts it: 'the arrow of God's eternity, like the arrow of causal time, does not reverse itself'.[542] The plot of salvation history, which, in turn culminates all human (and indeed non-human) history, is 'the movement of divine life itself',[543] or as he puts it still more radically: 'God is the temporality of the world'.[544] Further, God not only provides for us in his being the possibility of our being in time, he creates by making space for us in his being.[545]

Jenson's understanding of the Trinity is thoroughly temporal,[546] that is, he does not see time as incompatible with divinity, but, on the contrary as the way God is, as he puts it: 'The specificity of the Triune God is not that he is three, but that he occupies each role of time as a *persona dramatis.*'[547]   The history of the world is enclosed in the Triune being of God. The created order comes into being and takes its Direction through the divine conversation between the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit:[548]

> 'God the Father is the sheer given of creation; God the Spirit is the perfecting Freedom
> that animates creation; God the Son is the mediator of creation.'[549]

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[542] *ST* 1:218.

[543] Ive, 'God of Faith' : 134.

[544] 'The Triune God': 168; Ive, 'God of Faith' : 63.

[545] *S.T.* 2: 46-8.

[546] In this he is far more consistent than Pannenberg, the theologian whom he otherwise is closest to in the structure of this theological system. Jenson charges Pannenberg with ''historical-idealism'', and that he like Barth finally reduces futurity to the eternal present (Review of Pannenberg's *S.T.* 2 in *First Things,* 53 (May 1995): 60-2; Jenson, *S.T.* 2:310 [n. 4]).

[547] *S.T. 1*: 89.

[548] Jenson, 'Creation as a Triune Act': 38-42.

[549] *S.T.* 2:25. See 2:45, 48.

The Father as the past is bracketed with the Holy Spirit, as the power of the Future while the Son is the 'specious present' between them.[550]

Moreover, it is the identity of God as Spirit, as the Power of the Eschaton, who bears witness to us of the unconditionality of God's promises, and therefore of the temporal infinity arising out of the witness of the Spirit to the specific work of Christ.[551]

The doctrine of the Trinity, as Jenson articulates it, allows us to conceive of God as identifiable within time and at the same time, transcendent. God in himself is active, temporally identifiable relationship; and yet he is distinct from the temporal order which he creates. Jenson's temporal understanding of the Triune reality takes the historical Christ-event as both the beginning and the end of our grasp of the reality of God. The Christ-event is not itself to be understood as functioning analogously to some extra-temporal transcendence, since it is itself historical and therefore to be grasped in univocally temporal categories. On the other hand, the Christ-event is not to be seen as process, since it is irreducibly particular and specific to the life, death and Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. The Christ-event happened once, no further process or revelation is necessary in that sense; and yet in that finality all future possibilities are contained and still to be realised though the bringing of all things to completion through the work of the Spirit by whom all things are made possible and brought to achievement. Jenson thus preserves the universal significance of the Christ-event without at the same time undermining its historical specificity. He does so by understanding transcendence in thoroughly temporal terms. This is not (like the *analogia entis*) an abstraction of the reality of God from the categories of the world, but the situation and opening up of the categories of our understanding and action in the world in terms of the reality of God as revealed once and for all time in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He argues for this conception over against the traditional problematic of classical theology in general and that of Western theology in particular.

Jenson argues that the distinction between God's eternal relation and his relation in time laid the basis for the distinction between the historical ('economic') being of God from the being of God in himself ('immanent'). According to this conception, the three Persons of the Trinity over against us are (in themselves) functionally indistinguishable by the rule: 'the externally-directed works of the Trinity are indivisible' (*opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa*) and the view that the relations between the persons are timeless. It followed then that the identification of the Son with the man Jesus was purely contingent after the fact of

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[550] *S.T.* 1:218-9; *S.T.* 2:25-8, 45-8, 173, 338-9, 347; Ive, 'God of Faith' : 124-5. The term 'specious present' will be explained below.
[551] Jenson, *T.I.* : 168-76; Jenson, 'Triune God' 185.

the Incarnation. There was no necessary identification.[552] Put another way, it was a rule of Western theology that no proposition about the Trinity could be true from which it would follow that God is any different on account of the incarnation of the Son or the mission of the Spirit than he would have been without these; and indeed, the Father or the Spirit - or the Trinity as such - could equally well have become incarnate as Jesus.[553]

God, Jenson argues, is what happens in the event of Jesus' resurrection rather than a substance of which attributes are; these are simply analogies, they are not to be understood as exclusive or definitive predications, and it is unclear to what extent they can actually be predicated of God, and to what predicated, as standard religion would understand God.[554] Jenson argues that it is not necessary to hold to the notion of substance to preserve an understanding of the unity of God, since, as Barth has it: with 'pure duration' source, movement and goal are held together in the unity of eternity which, as Boethius has it: 'is the simultaneous possession of life without end'.[555] One can conceive of God as an entity only in the sense of being an event analysable into a series of events rather than as enduring substance.[556] Jenson draws on Gregory of Nyssa's discussion of divine infinity, particularly in the latter's *Against Eunomius,* to argue that if God could be conceived of as a defined entity with a given set of characteristics, he would not be infinite. To conceive of God in terms of timeless universality would be to conceive of him as undefined but of fixed character. True infinity is not the lack of definition but the continual overcoming of it through continual self-transcendence, which Jenson describes as 'temporal unhinderedness' or 'unsurpassability'.[557] With Barth, Jenson contends that it is only as event that God can be personal.[558] Conversely, it is only as person that God can be conceived of as event and yet be able to relate to others without necessarily absorbing them (as would be the case with pantheism).[559] The conception of personhood was made possible though the Augustinian-Hegelian discovery of the self. In this sense at least, the Western tradition retained a sense of

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[552] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 126.

[553] Jenson, 'Jesus in the Trinity' : 198; Jenson, 'Creation as a Triune Act': 40-1; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Preacher, the Text and Certain Dogmas', *dialog* 21 (1982): 108, 118.

[554] Jenson, *Story & Promise* : 118-20.

[555] *Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio (De Consolatione* 5:6). Jenson, *Alpha and Omega* 76; Jenson, *God after God* : 124-9; Robert W. Jenson, 'Story and Promise in Pastoral Care', *Pastoral Psychology* 26 (1977): 118-20; Robert W. Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 6 (1975) 3, 7; Jenson, *T.I.* : 176-80, Jenson, 'Triune God' : 165-9; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 48; Jenson, *Unbaptized God* : 144-5.

[556] Jenson, *T.I.* : 178-80 (not in Jenson, 'Triune God').

[557] Jenson, *God after God* : 128; Jenson, *T.I.* : 162-8; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 170; Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action' : 11; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 39-40.

[558] Jenson, 'Karl Barth' : 40.

[559] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' 39.

God as relation. In God's reality, personhood comes about through God as Subject discovering himself as Object and in the overcoming of this discovery being Spirit. Jenson seeks to demonstrate that as all-encompassing event, God is an eschatologically independent and therefore Triune person.

As Father, God evokes all the demands of the god of the past, but because he is the Father *of Jesus*, the one whose triumph through the power of the Spirit is in the future, the ideal of God as the guarantor of persistence is replaced by God as Liberator from every status quo.[560] Following Edwards, Jenson suggests that far from providing a shield behind which the immanence of God is hidden from temporal identification, the doctrine of the Trinity provides a way of identifying God as an historically recognisable community. He refers with approval to Edwards' contention that it is appropriate for the Son to be sent to be incarnate, rather than the Father since it is the Father who gives deity actively and the Son who receives it.[561] It is uniquely the Son of the persons of the Trinity who is fitted, as universal mediator, to act as mediator for our sin.[562] Jenson also takes up Pannenberg's insight that the inner-Triune relations are all reducible to their mutual love; and that it in in this mutual love that the unity of the Trinity consists. Love, as Jenson puts it, is God's 'authentic infinity'. For love to be authentic, it needs to be realised concretely and indeed, authentic love is identifiable as and by its concrete realisation.[563] Thus the relations of the Trinity are at once concrete by virtue of their infinity and *vice-versa.* God as *Trinity,* and not simply his effects can be recognised in an historically identifiable way in the person and life of Jesus of Nazareth. Jenson thus argues that we must revise the Western understanding of the relation between the 'immanent Trinity' and the 'economic Trinity': it is the acts of the Son and the Spirit which precisely constitute their relationship with the Father.[564] These acts are historically identifiable in that they can be recognised with reference to particular acts or events; and indeed are themselves historical events. God cannot be posited as the universal place-holder which religion would have him be. Rather, in Jesus, God is historically unique, and therefore resists abstract definition.

Jenson thus gives us his temporal account of the Trinity. As Jenson puts it: the immanent Trinity is the eschatological reality of the economic Trinity.[592] Thus the economy of God's action in the world reveals but also constitutes the reality of which the Trinity consists. The Spirit is the Self-Understanding, or Mutuality, which is the achievement of God in the

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[560] Jenson, *Story & Promise* : 111, 101.
[561] Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 94.
[562] Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 104, 127.
[563] Jenson, 'Jesus in the Trinity' : 205-6.
[564] Jenson, 'Jesus in the Trinity' : 196-7.

Eschaton through which God communicates the possibility of his Utterance, or Address, in the person of the Son taking the Language, the given possibility of mutual address or understanding, of the Transcendence whom the Son names as Father.[593] Central to Jenson's theology is the affirmation that the Triune history identifies God as at once origin and goal of the created order. The structure of the Trinity consists in the identity of the 'whence' and the 'whither', who in their identity bracket together the past and future of the world. These active relationships within the temporal order are not simply the revelation of God's being but are constitutive of who God is in himself. For Jenson, 'God' is a word for the joint dynamism of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.[594] Jenson follows Barth using the method of appropriation, whereby particular acts of the Trinity as a whole are identified with reference to one particular person of the Trinity, according to God's self-interpretation.[595]

There is a systematic ambiguity in Jenson's pneumatology, which Jenson himself generalises in the form of a question:

> How is the Spirit at once his own person and what 'all three' hypostases are together? How is the Spirit at once the one who has power and that power itself? [673]

Jenson's account of the operation of the Spirit lies at the heart of his temporal understanding of the Trinity. Like Augustine, he tends systematically to treat the Spirit as the bond of love between the Father and the Son. As Jenson puts it:

The love of the Father and the Son is their relation to their mutual future in the Spirit, always anticipated in the Father but never bound.[674]

In company with Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jenson demonstrates that the address of God itself is embodied in history, notably in the event of the Resurrection (although unlike Pannenberg, he does not consider that the event can be proved using the methods of secular historical research). If the Resurrection had not occurred, the address would not exist, since the promise that Jesus would return as the ultimate hope to which all history is heading, could not be made. Counterfactually, God could have created us without the Incarnation, but in that case, the community of the gospel, that is the community of those loved by God beyond the point of death, would not exist. The Trinitarian conversation would be about us, but would not include us. But Jesus *has* lived as man, died and risen, and therefore we are presented with the reality of God's promised fellowship.[680] Jenson argues powerfully and suggestively that we cannot but receive God's address as one capable of being defined in the historical event of Jesus' narrative. For Jenson, that God is future in the act of the Resurrection is what makes him God. The transcendence of God as apprehended by faith (rather than the projected 'god' of the religious quest) does not consist in God's immunity to time, but from his temporal infinity: his surpassing the past and the present by his future identity in the person of the risen Jesus. Thus for Jenson, far from making God relative to our experience, to understand God

temporally is to apprehend God's true transcendence; since it is in God's futurity that God's transcendence consists.[681] God is the one named in and through history as the one to whom all history is leading. As event. God has past, present and future; and it is the simultaneous possession of (rather than abstraction from) all three of these 'identities' which makes God identifiable.[682]

For Jenson, the gospel gives us God himself as body, specifically, the resurrected body of Jesus. The fact of the Resurrection identifies the Father through his relationship to the risen Son, and demonstrates the reality of the future hope constituted by the Holy Spirit. Jesus, out of his love for us, stakes the reality of the future against the hold of the past; and is vindicated. In the risen Jesus we have God's making of himself available as guarantee, but at the same time, he makes himself transcendable in his embodiment.[683] Far from being separate entities (as the Greek two-level ontology would have it) body and spirit need each other and together make us part of a narrative in which there is the possibility for surprise, and yet appropriate development from what has gone before. For Jenson, the Resurrection constitutes the deity (the transcendent unsurpassability though his identification with the Father and the Spirit) of Jesus as the Son of God. This is not to say that Jesus is/was not the Son of God before the Resurrection; rather, it is to affirm that the identity of Jesus does not derive from a primal act, but from a final outcome. [684]

Jenson holds that God's temporal infinity is (and not just analogously) the event embodied in the risen Jesus. Our expectation of his return is not just for a set of self-transcendent infinities, but for a specific encounter towards which all history is heading and in relation to which all history, post-Resurrection is being and will be transformed. In that sense, faith, in the sense of dependence on God's resurrecting power, will be the substance of what is hoped for, made concrete by God's presence as body, specifically, the resurrected body of Jesus. Jenson argues that to anticipate a specific future we must be able to anticipate that, in an historically definable sense, Jesus' living body will be present to us as object. Our meeting with the risen Jesus will at once be the culmination of history, and at the same time, the possibility of a new narrative. It is final in its achievement and yet fully open to new possibilities. Jenson attempts to resolve the antinomy of hope, which, he argues, visions of the last things based on anticipations of completed achievement of history as a whole (such as Hegel, or even Pannenberg) do not address, since history as a whole is an abstract, ultimately frozen and impersonal category. Jenson gives the answer to the antinomy of hope as love, namely that the final meeting with the risen Jesus will establish consummately that which is most longed for; our full and consummated participation in God's self-giving love.[685] The resolution of the antinomy of hope is at the same time Jenson's answer to the problem of transcendence. What we experience now, by faith, in the community of the gospel, as we participate in the Triune conversation in response to the Triune narrative, is the as yet unconsummated anticipation of the fellowship which we shall enjoy with the risen and

returned Jesus. In this sense, what we shall enjoy on that return is both the reality into which we can enter into now as we celebrate Jesus' death and resurrection and the content of that final enjoyment itself. For Jenson, this is worked out not simply in the inner-Triune relations, but in the context of the created order in which resurrection takes place. Through the Spirit we, as 'the spouse of the Son' (to use the phrase which Jenson quotes from Jonathan Edwards), are included in the life of the Trinity. Thus the Spirit is not simply identifiable as the abstract future, but specifically as the achiever of our corporate hope in the person of the risen Jesus.[686]

Here Jenson, while he aligns himself with the 'horizontal' conception of the Trinity enunciated by the Cappadocian Fathers, finds himself ending up in a very Augustinian way. While he takes from the Cappadocians, especially Gregory of Nyssa in his strictly Trinitarian discourse, the idea of God as temporal infinity not eternal substance; he takes from Augustine (like Barth but unlike Pannenberg) the conception of God as Person: the Father as Subject, the Son as Object and the Spirit as the occurrence of this discovery. As in Augustine's account, the Spirit for Jenson tends, especially in his earlier writings, to function systematically as the bond of love between the Father and the Son, although he paints this on the broader canvas of God's overall economy, not simply with regard to the inner-Trinitarian relations. In this picture, the Spirit is the living harmony to which all things will be brought in the community of the eschaton. This tendency for the Spirit to be understood as relation, and the danger that this has for our understanding of his personal distinctiveness is counterbalanced by Jenson's emphasis on his electing role, as the Power of the future. It is the Spirit who postdestines us. Jenson's conception of the priority of the future thus ensures a distinctive role for the Spirit in the economy of God. However, the combination of these two elements, does result in an ambiguity in Jenson's pneumatology. Like Barth he is unwilling to abandon the Western understanding of the persons of the Trinity as 'subsisting relations'; so that the Spirit is reduced to being the bond between the Father and the Son - even though Jenson continually affirms the role of the Spirit as agent. There is also a danger, which has been noted, for his conception of (the risen) Jesus to function in Jenson's system effectively as the place-holder, as the 'self of the Father, between the Father and the Spirit and between us and the future.[687]

Another exponent of this paradigm from a very different perspective is Arnold A. van Ruler (1908-70). Van Ruler's focus is on the Father, but is the Holy Spirit who creates history by distending the first and second comings of Christ.[565]

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[565] Smit, *Towards* : 175-6. Look up *Calvinist Trinitarianism and Theocentric Politics: Essays Towards a Public Theology*, ed. and translated by John Bolt (Lewiston, New York, 1989).

This paradigm attempts to correct the a-historical element of the salvation-historical approach by focusing on the historical process itself, considered in its own terms. Foremost in the systematic attempt to do this has been Wolfhart Pannenberg, but in different ways this is also attempted by Jürgen Moltmann and Robert Jenson along the lines of what we shall describe as the temporal paradigm[566] takes up the historical scheme of Joachim of Fiore, [567] where it is notably the Spirit who characterises the new age breaking in on the present, the realm of the Son, which in turn has superseded that of the Father. Joachim saw the age of the Father corresponding to the Old Testament dispensation, the Son that of the New Testament and the church, the Spirit that of the rise of religious movements, the reform and renewal of the church and the final establishment of peace and unity on earth.[568] As Gorringe puts it, for Joachim:

> 'The Father rules, then, through the creation of what exists and by keeping time open. The kingdom of the Son is the preaching of the gospel of the Lord who is a servant, who liberates from servitude by servitude, and who frees us from the fear of death through resurrection. The kingdom of the Spirit, finally, is the realisation of the new community which springs from this preaching.[569]

By the method of appropriation, it has been suggested that the Father corresponds to past, the Son to present, and the Spirit to future.[570]

Vollenhoven grounds his philosophical thought in explicitly Trinitarian terms. I shall look at how he portrays the work of the three Persons in the unfolding of the great narrative of God's dealings with the world in general and, more specifically, humanity. As a trained theologian, Vollenhoven is far less reticent than Dooyeweerd, a legal scholar, about expressing himself in explicitly theological ways – although, as we shall see, some of the positions he takes are not without difficulties.

The characterization of the roles of the three Persons was affected by the shift, noted earlier, from an intra-mental to a cosmic focus. Early on, Vollenhoven sees the work of the Father as the initiator of 'ideas' within the structure of thought, with the Son as Logos underlying how

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[566] Moltmann in *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God* (SCM, 1981): 204 ff
[567] c. 1132-1202.
[568] *Concordia Novi as Veteris Testamenti*, Venice, 1519, Lib 5, 84, 112 in B McGiven, *Visions of the End,* (Columbia University Press, 1979): 133 f.; refer T. Gorringe, *Discerning Spirit*, (SCM, 1995) : 139, n. 13. See also Hans Schwarz, 'Eschatology' in Jenson and Braaten, eds, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol II, (pp. 508-9), see also Hans Schwartz, *On the Way to the Future*, rev ed. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1979): 183 ff.
[569] Gorringe, *Discerning Spirit*: 66.
[570] Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 1-15.

these 'ideas' are assimilated in the process of human knowing, and the Spirit applying them in concrete situations.[571] In his later thinking, the focus shifts from the work of the three Persons in the intra-mental process, to the work of God in the world as a whole. He speaks of God 'Creating, Word-revealing and Spirit-guiding' ('Schepping, Logosopenbaring en Geesteleiding'), and he links these concepts to the work of the three Persons of the Trinity respectively.[572] Later, he calls these three successive stages, '[S]tates of [A]ffairs'.[573] States of Affairs are the stages in which God's Law is expressed in the created order. Each of these States of Affairs is linked to the work of one of the three Persons of the Trinity. This takes the form of a three-stage unfolding of the Law by each of the Persons in turn: the work of the Father is succeeded by that of the Son, and that in turn by the work of the Holy Spirit.[574] He sees the work of the Persons as a successive unfolding, with first the Father as creator, then the Son as revealer and redeemer, and, finally, the Spirit as the agent of change and the realisation of new possibilities. This sequence is not a straightforward identification of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit – in each act led by one of the Persons the other two Persons have subordinate roles. However, while it is not straightforwardly sequential, it is sequential nevertheless, in that the identification of each of the Persons takes place primarily, albeit complexly, in the unfolding economy of creation, redemption and 'positivisation'.

The way that Vollenhoven presents the work of the three Persons in sequence – albeit a complex sequence – raises the question about how the Persons can act jointly without losing their distinctions from one another. This is a matter I shall return to in Chapter Six.[575] But, for

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[571] At this stage in the thinking of Vollenhoven, an 'idea' is characterised as what Tol describes as a 'extra-mental archetype' or 'thing-law' of a given object (Tol, *Philosophy*: 112; see also pp. 180-211).

[572] Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)* /Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)* : §§73-75; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)* /Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (39h)*: §§75-78; see Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 5, 9 (n. 1). In the *Isagôgè* of 1930, Vollenhoven refers explicitly to the Heidelberg Catechism, Answer 25 regarding the Scriptural affirmation 'that these three [P]ersons are the only, true (and eternal) God' (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)*: §73('dat deze drie [P]ersonen de enige, waarachtige (en eeuwige) God zijn'); see Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.193-195).

[573] This is a special sense of '[S]tates of [A]ffairs' which I shall capitalise accordingly. Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 11; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-133; Vollenhoven, 'Kort overzicht (65b)': 2; Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)' ; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)' ; Vollenhoven, 'Norm en natuurwet (51h)'

[574] Here he closely follows Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.193-194, although, as Anthony Tol points out, there important differences of emphasis, in that Kuyper tends to see God's activity as inherent in nature and he tends to formulate this in teleological terms (Anthony Tol, personal communication, 13 Jan. 2008).

[575] Vollenhoven's identification each of the Persons with successive manifestations the work of God is in danger of portraying the Trinity in Modalistic terms, where the Persons are understood as different expressions of an underlying divine essence. Although the sequence is complex in this way, it remains true for Vollenhoven that the engagement of the Persons is sequential (Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-128). It is noteworthy that Vollenhoven argues that the early church considered the Sabellian heresy less dangerous than the Arian one,

the moment, it is clear that Vollenhoven sees God's engagement with the world in Trinitarian terms. It is thus, in Trinitarian terms, that we must consider God's Law and humanity's religious, (i.e., basic covenantal) response.

a. The Father – Past

For Jenson, the Father is the 'whence' both of the life of the Trinity and the life of the world, either as the Originator or Giver.[576] As Jenson puts it, the Father as Subject 'intends' the Son and gives the Spirit.[577] This should be understood reciprocally, and the sending by the Father of the Son and the Spirit can also be understood as his opening or liberation together with the Son by the Spirit[578]

Like Barth, Jenson identifies the pastness of God with the appellation 'Creator'. This is an assertion of the universal origin of all things at the hand of God.[579] Jenson identifies the Father as the 'whence' both of the life of the Trinity and the life of the world. He is the Originator[597] or Giver.[598] By identifying the Father with the pastness or 'having givenness' of God, Jenson also identifies him with the Law; the judgement on our clinging to the past.[599] It is the Father who commands.[600] The method of appropriation runs the risk of Modalism in the identification of successive acts of God with persons of the Trinity. But Jenson makes it clear that the Father is the author of redemption as well as creation (so affirming the indivisibility of God's acts and avoiding Modalism), since it is the Father who is love's will to its object, which we see realised in the event of the gospel.[601] Jenson suggests that classical theology has tended to define God with respect to the Father as the 'particular version of the First Cause'[1602], or as the *fons trinitatis* ('source of the Trinity').[603] Classical theology has tended to identify two 'sendings' of the Son and the Spirit, with the Father as the Unsent Sender.[604] As Jenson puts it, the Father as Subject, 'intends' the Son and gives the Spirit.[605] Jenson points out that this should be understood reciprocally, and that the sendings by the Father of the Son and Spirit can also be understood as his opening or liberation together with the Son by the Spirit. He suggests that the asymmetry of the traditional understanding of the relations

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since the Sabellians at least considered the Logos to be divine, whereas the Arians did not (Vollenhoven, 'Norm en natuurwet (51h)': /5, p. 61).

[576] Jenson, *Story & Promise* :126-7, Robert W. Jenson, 'The Futurist Option of Speaking of God', *The Lutheran Quarterly* 21 (1969): 24; Jenson, *T.I.* : 107, 109; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 138; Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 7; Robert W. Jenson, 'Does God Have Time? The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Concept of Time in the Physical Sciences', *Centre for Theology and the Natural Sciences Bulletin* 11 (1991): 2; see Ive, 'God of Faith' : 123-4.

[577] Jenson, *T.I.* : 148; Ive, 'God of Faith' : 124.

[578] *Triune Identity* 142; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 156-7; Ive, 'God of Faith' : 124.

[579] *Jenson, God after God* : 127, 168, 193.

of the persons of the Trinity tends to lead to a conception of God of law but not so much of the gospel, the opening up of the future to the futureless. Only by a reciprocally completed Trinitarian conception of the Father 'freed' by the Spirit and known in the person of the crucified and risen Son can such a future be assured.[606]

For Vollenhoven, the act of creation by the Father is God's secret will, or creation command.[580] The Father takes the leading role in the act of creation. Within that act the Father is the Archè of all things and the giver of the initial 'creation command' ('scheppingsbevel') according to which the created order comes into being.[581] Once the primordial act of creation has been carried out, the diversity of all creatures unfolds through the address of God.[582] The Father names each individual uniquely, so constituting the 'idea' or 'structure' that gives each created thing its unique identity.[583]

b. The Son – Present

Jenson characterises the Son as God's 'specious present'.[584] He sees the Son as the Object of God's presence to us, intended by the Father as his gift.[585] Jesus is the 'self' of God in that as

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[580] There is an echo here with Kuyper's notion of 'archetype' – that which is known to God alone but is only revealed indirectly in the form of an 'ectype' (Kuyper, *Sacred Theology*: 3.1.59, 60, pp. 96-117).

[581] Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 408; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)* /Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)* §73B = Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §75B ; Vollenhoven, *Gastcolleges*: 30; Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 6 (see Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 183-209, although Kuyper's emphasis there is on God's Triune counsel ('raad') rather than his command); see also Tol, *Philosophy*: 181-183.

[582] Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)*: §74A = Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §76A ; Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 6. Wolters points out that here Vollenhoven is following the traditional reformed distinction between *creatio prima* and *creatio secunda* such as in found in the writings of Vollenhoven's theological teacher, Herman Bavinck (Wolters, 'Vollenhoven on the ''Word of God''': 9 (n. 2); for Bavinck). For God's speaking, Vollenhoven uses the term 'Logos-revelation'('Logos-openbaring') not in the specific sense of the second Person of the Trinity, but in the joint speaking of all the Persons (see Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 5-6; see also Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 124).

[583] Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 379; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-123; Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)': /2, p. 30; Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138, 140; Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode': 11; Bril, ed., *Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy.*: 106; Tol, *Philosophy*: 181-183 .

[584] A term coined by William James in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) to denote the content of our sensible experience of time by contrast with the ''strict present'', the punctilinear perceptual present . See John C. Yates, *The timelessness of God* (London, Maryland: University Press of America, 1990) 98 ff. Dooyeweerd notes: 'As is known, the term ''specious present'' was introduced by E.R. Clay and popularized in the language used by

Jenson has as put it: 'as God turns to himself, he turns to Jesus the Nazarene. [586] This is not dissimilar from Hegel's thesis that in the Trinity the Son is the principle of otherness through the emanation of the world of the finite from the Absolute by which it achieves its full right of difference.[587]

The Son is the One in whom the Father finds himself, and who, in turn, is rescued from the past, by the Spirit, through the Resurrection.[588] As Jenson puts it: 'Jesus brackets us in time, he is at once remembered and awaited'.[589] Pannenberg puts it thus: 'The difference of the Son from the Father to which the Christological doctrine holds fast corresponds to the continuing difference in the message of Jesus between the futurity of the reign of God and its presence in Jesus' ministry'.[590]

The Son for Jenson is first the one in whom the Father's own word is heard and in whose person creation is given meaning.[591] He is the Object of God's presence to us, in that he is the one in whose person we can apprehend God's promise to us. He is intended by the Father as his gift.[592] Jenson describes him as God's self-identification for us,[593] or God's final 'Self-Expression'.[594] He is, in his person, the act of promise in the face of judgement. He is 'appropriately' the Fulfiller, the Utterance of a new language in the light of the old.[595] In Jesus we see the triumph of his self-giving to his fellows, which is the achievement of the Spirit.[596] By the Resurrection, the Father, through the Spirit, makes Jesus' personal intention unsurpassable. The person of Jesus is set before us as the One to whom we can look forward.[597] Jenson's general characterisation of the the Son is God's own 'specious

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psychology, especially by W. James in his *Principles of Psychology* (vol. I 609ff). 'Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee', ***Philosophia Reformata*** Part I (1940) Part II (1940): 193-234.

[585] Jenson, *Triune Identity* 109, 145, 148; Jenson, 'Triune God' 138; ''Three Identities in One Action'' 7; Ive, 'God of Faith' 124-5.

[586] Jenson, 'Body' : 82-9.

[587] G.W.F. *Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion III* (London, 1896) 1 ff. Refer Pannenberg, *ST*, 2:19.

[588] Robert W. Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' in *Research Institute in Systematic Theology, King's College London* (1990); Jenson, 'Does God Have Time?': 3; Ive, 'God of Faith' : 125.

[589] Jenson, 1977 #2622}: 113-123.

[590] *TKG:* 134, 71; reference in Greene, 'Doctrine of God': 34 and 36.

[591] Robert W. Jenson, 'Beauty', *dialog* 25 (1986): 253.

[592] Jenson, *T.I.* : 109, 145, 148; Jenson, 'Triune God' 138.

[593] Jenson, 'A Call to Faithfulness': 252. Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 7.

[594] Jenson, 'Religious Pluralism, Christology and Barth': 36; Jenson, *T.I.* : 140; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 155.

[595] Jenson, *God after God* : 191-3; Jenson, 'The Futurist Option of Speaking of God': 25.

[596] Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 12.

[597] Jenson, *T.I.* : 145 (not in Jenson, 'Triune God').

present'[598] He is the One in whom the Father finds himself, and who, in turn, is rescued from the hold of the past, by the Spirit, through the Resurrection.[599] Through the Resurrection, Jesus is the 'Act of Rhyming' between the future of the Spirit (Fulfilment) and the past of the Father (Creation).[600] As Jenson puts it:

> 'Jesus brackets us in time, he is at once remembered and awaited'.[601]

This corresponds to the analogical ascription by Augustine of understanding to the Son (understanding being the faculty which grasp the nature and relation of things are they are presented to us).

For Vollenhoven, the Son the gives the love command to humanity in general: the work of the Son is to provide the revelation of God's Law by whose light humanity can uncover the structures of creation, including the norms and laws which govern human life. This work is focused on revelation and redemption, in his offices as Logos and Christ respectively (the two offices are intertwined but distinct). In his earliest thinking, Vollenhoven sees the Son, as Logos, providing the basis on which the subject and object of knowledge can come into synthesis.[602] From the 1920s on Vollenhoven came to see the Logos as having a cosmic role

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[598] A term used by William James in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) to denote the content of our sensible experience of time by contrast with the ''strict present'', the punctilinear perceptual present. See John C. Yates, *The timelessness of God* (London, Maryland: University Press of America, 1990): 98.

[599] Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' :14; Jenson, 'Does God Have Time?': 3.

[600] Jenson, *Story & Promise* : 126.

[601] Jenson, 'Story and Promise in Pastoral Care': 115. See Jenson, 'Once More': 122, 24.

[602] Here he shifts his view from that which he set out in his doctoral thesis to that which he held from the 1920s on. In his earliest thinking, the Logos is that which brings norms together with judgement. In this sense, the Logos mediates epistemically between the norms called into being by Father, and the judgements made through the influence and work of the Holy Spirit (Kok, *Vollenhoven*: 24; Tol. *Philosophy*: 180-126). Looked at another way, the Logos is the one who norms the working over of experience (*empirie*) by systematic reflection (*ratio*). This connection should not be seen as a question of the Logos setting one's thinking and the order of the world in parallel (which he sees as naïve realism). On the other hand, the Logos should not be seen as an unknown third to which *ratio* and *empirie* stand in one-to-one relation. Rather the Logos has a regulative role in that it provides the framework which makes both *empirie* and *ratio* possible (Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 409-410; cited in Kok, *Vollenhoven*: 24, 314-315; and Tol, *Philosophy*: 185-201). This is not a claim that the Logos provides the content of thought (which for Vollenhoven would be too close to the 'scholastic' notion of 'thinking God's thoughts after him'). Vollenhoven rejects 'logos speculation', the view that postulates a special connection between human thought and the divine Logos (Vollenhoven, *De noodzakelijkheid eener christelijke logica (32b)*: 1-2; Vollenhoven, 'Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)': §15 , p. 70 (*Hoofdlijnen*: 27); see Tol, *Philosophy*: 197-201, 299 (n. 125)). Vollenhoven's point seems to be that while sober exegesis *does* identify the Logos in the N.T. with the Word of the Lord in the O.T., to single out a special link between this and one's *rational* faculty (or analytical function) is to absolutise the latter at the expense of all the other faculties and aspects of one's life. It is wrong to link the Logos purely with the logical. For him it is the divine Logos who

as the basis for the harmony and coherence of all the modalities, rather than an intra-mental role, bringing experience and reasoning together.[603] The Logos is the revelation of the eternally begotten Son in the creative act while, at the same time, the representative expression of the common creative work of all three Persons.[604] It is the Son then, as 'the Christ' ('the anointed one'), who calls humanity through grace back to the Father.[605] As the Christ, he replaces the old office-bearer, Adam, and bears the consequences of the judgement incurred by Adam's failure. He does so both as the eternal Son and as a human being. Only as God can he reverse the consequences of the failure of Adam as the first office-bearer, and yet it needs to be as fully human that he does so.[606] The human nature the Son assumes is not an abstraction: Jesus of Nazareth is a genuine human individual. Vollenhoven argues that the incarnation needs to be understood in terms of the 'enhypostatic' identity of the Son as an individual human being – not in terms of his assumption of an 'anhypostatic' ('impersonal'), pre-given or general human nature.[607] It is only through this enyhypostatic human being, Jesus of Nazareth as the new office-bearer, head of the angels as well as the earth, that redemption is possible in that it is only through him, as its new federal (i.e., covenantal) head,

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creates both the created logos (i.e., that which is of a logical nature), and the a-logical (Vollenhoven, 'Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)': 388 ('alogische')). It important to note that 'non-logical' is not illogical, only subject-matter to which the distinction logical/illogical does not apply as an appropriate designation.

[603] It combines both those elements of a logical, i.e., specific to the logical or analytical modality, and non-logical character, i.e., those of other modalities (Vollenhoven, 'Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)': 388-399).

[604] Vollenhoven argues that the names 'Son' and 'Logos' need to be distinguished. The first refers to the second Person of the Trinity as eternally-begotten, the second to the name of the Son in joint participant with the Father and the Holy Spirit in the creative act (Vollenhoven, '''De logos'' (38n)': 39-41; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d)* ; Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: 74-76; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §§ 117, 136 78-102). However, he is not consistent in this regard.

[605] 'Levens-eenheid': 124-5; Tol, 'Time and Change': 102. Strictly-speaking the term 'Christ' should be 'the Christ' (the anglicised Greek rendering of its Hebrew equivalent, 'the Messiah' both meaning 'the anointed one') the office assumed by the eternal Son in the act of redemption. In general, apart from where this needs to emphasised, I shall use the more generally used term 'Christ' without the definite article. 'Christians' are by extension, members of the anointed community as well as followers of 'the Christ'.

[606] *Introduction*, §124: 85-88.

[607] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 129-133, and (n. 188); Vollenhoven, 'Hypostasis-Anhypostasis, vooral bij de gnostiek (37n)': 8-13; Vollenhoven, 'Anhypostatos? (40a)': 75-76; Vollenhoven, 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons (1952k)': //6-9, pp. 3-92; Vollenhoven, 'De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons [2]': 3- 4; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §124, p. 187; see Zuidema, 'Het verschil in soteriologische waarde, toegekend aan den term ''onpersoonlijke menschelijke natuur'' in de concepties van Kuyper (– Hepp) and Bavinck (– Greydanus)'; Berkouwer, *The Person of Christ*: 313-320. Abraham Kuyper had said that Jesus Christ was not an individual (Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3, 'Locus de Christo (Pars Primo)', p. 37). Valentijn Hepp argues that the human nature of Christ cannot be distinguished by any specific characteristics (Hepp, *Dreigende deformatie*: 3.49).

that humanity truly finds its unity with God.[608] The incarnate Son is not only the bringer of redemption but also reveals the law of love, the characteristic of redeemed humanity.[609] This has implications for the laws or norms appropriate to each modality, including the modality of faith.[610] The Son who is the Logos, the basis of the created order, is present in the church as the Christ, the basis for the words and sacraments that shape the church's faith.[611] Thus, Vollenhoven sees the incarnation of the Son not only as making possible the salvation of 'souls' or separate individuals, but also as the revelation of God's Law for humanity in general.[612]

c. The Spirit – Future

The Spirit is the one who, in Pannenberg's words, is 'the ground, of life in its most inclusive sense'.[613] The Spirit operates by the continual process of drawing life beyond itself; the process of self' transcendence which Pannenberg calls exocentricity.[614] The Spirit is closely linked to Christ, since it is through the Spirit that Jesus as the 'resurrected Lord', that is the one who has vindicated the power of. God for the future, i.e. made manifest to us. It is through the Spirit that we can attest to what Jesus has done for us; and it is through the Spirit that the vindicated Jesus is glorified. This makes the Spirit more than a mere manifestation of Jesus, but an independent Person.[615] For Pannenberg,

> 'The power that fills the gospel is thus connected with the presence of the future of God in the coming of Jesus, and also with the imparting of this presence of eschatological salvation by the Spirit'.[616]

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[608] *Introduction:* §140, pp.105-6; Bril and Boonstra, ed., *S. Kaarten*: 278-280.

[609] Mt. 22: 34-40; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 124-126; Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode': 11-12; Bril, ed., *Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy.*: 105-106 and note p. 142.

[610] Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138. In the first instance, this is worked out with respect to the súbject-pole in the post logical-modalities, but there is the wider norm of flourishing which works out in all the modalities (see Chapter Four).

[611] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)* ; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §136, pp.101-102.

[612] Vollenhoven, 'Plato's realisme (slotgedeelte)': 159.

[613] *Jesus - God and Man* : 170.

[614] R. Neuhaus (ed.), *Theology and the Kingdom of God* (Philadelphia:. Westminster Press, 1969): 68, with Avery Dulles and Carl Braaten, Spirit, Faith and Church, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970): 13-31; *Anthropology in Theological Perspective* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1985): 60-74. 80-6; *Faith and Reality.* (London Search Press, 1977): 20-39; 'The Doctrine of the Spirit and the Task of a Theology of Nature', *Theology*. LXXV (1972) 8-21; Christoph Schwoebel, 'Wolfhart Pannenberg', in David F, Ford. *The Modern Theologians* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1989): 263

[615] *Jesus - God and Man:* 169-179.

[616] *ST* 2:459.

Jenson claims that God as Spirit is the goal of all things.[617] As Jenson puts it:
> '... God the Spirit is God as the transforming power of the eschaton, now to be the goal and judgment of what now is'.[618]

For Jenson, history needs to be understood in eschatological terms. It is moved forward by the ever self-surpassing liveliness of the Spirit. The key 'diagnostic question' is 'whether redemption is understood to fulfill initial creation or merely to restore it.'[619] As Jenson puts it:

'the world God creates is not a thing, a 'cosmos', but rather a *history* [our underlining]. God does not created a world that thereupon has a history; he creates a history that is a world, in that it is purposive and so makes a whole'[620]

History is moved forward by the conversation between God and his creation. It is by virtue of his address that God makes human beings his 'counterparts' (which Jenson suggests is probably the best translation of 'image').[621] For Jenson, the meaning of history is constituted by 'lived dramatic coherence'[622] In particular, history is shaped by the story of Jesus, in particular the Resurrection is seen as constituting the element of surprise combined with appropriateness (at least for us in retrospect). The problem to which this gives rise is: if God's transcendence is itself constituted eschatologically, how does that transcendence differ from the transcendence of history. Jenson states this paradox himself:

> 'The envelopment of our time by God is itself accomplished in the course of our time'.[623]

Jenson, in common with Moltmann and Pannenberg, is to see the Spirit as the one who makes history possible by providing the freedom within which we have the room to responds to the command of the Father. According to the 'dramatic coherence' provided by the Son. History

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[617] *Jenson, God after God* : 173; *Jenson, God after God* : 126; Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 3-4; *Jenson, T.I. :* 141; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 156.

[618] *Visible Words:* 93 (check), Ive, 'God of Faith' 132.

[619] He adds ''theology has too much tended towards the latter'' – he gives Anselm of Canterbury's Monologion, 15, as a particular example. ST 2:14-15, n. 70.

[620] He refers, 'as a totally different starting point' (ST 2:14, 65) to Carver. T. Yu, 'Stratification of the Meaning of time' in *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 33:31-33.

[621] ST 2: 16. He refers to Westermann, *Genesis*: 203-218.

[622] ST 2:319.

[623] ST 2:27.

is thus not determined protologically but eschatologically – above all in the supreme act of God's embodiment in the person of Jesus, raised from the dead by the power of the Holy Spirit. His understanding of history is thus based on his temporal account of the Trinity.

For Jenson, God has an identity as the goal of all things. This, he argues, is another way of saying that 'God is Spirit'.[651] The Spirit is the promise of the last future, 'the Power of the Future', or the *futurity* of God, bringing to us the all-encompassing transformation which is to come.[624] For Jenson, that God is Spirit is tautologous with the affirmation that God is god, since, according the Scriptures it is the god of faith (in contrast with the atemporal god of the standard religion) who is the power of the future, the prophetic word of God. As he puts it: '...God the Spirit is God as the transforming power of the eschaton, now to be goal and judgement of what now is'.[625] Jenson describes how, within the life of the Trinity, the Spirit is God's 'whither': God's self-transcendence.[626] He is the Projected One.[627] The Spirit proceeds from Jesus, who, as has been seen, is God's final Self-Expression.[628] He is the Outcome of the Gift who is the Son, of which the Giver is the Father.[629] As Spirit, God opens of himself to the future identity of judgement and acceptance in the eschatological resolution of law and gospel.[630] He gives life to the person of Jesus through whom this resolution is effected.[631] Through his identity as Spirit, God is open to himself as true future, not fixed by any past.[632] The Spirit, thus, as the power of the last future, 'frees' the Father, the pastness of all things, and witnesses to the Son, as God present with us.[633] Jenson describes the Spirit as 'the freedom that is the anticipation of Fulfilment, the downpayment on the End'.[634] It is through the Spirit that God's temporal eternity consists. As Spirit, he can never be surpassed, not that he is somehow above past and future.[635] God confronts in the Spirit the power of his own future. The Spirit brings 'otherness and novelty' to the Father and the Son.[636]

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[624] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 139, 148; Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' 13, 17

[625] Jenson, *Visible Words* : 95, 93. See Robert W. Jenson, 'Eucharist: Its Relative Necessity, Specific Warrants and Traditional Order', *dialog* (1975): 129, 132; Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 109-121; Robert W. Jenson, 'Liturgy of the Holy Spirit', *Lutheran Quarterly* 26 (1974): 189-90.

[626] Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' : 13; Jenson, 'Does God Have Time?': 2.

[627] Jenson, 'The Futurist Option of Speaking of God' : 24.

[628] Jenson, *T.I.*   140; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 155.

[629] Jenson, *Story & Promise* : 126; Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 3; Jenson, *T.I.* : 109; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 138.

[630] Jenson, *God after God* 191-2.

[631] Jenson, 'Beauty': 253.

[632] Jenson, *God after God* : l74; Jenson, *T.I.* : 169.

[633] Jenson, *T.I.* : 147-8; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 156-7.

[634] Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' : 1; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' : 48.

[635] Jenson, *God after God* : 172.

[636] Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' 17-18.

Jenson argues that the future promised and realised by the Spirit is specifically that which has been revealed in the Resurrection.[637] As Jesus in absolute and unconditional self-giving achieves the definitive coincidence of freedom and love, so the achievement in the Resurrection as achievement is the work of the Spirit.[638] The Resurrection points ultimately to the final coincidence of freedom and love, and this final goal gives the Resurrection its universal significance. This coincidence of freedom and love, Jenson points out is what Scripture means by 'holiness', and the Spirit as the One who brings this about is thus properly the 'Holy Spirit'.'[7] The ultimate holiness which the Spirit realises at the End, anticipated in the Resurrection makes penultimate holiness possible. Holiness in the life of God's eschatological community is the sign and historical effect of God as Spirit at work among his people, drawing them forward to the final consummation. There is some similarity to the eschatological vision of the Spirit in Origen, as has been described; but whereas with Origen (and Barth) it is the people of God who are drawn from the world into the life of the Trinity, for Jenson (in company with Pannenberg and Moltmann), it is the transformation of the world as such which is prepared by the Spirit as a fit environment within which the redeemed community can live.[668] As has been seen in the context of the gospel community.[669]

Both Jenson and Pannenberg speak of the Holy Spirit as 'the Power of the Future', or the futurity of God: bringing us the all-encompassing transformation that is to come.[639] For both theologians, it is in the Resurrection that the work of the Spirit is supremely revealed, and indeed located.

For Jenson, the Spirit, thus, as the power of the last future, 'frees' the Father, the pastness of all things, and witnesses to the Son, as God present with us. [640] It is through the Spirit that God's temporal eternity consists. As Spirit, God can never be surpassed, and indeed here there is a identification of the immanent and economic definitions of the Trinity, since not only is this the role of the Spirit in the world, but that role flows directly out of the relation with the Father and the Son, to both of whom the Spirit brings 'otherness and novelty'. [641] This corresponds to the will in the Augustinian analogy (will being the faculty which relates us the future).[642]

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[637] Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action': 3; Jenson, *T.I.* 140; Jenson, 'Triune God' pp. 155-6.

[638] Jenson, 'Three Identities of One Action' 12; Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' : 9**.**

[639] Jenson, Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 139, 148; Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' : 13, 17 (see Ive, 'God of Faith' 131); Pannenberg, *ST* 2:101-2.

[640] Jenson, *T.I.* 147-8; Jenson, 'Triune God' : 156-7.

[641] What is the point of Trinitarian Theology?'' 132.

[642] Augustine, *Confessions.*

The temporal paradigm accords primacy to the Spirit and is organised round that premise. The primacy of the Spirit and the futurity that characterises the work of the Spirit, can be seen in the statement by Jenson [?]:

> 'The unity of life that we see only partially in the sequence of the moments of time can be attained only from the future, which brings it to totality'.[643]

This bears a similarity to the statement by M.C. Smit (although Smit does not develop the temporal paradigm as such):

> 'History implies being directed not only to the origin but also to the centre and to the consummation of time. These are the three great *concentration points* of world history in which the meaning of life contracts into the integral meaning of history'[644]

The Holy Spirit puts the decree of the Father as revealed by the Son into effect.[645] This is God's effective will that realises the creative potential in specific situations:[646] In creation, the Holy Spirit first broods over the waters, leading to the unfolding of the still concealed diversity of the initial creation. Then, and in conjunction with the effecting of creation, he brings the revelation of the Logos to human consciousness, believers and unbelievers alike. This 'double work' ('dubbele werkzaamheid') is the 'genetic deployment' ('genetische ontplooing') of the Holy Spirit.[647] Alongside this 'double work' of the Holy Spirit in supporting and carrying through the work of the Father and the Son, there is the distinctive work of 'positivisation': the application and particularisation of God's Law in specific situations.[648] The work of the Holy Spirit causes human life to flourish – including the

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[643] *ST*, 2:102.

[644] Smit, 'The First and Second History'in *Towards* 378.

[645] Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)': /2, p. 30. In his early thinking, he sees this as taking place intra-mentally (Vollenhoven, 'W.W.Th.S. (18a)': 390-391, 410); Vollenhoven, 'Getuigen (59d)': 138.

[646] Vollenhoven, 'Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)': 171-172; Vollenhoven, 'Conservatisme en progressiviteit in de wijsbegeerte (59a)': /42, p. 311; Tol, 'Time': 103; Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 122-132; see also Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 11.

[647] Vollenhoven, '[Press release; lecture]: ''Bergson'' (21d)'; Vollenhoven, 'Bergson (1919)': 15 (I am grateful to Dr John Kok for providing me with his transcription of this manuscript); Tol, *Philosophy*: 184-185. In the versions of the *Isagôgè* between 1932 and 1939, there is a section entitled, 'The leading of the Spirit and the result of this activity' (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)*: §78 'Het leiding van de Geest en het resultaat van deze activiteit' .

[648] Vollenhoven, 'Levens-eenheid (55ms)': 127-128. Vollenhoven calls these three stages in the unfolding of the law as 'states of affairs'. See also Vollenhoven, 'De consequent probleemhistorische methode': 11; Bril, ed., *Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy.*: 106.

process of biological reproduction and the development of culture and civilisation.[649] For Vollenhoven, the eschatological hope is not a move to a supra-temporal realm, as we shall see is the case for Dooyeweerd. For him, rather, the eschaton is unfolded *in* time and does not involve a transcendence *of* time. He sees a temporal continuity between the present reality and the transformed heavens and earth achieved by a combination of the direct action of God in the historical process, through the Resurrection of Jesus and humanity's participation in that reality through the work of the Holy Spirit.[650]

d. Review

With respect to past, present and future, if all three Persons are not jointly active in past present and future, it calls into question to divinity of any of the persons not then present, and therefore the efficacy of their role in salvation history. To confine the role of the Father to the past or the Spirit to the future is to overlook the present call of the Father and the role of the Father as the One to whom all praise will be directed at the last. Similarly, to confine the Spirit to the future is to overlook the role of the Spirit in creation, and in the present experience of Christians.

More fundamentally, it commits us to one-dimensional notion of time, and raises the question as to what measure is implicit in this notion of God. One the one hand, it might reduce the Trinity, like Hegel, to the historical process; with the final result that history or History is God. On the other hand, it is paradoxically in danger of not taking history itself seriously, since history becomes defined in terms of continual divine self-transcendence; and the present, and indeed the Jesus of history, is swallowed up in the expectation of the future.

In this respect it is difficult, and, one might argue, impossible for the temporal paradigm to avoid the charge brought by Pannenberg himself against Hegel to the effect that it irreconcilable with the Christian understanding of God's freedom to hold that God had to create the world out of some inner necessity of his own nature, even in a small way, for the purpose of his self-actualisation. Both Pannenberg and Jenson appeal to God's love as a way out of this dilemma, but unless that love is not itself finally transcendent of the historical process (and if the Triune relations themselves are temporal), it is difficult to see how they escape the charge of historical determinism that they both level against Hegel.[651]

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[649] Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §121 82 (Vollenhoven refers to Pss. 127 and 128, and also to Dt. 7.13); Vollenhoven, 'Problemen van de tijd (68b)': 207-209.
[650] Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 6 (Vollenhoven quotes 1 Tim. 3.16, Rom. 6.9 and 1 Cor. 15.33-34).
[651] Pannenberg, *ST* 2:19.

There are two deep ambiguities within Jenson's theological system, within his pneumatology and his Christology respectively. In the case of both the Spirit and the Son, the root of the ambiguity in Jenson's theology arises because Jenson has followed the tendency (endemic in the Western theological tradition) to reduce the persons to 'subsisting relations' (as 'bond' or 'bracket' respectively) rather than recognising their distinct substantiality. With respect to Jenson's pneumatology, the ambiguity arises with the conflation of God's *perichoresis* with the distinctive work of the Spirit as being the 'power of the future'. The identification of the Spirit with God's futurity tends to detract from the past or present work of the Spirit in the world; as well as the role of the Father and the Son in the future. The latter consideration tends also to blunt the force of Jenson's own solution to the antinomy of hope in terms of love, since, as Jenson strongly emphasises, it is in the person of Jesus, as the 'man of the future' that the final coincidence of love and freedom will be realised; so that in this respect Jesus, as much as the Spirit, bears the distinctive character of futurity. With respect to Jenson's Christology, the ambiguity arises in an analogous way, with Jesus, through the Resurrection, being regarded as the bracket (in the God event) between the Father and the Spirit; and at the same time being the One whose personality has universal significance as the ultimate lover. The exclusive situation of the identity of Christ in the 'evangelical events', limits the scope and significance of the 'christological determination of creation'. The result of these ambiguities is to obscure the Triune role as Creator. In accordance with his own persuasive account of the the Lutheran 'two kingdoms' doctrine, the significance of the work of the Spirit and 'christological determination of creation' is largely to be deferred until the return of Jesus.   Until then, our ethics, and likewise each discipline of understanding and interacting with the present world, are to be theoretically secular in force (*etsi deus non daretur*), albeit motivated by a distinctive ultimate hope. Further, it may be doubted whether the characterisation of the Triune persons as past, present and future (using the method of appropriation) is sustainable, since, as has been argued, it is not satisfactory exclusively to characterise the Spirit as future, nor the Son as the bracket between the present and the future.

It is possible to address these ambiguities without detracting from the validity either of Jenson's critique of standard religion, nor his identification of God in the historically-defined person of Jesus of Nazareth. The former depends on the rejection of the notion of God as atemporal substance, while the latter rests on the proposition that God is none other than as identified in Jesus; both of which are arguably better secured by a temporal understanding (using Jenson's method) of the *perichoresis* and the *enhy (or 'u')postasia* respectively. These notions, already recognised by Jenson, might well be developed to provide a less problematical framework for understanding the work and character of the Triune persons than the characterisation of Father, Son and Spirit as past, present and future respectively. The notion of *perichoresis* moves Jenson's identification of the Spirit with futurity to the work of all three persons of the Trinity. It may be argued that it is in the *perichoresis* of the persons, that God's futurity consists: and the Spirit is not to be identified with God's futurity as such,

but as the One who whose freeing action *results* in the joint Triune achievement of the future. As noted, Jenson may indeed be moving implicitly to this position. The *enhypostasia* identifies Jesus' risen humanity precisely as the locus of his address by the Father (thus having his intension as the Son) and the work of the Spirit (thus having his extension as the Son); and this identification is temporal in the sense that it takes place within and in terms of history, and it locates his significance in his risen person rather than in an abstract relation. It thus makes it possible to discern the significance of the 'christological determination of creation' for the past and present, as well as for the future.

The question arises as to what is the nature of the Trinity in the eschaton, when the Kingdom of God is something no longer essentially future but present? It might be argued that the logical conclusion of Pannenberg's understanding is that the Trinity is the corollary of the provisionality of God, and that with the eschaton it will taken up entirely in God's Unity. Since there is the strong implication in Pannenberg that Trinitarian distinctions are based on the difference between the past and the future - so that if in the future the distinction between past and future is overcome will the Trinitarian distinctions then cease to exist?   In the eschaton, Jesus will no longer be distinguishable from the Father as the one pointing to the future of the other, as that future will have arrived, and the Spirit can no longer be charactarisable as the one pointing to the futurity of existence as whole, as that future will have arrived.   Pannenberg rejects the idea of history as a progression from temporal existence to an a-historical eternity, but rather stresses our expectation of the eschaton; but there seems to be little practical difference between the undifferentiated future which he implicitly seems to envisage, and the a-historical eternity 'which he seems to reject.   Both seem to involve the effective conflation, or rather sublimation, of the economic Trinity, and therefore, for Pannenberg, the collapse of the differentiation of God both within himself and with his creation.   This also bears out the critique that Pannenberg lays himself open to: that his account of the Trinity is the account of God as he reveals himself to us.   Granted, Pannenberg has excluded the validity of direct revelation, but in order that our understanding of God should inform our understanding of history the world, there does need to be some way in which we see the character of God as shaping history and not, finally the reverse process taking place - as seem to be the implication of Pannenberg's account. Otherwise, what does 'God' mean, apart from being a personification of the historical process itself (which is not what Pannenberg is trying to have us believe)?[652]

The problem for Moltmann is what a distinctively Christian understanding of history might be, apart from a general expression of optimism grounded in God's demonstrated solidarity, as Trinity with the world.   The question is at its most acute when we seek to understand what

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[652] Moltmann, *T.K.G.* : 63-4, 71; Greene, 'The Doctrine of God' . 2Q3--5, 363-7.

the Trinity means in the context of the eschaton, since although Moltmann has determinedly fixed our attention with that in view; yet it is unclear whether then, and indeed now, we are able to conceive in his terms of the Persons of the Trinity fulfilling distinctive roles apart from being, as God, the guarantee of our and the rest of creation's future.

Both Pannenberg and Moltmann ground their expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity on the tension 'between the present and the future. For both, the eschatological dimension is paramount. For Pannenberg, it is the demonstration in universal history of the futurity of God. For Moltmann, it is the 'Christological eschatology' of 'hope'; the idea that we are not Inescapably bound by the present, but are freed, through the resurrect ional power of Christ, to move forward in new directions. For both, the *venturus* of Christ, beyond the *futurum* of our present experience. God is not somehow divorced from what happens in history, but that history is drawn forward by God's decisive involvement in it.

For both Pannenberg and Moltmann, God's decisive involvement takes the form of a key determinative event. For Pannenberg it is the resurrection, as the 'prolepsis' of our future. For Moltmann, it is the cross of Christ in which the whole of history is contained. For both, history is conditioned by an event within history, which at the same time is far wider in its implications than the boundary of historical experience. Both wrestle with essentially the same dilemma: how can God both be active (decisively) in history, and yet in some sense 'ahead' of it (for neither theologian would regard him as 'outside' history) and somehow drawing it to its final conclusion. If God is within history, what reality can we understand him to have beyond it?

The problem of how we can understand God as somehow 'beyond' history is especially a problem for Pannenberg with his rejection of the possibility of direct revelation. A determined skeptic, when presented with, for example, the historical evidence ('from below'} for the resurrection in the context of apocalyptic expectation (each as that with which Pannenberg presents us)[653] might simply reply that the world is somewhat stranger than initially he or she may have conceived - it will not necessarily compel belief in a transcendent God. Similarly, Moltmann's assertion of the universal significance of the cross of Christ does not necessarily compel1 acceptance of it as the ground of hope since it may simply be taken as another example of the 'gods' of a vindictive and arbitrary universe killing us 'for their sport' (with the happy outcome of the resurrection discounted as corporate delusion). The issue in question, which neither Pannenberg and Moltmann can avoid, is that of the authority of God not just by virtue of his acts but by virtue of his very being. In addition to

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[653] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Revelation as History* (1968): 123-158; Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus God and Man* (1968): 53-114)

our encounter of God in history, and indeed prior to it, needs to be our encounter with God as God that is as the one whom we trust as good beyond all things.   Pannenberg does take this into account to a certain extent in his discussion of God's truth as trustworthiness (Hebrew: emeth) rather than the perception of timeless propositions, but tends to imply that the historical process itself will disclose and validate his self-revelation. Moltmann grounds it in the self-attesting promises of God: like Pannenberg, the truth, of these will be demonstrated only as we appropriate them in concrete historical action.[654]   By relying on the historical outcome itself to be the validation of what is taken on trust (namely, that the claims of Jesus are determinative of the future), both Pannenberg and Moltmann leave us within an apologetical impasse.

This apologetical impasse is especially acute in our experience of God as Trinity.   Here the full revelation of God's Trinitarian character depends on both past and future historical experience.   For us, Christ is the one whose proclamation of the coming Kingdom of God was attested by the resurrection, but will be proved consummately with the resurrection of the dead in the eschaton. Similarly, the Holy Spirit whose present reality has been evinced also in the resurrection, but who points continually beyond the present to the final consummation. The Father has shown himself in Christ to be the one whose call to obedience In the proclamation of the Kingdom has been validated, and whose authority will be seen to be decisive at the end of all things.   But we can only know all this as we take the historical evidence on trust, and appropriate it in historical action trusting in the 'vertical dimension' (for Pannenberg) or 'eschatological hope' (for Moltmann).

However, what is this 'vertical dimension' or eschatological hope'? Both Pannenberg and Moltmann are vague about the nature of the eschaton to which the progressive realisation of Kingdom of God is leading, since, despite their stress on the priority of the eschaton, it i.e. the present In which God Is manifested (indirectly) as Trinity.   As we have seen, for neither theologian is it clear whether God will be Trinitarian in the eschaton, since for both Pannenberg and Moltmann, Trinitarian differentiation is expressed in terms of dialectical tensions within the historical process itself

For Pannenberg, it is the process of God's self-realisation which occurs in history through the dialectic of self-differentiation of the Son from the Father.   This is reflected in creation though the overcoming of sin (brought about as a result of wrongful human presumption through the recognition, in Christ and through the power of the Spirit, of true creaturely differentiation from God.   The essence of this lies in the recognition of creation (through the

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[654] *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie II* 118**,** 230, 232; Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope on the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology* (1967): 84-94.

cross and resurrection) of the identity of Jesus with God as one bearing the power of its future. Thus creation in turn can reflect more fully the mutual recognition of the Persons of the Trinity in. true unity and harmony, as we understand, and live out more fully our own dependence on God.

For Moltmann, it is the nature of suffering with which he is concerned. The Trinitarian paradigm of this, through which God shares our suffering, Is the separation of the Son from the Father on the cross – the pain of which the Spirit also shares. This separation is overcome in the course of history, which is the process moving towards the 'unification' of God, which in turn provides the paradigm for human society in its qualities of equality and community.

Both Pannenberg and Moltmann can be described as setting out the theological basis, in the relations of the Persons of the Trinity, of our hope in the present for what God promises to us for the future. The danger of this approach Is that in identifying the nature of God too closely with the historical process, both are In danger of losing the sense of God's transcendence over against creation: so that we deny him the ability to speak to us except in our own terms, which may be wrong or distorted . If the Trinity be retained as a truly theological concept, it cannot simply be portrayed in terms of the historical process'; for that leaves us with the paradox that the very differentiation within God through which he brought creation into being will be made subject to and conflated with that creation. This would be to fall into a form of monism, which is the antithesis of the Trinitarian doctrine.

It may be suggested that a charge of Marcellianism might be leveled against both Moltmann and Pannenberg.[655] After the redemptive work is achieved they will be resumed again into the Divine Unity and 'God will be all in all' [656] which might be levied against both Moltmann and Pannenberg, and indeed of Jenson, exemplified in the approving paraphrase by Moltmann of Pannenberg: 'It is only in the eschaton that the economic Trinity reaches completion in the immanent Trinity'.[657] Pannenberg's own suggestion is that in the eschaton, past, present and future will be overcome.[658]

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[655] Marcellus, bishop of Ancyra (d. c. 374) who taught that in the Unity of the Godhead, the Son and the Spirit only emerged as independent entities for the purposes of Creation and Redemption. It is interesting that the distinguished theologian, Hendrikus Berkoff, whose theology has many similarities to both Moltmann and Pannenberg, has explicitly acknowledged his closeness to the Marcellian position,

[656] *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Second Edition, reprinted 1988)

[657] J Moltmann, Trinität *und Reiches Gottes* (1980 177-8 paraphrased by Pannenberg in 'Father, Son,Spirit: Problems in a Trinitarian Doctrine of God', *dialog* 26 (Summer 1987) 257

[658] Moltmann, *T.K.G.* : 63-4. Refer Greene, 'Doctrine of God', p. 366.

This is perhaps due their common Hegelian inheritance, as Colin Gunton puts it:

> 'In Hegelian terms [...] matter, time and space are finally abolished as a result of Spirit's relentless movement'.[659]

A similar point has been made by Oliver O'Donovan:

> 'When history is made the categorical matrix for all meaning and value, it cannot then be taken seriously as history. A story has to be a story about something, but then everything is story there is nothing for story to be about'.[660]

Pannenberg speaks of an 'inverted monophysitism' in Hegel with respect to the latter's claim that in the death of Christ not the man died but the Divine, becoming man thereby.[661] In order to avoid the charge of Marcellianism, it is necessary to provide an account of the Trinity which gives an account of the distinction of persons that applies at all stages of God's economy, and indeed is distinct from it. At the same time, it is necessary to have a robust application of Rahner's dictum that 'the 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity, and *vice-versa*[662] if the doctrine of the Trinity is to have a purchase which is relevant and historically transformative.

The division of time into three tenses is arguably culturally specific - contrast for example the two tense view of Hebrew. Statements about time are therefore to be understood as statements about our culturally-conditioned experience rather than about reality as such (holding for the moment the epistemological and ontological status of 'reality as such'[663] There is, nevertheless, some point in identifying the Father with the past, since that is where our calling comes from, and the Spirit with the future, since it is through the operation of the Spirit that things are taken forward, and Christ with the present, since that is where we encounter the truth and coherence of the world; but it is better to consider these not so much

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[659] *The One, the Three and the Many:* 186.

[660] *Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics* (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986) 60; quoted by Henri Blocher in this 'Immanence and Transcendence in Trinitarian Theology' 117.

[661] *Jäner Real philosophie* [1805-6] Ph B, 67, 268 n. 3 quoted in Pannenberg *Hegel's view of history* (?), whereby divine action is finally reduced to human terms.

[662] Probably more robust than Rahner himself in *The Trinity* (trans. J. Doneel; New York, 1970) 22. See article by Gary Badcock in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed. *The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1997) 143-154; also Catherine M LaCugna, 'Re-Conceiving the Trinity as the Mystery of Salvation' in *Scottish Journal of Theology,* Vol. 38 (1985) 11-12.

[663] Response by R.J Russell to Jenson in *Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences Bulletin* (Berkley, California), 11 (Winter, 1991): 7-19.

as tenses as characteristic of our experience with an overall reality. Pannenberg interestingly contrasts the eschatology of Jesus, who sees salvation of human life depending on the future (i.e. the temporal paradigm) with that of Paul, who sees salvation as assuredly present for believers, albeit in the light of the final judgment through Jesus Christ (i.e. the salvation-historical paradigm).[664] Whether this is an adequate characterisation of the respective positions of Jesus and Paul is questionable,[665] but it may be suggested that it does reflect a tension in Pannenberg's own thinking

Pannenberg's account of the Trinity, like Moltmann's and Jenson's, describes God's vulnerability to the outcome of the historical process. For Pannenberg, the critical point is the moment of Jesus' Resurrection, when the identity of Jesus with the Father, and truth of his proclamation of the coming Kingdom, is put to the test. The Holy Spirit is the independent witness who attests to the reality of this achievement and the truth of this confession, and effects its implications in the world (not simply for Pannenberg in the church). The question which remains is: this identity of the Son with and Father having been affirmed and its implications realised, what enduring meaning for the world do the internal relationships of the Persons of the Trinity have for the world, particularly with the arrival of the eschaton when the differentiation of the Persons will be superseded or so it seems from Pannenberg's account, since the differentiation of the Persons is expressed in terms of the historical process. Even though Pannenberg denies that the distinctiveness of the Persons of the Trinity will be dissolved in the eschaton, the overall logic of his presentation seems to point the other way.

The temporal paradigm is an advance on the salvation-historical one in that past, present and future intersect at every point of time, so that persons are not separated in that sense; but the weaknesses are two-fold: it does not adequately safeguard God's transcendence from the created order, and, as has been pointed out does not adequately take account of God's internal distinctness. God cannot simply be identified with the historical process, since that would be to divinise the historical process, and ironically rob it of its transcendence. As the historical process is the succession of past, present and future, by characterising the persons of the Trinity as this succession (albeit with the primacy of the future over the past) the temporal paradigm runs precisely this risk.

The identification of the persons of the Trinity with past, present and future, which Jenson advances in a powerfully suggestive and thoroughgoingly systematic way cannot, for the considerations advanced above, finally do justice to the engagement of all three Persons in

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[664] *ST* 2:399-403.
[665] see David Wenham, *From Jesus to Paul*

the historical narrative over time. Nevertheless, it takes us a considerable way forward in our understanding of the engagement of God in the historical process. There is some point in identifying the Father with the past since that is where our calling comes from, and the Spirit with the future, since it is through the operation of the Spirit that things are taken forward, and Christ with the present, since that is where we encounter the truth and the coherence of the world; but it is a question of whether Jenson does not finally reduce the operation of the persons *to* the historical process itself.

The temporal account, which itself is so powerfully suggestive, is at the same time very problematical. By identifying the Persons of the Trinity as elements *within* the historical process rather than constitutive *of* it, there is a danger of reducing the Trinity *to* the historical process, as Hegel has done. The gap between Hegel and Jenson in this respect is the historical particularity of the risen Christ, but the fundamental problematic is the same.

The way that Pannenberg and Moltmann's expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity should shape our understanding of history, i.e. to give us a sense of God's involvement in the process of history; and to call us to trust in him and community with one another.   Each has demonstrated that, at least the Trinity does show that the revelation of God in Christ, and his giving to us of his Spirit, in creation, reconciliation and glorification does point us beyond ourselves to God in community, who is the power of our future.   Problematical as each of their accounts of the Trinity are, each in his own way provides us with an important clue about what a Trinitarian understanding of history might or indeed should, involve; namely that it is only through our encounter with God's self-giving nature as one in three Persons that we can have hope in a future which is grounded in personal trustworthiness rather than one subject either to impersonal determinism or blind chance.

Jenson's account of the Triune relations brings together two powerful and complementary motifs: that of his conception of the persons of the Trinity in temporal terms, and, secondly, the revelation of the priority of the future in the Resurrection. In combining these two motifs, he relocates Barth's christological reversal exclusively within the historical narrative, and in particular, in the Resurrection. Simply to hold the priority of the future, would be to leave the future without content; and simply to speak of the recollected Jesus without affirming the priority of the future would be to deprive the narrative of any power. Jenson brings these two motifs together in his account of the role of the Spirit, who is the power of the future, as he has attested Jesus for us through the event of the Resurrection to be the person of the last future. Jenson argues that God is transcendent not in the sense that he is remote from history, but rather in the sense that he is prior to creation and surpasses it through his own liveliness; but neither the past nor the future should be thought of neutral, abstract categories. The life of the Trinity is held together by love, which indeed is that which enlivens the beauty of the

eschaton: since, as the gift of the Spirit, the eschaton cannot but always be on the move, and love by its nature is active deepening, not stasis.

For God as Trinity, according to Jenson, the future is not dependent on God's primordial knowledge, since God is not only the one before all things, but is also the one by whom the future, as a distinct category (not merely the extrapolation from the past), is brought into being. The supreme risk has been taken, and won, in the historical person of Jesus, who is at once the man (and God) of the last future, and the One who truly names the One who sent him. In Jesus, the past and the future meet, not on the basis of past causation, but through the transforming of the necessities of the past by the new future made possible by the Spirit. The Resurrection is the past event which is at one and the same time not determined by the past and different in kind from anything which might be extrapolated from it; and yet is that which gives hope to the present retroactively from the future.[666] The future as a distinct category (rather than the projection forward of the possibilities, factual or counterfactual of the past) cannot be accommodated in the problematic of standard religion. Jenson's conception of human freedom in terms of the new possibilities which God as Spirit opens up freed from, but not antithetical to, the past is incompatible with the traditional conception of human freedom in terms of lack of past determination (the correlative of the standard religious conception of God). Rather than the conception of freedom in terms of absence of determination, human freedom for Jenson is seen as positive liberation from the constraints of the past as it is transformed by new, God-given possibilities. The basis for accepting this conception of the future is simply the claim that this is how God has surprisingly revealed himself to be in the person of the risen Jesus. The consequence is that the idea of an atemporal god who risklessly determines all things from the beginning has to be abandoned. God the Trinity for Jenson, is not to be confused with the course of history as a whole, nor to be divorced from it as an abstract category of being; but is the name of God who is particularly so revealed in the person of Jesus.[667]

There is the need to give an account of what Colin Gunton has called the divine 'substantiality' which, unlike the essentially monadic conception of God as substance, is properly predicated not of God's being as such (which is excluded through the rejection of the absolute distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity), but of the persons of the Trinity.[668] Without such an account of the substantiality of each of the persons of the Trinity, including that of the person of the Son, Jenson's key conception of the distinct and

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[666] Ive, 'God of Faith' , 4.1.
[667] Ive, 'God of Faith' , 2.3, 3.1.
[668] *The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 191.

undetermined future is in danger of being reduced to an abstraction, since what gives the Christian hope its concreteness, is the anticipation of its taking the character of Jesus in his fully embodied personality (as Jenson himself emphasises). As has been noted, it is only through the anticipation of such a concrete personal encounter with Jesus as the finally successful lover, that the antinomy of hope is capable of resolution. Such a conception of the substantiality of the person of Jesus in particular, and that of the persons generally, might indeed provide a space, not of metaphysical distance, which Jenson rightly rejects as a capitulation to standard religion, but of creative possibility. This creative possibility would exist not through the operation of hierarchy of being (subordinationism), nor through the Triune persons being seen as successive expressions of an underlying and unknowable divine substance (Modalism), but as interplay of distinct persons lovingly and harmoniously within a common field of action (perichoresis).[669] It is not incompatible with the tenor of his theological concern (developing a Trinitarian model along Cappadocian rather than Augustinian lines, as indeed Jenson would have us do) to suggest that the bond of love between the persons of the Trinity is not the Spirit, but the very *perichoresis* according to which they are together God. Thus, the futurity of God can be seen as not so much the special province of the Spirit (as Jenson argues), but rather that of the divine interaction constituted by the Triune perichoresis.[690] In this way, the coming of the future Kingdom is not to be seen as the end of the Triune action (as it might be if the correlation of the persons of the Trinity with past, present and future were rigidly applied), or the end of the distinctive differentiation of the persons of the Trinity (the corollary of the temporal correlation of the persons of the Trinity); but, rather, the consummation of our participation in the ever continuing Triune reality towards which Jenson's theological writings so powerfully direct us.

(iv)   The *Covenantal* **Perichoretic Alternative**

We are not to see the Persons in isolation from one another but 'perichoretically'. Each Person 'makes space' for each of the other two Person in the three great acts of God: creation, redemption and transformation (with the Father leading in creation, the Son leading in redemption and the Holy Spirit leading in transformation). The self-giving love of the three Persons provides a grounding, shape and purpose for as Christians and the basis on which our Christian faith can be worked out in every area of life

The insights gained with respect to our consideration of the distinctiveness and mutuality of the perichoretic work of the three Persons can provide an analogical guide to the systematic

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[669] See Gunton, *The One, The Tree and the Many* 152 ff. 141

consideration of the transcendentals. I argue that what I am putting forward is not a return to the analogia entis for the following reasons:

First, the notion of analogy being used is the Reformational one which pertains between different modally-defined kinds of discourse – in this case, the concept of perichoresis specific to faith discourse opens up other forms of discourse by analogy.

Second, the concept of perichoresis in this context refers to the work of the Triune Persons, not their being. The three Persons work together and so together realise the plural and irreducible diversity of the world.

Third, the basis of God's relationship with the world is a covenantal not an analogical one. I argue below that the Kuperian view presents an alternative to a view of God framed in essentially monadic terms as either supreme intellect (in which creation is seen as a reflection of God's mind), or supreme will (in which God is seen as an arbitrary potestas absoluta). The perichoretic Trinitarian position provides a clear alternative to both these positions. The conception of the love among the Persons, and the covenant which flows from that avoids both the conception of God as a monadic intellect, as well as the alternative (voluntarist) conception of God's work as sheer potestas absoluta.[670]

The Persons are primarily joint, but distinct, agents in the work of creation, redemption and transformation, bound by love among the Persons which is the sole ground for their common work. Thus, the world needs to be seen, to use John Calvin's expression, as the 'theatrum dei gloriae' (the theatre of God's glory). The world is not the extension of God's being, but it reflects and bears the impress of God's Triune action, in its creation, redemption and transformation and indeed, God's presence in and through his incarnate Son.

There is a well-developed Trinitarian and covenantal Trinitarian tradition within Reformed theology. [671] A powerful statement of the Trinitarian approach can be found in Kuyper's

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[670] This will be explained in the following section.

[671] In what follows, Kuyper and Van Til are drawing on a substantial tradition within Reformed theology. With respect to Calvin, there is a considerable debate about the role the covenant plays in his theology, but Peter Lillback argues not only for the centrality of the covenant in the Calvin's theology as God's 'self-binding'. Crucially, Lillback cautiously suggests that the covenant is located in the first instance in the relationship between the Persons, although Calvin's major focus is on the unfolding of that covenant in history [Peter A. Lillback, *The Binding of God: Calvin's Role in the Development of Covenant Theology* (2001): 212-214]. The notion of the covenant between the Persons was developed in the theology of, among others, Caspar Olevianus (1536-1587), William Ames 'Amsius' (1576-1633), David Dickson (1583-1662), Johannes Cloppenburg (1592-1652), Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661), John Koch 'Cocceius' (1603-1669); Thomas Brooks (1608-1680), Thomas Manton (1620-1677), Francis Turretin (1623-1687), John Flavel (1628-1691), Peter van Mastricht

writings and lectures. For Kuyper, the Persons of the Trinity bind themselves in a covenant for the existence and well being of the world, and there is constancy in their governance of the world that comes out of their compact with one another. The covenant is the belief of the three Persons, and expresses their mutual, free and loving interdependence. All things hold together, just as the Persons of the Trinity are in mutual interrelation. Kuyper points out that the work of creation and redemption both find their highest unity in Christ. As the Eternal Son, he participates in the work of both, not as a foreign element but as a full co-director of the 'Eternal Counsel of Peace' ('eeuwigen Vrederaad') and as mediator of both creation and redemption.[672]

The statement 'God is love' or even 'God is a community of love' which is merely an unpacking of that statement is not a theoretical statement. It is a covenantal statement based on God's self-revelation – indeed it is not a statement which can be made with any neutrality, any morethan the statement of a lover to his or her beloved 'I love you' can be made neutrally. Nor can it be treated as a sort of scientific hypothesis – as if the lover or his or her beloved can properly respond 'Ah, that is an interesting theory, let me go away and accumulate empirical evidence to substantiate the truth of that claim'. Of course, fairy tales are full of stories of prince or princess putting the love of their suitor to the test, or of their assertion of the worthiness of their suitor by means certain trails. However, even there, there

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(1630-1706), Franciscus Buurman (1632-1679), Johannes Heidegger (1633-1698), Herman Wits 'Witsius (1636-1708), Thomas Ridgeley (1667-1734), Thomas Boston (1676-1732), John Gill (1697-1771), Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), Charles Hodge (1797-1878), Archibald A. Hodge (1823-1886), and Benjamin B. Warfield (1851-1921) [Heinrich Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources* (1950): 376-394; Ralph Allan Smith, *The Eternal Covenant: How the Trinity Reshapes Covenant Theology* (2003): 17-28; Peter Golding, *Covenant Theology: The Key of Theology in Reformed Thought and Tradition* (2004): 138-142; Jonathan Edwards, *The History of Redemption* (n.d.): 18, 346-347; Benjamin B. Warfield, 'The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity' (1988): 166]. A note of dissent is sounded by Karl Barth on the grounds that the Trinity is the doctrine of 'three modes of being in one God', and the covenant purely between God and humanity [Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (1975 -): IV/1, 54-66. William Klempa, 'The Concept of the Covenant in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Continental and British Reformed Theology' (1992): 104]. However, Barth's demurrer can itself be challenged on the ground that his characterisation of the Persons as 'modes of being' (Barth, *Church Dogmatics* : I/1 359-368) is insufficiently Trinitarian, and that restricting the covenant purely to the relationship between God and humanity begs the question about whether it is appropriate to see the covenant purely in divine-human terms, or whether it can be seen as a working out of the intra-Triune relationships. Nevertheless, even in Barth, there are resources for seeing the intra-Triune basis for God's action towards the world, not least in his creation of humanity, not least in marriage as a reflection of the inter-Personal covenant (See Lisa P. Stephenson, 'Directed, ordered and related: the male and female interpersonal relation in Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics*', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 61 (2008)).
[672]Kuyper, *Dictaten*: 3 Locus de Foedere, §5 80-90,. especially p. 89. Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.9.4, pp 202-209 Kuyper, *To be Near unto God* (1925), Ch.47 289-91; Ch.56 347-9; Ch.68 417-9; Ch. 83 507-9; Kuyper, *De Gemeene Gratie* (1902, 1903, 1904): 2, Ch. 86 'De Gemeene Gratie en de Zone Gods' 642-649; Bratt, ed., *Kuyper Reader*: 182-187.

is something not quite right. Certainly, in normal behaviour, it would not be quite right to treat the covenantal self-declaration of another in this way, and even less is it appropriate with respect God – in the case of God we find ourselves within the realm of theodicy. We can doubt the priority of God's love in the face of evil, and one of the main reasons for loss of faith is doubt about whether our belief in the existence of a God for Whom love is primary is compatible with the existence of real evil and suffering – especially in innocent suffering -- in the world. There is no problem of evil for a Muslim, for whom everything that happens is sheerly the will of God, for whom God's love is secondary and relative. Nor is it a problem for a Hindu or a Buddhist, for whom evil and suffering are merely an evanescent feature of the world. It is a problem for a Christian and for any contemplating Christian faith - not at a hypothetical or theoretical level, but because it goes right to the heart of our covenantal relationship with God. It cannot be addressed as anintellectual problem but only responded to through faith in the life, death and resurrection of our incarnate Lord.

So the statement God is love – or God is a community (i.e. Triunity) of love, is not a hypothesis but a basic covenantal commitment. If we are asked a question: which God do you believe in, we can answer, we believe in the God for whom love is primary. Baal is a god with whom one transacts business – whose love is bought through a process of ritual sacrifices. The Allah of Islam loves, but only in a secondary way, in response to human obedience. Love also sets the Judeo-Christian God apart from the Hindu Brahma, who is finally impersonal and therefore cannot love. For a Christian, the statement 'God is love', cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience – that was the mistake of Job's comforters, and is something which Job himself comes to recognise – as indeed does the preacher and the Psalmist.

The approach of building up a body of knowledge about God and coming to hypotheses about God seems to put it the wrong way round. We know God through God's self-revelation; and we can only know God in this way: be it directly through Scripture, or indirectly through human experience. It is important not to confuse beliefs and theories. God is love is a belief – it is not, and cannot be treated as a theory. Certainly people can and are brought to faith as a result of God working in their lives, but that is not so much a matter of building up a hypothesis, as a shift of basic covenantal allegiance. 'The God who sees' is the name of the One Who one believes in and serves – it not a hypothetical generalisation (it comes from Gen 16, when Hagar has encountered an angel, whom she come to recognise is YHWH Himself and so receives the direct assurance of His love). It is not a straightforward empirical statement. Similarly the statement 'God does not see evil' is not a statement which can straightforwardly be set against the statement 'God sees people'. Rather, it is a statement of God's covenantal identity – which God is holy and that God rejects evil. Most basically, we are not, as it were, to try to subject God to a sort of Turing test. If we do not believe that

God is personal, nothing will compel us to deduce that God is personal – it is a basic belief not a hypothesis.

The notion of perichoretic adequacy provides a rigorous criterion to evaluate the adequacy of various paradigms.

The strength or weakness of a particular paradigm is not an arbitrary matter since there are definite criteria to assess the adequacy of a particular paradigm. The nature of the Trinity is not defined by number but by relation. On the one hand, it is a matter of discerning in the world the relationships which best reflect the character of the Trinity. On the other hand, the fit is one more of coherence than correspondence, since it is the total dependence of creation on its Creator in which its strength consists.

A proper perichoretic understanding of the Trinity grounds the diversity of the whole in the unity and vice-versa. Any satisfactory paradigm needs to show how the Triune communion can operate in concert at any one time without confusion about the operation of each distinct person. As Jenson puts it: 'any work of God is rightly interpreted only as it is construed by the mutual roles of the Triune process'[673]

What the Trinity is about is God's covenantal identity. God's aseity cannot simply be understood in terms of God's independence from the universe, or the universe's dependence on God - because that is to treat God and the universe as two ontological correlatives, which may or may not be related. Rather, God's aseity consists in the first instance on the mutual dependence of the three Persons.

Each of the paradigms receives its distinctive character and strengths by according methodological primacy to one to the persons of the Trinity. For the same reason, the weaknesses of each paradigm derive from their neglect or at best subordination of the other two persons.

The existential paradigm accords primacy to the Father, in that it emphasizes the aspect of calling, which in turn is the ground of our authenticity (which Tillich calls 'theonomy' - as opposed to 'heteronomy' or 'autonomy'). The existential paradigm neglects both the aspect of relationship, since relationship is conceived in one-dimensional terms, mainly with its focus on the subject that is the one who receives the call and is then in turn responsible for responding to it. It is also neglects the dynamic dimension, since the focus is on the kairos, the decisive moment and decision.

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[673] *ST* 2:25. see Gunton ''The Doctrine of Creation: the end of Causality'' in *Theology*

The salvation-historical paradigm accords primacy to the Son in that it is our relationship in and through the Son that we have both the ground of our existence, and our purpose. But this in turn tends to neglect the concentration point that focuses the quest for authenticity, the crisis of our decision to follow Christ. It also tends to play down the dynamic nature of the process, there is a sense, for example in Barth, in which all things have been set before the foundation of the world, and history is only derivatively the playing out of the eternally founded redemptive plan. Choice and history are thus almost epiphenomenal aspects of that eternal order found in Christ.

The temporal paradigm accords primacy to the Spirit in that it through the Spirit that historical process is drawn forward, not least in the revolution of history achieved through the resurrection, as we see in Moltmann and Pannenberg, but perhaps in the most thoroughgoing way in Jenson. The Spirit is the one who makes true futurity possible, not futurum, the extrapolation from the present of potential developments, but venturum, the possibility of the radically new – not the ephemeral and already jaded neos of postmodernism, but the kainos of the world-order which is to come. The weakness of the temporal paradigm is that on the one hand, it tends to reduce the transcendent to embodied reality and in particular to the historical (albeit genuinely historical, namely the real developmental) process. On the other hand, persons and relationships are seen as events, and indeed God is event: the notion of relationships as embodying a present reality as opposed to being the material for future development is not accounted for. If the salvation-historical paradigm tends towards Parmenides, then the temporal paradigm tends towards Heraclitus

When we focus on any on any one of the Persons, we see the other Persons and their relations and working reflected as well, which is why each of the paradigms on their own are so powerful in their own right. However, is in an incomplete account, and if pursued too exclusively, tend to distortion and sterility. The rightness and the full integrity and potential of God; working, can only be appreciated if we understand the Existential paradigm alongside the others which there are the salvation historical paradigm and the temporal one. Drawing on insights of Jenson himself, an alternative path might be to take seriously the 'christological determination of creation' within the framework of Trinitarian relations. Jesus as the 'person of the future' is the one through whom all things were made to towards whom they are heading. The Father and the Spirit, as the givers of the ultimate and the historical, are co-ordinate with the Son. Through the co-ordinate relation, thus, of all three Persons, our understanding of the irreducible transcendence of their joint operation in history from beginning to end is secured.

All three approaches are problematical in that they divide the substantial unity of the Godhead (for example by playing, or ignoring the role of the Son and the Spirit in the past or

creation etc.) and it confuses the persons, in that they involve a Modalistic flattening out of the persons of the Trinity, rather than recognising a distinctive joint action of the persons at every point in time, and phase of salvation-history. This is the criterion for the successful application of Trinitarian insight to the historical process.

Even though the existential, salvation-historical and temporal paradigms are unsatisfactory, they do take us closer to a more Trinitarian understanding of the world. The existential paradigm needs to be complemented in its 'subjectivity' by the 'objectivity' of the salvation-historical paradigm, and the dynamism and eschatological vision of the temporal paradigm. A reformulation of the salvation-historical paradigm along more satisfactorily Trinitarian lines requires that we take fuller account of the diverse actions of the three Persons at each of the stages of the salvation-historical process. The temporal paradigm points to the convergence of the three Persons, although it is not satisfactory to reduce them to past, present and future.

Paradoxically the existential, the salvation-historical and the temporal paradigms all fall down in not taking either the transcendence of the Trinity, or the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth seriously enough. But the possibility of the diversity of the persons in the unity of their action points to another paradigm that may more richly, and less problematically, capture the Trinitarian constitution of the world.

The basis I suggest for drawing together is the covenantal relationship between the three persons. This cuts across the debate between realisms and voluntarism, in that it allows us to understand God's engagement with the world in a way that is consistent with the covenant between the Three Persons, without reducing God to the world. The covenantal paradigm allows us to understand the way the Three Persons act jointly, without losing an appreciation of their distinctive characteristics and operations. With a perichoretic understanding, we can appreciate how these characteristics are mutually enriching, while at the same time, as attributed properly to each of the persons.

(d) The Threefold Covenant of Creation, Redemption and Transformation

The threefold covenant reflects the three great acts of the Persons together in creation, in the redemption, and the transformation of the world. In each of these covenants, a different Person takes the leading role. In creation the Father takes the leading role, in redemption, the Son, and in transformation, the Holy Spirit. However, this does not mean that each Person exclusively with respect to a certain role, or separately from each of the other Persons. The rule that the works of the Person *ad extra* are undivided applies – that the Persons act distinctively does not mean that they act seperately or independently of each

other. In each of the great acts, the other two Persons are involved perichoretically, as we see above. In creation, the Son is the Word of the Father, made effective through the Holy Spirit. In redemption, the Son is appointed as Christ by the Father and anointed by the Holy Spirit. In transformation, the Holy Spirit is send by the Father according to the measure or shape of the Son.

(i) Creation

In creation, the Father takes the lead in the decrees which brings the created order into existence, but the bible tells us that this act is through the Son and is effected by the Holy Spirit, the wind who moves across the face of the primeval waters. The the Father calls all things into existence, through the Son and the effective operation of the Holy Spirit

The Father calls creation into existence; the Son as Logos holds all things together; and the Holy Spirit moves over the face of the waters carrying out the creative process (Gen. 1). God's original action of creation is effected through the work of the Holy Spirit.[674] It is through the word of the Father that all things are called into being. In Romans 4: 17, we read of 'God [in Pauline usage referring distinctively to the Father] who gives life to the dead and calls into being [gives intension to] those things which do not exist.'' The declaration of the Father is, through the joint actions of the Son as the Holy Spirit, also performative.

[the created order not a machine, but God's promised commitment to the world -- story of the Royal Society motivated by seeing the beauty of God's work in the world]

(ii) Redemption

Humanity turned away from God. The archetypical case of this is Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, the paradise (the enclosed garden) prepared for humanity by God.

The **Structure** of creation is itself unaffected by the fall (i.e. no part or element of it is lost – the fall is not ontic but religious), even though the different elements are now comprehensively subject to the misdirection of sin and evil though the distortion and marring of the relationship with the absolute Origin – it is the **Direction** of creation which is turned away from God.

Redemption is made possible for humanity by the Son, in according with the will of the

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[674] Kuyper, *Werk Heiligen Geest*: 55-78; Kuyper, *Holy Spirit*: 1.2; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 Locus de Providentia.

Father, who became a human being in order to die on behalf of humanity: the Son vicariously lays down his life as the sole basis for salvation in agreement with the Father, and the Holy Spirit 'opens the gate of heaven to the elect' (as Calvin puts it).

[Story about how seeing God as loving in an unconditional way - not that love is dependent on our obedience. Luther and his discovery of justification by faith - we are covered by the Father's love for his Son, not through anything we have done]

(iii) Transformation and the Goal of all History

Transformation is effected by the Holy Spirit, both specially, for redeemed humanity, that is on behalf of those to whom, in John Calvin's words, the 'gate of heaven' has been opened by the Holy Spirit, and in general for all creation: the Holy Spirit transforms those who have been justified according to the will of the Father to 'the fullness of the measure of Christ' This culminates in the entire purging of the universe of all evil and the new heaven and earth.

The Holy Spirit restrains the effects of sin through his universal influence over all people. For Kuyper, this insight is expressed in his notion of 'common grace': the notion that the Spirit is not simply working in the hearts of individuals ('particular grace'), but also in the cultural development of creation and human society as a whole.[675] Special grace and common grace presuppose one another – it is through common grace that special grace is possible and vice versa.[676]

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[675] Wolters, 'Dooyeweerd': 7-8; Kuyper, 'Common Grace in Science (1904)' (1998): 441-460; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 Locus de Foedere, §7, pp. 118-130; Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.10.11, pp. 210-217; Dooyeweerd, 'R.K. en A.R.S.' see Jacob Klapwijk, 'Calvin and Neo-Calvinism on Non-Christian Philosophy', *P. R.* 38 (1973): 47-58 on the relation between the formulations of Calvin, Kuyper and Dooyeweerd.

[676] Sytse U. Zuidema, 'Common Grace and Christian Action in Abraham Kuyper' (1972). D.F.M. Strauss argues that there is a problem in the way in which Kuyper sees Christ as Head of 'particular' grace and the 'church', but as such can only have a 'sideways' influence on civil life (Kuyper, *De Gemeene Gratie* (n.d.): 2.276 ('zijdelingschen' …'burgerlijke leven')). According to Kuyper, this influence is confined, firstly, to protecting the freedom and character of the institutional church; secondly, to preventing heathen concepts and ideas from replacing Christian ones in public opinion and institutions; and finally, through the behaviour of the members of the congregation, to the extension of nobler and purer concepts. In short, all that the congregation of Christ can aim is only a '*moral triumph*' – a position that Strauss sees as close to Thomas Aquinas's notion of grace perfecting nature. Strauss contends that Kuyper is working within a grace/nature dichotomy in that he accords the State a natural point of departure, while he accords the church a super-natural point of departure. Certainly, by allocating to the church institution the terrain of particular grace, and to civil society in general the terrain of common grace, Kuyper is tending towards a scholastic dualism that gives the institutional church a distinctive ontological and epistemological status within the wider social order (D.F.M. Strauss, 'The Viability of Kuyper's Idea of Christian Scholarship': 125-126).

[Story of the way the Cappadocian Father's won people over by their care of the sick and suffering - very different from the normal practice in the Roman Empire of the time]

(iv)The Need to Understand the Three Covenants Distinctly

The three covenants should not be confused. For example, we are saved not through works (creational) nor through our sanctification (transformational), but solely through the death of Christ (redemptive). At the same time, these covenants build on one another — the basis for setting right the failure of humanity to respond rightly to the creation mandate, provided by the Son in his role as Logos, is the act of redemption to provide justification of the elect, accomplished by the Son in his role as Christ, for which the final act of consummation, prepared for by the sanctification of the elect and the inaugurated restoration, indeed transformation, of the fallen creation as a whole, is the return of the Son in his office as Lord and Judge.

The different biblical covenants (Adamic, Noachic, Mosaic, Davidic – are all mixtures of all three covenants. It important to distinguish the creational, redemptive and transformational strands in all these). These biblical covenants should not be regarded as successive dispensations, but rather as the progressive revelation of God's purposes.

(e) The Distinctive Work of the Persons in Perichoretic Covenant

Perichoresis implies that the work of God in the world needs to be understood in terms of the action of all three Persons and that their joint activity is multi-dimensional.
This fulfils the requirement that the operation of the Three Persons be distinguished and yet shown to act together. Each opens out and makes possible the work of the others.

(i) The Work of the Father as the Ground of Origin

The Father is the one from whom the ultimacy of reality is evidenced in the created order. Just as within the Trinity, the Father sends the Son, and the Father responds to his call, so in the creation, the Father calls individuals into being and they in turn depend on this calling and direction.

There are some passages in the Old Testament which speak of God as Father, namely: Ex. 4.22; Deut. 1.31; 8.5; 32.6; Isa. 1.2; 63.16; Jer. 3.19; Hos. 11.1; Mal. 1.6. This prepares the way for the New Testament teaching of Jesus of his relationship with the Father, and, through that, the relationship of calling with all those who are incorporated into the Kingdom through Christ.

The distinctive attribute of the Father is that of calling authority. Jesus came to do the will of the Father. In Mark 7 we see that Jesus as teacher came to do the will of the Father – it is this in which his authority consists. This is especially the Johannine vision (John 4:34; 5:30; 6:38-40) but is present in all the Gospel traditions, not least in the formulation of the Lord's Prayer, deeply embedded in the oral legacy common to them all. The struggle of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane is much more complex, and at the heart of the controversy between the monothelitic and duothelitic perspectives, but the latter (upheld as the orthodox view) amounts to the recognition that final authority is located in the person of the Father. Jesus carries out his ministry in the authority of the Father, calling those to whom he goes to respond in the moment of crisis (the *kairos*).

The altar is the kairos-point: the point of encounter with God to which the theophanic encounter with Angel and Glory-Cloud jointly leads. The institution of the central altar in Israel in Deut 12:5 ff. in an important step in the life of Israel's corporate faith-commitment; but initially the altar was erected on Mount Sinai. God's dwelling and the holy mountain are merged in the reference in Exodus 15:13-18. It is significant that the alter on Mount Moriah, designated by god for the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham (Gen 22:2), later became the temple at the site dedicated by David and built upon by Solomon (see 2 Chron 3:1).[677] It was echoed later by the building of an altar at Mount Ebal by Joshua (Joshua 8:30 ff) ''the victorious counterpart answering Abraham's altar as a sign of faith''[678]
Ultimate trustworthiness characterises the operation of the Father. This ultimate trustworthiness gives the world and us its Direction.[679] The Father addresses us, and this does not just give us our character but our very being.[680]

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[677] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 374
[678] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 377
[679] As Wolfhart Pannenberg puts it: ''…the biblical belief in creation demands that we reckon with a reference of all creatures to the biblical God as their creator, even though they cannot know that he is the one from whom their life derives and to whom it returns. In a correspondingly indefinite way, creatures can thus have faith or not, whether in the thankful acceptance of life and confident openness on the one side, or in anxiety about their own ability on the other.'' (*ST* 2:251-2).
[680] As Robert Jenson points out: 'It is not only our salvation that it accomplished by God as address, but our being as such' (ST 2:68).

The Father addresses the son: You are my Beloved Son: it the you or the Thou (to pick up the translation of Martin Buber; *I and Thou*). Naming is the kenosis of the Father, but as with the kenosis of the Son, is vulnerability. Naming also involves joy, the longing for the other and the desire to name it.   But in naming the other, I am creating barriers to the I, since they are other to the extent that they resist the I. And yet, our relation to the Father is one of absolute dependence. We owe not only who we are but that are at all to the call of the Father. This is brought our most dramatically in Genesis 22, which Walter Moberly sees paralleled in the call of the disciples at Caesarea Philipi.[681]

Thus we see that Jesus derives not his being, but his being in authority from the Father – authority is the distinctive attribute of the Father which he conveys perichoretically to the Son.[682]

Jesus sends us out in the authority (ἐξουσία) of the Father (Matthew 28:18).In responding to the call, we are entering the very being of the divine Godhead (the true meaning of θέωσις or divinisation). We are being drawn into the relationships that constitute the being of the three Persons Jenson, discussing Jonathan Edwards' insights, describes this as being ''roped into'' the relationships of the Three.[683]   There is a sense in which we as creatures in our plurality in the world mirror the distinction between the Persons. We must be careful, however, not to step over the boundary between noting the resemblance and claiming, with Pannenberg (following Hegel) that there is a necessary connection between the distinction of the Son from the Father and that of relative creaturely independence. Pannenberg notes:

> ''As creatures that have attained to full independence, we humans must develop and become what we ought to be. In the process, we can all too easily give our independence the form of autonomy in which we can put ourselves in the place of God and his dominion over creation. But without creaturely independence the relation of the Son to the Father cannot manifest itself in the medium of creaturely existence''.[684]

(ii) The Work of the Son as the the Ground of Coherence

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[681] R.W. L Moberley, 'Christ as the Key to Scripture: Genesis 22 re-considered' in *He Swore an Oath: Biblical Themes from Genesis 12-50*, edited by R.S Hess, P.E. Satterthwaite and G.E. Wenham (Tyndale House, Cambridge, 1993): 170-173.

[682] Discuss here T.F. Torrance's explication of the Father's arche in *Christian Doctrine of God*

[683] Robert W. Jenson, 'Theosis', *dialog* 32 (1993): 110.

[684] *ST* 2:264-5.

God does not simply express himself and make himself known in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is truly the eternal Son, revealed to us, distinct from the Father and the Spirit, in his theophanic (or better Christophanic) appearances through the Old Testament, he is revealed in the person of the human Jesus. The human Jesus has no other personality but that of God.[685]

In that we know Jesus, we know the one through whom all things were created and for whom all things are intended. This is put powerfully by Gregory of Nyssa:

> Since, then, the Godhead is very life, and the Only-begotten God is God, and life, and truth, and every conceivable thing that is lofty and Divine, while the creation draws from Him its supply of good, it may hence be evident that if it is in life by partaking of life, it will surely, if it ceases from this participation, cease from life also.[686]

The Son is also, according to John's Gospel (drawing on a strain throughout Scripture, not least the Psalms – ''in your light do we see light'', and ''your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my paths'') both the ''light of God, and ''light of the world''

The Son is the one in whom all things cohere, [687]or, as Gunton puts it: ''the immanent dynamic of meaning which holds time and space together.[688] This is what Jenson call the ''[C]hristological determination of all creation''.[689]

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[685] It is interesting that John Macquarrie has considerable difficulty with this concept, since it cuts across his essentially existential understanding of the hypostatic union. For him, the union of God with the man Jesus is a momentary rather than an eternal relationship. See Maquarrie's *Christology Revisited* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1998) Ch 3 ''Two Traditional Ideas [Anhypostasia and Enhypostasia] Evaluated'', pp. 43-60. For Barth, see Hanson's summary: ''Barth quotes with approval the dictum of a seventeenth-century scholar: *non personam sed naturam assumit,* [He assumes the nature but not the person': the reference is 2, p. 250.] and says that the Word made his own 'this one specific possibility of human existence', i.e. being Mary's son, and he adds: 'So this man was never a reality by himself On p. 164 he says that *anhypostasia* does not mean impersonality. The ancients, he claims, called what we mean by personality *individualitas,* and this they freely admitted Christ had. But it was the personality of the Word, not of any man. He sums it up at 2, p. 348 when he writes: 'There never was a man Jesus as such apart from the eternal reality of the Son of God.' We should note perhaps one other significant passage in Barth. At 2, p. 182 he quotes with approval a sentence from Gregory of Nyssa apropos the virgin birth and the empty tomb: 'If what was narrated of Christ was within the bounds of human nature, where is the divine element?' It is plain that, as far as the historical life of Jesus is concerned, Barth believes that the divine element is manifested in the miraculous, the superhuman.'' [Hanson, *Grace and Truth*, p, 103]
[686] Adv Eunomiusm Bk 8.5. in *NFNF*, Ser. 2, Vol. 5, p. 417.
[687] Col. 1:15; see also 1 Cor. 8:6b and John 1:1 etc
[688] Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many*: 179.

The Second Person participates intimately with the First and Third in the act of creation:

> ''By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and the starry hosts by the breath [or Spirit] of his mouth.''[690]

Aristo of Pella according to Saint Jerome, writes in his 'Dialogue of Jason and Papiscos': *In filio*

> *Infilio deus fecit coelum et terram*[691]

The Son is revealed in the Old Testament as the Angel of the Lord,[692] not least in his wrestling with Jacob,[693] who thereby changes his name to Isra-*el* – the one who strives with God. The Angel expressly affirms his possession of the divine nature by affirming that his ''name'' was ''in'' the Angel (Exodus 23:21) and there is an oscillation of the reference to the Angel and God implying interchangeability (Gen 16:7-14; 21:7; 22:11-16; 31:11-13; 18:15,16).[694]

Moreover, there is a close relationship between the Angel of God and the Glory-Spirit (Exodus 14:19).[695] The place of the Angel's appearance was by virtue of his presence, holy ground, requiring the removal of shoes (Ex 3:5, Josh 5:15). The Angel also has the exclusive prerogative to forgive sin (see Exodus 23:21).[696]
In Exodus 32 and 33, Moses asks that God should be present both as Angel and as Glory Cloud. Kline points out that in the patriarchal age, the mode of theophany was the Angel

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[689] Jenson, ''Creation as a Triune Act'', *Word and World*, 2 (Winter 1982) p. 41; see Ive, ''The God of Faith'', p. 129

[690] Psalm 33:6.

[691] Hawthorne, ''Three in the Holy One of God'', p. 170 a.d. 140.

[692] Genesis 16:7 ff, 16:11; 17:1 f 18:1 ff;19:1; 21:17; 22:11,12,15; 24:7, 40; 31:11f.;; Exodus 3:2,4,6; 23:20-23; 32:34; 33:2,14; Judges 2:1; 5:23; 6:11,12,20; 13:3,9,13,15-23; 2 Samuel 14:17; 2 Kings 1:3,15; 19:35; 1 Chronicles 21:15,18; Ecclesiastes 5:6; Isaiah 37:36; Zechariah 1:11-13; 3:1,2,5,6; 12:8.Justin Martyr, *Apology*, 1:63; *Dialogue*, Chs, 56-60; Novatian, *Concerning the Trinity*, Chs 17, 18; Calvin, Institutes, 1.13.10. See Knight, A Biblical Approach, pp. 25-8.

[693] Novatian, *Concerning the Trinity*, Ch. 2.

[694] Kline, Kingdom Prologue *to the Kingdom*, p. 370. T.F. Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, pp. 69-70..

[695] Kline, Kingdom Prologue, pp. 370-1.

[696] Kline Prologue, p. 370; Images of the Spirit, pp. 70,71

apart from the presence of the Glory-Spirit – sometime such that they could entertain angels unawares. (Heb 13:2; Gen 18:1 ff; 19:1 ff; Judges 13:3 ff – compare Luke 24:15 ff.).[697] We can also point to figures such as the ''arm of the Lord'' which, not least in Isaiah, seems to function as a distinct, divine hypostasis.[698] G.A.F. Knight comments

> '''Mine arm shall judge the people . . . and on my arm shall they trust'' (Isa. 51.5). God's arm acts for God; while being an independent part of God, yet His arm is God, and the whole of God is in His arm, though paradoxically His arm is not the whole of God.''

There is a direct trajectory through from this into the writings of the New Testament and the early church,[699] As Gregory of Nyssa notes:
> ''He Who through Himself reveals the goodness of the Father is called ''Angel'' and ''Word, ''Seal'' and ''Image,'' and all similar titles with the same intention. For, as the ''Angel'' (or ''Messenger'') gives information from some one, even so the Word reveals the thought within, the Seal shows by its own stamp the original mold, and the Image by Itself interprets the beauty of that whereof. It is the image, so that in their signification all these terms are equivalent to one another. For this reason the title, ''Angel'' is placed before that of the ''Self-Existent,'' the Son being termed ''Angel'' as the exponent of His Father's will.''[700]

Central to the understanding of Jesus as the Word is that Jesus is the embodiment of Truth (14:6) which in the biblical understanding is something lived and acted upon, and which gives all things coherence and meaning; ''you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free''. (8:32) Living in Jesus as the Truth is illustrated in diverse ways; water (4:14). bread (6:33), light (8:12), door (10:9).way (14:1-7).

With the title, ''Son of God'' the ascription of divinity is less clear, since the term is used in Jewish literature primarily as an expression of God's free act of grace e.g. ''Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee'' (Psalm 2:7) appears to be a Hebrew adaptation of the

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[697] Kline, Kingdom Prologue, p. 371
[698] Ex 6:6 Ex 32:14 Nu 10:9 Nu 11:23 Nu 31:3 Nu 32:20 De 11:2 Jos 24:20 1Sa 25:26 2Sa 20:6 2Ch 13:12 2Ch 32:8 Ps 98:1 Pr 31:30 Isa 33:2 Isa 40:10 Isa 48:14 Isa 51:9 Isa 53:1 Isa 62:8 Jer 48:25 Jer 49:2 Joe 2:1 Mic 3:11 Joh 12:38
[699] See M. Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma, ET London, 1957 whom Barker comments ''regarded angel terminology , especially as used by Origen, as evidenece of authentic early Christology'' even though he was criticized by later scholars [For discussion, see J.W. Trigg, ''The Angel of Great Counsel:Christ and the Angelic Hierarchy in Origen's Theology' in JTS 42.1 1991, pp.36-7 (Barker, Great Angel, pp. 200-1)
[700] Adv. Eunomiusm, Bk 9.3, in NPNF, Ser 2, Vol 5, p. 465.

Babylonian formula of adoption.[701] One should understand ''Son of God'' primarily as an elective designation: his sonship is linked to, although not dependent on, his coming into the world as Saviour. (3:16; 5:16-44)

This raises the constant question: '' $πόθεν ἐστίν$ '' (7:27-8; 8:14; 9:29-40; 19:9), and therefore of his 'Identity': το $ανως$ with God (1:18; 8:42; 13:3; 16:28; 17:5) as opposed to ''το $κατω$ (3;13; 8:14. 23.[702] In this way, Jesus provides his credentials for the redemptive work which he is to perform: he is the one who can act in history, just as the ''I am'' *(ani hu)* who appeared to Moses at the burning bush: the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob (Ex3:6; Jn 8:58). Similarly, the many references to the glory ($δόξα$) are given the significance of the redemptive presence of God *(kabod)* which accompanies the children of the tabernacle (Ex. 16:7, 10; 24:15-18; 33:20; 34:5-8; 40:40:34-5; Lev. 9:6, 23). This is explicitly referred to in the Prologue of John1:14:

 $ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν, ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός$ and it on the testimony of Moses that Jesus comes with full redemptive authority (5:46). In the Gospel, it is at the hour of supreme sacrifice, which is the act of redemption, that Jesus reveals his full glory (7:39; 12:23-28; 13:31; 17:5) This is the significance of Jesus' climactic appearance to his disciples after his resurrection (20:19-31): the vindication of the efficacy of his redemptive act calls the response of Thomas ''My Lord and my God'' (20:28) The numerous references in the Gospel to his own person, and to God as his Father should be seen in the light of this redemptive mission: it is the dynamic equivalent to the references in the Synoptics to the Kingdom i.e. God coning into and redeeming the world.

In the Old Testament, God's grace was pre-eminently expressed through his election of Israel, and the choice of the Davidic line. Thus there is a very close conceptual relation between the concept of the ''Son of God'' and ''the Messiah'' *(ho christos:* ''the anointed one''); although as Dodd points out, while there is a close identification of the two concepts in the Synoptics, it is not clear whether the title ''Son of God'' was used of the Messiah in pre-Christian Judaism.[703] The designation of Jesus as Son of God and Messiah are important in defining both who he is and what he has come to do. Jesus is the Son of David (7:42), and as such answers alike the expectations of both the unbelieving Jews (7:26ff; 10:24) and believers (1:41; 4:29; 12:12-15; 20:31). But Jesus himself is careful, as in the Synoptics, to tone down the political expectations which the public declaration of the Messiah might arouse, and made use, rather, of the designation ''Son of Man'' - although this too bore

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[701] 442 p. 252.
[702] 442 p. 252.
[703] 444· p.253.

messianic connotations in the light of Daniel 7:13; although, here too, Dodd points out that there is little evidence in pre-Christian Judaism that the term ''Son of Man'' was used as a messianic title.[704] Perhaps the more profound significance of both the messianic acclamations and of Jesus own designation of himself as the Son of Man (3:14; 5:27; 12:34) is his identity and solidarity with his people expressed in his title;'' the Lamb of God'' (1:29,36; 22;1,3) a notion developed most fully in Revelation (5:6-12; 6:16; 7:17; 14:1-5; 17:14), but derived from Genesis and *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, Joseph 19:8). Jesus suffers with and for his people, and in his suffering wins their acclamation and allegiance in the glory that is to come.

It is in the fully human Jesus that the personality of God is known, and the personality of Jesus is none other than the personality of God – and the personality of God is none other than the personality of Jesus. As it is put by Justin Martyr:

> Jesus the Christ is the Son of God and His Apostle, being of old the Word, and appearing sometimes in the form of fire, and sometimes in the likeness of angels; but now, by the will of God, having become man for the human race,...[705]

This is the doctrine of the *enhypostasia* [706] in which it is asserted that in the personality of Jesus of Nazareth we can discern the personality according to whom the universe is properly shaped. As Jenson puts it:

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[704] p. 241

[705] Justin Martyr, *Apology*, 1:63.

[706] A cognate of the terminology developed in the Sixth Century by Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem, and subsequently formalised by Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus. Recent studies have been careful to distinguish between the Origenistic Chalcedonianism of Leontius of Byzantium, with his suggestion of an intermediate hypostasis between the humanity and divinity of ''Jesus Christ'', and the Neo- or Cyrillian (i.e. Alexandrian) Chalcedonianism of Leontius of Jerusalem, who properly developed the concept of the enhypostatic unity of the person of Jesus Christ. See D.B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* (Dumbarton Oaks, Washington D.C.: Harvard Centre for Byzantine Studies, 1970); and Patrick T.R. Gray*, The Defence of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979). The most satisfactory statement is found in Leontius of Jerusalem (not Leontius of Byzantium, whose statement of the problem is unsatisfactory). See Adversus Nestorianos, Bk 2, Ch. 2 (Migne PG, 1560, B):'Ει τοινυν, εστι λεγειν, φαμεν, τρεις υποστασεις ενουσιος εν μια ουσια. ενδεχηεται δηλονται και φ υσεις λεγειν ενυποστατους δυο εν μια υποστασει και ουτως ουδε φυσιν ανυποστατον φαμεν, ουδε δυο υποστασει τας δυο φυσεις δογματιζομεν ('If, then, we say, it is said three Persons 'enousia' in one 'ousia' it surely needs to be accepted also that one should speak of two enhypostatic natures in one hypostasis and thus we do not speak of an anhypostatic nature or teach about two hypostases for the two natures.'). It is Jesus' relationship with Mary that his humanity consists (or subsists) - it is not a matter of taking on a generalised human nature (anhypostatos) or somehow being joined with a human correlate (idiohypostos) but is enhypostatic through his flesh and blood relationship with Mary as her son, and so through her to the rest of the

‘‘nature does not subsist apart from [his] personality’’‘‘.[707]

his is the meaning of the reality of Jesus as the Word of God, as Jenson notes, he is not the word in isolation as himself but

> ‘‘he is the content of the proclamation whose power is the Spirit and whose source is the Father.‘‘[708]

The divine substantiality of the Son is identified in the person of Jesus Christ, the One who, with the Father and the Spirit, created the world, and in whom all things cohere, as well as being, as Jenson emphasises, the man of the future. There is danger in talking of the Son's ‘‘substantiality’’ of introducing (as we have seen Jenson accuses Pannenberg of doing) an atemporal Correlate (along ‘‘Antiochene‘‘ lines) of Jesus of Nazareth. Put another way, is it

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human race. The disputes between Cyril and Nestorius, on the one hand; and between Aquinas and Duns Scotus. On the other are both about false problems. Against both the an-hypostatic view of Cyril and the idio-hypostatic view of 'Nestorius', is the position set out by Leontius of Jerusalem, and subsequently formalised by Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus. Recent studies have been careful to distinguish between the Origenistic Chalcedonianism of Leontius of Byzantium, with his suggestion of an intermediate hypostasis between the humanity and divinity of 'Jesus Christ', and the Neo- or Cyrillian (i.e. Alexandrian) Chalcedonianism of Leontius of Jerusalem, who properly developed the concept of the enhypostatic unity of the person of Jesus Christ. See D.B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* (Dumbarton Oaks, Washington D.C.: Harvard Centre for Byzantine Studies, 1970); and Patrick T.R. Gray, *The Defence of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979). Aquinas is right to insist on the universality of Jesus as Lord, but Scotus is right to stress his haecceity in and through Mary (without going along with Scotus's attempt to relocate Mary to a pre-lapsarian state). Jenson himself refers to the doctrine of the *enhvpostasia* in passing: ‘‘...the man Jesus in 'enhypostatic', hypostasized in the Logos;...The hypostatic reality of the man Jesus becomes moreover an actual phenomenon of his existence‘‘ (Robert W. Jenson, 'An Attempt to Think about Mary', *dialog* 31 (1992), p. 263). He also gives the classical Lutheran statement (of what is the *enhvpostasia): die hypostasis des Wortes ist jetzt auch die hypostasis eines Menschen* [the hypostasis of the Word is now also the hypostatis of a human being]‘‘ (‘‘Aspekte Christologie‘‘, p. 117). He does not, however, develop this systematically with regard to creation. It not a matter of taking on a generalised human nature (anhypostatos) or somehow being joined with a human correlate (idiohypostos) but is enhypostatic through his flesh and blood relationship with Mary as her son, and so through her to the rest of the human race. This argues against the traditional Protestant scholastic practice of stating the formula in terms of the anhypostatos/enhypostatos or anhypostasia/enhypostasia, which of course was taking up by Karl Barth in a rather eccentric way [CD I/2, p. 163] and by T.F. Torrance (‘‘The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church‘‘ in the *Scottish Journal of Theology* 7/3 (1954), p. 249 ff.). This way of stating it has been critiqued by F LeRon Shults in his *Reforming Theological Anthropology* (Eerdmans, 2003, pp.140-162). Shult's article focusses on Leontius of Byzantium rather than Leontius of Jerusalem, but it helps to clear the ground.

[707] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' : 172; Ive, ‘‘God of Faith‘‘, p. 130.
[708] *ST*, 1:171.

possible to hold a conception of Jesus ''deep in the flesh'' together with that of the substantiality of the Son of God? The answer to this question requires a rereading in temporal terms of the classical theological concept of enhypostasia.[691] The doctrine of the *enhypostasia* read in the light of the Resurrection (rather than as an abstract solution to the problem of the two natures) enables an account to be given of the distinctive personhood and, indeed, personality of the Son in the person of Jesus of Nazareth without the need to resort to such (standard religious) devices as the $Λόγος\ ἄσαρκος..$. We begin with our knowledge of the risen Jesus, the particular and ultimately successful embodiment of crucified love; and from there struggle to discern the character of the universe. The Word known (intentionally and extensionally) in the resurrection of the man, Jesus of Nazareth, is that same Word through whom all things are created, so that all creation also bears the imprint of his personality. As Jenson points out in his account of the critique of Logos theology, in emphasising the continuity of Christ with creation there is the danger of Subordinationism. In order to avoid this danger, the *enhypostasia* of Jesus needs to be affirmed in the context of the perichoretic joint action of the persons of the Trinity in such a way that the Resurrection, and indeed history as a whole, is seen as the operation of each of the three Persons of the Trinity operating distinctly but as one. To be faithful to Jenson's method, it needs to be made clear that, unlike classical theology (in this case, in its Neo-Chalcedonian formulation), this is not the abstract solution to the problem of how the distinct human and divine natures of Jesus Christ are united in one person,[709] but rather the fact of God's identification of himself (intentionally and extensionally), through the act of the Resurrection, in the eminently human person of Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus' divinity is not an ''extra'', but is intrinsic to who he is; and it is precisely in his humanity that his divinity is known and consists.[693]

The Resurrection affirms above all that ''Jesus is Lord'': that he is divinely sovereign over the created order, and that the created order has its true character in him despite its (ethical but not ontological) declension from that character. It distinguishes Jesus from the created order, since in it he has overcome the process of death and disintegration to which the created order has been subjected. At the same time, it identifies him entirely with it. Jesus is thus at once identified ''deep in the flesh'' as human; and, uniquely, at the same time participant by right in the divinely transcendent conversation which is always ahead of us. The divinity of Jesus is, as Jenson puts it, an ''outcome'' in that it completes the Triune identification of who and that he is: one with the Father from whom he receives his intension as God, and one with the Spirit, by whose supreme act his divinity is denoted. If Jesus had

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[709] T.F. Torrance observes that the classical doctrine of the hypostatic union ''was formulated in almost entire abstraction from the historical life and work of Jesus Christ from His birth to His resurrection'' (''The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church'' in *The Scottish Journal of Theology (*1954), p. 246).

died and had not risen, the fact of his divinity would have been negated; so that his divinity, and therefore the divinity of God the Trinity was at risk. The Resurrection is thus not merely a *revelation* of the divinity of Jesus (as an analogical understanding of the Christ-event might lead us to suppose) nor is it simply a discovery of previously unrealised potential (as an understanding of the Christ-event as process might suggest); but, rather, in the sense that it involves God in real risk it constitutes it, since (as Jenson shows throughout his writings) the god of faith is not only to be named but to be counted on. The Resurrection demonstrates, therefore, that the character of Jesus is identical with the character of God, and *vice versa.* This conclusion is arrived at not by positing an atemporal Correlate with the human Jesus, but, as Jenson argues, through recognition of the ''scandalous particularity'' and ''offensive actuality''' of the crucified and risen Jesus. The significance of Jesus identified thus in rigorously temporal terms cannot be limited, as promise, to the expectation of his final return (which an austere and selective reading of Jenson might lead one to conclude). This would be to empty the fact of divinity so established of its universal consequence for us now. A broader conclusion one might argue for on that basis of Jenson's writing is that the fact of the divinity of Jesus established in the historical event of the Resurrection must imply a universal continuity of his divine identity. Although in the sense discussed above Jesus' divinity is the outcome of the Resurrection, as divine his identity is established for all history prior and subsequent to the Resurrection..

Pannenberg contends that just as the Son in his self-distinction from the Father is the ontic basis for the creaturely existence of Jesus, so he is also the ontic basis for all creaturely existence.[710] He explains further:

> In his awareness of being a mere human, a creature in his self-distinction from the Father, Jesus recognised the Father as the one God over against himself. In so doing he gave validity to the independent existence of other creatures alongside himself.''[711]

As he notes, following Barth:

> ''By distinguishing the Father from himself as the one God, the Son certainly moved out of the unity of the deity and became man. But in so doing, he actively expressed his divine essence of Son. The self-emptying of the Pre-existent is not a surrender or negation of his deity as the Son. It is its activation.[712]

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[710] *ST*, 2:23-4.

[711] *ST*, 2:29.

[712] *ST* 2:377 ref. Barth *CD* IV/1, 129 f., 177 ff., 179 ff.

He therefore sees creation and its component elements as structured by the Son:

> ''… they are willed and affirmed by the Father in his self-distinction from the Son, by which the also accepts the Son in his distinction. The Father wills and accepts them as an expression of the overflowing of the divine love with which the Father loves the Son.[713]

Pannenberg is in danger of loading too much on the Logos. From the self-distinction of the Son from the Father, he argues that the Logos is

> ''the generative principle of all the finite reality that involves the distinction of one thing from the other ...[and] the origin of each individual creature in is distinctiveness and our underlining] of the order of relations between the creatures''.[714]

It may be suggested that the operation of these three aspects are better understood as the three dimensions of the Triune action, rather than pertaining solely to the Logos. Pannenberg himself qualifies his position by stating:

> ''The Son's fellowship with the Father is always mediated by the Spirit''.

In the final instance, Pannenberg sees the process as a dialectical unfolding, as he puts it:

> ''[The Spirit] has to overcome the rifts that come as creaturely existence makes itself independent'' [715]

Although methodologically, this derives from the temporal paradigm, and to bracket in one description the relation of the Son to the Father with that of the creation to God raises the charge of historical reductionism (which, as we have seen, Pannenberg himself levels against Hegel;[716] nevertheless, this is an insight into the Christological determination of creation which needs to be preserved and developed.

The Son is, as Jenson put it: the

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[713] *ST,* 2:87.
[714] *ST,* 2:62
[715] *ST,* 2:84.
[716] *ST,* 2:19, 28. See above.

''mediator of creation …between the Father originating and the Spirit liberating, …Were there not the crucified and risen incarnate Son, then - all else impossibly remaining the same - the Spirit's word would be the infamous 'Let go and let be' and the Father's would be 'That is mine'….''[717] [He continues]: ''As the Father's love of the Son as other than himself is the possibility of all otherness from God, and so of creation, so the Son's acceptance of being other than God is the actual mediator of that possibility''.[718]

Truth is the characteristic of the Son. Jesus says ''I am the Way (i.e. the Torah, the law of God), the Truth, and the Life. This needs to be understood in the context of the Hebrew notion of *emeth,* holding on to what is in relation rather than the Greek concept of truth as unchanging and impassible.[719] In Hebrew thought there is an identification of the truth of God and his active word.[720] However, in order to avoid the fall into Arianism, it is important, following Athanasius, to make the crucial distinction between the being of God and his will.[721] In creating the world of the world through Son, God does not thereby make the world part of his being. Moreover, as Zizioulas points out, in making the move, Athanasius is re-defining ''being'' as a relational concept – as the communion of the Son with the Father – and by extension, with the Spirit.[722] Zizioulas also notes that for Maximus Confessor the Logos is

''ὑπὲρ ἀλήθειαν because there exists nothing which may be examined beside Him as compared with Him, whereas the 'truth' of which we have experience is opposed to falsehood''[723]

It is expressed in structural terms. Structures are the ligaments of life: those things that bind all things together. In Christ, all things hang together.[724]

Robert Jenson, drawing on an insight of Jonathan Edwards, points out that this is:

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[717] *ST* , 2:27.
[718] *ST*, 2:27..
[719] Greene, ''Pannenberg'', p. 304.
[720] Pannenberg, *GST*2, p. 232' reference in Greene, p. 305. The significance of Amen as the designation of Christ cf. J.S. Clements , Hastings D.C.G, I, 51 a and J. Massie Hastings' D.B. I, 81 a [ref in B.B. Warfield, ''The Lord of Glory'', Evangelical Press, London, 1974, p. 296, n. 14,
[721] *Contra Arianos* I:33, II:2. See G. Florovsky, ''The Concept of Creation in St Athanasius'' in *Studia Patristica* IV (ed. F.L Cross, 1962), pp. 36-37. Quoted I Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, p. 83.
[722] *Being as Communion*, p. 84.
[723] Maximus, *Amb.* in
[724] Col. 1:17

Precisely the work of *redemption* [Jenson's italics], just as it occurs in the actual event of Christ, is the purpose of creation.[725]

This is made possible by the Triunity of God where those created as respondents in that communion can also be personal.[726] This community with one another gives space as the ''*dramatic location*'' [Jenson's emphasis] of the persons of the Trinity.[727] The Incarnation is thereby not simply a remedy but also the provision of the very conditions for participation in the divine community, according to God's intention.[728] It is through the ''dramatic coherence'' of the life of the incarnate Son that our self-identity, as human beings, is possible.[729]

This is in turn possible only through the only true choice and determination: that of the Triune God.[730] Drawing on an insight of Jonathan Edwards: ''precisely the work of *redemption* [Jenson's italics], just as it occurs in the actual event of Christ, is the purpose of creation''.[731] This is made possible by the Triunity of God where those created as respondents in that communion can also be personal.[732] This community with one another gives space as the ''*dramatic location*'' [Jenson's emphasis] of the persons of the Trinity.[733] The Incarnation is thereby not simply a remedy but also the provision of the very conditions for participation in the divine community, according to God's intention.[734] It is through the ''dramatic coherence'' of the life of the incarnate Son that our self-identity, as human beings, is possible.[735]

We may hold with Pannenberg, and Jenson that the Incarnation is in turn retrospectively dependent on the Resurrection:[736]

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[725] ST 2:20
[726] ST2:96.
[727] ST 2:98.
[728] ST 2:19
[729] [find missing ref].
[730] *ST* 2:107.
[731] *ST* 2:20.
[732] *ST* 2:96.
[733] *ST* 2:98.
[734] *ST* 1:72; 2:19.
[735] *ST* 2:319.
[736] Ive, p.130.

The Resurrection was the *executing* [Jenson's italics] of the Triune God's unity with himself.[737]

Jenson, like Barth, sees human life as bounded necessarily by death. Death is not something introduced adventitiously through sin, but it is intrinsic to the human condition.[738] Jesus, by dying, accepts these conditions, and is thus truly human, and the Resurrection does not bypass this acceptance, but rather raises it to the centre of all reality: that at the heart of all things is the One who has died and is now risen:[739]

If there is such a God as the gospel presents, he is invested in historical particularity.[740]

The risen Jesus is thus seen to share the very identity of God himself.[741]

The identity of God in the person of the risen Jesus can be read both backwards and forwards from the event of the Resurrection. It can be read back to the act of creation.[742] The defining event, above all, is the deliverance of the people of Israel from slavery in Egypt. The same God redeems Israel as the One by whose power Jesus is raised from the dead.[743] There is a chain-connectedness in the prophetic witness which runs forward from the Exodus to that of the Christ-event itself culminating in the Resurrection:[744]

…the Son appears as a narrative pattern of Israel's created human story before he can appear as an individual Israelite within that story.[745]

The Resurrection is in turn brought forward to us by the witness of the apostles.[746] Scriptural witness, which is what this is, is not therefore, *pace* Bultmann, simply to be understood as an existential appeal.[747] It is rooted in God's concrete dealings with an historically particular

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[737] *Unbaptized God: the Basic Flaw in Ecumenical Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), p. 140. See Ive, p. 55.
[738] *ST* 2: 75, 326-31.
[739] *ST* 1: 219.
[740] *ST* 2: 117.
[741] *ST* 1:47; 2:70-1, 132; Ive, p. 54.
[742] *ST* 2:14, 68, 91.
[743] *ST* 1:42-4, 49; Ive, pp. 49-51.
[744] *ST* 1:63-71; *ST* 2: 69-72; Ive, pp. 54-5.
[745] *ST* 1:141.
[746] Ive, pp. 89-91.
[747] *ST* 1:167-71; 2: 309-11.

people in the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament, and the historical events which surround the Resurrection of Jesus[748] and the community to which these give rise in the New Testament.[749]

The three covenants can also be seen in the threefold character of the Son's work as Christ, the Second Adam. As Second Adam, he is first of all the example of what created humanity was created to be. This is his prophetic role calling fallen humanity back to God's creatorly intention for humanity. 'Second Adam' also refers to his substitutionary role, as the one who died in Adam's place, that is on behalf of the elect — this is his priestly/sacrificial role, both High Priest and Lamb, 'Second Adam' finally refers to his eschatological role — the human being of the future, the first fruits of the dead and the prototype and king and of the transformed and restored creation. In broader terms, the Son is Word (through whom all things were created), Christ (in whom alone is redemption), and Lord (who alone has the authority from the Father and power from the Holy Spirit over all areas of the transformation of the created order). Office is a function of the Person (the Son in relation to the Father and the Holy Spirit) not the nature. (in contrast to, say, his role as Logos which is then seen purely as a function of his divinity). The Son plays an intermediate role: in the first instance between the Father as Origin and fallen humanity, and then as head of redeemed humanity, bringing humanity – and with humanity the whole of the cosmos – back to the Father.[750]

In the light of these broad considerations, I shall now look at the work of the Son in terms of the threefold covenant of creation, redemption and transformation.

a. The Son as Logos – His Creative Work 'in the Beginning'

The role of the Son as Logos is as the one who shares eternity with the Father and Holy Spirit, whose personality is still to be incarnate.[751] The Logos in John 1.1 is the *speech* of

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[748] Although he differs from Pannenberg in not seeing the Resurrection as susceptible to straightforward historical investigation and empirical proof because the very discipline of historical research is too secularised for this to be possible (Ive, p. 83).

[749] Ive, pp. 56-7.

[750] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.471-473, 491; 2.30-32, 222-223, 227-237, 267-268, 297-300, 347-348, 491-497; 3.448-449, 557; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.60-61 (not in *W.d.W.*), 174-175 (not in *W.d.W.*), 506-507, 522; 2.32-34, 294-5, 298-300, 337, 363-364, 418, 560-564; 3.506-507, 633.

[751] This is the doctrine of the *enhypostasia* – a cognate of the terminology developed in the Sixth Century by Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem, and subsequently formalised by Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus. Recent studies have been careful to distinguish between the Origenist Chalcedonianism of Leontius of Byzantium, with his suggestion of an intermediate hypostasis between the humanity and divinity of 'Jesus Christ', and the Neo- or Cyrillian (i.e. Alexandrian) Chalcedonianism of Leontius of Jerusalem, who properly developed the concept of the enhypostasic unity of the person of Jesus Christ. See D.B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* (Dumbarton Oaks, Washington D.C.: Harvard Centre for

God, not simply an abstract idea,[752] and, drawing on Jonathan Edwards,[753] it is he who, in the act of creation, is the inner-Triune Communication who himself communicates.[754]

The Son is the one in whom all things cohere, [755]or, as Colin Gunton puts it: 'the immanent dynamic of meaning which holds time and space together.[756] The Second Person participates intimately with the First and Third Persons in the act of creation:

> By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and the starry hosts by the breath [or Spirit] of his mouth.[757]

The Son is also, according to John's Gospel (drawing on a strain throughout Scripture, not least the Psalms – 'in your light do we see light' (Psalm 36:9), and 'your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my paths' (Psalm 119:105) both the 'light of God, and 'light of the world'.

There is a sense that it is in the yet unborn Jesus of Nazareth that all things hold together, and it is as this proleptic human being that the Son as Logos walks with Adam and Eve and is revealed in and through history of God's Covenant in human form as the Angel (i.e. Messenger) of the Lord..[758] In that we know Jesus, we know the one through whom all things were created and for whom all things are intended.

b. The Son as Christ – His Redemptive Work on the Cross

The Son's role as Christ (Messiah – the anointed one) should not be assimilated to his humanity alone. It is as fully divine and fully human, and only so, that human salvation is achieved: it is only as God that Jesus can save, but it only as he assumes our full humanity

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Byzantine Studies, 1970); and Patrick T.R. Gray, *The Defence of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979).

[752] *S.T.*, 1:97; *S.T.* 2:6-8.

[753] *Miscellanies*, 1004.

[754] *S.T.* 2: 19.

[755] Col. 1:15; see also 1 Cor. 8:6b and John 1:1 etc

[756] Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many* 179. This is what Robert Jenson call the '[C]hristological determination of all creation' (Jenson, 'Creation as a Triune Act' 41; see Ive, 'God of Faith' p. 129).

[757] Psalm 33:6.

[758] Genesis 16:7 ff, 16:11; 17:1 f 18:1 ff;19:1; 21:17; 22:11,12,15; 24:7, 40; 31:11f.;; Exodus 3:2,4,6; 23:20-23; 32:34; 33:2,14; Judges 2:1; 5:23; 6:11,12,20; 13:3,9,13,15-23; 2 Samuel 14:17; 2 Kings 1:3,15; 19:35; 1 Chronicles 21:15,18; Ecclesiastes 5:6; Isaiah 37:36; Zechariah 1:11-13; 3:1,2,5,6; 12:8. Knight, A Biblical Approach 25-8.

that his self-sacrifice can be truly effective for us – true to the dictum of Gregory of Nazianzus that that which he has not assumed is not healed.[759]

The Father sends the Son to be our redeemer, and the Holy Spirit brings about the incarnation of the Son as a human being, Jesus of Nazareth (Lk 1:35)

At Jesus' baptism, the Father declared the Jesus to be the one in whom he is well-pleased and the Holy Spirit descends upon Jesus in the form of a dove, equipping him for his ministry (Mt 3:16-7; Mk 1:10-11; Lk 3:21-22; Jn 1:32-33)

In his transfiguration, the voice of the Father borne by the Holy Spirit declared Jesus to be his beloved Son (Mt 17:5; Mk 9:7; Lk 9:34-35; 2 Pet 1:17)

In Gethsemane and then Golgotha, Jesus prayed to the Father that the Father's will be done, and was encouraged by the Holy Spirit in the face of death (Mt 26:42; Mk 14:36; Lk 22:42-43; Jn 17).

In his death, Jesus prophetically showed the Father's love (Jn 3:16-21); as priest yielded up his life as the sole and perfect sacrifice for our sins (Rom 3:25; Tit 2:14; Heb. 9:14), and through the Holy Spirit accomplishesd his kingly victory over the power of sin and death (Rev. 12:10-12). Thus the office of the Son as Redeemer/Christ is itself threefold, reflecting the threefold offices of the Messianic work as prophet, priest and king, as follows:

i Prophet – looking back

As prophet Jesus looks back to his role as Logos, bearing the authority of the Father, calling his hearers to their creational responsibilities before the Father. It is also an exemplary role in that he shows his hearers what it means to fulfil their creational responsibilities – but more than that, he embodies the self-giving love of the Father in the surrender of his Son to human degradation and judicial murder that he demonstrates in his person what it is for the Father to love his creation, now fallen (John 3.16).

Christ himself developed this concept in his use of the expression 'son of man'. It is an anointing which Christ shares with his people. It is Christ bringing to us, in his person and example, the call to return in obedience to the Father, exemplified supremely in Jesus' self-giving in the Garden of Gethsemane. This is brought out in Philippians 2, where Christ is seen as emptying himself in obedience to the Father's will; and also And also in Hebrews 5:8-9.

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[759] Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 51, to Cledonius (First epistle against Apollinarius).

For Peter Abelard (1079-1142), it was an attempt to take the focus away from the problem of human sin. The questioning by Abelard of the necessity for Christ's death was, however, taken up after the Enlightenment in the form of the exemplary theory of the atonement. Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) argued that Christ's unmerited sufferings 'completely demonstrated his fellowship with sinful humanity, for the purpose of moving them to repentance'[760] stress that the point of Christ's death- i.e. the awakening emphasis on our love for God.[761] In a more attenuated way, it is also shown in Hastings Rashdall's understanding of the exemplarist theory of the atonement,[762] in which Jesus is seen as provided us with a model of obedience, which we are to follow and copy.[763]

The relation of the Father to the Son is one of vulnerability. In giving the Son Father is exposing himself to loss and, vicariously to rejection. The kenosis of the Son is of the kenosis of the Father and the Spirit, but paradoxically, as John; Gospel makes clear, it is also their glorification. Jürgen Moltmann demonstrates the in his book, *The Crucified God*.[764]

In one sense we participate with Christ in his death, as we experience its redeeming benefits 'one died for all, therefore all have died' (II Cor. 5:14b). Here Christ is seen rather as the supreme prophet in the radical incarnational sense: the one who shows the ultimate solidarity with his people to the extent of dying for them in order to bring them back to God. In this sense he is the fulfilment of Moses' prophecy that 'the Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet like me from among your own brothers' (Deut. 18:15). Above all, we have the figure of the suffering servant of Isaiah (42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-9; 52:13-53:12).

ii. Priest – once for all

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[760] A. Ritschl, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, (Edinburgh. 1900, German original 1874); quoted in Hughes, *True Image* 356.

[761] Philip Hughes, True Image 350-1. His argument appears in his Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, which most students of theology know only in abbreviated form, in Eugene R. Fairweather, ed.., A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham (Library of Christian Classics, vol. 10; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press. 1956), 276-87; Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet* 247.

[762] McGrath ('The Moral Theology of the Atonement' 205, n. 4) points out that the term 'atonement' was introduced by Tyndale, apparently as an equivalent to *reconciliation* (ref R.E. Latham, *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources* (London, British Academy, 1973) 8-9. McGrath comments: 'Perhaps through the Authorized Version's translation of Romans 5:11 … the phrase came to have an absolute sense, meaning 'the benefits of Christ''.

[763] H. Rashdall, 'Abelard's Doctrine of the Atonement', *The Expositor* h[e] series, 8 (1893) 137-50 reprinted in *Doctrine and Development*, *University Sermons* (London: Methuen, 1898); *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology, being the Bampton Lectures for 1915* (London, Macmillan, 1920). For these references and a thorough critique, see Alister McGrath, 'The Moral Theory of the Atonement: An Historical and Theological Critique', *Scottish Journal of Theology* Vol 38 205-220.

[764] SCM Press; New edition edition (1 Jun 2001).

As priest, Jesus is most properly self-giving, laying down his innocent life for the lives of sinful humanity. This understanding is repeated in numerous places elsewhere (Mt. 26:28; Mk. 14:24; Jn. 1:29; Rom. 4:25; I Cor. Eph. 5:2; Heb. 1:3; I Pet. 1:19; 2:24; I John 2:2). This is the work of Christ in his own person in the authority of the Father and with the priestly anointing of the Holy Spirit. It is work which is uniquely Christ's, which we cannot share. It is on the basis of this work alone that we stand before God at the final judgment. It needs to be sharply distinguished from ensuing sanctification (or indeed prevenient grace) and seen entirely on its own terms. It is imputed rightness – a transferred status before God, not imparted or infused righteousness – this latter is a process which does not contribute anything at all to our status as justified sinners before God, but follows from our justification, both now and anticipated Christ exercises this priestly role until the eschaton in his advocacy and intercession for those who believe in him, and trust his perfect sacrifice made once for all.[765]

iii.   King – looking forward

As king Jesus was filled with the power of the Holy Spirit, from his conception, growth in wisdom (a gift of the Spirit), baptism, ministry and miracles, kingly death, resurrection to new life, ascension to the right hand of the Father and rule. This is what has traditionally been called his role as 'Christus Victor' (Christ the Victor). But this follows on from his role first as prophet than as priest – it is not to be seen as an alternative or replacement for those other roles.

In the Bible, there is the picture of the self-emptying victor; the one who has purchased our deliverence with his own death, and in the process destroyed death itself (I Cor. 15:55-57). Different analogies can be used, from the picture of the divine warrior - the messianic warrior of Isaiah, echoed in Ephesians, who takes captivity captive through the power of the Spirit, and by whom we as his people are equipped with the 'panoply' (the full amour) of the Spirit (as described in Ephesians 6)

This is the kingship of Christ, which is linked to his supreme humiliation (Jn. 12:32f. Phil. 2:6-10; Rev. 5;11-14)). In doing this, he gave himself as a ransom-substitute for the moral consequence of the sins of his people (Mk. 10:45; Rom. 5:6-6:18; Col. 2:14; I Tim. 2:6; Rev. 5:6-10). He thus wins the right to avenge himself on those who do not avail themselves of his ransoming provision (Rev. 6:16); but for those whom he has redeemed, he will be a caring shepherd and conquering king (Rev. 7:17: 14:1-5; 17:14). The larger context of this

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[765] Calvin, Institutes 2.15.6; Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet* 68-9.

redeeming work is the cosmic struggle in which Christ is engaged against the corporate effects of evil, rooted in humanity as corporate sinfulness (Jn. 8:34; Rom. 6:23; 7:14,24; I Cor. 6:19-20; 22-23; Eph.l:7), and expressed in cultural terms in the idolatry of Babylon (Rev. 17-18) – a struggle which culminates in the victory of Christ as King of Kings and Lord of Lords (Rev. 19).

This position has also been developed most recently by Gustave Aulén in his *Christus Victor*.[766] Aulén understands the act as a decisive turning point in the war: a now but not yet of the final deliverance still to come.[767]

c. The Son as Lord – His Work as Judge of all the Earth

Jesus alone is the one who can create true revolution, since he lived to the full within the constraints of the established structures and freely gave his life without denying the historical human reality which they constituted.[768]
Christ, through the will of the Father and the power of the Holy Spirit, took on human nature fully, in all its aspects, but through that embrace, we are presented with the very personality of God. This is the insight won for in the struggles about the definition of the person and natures of Christ before and after the Council of Chalcedon. Jesus is one person. In the incarnation, God did not take into his being a separate human person (as we see most notoriously in the novel and film, the *Last Temptation of Christ*), nor do we have a hybrid of God and man, with some of the faculties of Jesus belonging to his divinity, and others to his humanity (as we have in Apollinarianism) but rather the person of the Son takes on humanity in all its fullness, but in the person of Jesus we see the personality of God himself (this is the doctrine of the enhypostasia, which modern scholarship has shown was articulated by Leontius of Jerusalem (not Byzantium)[769]. It is in this Christ, that all things take their coherence (Col 1:17).
We can know Jesus, not as an abstract, a-temporal being, but as an historical, flesh and blood person, attested to us by the apostolic witness. This is not pure abstract projection (although this can be attempted, especially if the Christ of Faith is detached from the Jesus of History), but whatever we may think of Jesus, we cannot simply force him into a particular grid,

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[766] See above.
[767] Gustaf Aulén, *Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement* (1961); F. W. Dillistone, *The Christian Understanding of Atonement* (1968); Colin E. Gunton, *The Actuality of the Atonement* (1988) 81.
[768] Jenson, 'Triune God' 183 (not in Jenson, *T.I.*). See 'Futurist Option' 21.
[769] See Patrick T. R. Gray, *The defense of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)* (1973).

because of that irreducible historical kernel. The Nazis may attempt to project their ideal onto to Jesus as the Aryan Christ, but that could not escape the for them uncomfortable fact that Jesus was a Jew. Less extremely, we cannot simply try to domesticate Jesus as a Western liberal or a liberationist hero. The historical Jesus will also break out of any mould into which we may try to force of Jesus.

This is confirmed for us by the Resurrection of Jesus. The statement 'Jesus is risen' is not about a generalised religious stance, but in the first instance concerns the empty tomb and the appearances of the fully embodied Jesus to the disciples (women and men, in that order). This in turn has implications for their belief.   The case in point is Paul, who moves from a world-view premised on the non-Resurrection of Jesus (and therefore that the disciples are both untrustworthy and blasphemous and to be persecuted), to one premised on his resurrection. The claim, 'Jesus is risen' is thus a one with implications for the whole of life, because Paul goes on to claim (in Colossians 1.15) that Christ (i.e. Jesus of Nazareth) is the one in whom all things hold together. That is: the flesh and blood, historically identified human being, Jesus of Nazareth, is also the Son and God and the basis of the ontic coherence of all things.

The risen Jesus is thus the ultimate revolutionary, the anticipation of whom makes bearable, and at the same time gives meaning to, the unsatisfactory nature and pathos of all penultimate revolutions.[770]

In Jesus' resurrection, the Father raised Jesus to life through the power of the Holy Spirit (Rom 1:4, 8:2, 11; Eph. 1:20; Phil. 3:10; 2 Cor. 4:14; 1 Pet 1:21; 3:18). In his ascension,he was raised as Lord to the right hand of the Father by the power of the Holy Spirit (1 Pet 3:22).

As his people in the middle time of God's Kingdom (now and not yet), we are called to make disciples and to baptise all peoples in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit (Mt 28:19; Tit 3:4-7; Rev 22:17)

In his return as judge, Jesus comes in the authority of the Father, 'with the heavenly angels' – the sign of the power and presence of the Holy Spirit (Lk 9:26, 12:9; 1 Tim 5:21; Tit 2:13; Jude 14).

Just as the Son is the Creator and Redeemer, so he is also the Lord and Judge.

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[770] Robert W. Jenson, 'Aspekte der Christologie in einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft' (1971) 116; Jenson, *Story & Promise*   67-70.

(iii) The Work of the Holy Spirit as the Ground of Providence

The distinctive charateristic of the work of the Holy Spirit is that of empowerment (δύναμις)).

The figure of the Spirit is mentioned in the Old Testament in personal terms and being grieved (Isa 63:10), guiding people (Ps 143:10), instructing them (Neh. 9:20), causing them to rest (Isa 63:14), rushing upon them (Judges 14:6; 15:14; 1 Sam 11:6).

Meredith Kline describes two ways in which the Spirit does this as a covenantal agent. The first is in Genesis 1:2 where the Spirit overarches the ''deep-and-darkness'' (''*tohu we bohu*'') as the a sign (mirrored later in the rainbow of Genesis 9:12 ff.) This, Kline suggests, is to be identified with the Glory-cloud epiphany seen at the ratification of the old covenant at Sinai, which represents God standing as cloud-pillar in witness of his covenant with Israel; and again in the New Testament book of Revelation, where the Glory-Spirit is pictured as enveloping the incarnate Son

> ''his hand lifted in oath to heaven as he swears by himself, the Creator, that the mystery of God was to be completed (Rev 10:1,5-7; cf. Rev 1:15; 2:18)''[771]

Kline also points out that an interpretations of the Spirit's hovering over the watery wastes is provided in Deuteronomy 32:10-11, with two rare words, one describing the Spirit's bird-like action, and the other the ''inchoate state of deep-and-darkness''.[772] This is further alluded to in the act of the Spirit in Genesis 8:1 at a critical juncture in the course of the Noahic flood – after which the waters receded.[773] The description of the Exodus event recalls the presence in the Exodus of the Glory-Cloud, sometimes simply called ''the Spirit'' (Neh. 9:19 ff; Isa. 63:11-14; and Hagai. 2:5) – a localised manifestation of the ''cosmos-filling glory of the living Presence''.[774] This can be seen in the work of the Wisdom figure in the architectural delineation of creation in Proverbs 8:30.[775] Eden is the sanctuary of the Spirit – the

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[771] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 16. Kline refers to his Images of the Spirit (Wipt and Stock Publishers, March 1999), pp 19 ff.

[772] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 30.

[773] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, pp. 219, 223.

[774] *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 30.

[775] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue,* p. 34.

archetype of paradise (see Isa. 51:3; and Ezekiel 28:13; 31:8 ff.), surrounded by cherubim (Gen. 3:29).[776] As Kline puts it:

> ''God's epiphany as Glory-Spirit on the holy mountain in Eden, the historically localized manifestation of the heavenly Presence, was the central focus of the theocratic city. As created, the city had a vertical cosmic axis at its centre; its focus was the mountain of God, extending from earth to heaven, its feet in the garden and its head crowned by the Glory of the celestial temple, theophanically unveiled.''[777]

Kline points out that the phrase ''in the cool of the day'' (Genesis 3:8) should be rendered ''as the Spirit of the day'', where ''Spirit'' denotes the theophanic Glory and ''the day'' the coming great judgment (cf. Judges 11:27 and 1 Corinthians 4:3).[778] This is later reflected in the Spirit-prophetic role of Noah.[779] It is the Spirit, in the dual appearance of a smoking brazier and a blazing torch,[780] who leads Abraham through the covenantal ceremony, which creates a special relationship with the people who are chosen to bear God's name. This is later mirrored in the experience of the Exodus, as Kline puts it:

> ''The Glory-Spirit of the Genesis 15 death passage, the Creator-Spirit who of old had divided and bounded the mighty waters in preparation for earth's original paradise, was present with Israel on its way to the paradise of Canaan (Exodus13:21, 22).[781]

The temple was a replica of the royal sanctuary of the Glory-Spirit (Isa. 66:1).[782] This is reflected in the new community of the universal church (Heb 12:22-24).[783] There is continuity between the Old Testament *qahal,* the assembly at Sinai-Zion, (''the gathering of the covenant people at the site of the presence of the Glory-Spirit''), and the New Testament *ekklesia.* [784]

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[776] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 48.
[777] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p ; see also pp. 327-8.
[778] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 129. See Kline, *Images of the Spirit*. See also Amos 5:18-20; Isa 13:6, 9; Zeph 1:15; Joel 2 ; Ezek 34:12; and 1 Peter 3:10.
[779] ''Spirit'' (Gen. 6:3) and ''walking'' (6:9) see Gen. 3:8. See 1 Pet. 3:19, 20 and 2 Pet. 2:5. Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 209.
[780] Genesis 15:17. See Kline, *Kingdom Prologue,* p. 296..
[781] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 301.
[782] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue,* pp. 31-2.
[783] Kline, Kingdom Prologue, p. 381. See 1 Cor. 3:16-17
[784] Kline, Kingdom Prologue, p. 382.

Wisdom especially in Proverbs 8 seems to function as a distinct hypostatis. Eichrodt notes the universality of the Spirit's work in the way that Wisdom was seen as universally applying to all nations, not simply Israel:

> This development of the concept of Wisdom gained in importance because it afforded the possibility of acknowledging truths possessed by foreign nations by describing them as participation in the divine *hokma*. For since Wisdom is already made known in the creation, she is naturally accessible to all peoples. Her connection with the ancient conception of practical shrewdness could be accommodated by making the latter the gift and endowment of Wisdom. As the creator of Man she loves him [Prov. 8:17, 31b] and seeks to make him happy. She invites him into her house [Prov. 8:1 ff; 1:20] and encourages him to make a covenant with her. She it is who bestows sovereignty and skill in government on the kings and nobles of the earth [Prov. 8:15f.] 'Every voice that exhorts to good, is her voice. Every perception of truth and every practice of virtue comes under her influence, and is her work. Whoever rejects her, forfeits life; whoever possesses her, has found life.'[785] In this way a wide sector was opened up within which it was possible to come to terms with foreign practical wisdom, and to make its much-admired insights one's own. Knowledge of Nature, and the moulding of the individual life, formed a bridge between Israel and the pagan world. In so doing men had no thought of imperilling Israel's own inheritance, but believed themselves capable of loyally holding fast to Yahweh.[786]

Although the tradition has indeed tended to read this in a Christological way,[787] there is an important minority tradition which ascribes Wisdom to the Holy Spirit, for example Irenaeus, with his overarching vision of the work of God, discussed the Spirit in the context of Wisdom.[788]

The figure of Wisdom in the Old Testament operates according to this Pneumatological logic. Wisdom is clearly doing the same thing in Proverbs 1-9 (and also in the Apocryphal literature

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[785] Eichrodt notes: ''Dillmann, *Handbuch der alttestamentlichen Theologie,*, p. 347. G. von Rad *Old Testament Theology* I, p. 443) rightly emphasizes that with this imploring citation of Wisdom, which brings the offer of salvation with special urgency directly to the individual, something new comes into the life of Judaism (Eichrodt, Old Testament Theology, 2:87, n. 4).

[786] Eichrodt, Old Testament Theology, 2:87 .

[787] If the figure Wisdom is indeed to be taken hypostatically. The contemporary scholarly consensus seems to be that Wisdom there is better to be understood as a literary device, see respectively R.B.Y Scott, *Proverbs and Ecclesiastes* (New York: Anchor, 1965/1985), pp. 69-70, Derek Kidner, *The Proverbs* (Leicester: IVP, 1964), pp. 76-84.

[788] *Adv. Haer.* 4.20.1; Jenson ST 1:97.

in Sir. 24 and Wisdom 7:22-8:1) as the Spirit is explicitly doing (e.g. in Exod.28: 3; 31:3; 35:31) but more generally in the endowment of wisdom itself (as in Gen. 41:38-9; Exod. 28:3; 35:31; Deut. 34: 9; Isa.11: 2 etc.). As Irenaeus puts it:

> Wisdom also, which is the Spirit, was present with Him, anterior to all creation, He declares by Solomon: ''God by Wisdom founded the earth, and by understanding hath He established the heaven. By His knowledge the depths burst forth, and the clouds dropped down the dew.'' And again: ''The Lord created me the beginning of His ways in His work: He set me up from everlasting, in the beginning, before He made the earth, before He established the depths, and before the fountains of waters gushed forth; before the mountains were made strong, and before all the hills, He brought me forth.'' And again: ''When He prepared the heaven, I was with Him, and when He established the fountains of the deep; when He made the foundations of the earth strong, I was with Him preparing [them]. I was He in whom He rejoiced, and throughout all time I was daily glad before His face, when He rejoiced at the completion of the world, and was delighted in the sons of men.''[789]

Theophilus of Antioch[790] also identified the Spirit with the Word (2:10),[791] as well as Hippolytus:

> ''God created all things by the Logos and arranged them by the Wisdom.[792]

Pannenberg suggests that the distinction between Son and Spirit was ''still unclear'' in the theology of the 2nd and 3rd Centuries, and that the identification of Wisdom with Spirit was replaced by the identification of Wisdom with the Logos first by Justin [793] then by Athenagoras [794] Tertullian[795] and finally and determinatively by Origen.[796] It may be suggested in response that the direct identification of the Logos with Wisdom put Trinitarian theology on a Subordinationistic footing - as indeed proved to the case when Arius seized on

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[789] *Adv. Haer.* 4.20.3
[790] *Ad Autol.* 2.15 etc.; Theophilus of Antioch sometimes gives to the Holy Ghost, as to the Son, the name of *Wisdom* (*sophia*), mentions besides (Ad Autol., lib. I, n. 7, and II, n. 18, in P.G., VI, col. 1035, 1081) the three terms *theos, logos, sophia* and, being the first to apply the characteristic word that was afterwards adopted, says expressly (ibid., II, 15) that they form a *trinity* (*trias*).
[791] see Pannenberg *ST* 1:270. Pannenberg argues *ST* 1:270.
[792] *Contra Noetus,* 10 (refer Wiles, ''Origin of the Doctrine of the Trinity'' *Journal of Theological Studies,* N.S., 8, 1 (April 1957).
[793] *Dial.* 61
[794] *Suppl* 10.3 (ANF 2, 133).
[795] *Adv.Prax.* 6-7
[796] D*e princ1.*2-3.

Proverbs 8:22 ff. in this way.[797] Proverbs 8, and indeed 1 Corinthians 1:24 is secondarily Christological through the operation of perichoresis, for example in where Christ (i.e. the anointed one) is called the wisdom and the power of God this is the logic of Isaiah 11:2, i.e. the sharing by the divine Messiah of the distinctive attributes of the Spirit who marks him out through signs and wonders.

The fact that *ruach* is feminine[798] has suggested a feminine character to the work as the Spirit, as the role of Wisdom in Proverbs 1-9 suggests. Perhaps more importantly, there is also a strong feminine image to the work of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament, most notably in the image of rebirth.[799]

This is brought out powerfully by Victorinus[800] who developed an understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit far richer than that of those who preceded him, and indeed those who came later. The Holy Spirit for Victorinus (as for Irenaeus, Theophilus and Hippolytus) is the Wisdom of God.[801] The movement (*motus*) in God that begets the son as vita also generates the Spirit as *intellegentia.* The Spirit in turn illuminates the world and leads it back to God.[802] The Holy Spirit has the function of re-uniting the Son with the Father as *patris et filii copula.*[803] This clearly influenced the understanding of Augustine of the Holy Spirit as *vinculum caritatis* between the Father and the Son – although arguably the latter is a much more formal and impersonal conception than the dynamic understanding of Victorinus. Most startling of all, but interestingly, Victorinus speaks of the Holy Spirit as the Mother of Jesus. The implication of this is that Victorinus sees a definite relationship between the Holy Spirit and Jesus. The Holy Spirit for Victorinus is not just an *agent* of God's action, but is directly related to the person of the Son.

Victorinus's position has its canonical basis in the Gospel of Luke, especially in the Annunciation of the birth of Jesus.

John's Gospel sets out the person and place of the Holy Spirit more clearly perhaps than

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[797] Gary Badcock, *Light of Truth and Fire of Love: a theology of the Holy Spirit* (Eerdmans/Alban).
[798] With the exception of isolated instances, such as Exodus 10:13. *The New Brown-Driver-Briggs-Gesenius Hebrew and English Lexicon* (Hendrikson Publishers, 1979), p. 924.
[799] John 3.47. Refer T. Gorringe, *Discerning Spirit*,(SCM, 1990, p. 125).
[800] Caius Marius Victorinus (AD 4th Century)
[801] *Ad Arr.* 1:12, 32; 3:8,9; refs in *Patrology* 4:78.
[802] *Ad Arr.* 1:26; 4:7; refs in *Patrology* 4:78. Mary T. Clark, translator, *Marius Victorinus: Theological Treatises on the Trinity* (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, date? [cannot find on the Web])
[803] Hymn 1:4; *ref* in Patrology 4:78.

anywhere else in the New Testament. The Spirit in John's Gospel is shown in a very close relationship to Jesus, and the Issues of the Christology and Pneumatology of John run along parallel lines. In the Johannine writings, the Spirit bears witness, speaks, teaches and conducts as a guide,[804] although the work of the Son and Spirit was always clearly distinguished, nor whether the Spirit proceeds from the Father or the Son.

John's Gospel sets out the person and place of the Holy Spirit more clearly perhaps than anywhere else in the New Testament. The Spirit in John's Gospel is shown in a very close relationship to Jesus, and the Christology and Pneumatology of John run along parallel lines.

The tern *pneuma,* taken from the LXX, translates the Hebrew *ruach* the fundamental idea of which is wind or breath. It is not necessarily used in John's Gospel as a person. Jesus at his death is described as giving up his *pneuma* (19:30). *Pneuma,* the principle of God-breathed inspiration, is contrasted with sarx, the principle of worldly futility, or, more neutrally, of mere materiality (3:6; 6:63). Alongside this is Jesus assertion: '' ὁ Θεός'' (4:24) – part of the very nature of divinity is made known to us in this God-ward quality to which we are called.[805]

But is clear that the Spirit referred to in the Gospel is more that this. The Holy Spirit (Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον*),* also called the Spirit of Truth *(* τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας) or simply the Spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) is the one who empowers and who brings new life.   The work of the Holy Spirit cannot be understood in isolation from the work of the Father and the of the Son. The question is from where does the spirit come, and in John 10:38 Jesus tells the Jews

> ''even though you do not believe in me, believe in the *miracles* that you may learn and understand that the Father is in me and I in the Father''.

One might see here, Augustine's view of the Holy Spirit as the bond of love *(vinculum caritatis)* between the Father and the Son.[806]

Jesus in turn, gives the Spirit to his disciples (7:37-39; 14:16-17; 15:26; 16:7; 20:22), which he describes in life-giving terms, firstly in the giving of new birth (3:5-8), and then in the giving of life (6:63) Jn 4:10-14 and 7:37-39. Jesus speaks of himself as giving the living water which symbolizes the Spirit. If the two passages are taken together, it is arguable that

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[804] John 14:26; 15:26; 16.13 1 John 5:7; Rev. 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22; 14:13 (Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament*, p. 201, n. 4).
[805] C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel. (CUP, 1953). Ch.8.
[806] A. Richardson and John Bowden, A New Dictionary of Christian Theology SCM, 1983), p.112.

the living water of the Spirit referred, not from the believer. This is in fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy that one day a fountain would be open to the house of David (Zach. 13:1; 14:8); and that God would give water to the thirsty (Isa. 44:3; 55-.I)[807]. It is consistent with Jesus' view of himself as the Temple (2:21) from which the prophet Ezekiel saw life-giving waters flowing (Ezek.47: l-12; Rev. 21:1,17, 22; 22:1).[808] It is argued that 19:34 is a continuation of this idea. The difficulty that blood and water is referred to, is explained by the later Jewish traditions associated with the striking of the rock a Meribah, where blood is described (e.g. in the later Aggadah legends of the Midrash Petirat Aharon) as coming from the rock as a result of Moses' violence. A surer exegesis is probably to read 19:34 in the light of Jesus' self identification with the Temple, referred to above, with its consequent eschatological fulfilment also referred to.[809]

The distinctive title given to Holy Spirit in John's Gospel is $\dot{o}$ $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\lambda\eta\tau o\varsigma$, which is a judicial term, meaning counsel for the defence – or possibly for the prosecution (see 16:8-11). The gift is given to the disciples in the context of their future mission. The church will be faced in its task by many enemies and dangers, and they will need someone who will stand alongside them as their defender. There are five passages in the farewell discourses (Chs. 14-16) in which Jesus talks about the Paraclete-Holy Spirit (14:16-17; 14:26; 15:26-7; 16:7-11; 16:13-15) As Congar points out, the work of the Paraclete should be seen as parallel to, and continuous with, the work of Jesus: like Jesus, he is given by the Father (14:16, 26; 15:26//3:16; 5:43; 16:28; 18:37) teaches/ communicates/ bears witness to the Father (14:26; 15:26; 16:13ff.//l;17; 4:25; 5:31ff.; 7:14 ft.; 8:13-20; 14:6; 16:25; 18:37). speaks not of himself but only what he has heard (16:13//7:17; 8:26. 28,38; 12:49ff.; 14:10), reveals Jesus glory (16:14//12:28; 17:1.4), is only known by believers (14:7//14:19. 16:lff.) is with and in the disciples (14:16//3:22; 13:33; 14:20; 14:26) cannot be received by the world (14:7//1:11; 5:53; 12:48), confounds the world (16:8//3:19ff; 9:41; 15:22). In this, however, it should be noted that in the Gospel, the Spirit is shown as proceeding ''from near the Father'' (15:26 - π $\pi\alpha\rho\grave{\alpha}$ $\tauο\tilde{\upsilon}$ $\pi\alpha\tau\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$) rather than ''from'' ($\dot{\varepsilon}\kappa$) the Father. Also, as has been noted previously, he (the masculine form of the demonstrative is used in the text) is shown as being given by Christ as well (7:37ff. etc.)[810] The term ''another paraclete'' ($\check{\alpha}\lambda\lambda o\varsigma$ $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\lambda\eta\tau o\varsigma$) seems to Indicate that Jesus is referring to himself as the first paraclete; although it can possibly be

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[807] G Burge. *The Anointed Community* (Eerdmans, 1987), pp. 88-97; Yves Congar *I Believe in the Holy Spirit.* Vol I. (Chapman. 1983), pp. 50. They both argue strongly that the full stop in the text should come after ene in v. 38, so that *ho pisteuwn* completes the *parallelismus membrorum,* rather than after *pineto* in v. 37, which requires *''ho pisteuwn''* to be the suspended subject (*casus pendens)* of the citation resumed in *''autou''.* S.V.G. Tasker. *John*, (IVP, 1960/1980).
[808] Congar, *Holy Spirit*, p.50.
[809] Burge, Anointed Community, pp. 93-4.
[810] Congar, *Holy Spirit* pp. 55-7; Michael Cressy in *IDB,* p.325.

translated ''another, a paraclete''. Burges argues that the context of Jesus giving the Paraclete is that of persecution and that the key passage is therefore 15:18-164a, which he sees as having strong parallels with the Synoptic tradition, particularly Matt. 10 (the commissioning of the twelve). This experience of the church on trial may have sharpened the forensic analogy.[811]   The climax of this movement is 20:22-3, called by scholars ''the Johannine Pentecost'', where Jesus anticipates the gift of the Spirit after his ascension, and links the authority of the apostolic witness, implicitly in the face of persecution, with power specifically upheld by the Holy Spirit. This is to further the mission of the church.

Thus, throughout John's Gospel, there is a very close link between the ministry of Jesus and the work of the Holy Spirit; and in promising the Holy Spirit as Paraclete, Jesus is setting out the continuity of his work with that of the Spirit; his mission as the Word of God, lived out in the continuing apostolate of the church, is parallel to, and inseparable from, the coming of the Holy Spirit's power.   But the Holy Spirit should not be seen as a successor to Christ (as might be deduced if the Paraclete passages are taken on their own). Rather, Jesus' whole ministry is penetrated and constituted by the presence of the spirit: in his Messianic calling, in his miracles, and in the giving of life and power to all who believe in him.

In Acts of the Apostles we are told that the Spirit speaks, forbids, thinks good, appoints, sends, bears witness, snatches, prevents is (not) deceived, tempted and resisted.[812] This is closely paralleled in the Pauline corpus, where the Spirit is described as being grieved, bearing witness, crying, leading and making intercession.[813] In 1 Peter, the Spirit testifies and the author of Hebrews says that the Spirit speaks and bears witness in the writings of the Old Testament (3:7).[814]

Just as Jesus has taken upon himself the Spirit, so we are to receive the same Spirit. In Joel 2:28 following there is the promise of the outpouring of the Spirit – specifically quoted by Peter in his Pentecost sermon in Acts 2:17-21. According to the Old Testament, we are offered the Spirit of judgment, counsel and might, the Spirit of grace and supplication.[815]

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[811] *Anointed Community*, pp. 206-8.
[812] Speaks (1:16; 8:29; 10:19; 11:12; 13:2; 28:25), forbids (16:6); thinks good (15:28), appoints ((20:28), sends ((13:4), bears witness (5:32); 20:23), snatches (8:39), prevents ((16:7), is lied to (5:3), tempted (5:9), and resisted (7:51, cf. 6:10) (Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament,* p. 201, n. 1.)
[813] Romans 8:14, 16, 26; Gal. 4:6; Eph 4:30, 1 Tim. 4:1 [Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament*, p. 201, n. 3]. T.F. Torrance points out that behind Paul's thought in Rom. 8:26 f. & 34 about the Holy Spirit sharing in the vicarious incarnation of Christ, there lies Isa. 63:9-11 (cf. Exod. 2:20; 33:14)
[814] Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament*, p. 201.
[815] Isaiah 11:2; Zech. 12:10. Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament*, p. 32, n.3. refer E.F. Scott, *The Spirit in the N.T.,* p. 20.

The Spirit is represented in the Book of Revelation by the presence of the Four Creatures. It in this context that we need to understand the role of the Spirit in revelation, as Irenaeus states it, the Word:

> ''... gave us the gospel *under four forms but bound together by one Spirit.* As also David says, when entreating His presence. Thou that sittest upon the cherubim, shine forth. *For the cherubim too were four faced and their faces were the images of the dispensation of the Son of God* ''[816]

These spirits represent the Holy Spirit, who works as the power of the Name of God (that is of the Son):

> ''A man cannot be found in the kingdom of God, except they (the holy spirits) clothe him with their clothing. For if you receive the name alone but do not receive the clothing from them, you will benefit nothing for these maidens are the powers of the Son of God. If you wear the Name but do not bear his power -you are bearing his name in vain.' What', said I 'is their raiment, Sir?' Their names themselves', said he, 'are their raiment. Whoever bears the Name of the Son of God must also bear their names; for even the Son himself bears the names of these maidens.'''[817]

where the Spirit is the covenantal witness, sign and executor of the giving of God's glory. Humanity is given a robe emblematic of God's glory. This is instanced supremely in the giving of the sacred vestments to the high priest of Israel. In Ezekiel 16, the allegory depicts the marriage troth of God as represented by the adorning of the bride-Israel with the sacred garments of the Glory-likeness. This harks back to the over-shadowing canopy of the nuptials between God and Israel at Sinai, and beyond that to the overarching of God's Spirit in the original act of creation. The investing of humanity with God's glory is thus a covenantal fiat, specifically accomplished by the Spirit.[818] It is seen further in the book of Hosea, where God sends out the wife of his covenant naked, saying:

> ''She is not my wife and I am not her husband'' (Hosea 2:2, 3).[819]

As Kline puts it:

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[816] Against Heresies III.2 (Barker, Great Angel, p. 204).
[817] Hermas Sim.ix.l3.2-3 (Barker, Great Angel, p. 210).
[818] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 17. Look up fuller discussion in his *Images of the Spirit,* chapter 2.
[819] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 152.

‚‚Human culture was a creaturely replication of the royal glory of God as revealed in the theophanic Glory itself, the archetype of both cosmos and men.‚‚ [820]

The two trees in the garden are reproductions of the Glory-Spirit, with their symbolism of judicial dominion and immortal life.[821] After the Fall, the priestly guardianship, originally committed to humanity itself, is now assigned to the cherubim, who bar the way to humanity (Genesis 3:24).[822] This guardianship is restored to humanity in the person of Jesus, when Jesus is led by the same theophanic Spirit who pronounced judgment on Adam and Eve (Genesis 3:8); and the angels, previously adversaries, now minister to his needs.[823]
The perfection of creation by the Holy Spirit has two aspects: the first is the realisation of new structures in the present, and the second is the promise of futurity that the Spirit offers.[824]

Colin Gunton suggests, it is the Spirit who is the ‚‚perfecting cause‚‚ of creation.[825]
Basil the Great states:

‚‚the Lord who commands, the Word who creates, the Spirit who confirms. And what else would confirmation be but perfecting in accordance with holiness‚‚.[826]
Gregory of Nyssa states that the activity of creation:

‚‚begins from the Father, proceeds through the Son and is perfected in the Holy Spirit‚‚.[827]

Didymus puts it thus:

‚‚the Father commands, the Son creates, the Spirit sanctifies‚‚.[828]

John of Damascus puts it thus: the Father

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[820] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 77.
[821] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 93.
[822] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 137.
[823] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, P. 145
[824] Gunton, *The One, The Three and the Many*
[825] Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many*, p. 182; he quotes from Basil, *On the Holy Spirit* XV. 36 and 38.
[826] *De Sp. S.* on Psalm 33:6 quoted in Shapland, p. 82, n. 2.
[827] *Adv. Mac.* 13 quoted in Shapland, p. 83, n.13
[828] De Trin. 2:565c on Gen. 1:27 see Dial de Trin. 3:24:
δια του Λογου κτιζει και δια του πνευματος αγιαζει‚‚ in Shapland , p. 83, n. 13.

''creates by thinking, and what is thought is worked out as it is carried out by the Logos and perfected by the Spirit''.[829]

As Abraham Kuyper states:

''The Father brings forth, the Son disposes and arranges, the Holy Spirit perfects.''[830]

Jonathan Edwards gives the presence of the Spirit a communal dimension in his *Miscellanies* where he defines ''conversation'' as ''intelligent beings expressing their minds to one another, in signs ...'' These ''signs'' are means by which the members of a society uncover to one another their mental intentions, which would otherwise be hidden from one another, and so ''taste'' the joy for which that society was designed.[831]

The doctrine of providence asserts that all things and, in particular, human destinies, are within the will of God. Thus the doctrines of providence and election are linked.[832] However, Jenson argues that election is the continuing work of God as Spirit not (pace Thomas Aquinas) ''a division of providence'' determined antecedently by God for all creatures.[833] Rather, God's providence and care for the world take place as the Spirit goes before us and opens up the future for us. The Spirit is the ''postdestining'' god, as Jenson puts it. He is ''the freedom of Jesus' future to transform and renew all previous events whatever''.[834] This continuing work of the Spirit can be seen specifically at the time of Jesus' death and resurrection and when the promise of the event is recounted to each one to whom the gospel is proclaimed.[835] Faith means waiting on God in trust that all events will have their purpose renewed in the final transformation. The doctrine of election asserts the freedom of God's choice with respect to humanity.[836] As Jenson puts it, election says in the active voice with God as the subject what justification by faith says in the passive voice with humanity as the subject.[837] Jenson argues that if the gospel promise is unconditional, it must be able to assure

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[829] *The Orthodox Faith* 6.6-8; quoted in Jenson, *ST*, 2:25.
[830] *Vol I. Chapter 2* The Work of the Holy Spirit VI. The Host of Heaven and of Earth.
[831] *Miscellanies #* 1138th entry quoted in Jenson, *America's Theologian* , pp. 191-2. See Robert W. Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' in *Society for the Study of Theology* (1988), pp. 7-8. Jenson notes that Edwards sees ''conversation'' as a third level beyond, firstly, the apodeictic setting out by society of the rules of that society, and, secondly, the framing and dissemination of specific policies for the furthering of the good of that society (Jenson, *America's Theologian* , pp. 192-4).
[832] Jenson, *America's Theologian* : 99.
[833] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , pp. 134-5; Summa Theologica, I, 23, 1 cited in Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , p. 144, n. 27.
[834] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , pp. 137, 139.
[835] Jenson, *Story & Promise* , pp. 121-2
[836] Jenson, *America's Theologian* , pp. 99-102. See Jenson, 'The God Question', p. 48.
[837] Jenson and Gritsch, *Lutheranism* , pp.157-8.

us of the outcome of all events, since if it were not able to do so, there would be some reservation which the ''gospel-speaker'' would have to make in proclaiming the promise. Following Luther, Jenson maintains that, with respect to the mystery of God's election, rather than attempt any abstract harmonisation of God's will with his love, we need to remain content (as will be seen) with the mere assertion of God's perfect will and his perfect love as two aspects of God as we find him and trust him, without trying to define how they are related.[838]

The assertion of God's ultimate agency in history is in direct conflict with the Enlightenment attempt to reduce our understanding of God to at best an abstract principle, a reflection of all that we might consider to be most desirable. At the heart of the Enlightenment scheme is the concept of interchangeability. All acts must be justifiable in general terms, and the good is what we hold to be equally desirable for all, and therefore that to which all are equally entitled. Human individuals are therefore to be understood not as unique subjects or objects of particular actions, but rather the bearers, or potential bearers, of what is held to be that good (or those goods) to which we, as human individuals, are entitled. At the same time, it is also held that it is individuals alone who are the agents of history through the exercise of their free will.[839]

Jonathan Edwards made a critique of the philosophical (as distinct to the ordinary language) sense of this notion as incoherent and concludes that the notion of free will adds nothing to the explanation of why a person acts in a particular way. By definition I cannot obey or disobey a command other than according to the sum total of my inclinations. Whether I act according to my better or worse judgement depends on which of my inclinations I choose to give weight to, or not, and so my act remains my responsibility. Moreover, moral necessity precisely involves my acting as I will. That I act according to moral necessity means that I am acting according to character, which is the sum of my inclinations (be they virtuous or vicious). It makes no sense to speak here of the will (as opposed to the person) being free or not, since it is the person within a particular historical context and set of relationships who acts, not an abstract capacity.[840] Robert Jenson describes the notion of ''free will'' as ''a destructive illusion''.[841] To be free, according to the axiom of free will, there needs to be an undetermined moment of choice by which the act of free will is constituted. The ideal which

[838] Jenson and Gritsch, *Lutheranism* , pp. 157-63.
[839] Jenson, *America's Theologian* , pp. 99-100.
[840] Jenson, *America's Theologian* , chs 12, 13; Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , p. 136; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' , pp. 30, 42.
[841] Jenson, 'Story and Promise in Pastoral Care', p. 123

informs the notion of free will is that which Edwards called ''indifference'' (or as it might be put in Twentieth Century terms: ''neutral detachment'').[842]

The ideal of ''indifference'' arises by analogy with the conception of God as self-contained and impassible.[843] It derives its conceptual force, from an implicit assertion of a self-subsistence over against God: that we are quasi-divine ''primary'' substances in a competitive relationship with God. Luther declares that ''the free will'' is ''simply a divine name''. The corollary of the axiom of free will is that I can be free only insofar as I am free of God, or at least that where I will what God wills, I do so independently, complementary to the operation of God's grace.[844]

If God is conceived of in terms of detached impassibility rather than as being active in the world, in relation to us as beings of an analogous but derivative type, then two options are possible: either we can go against God's will in competition with him, or we can be absorbed into his being and lose our separate identity. Either way, our ''otherness'' is seen as being in opposition to God's being.[845] The assertion of the ideal of free will takes the first of these two options. Prior to the Enlightenment, this had been modified in the Western theological tradition, which, following Augustine, arrived at a synthesis of the two options. Providence was understood in terms of the operation of an effectively monadic divine agency on the human substance in order to assist the operation of human free will to come to a satisfactory state.[846]

The Enlightenment secularised this concept to understand human free will to be the sole normative basis of freedom. The notion of ''indifference'', conceived thus, removes the logical possibility of moral persuasion because for a will to be entirely self-determining, it must not be swayed by considerations external to its own sheer operation.[847] The natural consequence of the doctrine is to remove the basis of community, which depends upon moral persuasion taking place in terms of that community's shared ideals. Genuine community can only come about as the basis of shared values, which in turn require a common conception of God's active purpose for humankind in general and for that community in particular: a common quest defined by ''the mandate of heaven''.[848]

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[843] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' , p. 37.

[844] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' , pp. 30, 36-7, 42.

[845] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' , p. 39

[846] Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' , p. 30; Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' , p. 97.

[847] Jenson, *America's Theologian* , pp. 166-7.

[848] Jenson, 'On Becoming Man' , pp. 118-9; Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , pp. 146-7; Jenson, 'Christian Doctrine' , p. 41;

For Calvin, election is the work of the Holy Spirit, as he puts it:

> ''The Spirit of God alone opens the gate of heaven to his elect''[849]

Calvin explains how it is the Spirit who actively performs the work of election:

> ''The Spirit of God, who reveals to us the ''mysteries of the kingdom of heaven,'' is
> the Spirit of adoption; and divine adoption is wholly gratuitous, the free gift of God.
> Therefore, the Spirit Himself *is freely given* on whomsoever He is bestowed. Now,
> that the Spirit is not thus freely bestowed on all men universal experience undeniably
> proves. Wherefore, faith is the special gift of God, and by that gift election is
> manifested to, and ratified in, the soul that receives it….This is what Paul means
> when he says that Christ, who is a '' stumbling-block to the Jews '' and ''foolishness
> to the Greeks,'' is '' *to them that are called,* the wisdom of God and the power of
> God.'' [850] He calls, or invites, *all men* unto eternal life. But, in the latter case, He
> brings unto eternal life those whom He willed according to His eternal purpose,
> *regenerating* by His Spirit, as an eternal Father, *His own children* only.''[851]

The Holy Spirit is for Calvin,

> ''the bond by which Christ effectually joins us to himself''[852]

William Placher sums up Calvin's understanding of the work of the Spirit in the process of
election as follows:

> ''This aspect of the Spirit's work involves two parts. First, it ''enlightens'' the mind;
> it produces ''knowledge'' and enables us to understand what the Bible means.
> Second, it ''establishes the mind''; it brings our minds (and our hearts) into ''a firm
> and steady conviction'' regarding the claims embodied in the text. Amid feelings of
> humility and gratitude, in a life lived in obedience, Christians find that the stories the
> Bible tells of Christ as the revelation of God's Identity have a compelling force. They

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[849] *Comm. John* on 1:9 (Butin, *RRR*, p. 67, p. 176, n. 45).
[850] Calvin, Treatise on the Secret Predestination of God, p. 98.
[851] Ibid, p. 100.
[852] Calvin, 1559 *Institutes*, III.1.; Butin, *RRR*, p. 81; p. 185, n. 36. See Augustine *De Trinitate* VI.5 in which
believers are commanded to ''imitate the unity of the Father and the Spirit that is in the Spirit'' both in our
relations with God as well as among ourselves.

sense that that force does not result from their own efforts, and Calvin, again on scriptural grounds, attributed it to the work of the Holy Spirit.''[853]

Sherman comments:

> The Spirit acts as the intermediary between God the Father speaking his gracious Word to the Bible's diverse human authors. Yet another aspect of that Reformed tradition, although often less well known, is the recognition that the Holy Spirit is required not just in the writing or proclaiming of Scripture, but in the hearing of it. For the Bible to be *received* as God's Word requires the inspiration of the Holy Spirit as well.[854]

Kuyper emphasizes two aspects of the work of the Holy Spirit:

> ''First, the work of the Holy Spirit is not confined to the elect, and does not begin with their regeneration; but it touches every creature, animate and inanimate, and begins its operations in the elect at the very moment of their origin.
> Second, the proper work of the Holy Spirit in every creature consists in the quickening and sustaining of life with reference to his being and talents, and, in its highest sense, with reference to eternal life, which is his salvation.''[855]

This is related to the question of common grace, which Kuyper propounded, and was opposed not least by Herman Hoeksema.[856] Kuyper describes it thus in relation to the prayer of the unconverted:

> ….all these operations of general grace are, as soon as they touch the life of prayer, the work of the Holy Spirit. He who in creation strung the harp of prayer 'in the soul is the same who causes not only the tone of prayer to vibrate even in our egoistic petitions, but who, in a more glorious way, sometimes even as tho the soul were an

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[853] William Placher, *The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modem Thinking about God Went Wrong* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 67. Placher draws °n Calvin's *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul to the Ephesians* (on Eph 1:13) and from *institutes of the Christian Religion,* vols. 20 and 21 (Library of Christian Classics; ed.John Millie, John T. McNeill. and Henry P. Van Dusen; trans. Ford Lewis Battles; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 3.1.1. (Sherman, KPP, pp. 244-5).

[854] KPP, p. 255. Sherman comments: ''Karl Barth in particular makes this point both eloquently and at length, but Calvin and numerous Reformed confessions established it much earlier.'' (KPP, p. 255, n. 37).

[855] Kuyper, Vol 3, Book 3 *Work of the Holy Spirit,* IX: Creation and Re-creation.

[856] See Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics

Æolian harp, touches the strings with the breath of His mouth, and draws from it the beautiful and entrancing tones of prayers and supplications.[857]

However, as Kline points out, there is a dual character to the Glory-presence of the Holy Spirit. The possibility of the death-curse as well as the life-promise is present in the Edenic covenant (Genesis 2:17).[858] This is seen in the operation of the Glory-Cloud, which was a protective share to the Israelites but a bewildering darkness to the Egyptians, and the Glory-fire, which was a guiding light to the former, but a blinding, consuming blaze to the latter.[859] Athanasius states, alluding to Isa. 63:14:

> ''…it was God himself who, through the Word, in the Spirit, led the people [of Israel through the wilderness]''.[860]

Butin notes Werner Krusche's analysis that shows

> ''Calvin's persistent awareness that the Spirit of God is active, not only in Christian believers or the church, but also generally in whatever is good, in whatever is good in creation and human life''[861]

There is a close link between the redemption of the universe and the Resurrection of Jesus, through the power of the Holy Spirit.[862] In the pre-incarnate Son, the universe is made through the power of the Holy Spirit, so also though the Resurrection of Jesus by the same Holy Spirit; the universe is restored and brought to its future potential through the adoption of the redeemed ones as the children of God. Romans 8 is a prime source for this:

> ''We know that the whole creation has been groaning with labour pains until now, and not only the creation but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for our adoption, the redemption of our bodies''.[863]

Athanasius states:

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[857] Kuyper, Work of the Holy Spirit 3.3.41: Prayer in the Unconverted
[858] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 101.
[859] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue,* p. 103,
[860] *Ad Serapionem* 1:12, quoted in Shapland, pp. 90-1, n. 7. See also Didymus, *de Sp. S.* 43-53.
[861] *Das Winken des Heilgen Geistes nach Calvin* (Göttingen: Vanderboek and Rynecht, 1957), pp. 15-125; *RRR*, p. 186, n. 49.
[862] See Rom. 1:4.
[863] Rom. 8:22-23.

‘‘…in [the Spirit] the Word makes things originated divine …, [and again] the Father does all things through the Word in the Holy Spirit‘‘.[864]

Further, with reference to 1 Cor. 12:4-6, he states:

‘‘the gifts which the Spirit divides to each are bestowed from the Father through the Word‘‘.[865]

As Pannenberg points out:[866]

‘‘The human destiny for fellowship with God which finds definitive realisation in the incarnation, means that humanity as such, and each individual within it, it lifted above the natural world and even above the social relations in which we exist.‘‘

Moreover, we are not called as individuals, but as a new community, as Sherman describes it:

‘‘Gods truth enables us to recognize that nothing in this life or this world has the power and right to define who we are, for that truth comes to us exclusively from our Creator, who is also our final end. This is the true reality proclaimed by Christ, which he gives us through the power of the Spirit. But how do we come to know all this? How are we convinced of it? It is not an abstract principle we discover or deduce, and it is not even a lesson we learn through our own experience. Rather, it is living reality that comes to us through personal encounter and address. This reality is not merely an ‘‘interior‘‘ or ‘‘spiritual‘‘ attitude, but must be acknowledged as a new and external reality—a point manifested by the fact that at Pentecost the Spirit empowered not just individuals, but established a new community, one open to all nations and all ages (Acts 2). As the biblical narratives of humanity's creation indicate, we were not meant to be alone (Gen 2:18). We were intended to be in deep and intimate communion with God and one another—even if those same narratives also indicate how such communion has been derailed, if not destroyed, and a sense of our true end lost.‘‘[867]

This is related to the problem of divinisation as we find it in the writings of Athanasius especially. Athanasius wrote:

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[864] *Ad Serapionem* 1:28, see Shapland, p. 135.
[865] Ad Serapionem, 1:30, see Shapland, p. 141.
[866] Kline, Kingdom Prologue, pp. 373-4.
[867] KPP, pp. 258-9. Sherman comments: ‘‘Consider the Genesis accounts of the fall, Cains slaying of Abel, the flood, and the Tower of Babel (Gen 3:7ff, 4:3ff., 6:5ff., and ll:lff).‘‘ [KPP, p. 259, n. 38]

"The Word is not of things created, but rather is Himself their Creator. For therefore He assumed a created human body, that, having renewed it as its Creator, He might deify it in Himself, and thus bring us all into the Kingdom of heaven through our likeness to Him. For man would not have been deified if joined to a creature, or unless the Son were very God; nor would man have been brought into the Father's presence, unless He had been His natural and true Word who had put on the body. And as we would not have been delivered from sin and the curse, had not the flesh that the Word assumed been by nature human (for we should have had nothing in common with what is alien to us); so too humanity would not have been deified, if the Word who became flesh had not been by nature derived from the Father and true and proper to Him. For therefore the union was of this kind, that He might unite what is man by nature to Him who naturally belonged to the Godhead, that his salvation and deification might be sure". [868]

It is important to note that we are included in the Triune economy, not the Triune being (the West has tended to read ''theosis'' in the latter way, but it is misleading). Also the essentially monadic Western view of God tends to read ''theosis'' as somehow an ascent up a ladder of being, rather than our being drawn into the loving covenant between the Three Persons (the Eastern Orthodox understanding of the Persons, and the divine perichoresis is far stronger). [869] As Lossky puts it:

> The goal of Orthodox spirituality, the blessedness of the Kingdom of Heaven, is not the vision of the essence, but, above all, a participation in the divine life of the Holy Trinity; the deified state of the co-heirs of the divine nature, gods created after the uncreated God, possessing by grace all that the Holy Trinity possesses by nature. [870]

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[868] *Orations Against the Arians*, ii.70 This may indeed be different for Gregory Palamas. Robert Jenson in his book, *Unbaptized God* (pp. 142-3) suggests that for Palamas: ''It is impossible to avoid the impression that the divine ousia is itself somehow entitive. Then it is impossible to avoid the impression that this ousia is to provide a refuge in which Hellenism's interpretation of God, as the one who is God because the 'neither becomes or suffers' can be maintained''. John Meyendorff argues against this, that Palamas' distinction is not too different from that made by the Protestant scholastics: between the immanent and economic Trinity, and that it is important to see the essence and energies in thoroughly Trinitarian terms - and so mutually identical (as indeed of course is the case with the Cappadocians from whom Palamas derived the terminology in the first place). Michael A. Fahey and John Meyendorff, *Trinitarian Theology East and West St Thomas Aquinas – St Gregory Palamas* (Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1977)
[869] Jenson, 'Theosis': 108-112.
[870] *Mystical Theology*, p. 65, quoted in del Colle, *Christ and the Spirit*, p. 10.

When we say that the saints have been transformed or 'deified' by the grace of God, what we mean is that they have a direct experience of God Himself. They know God – that is to day, God in His energies, not in His essence.[871]

A Western exception in this is Jonathan Edwards. Edwards writes, alarmingly (to Western eyes), about our being created to be the spouse of God's son. It is possible, as Jenson puts it for the Trinity to ''rope us in''[872] or, in the words of Edwards himself which Jenson cites, that we should be ''partakers of the Son'(s) relation to the Father'',[873] as through the Spirit we are brought into the family of the Trinity as the ''spouse of the Son'';[874] who develops the ''ontological argument for the Trinity'' (first set out by Richard of St Victor): three is the minimum for a witnessed exchange of love, but is also the way in which others can be included in that love:

> ''The Godhead being thus begotten of God's loving [having?] an idea of Himself and showing forth in a distinct Subsistence or Person in that idea, there proceeds a most pure act, and infinitely holy and sacred energy arises between the Father and the Son in mutually loving and delighting in each other … The Deity becomes all act, the Divine essence itself flows out and is as it were breathed forth in love and joy. So that the Godhead therein stands forth in yet another manner of subsistence, and there proceeds the Third Person in the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, viz. The Deity in act, for there is no other act but the act of will''[875]

As Ralph del Colle puts it:

> ''The issue is not whether the divine nature absorbs the human nature of Christ (the monophysite heresy), now extends to the church as his body but whether the persons who are members of the church are given their full due as participants in its life by virtue of the universal anointing of the Holy Spirit.''[876]

Divinisation as Jenson points outs (drawing on the insights of Jonathan Edwards[877]), involves God roping us in to participation in the divine perichoresis. It is not a matter of transforming

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[871] Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 68.

[872] Jenson, 'Theosis', p. 110.

[873] Edwards, sermon, ''The Excellency of Christ'', App. 11.2**;** quoted in Jenson, 'Theosis', p. 111.;

[874] Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : pp. 7-8. See Jenson, 'An Attempt to Think about Mary': p. 263.

[875] B.B. Warfield, ''Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity'' in *Biblcial Doctrines'', p. 138.*

[876] *Christ and the Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective* (OUP, 1994).

[877] *America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards* (Oxford: OUP, 1988)

our substance into God's or scaling a metaphysical ladder of being, but entering more fully into the life of God, ethically expressed. The promise of the gospel is

''inclusion in the Triune community by virtue of union with Christ…''.[878]

The Eschaton can only be understood on a Trinitarian basis, as Peter Leithart points out:
''What makes us construe X as a beginning? I submit that it is because of an aspiration to move away from X. There must be some yearning to go to Y, and as we are going toward Y we construe X as ''where we came from.'' Beginnings depend on the sense of an ending, the desire for an ending that is different from the beginning. There must be an eschatology to get a story off the ground, somewhere to go, somewhere better to get to, that justifies separation from where we are…Eschatology is rooted in the trinity. Only a Triune cosmology is teleological. There may be an emanation from a Unitarian God, but at best that emanation will return where it began. The Trinity means that where you go is different from where you started, but also means that where you go is not less than where you started. It is equal in power and glory. Y can actually be a glorification of X, just as the Son is the glory of His Father.''[879]

The substantiality given by the Father in Gunton's words is

''not fully given in the beginning and has to achieve its end''.[880]

Or, to use an axiom of Basil the Great:

''The whole of human life is fed not so much on the past as on the future''.[881]
Or, as Jacob Klapwijk puts it:
''God's kingdom is the creation itself in the light of its messianic final end. This view is even more powerfully stated in the thesis: Between the given order of the creation and the coming kingdom of shalom there is a relation of intentional identity…. we must never take the biblical witness concerning God's 'statutes and ordinances' (Psalm 119) in isolation from or in opposition to the sublime vistas of the prophets and apostles. There arises in that case as of itself an appalling, backwards-looking

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[878] *ST* 2:311.

[879] For more on this point, see Peter Leithart's article ''Surplus at the Origin''in the October 2004 issue of the *International Journal of Systematic Theology.*[879]

[880] *The One, The Three and the Many* Refs

[881] Ep 42.1 in Courtonne, Saint Basil Lettres, 1:10 quoted in Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture,* p. 311 and also p. 312.

Christian conservatism that is blind to the dynamics of the creation. Precisely because of the messianic visions of the future, we have to turn our hearts and direct our attention forward. We have to decipher the *eindselen,* the eschatological symbols, in order to understand the *beginselen* the protological ordinances. And vice versa! Only in such a *'va et vient'*,[882] or better, in the way of 'expecting' and 'reflecting' may we discover all that God intended with His fallen creation 'from the beginning' ''[883]

or as it is put by J.P.A. Mekkes:

'' 'To speak of creational ordinances as something in themselves is... impossible' …'structures under the rainbow'… 'but precisely this [rainbow] points towards its dynamic fulfilment'. ….'[Man] is *subject to* the future: it is [the future] which, through History, *norms* the creation'.[884]

Through the Spirit new possibilities are opened up, not in a random way (although it may seem so at the time), but in a way that creates new possibilities for the future.[885] A good example of this is Sarah, as Kline puts it:

''Every human strategy had been defeated, and human resources of strength were utterly exhausted. Only then was the promise fulfilled, the child given, the Son born to the barren and the dead, the Lord visiting Sarah as he had said and doing unto her as he had spoken (Genesis 21:1).[886]

The Holy Spirit moves all things forward to the Sabbath of all things; the goal of all creation, As Meredith Kline puts it:

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[882] Klapwijk notes: ''I just borrow the expression from Paul Ricoeur. I take distance from its dialectical background, which is described by Ricoeur himself as a 'dialectic with postponed synthesis* *{Histoire et Verite,p.*16). For the rest, I would recall that the symbolism of the apocalypse, particularly in Revelation 22, itself refers to the symbolism of the creation account''

[883] ''Reformational Philosophy on the Boundary'', pp. 113-4. Klapwijk adds: ''We must be mindful of the words of Levinas, who says that only the messianic triumph can overcome the brokenness of history, or the words of Adorno, who says that only the messianic perspective exposes injustice.[E. Levinas, *Totalile et infini,* p. 261 and T. W. Adorno, *Minima moralia,* § 153.] [p. 114]

[884] ''*]. P.* A. Mekkes, *Tijd der bezinning* (1973), p. 60; *Radix, tijd en kennen* (1970), p. 183. Already in *Scheppingsopenbaring en viijsbegeerte* (1961) we find the words: The way of creation (is) the way of the Kingdom' (p. 90). ''[Klapwijk, ''Reformational Philosophy on the Boundary'', p. 114]

[885]*ST* 2:274-5.

[886] Kline, *Kingdom and Promise,* pp. 307-8.

''The Sabbath at the completion of creation answers to that paradigm-promise of the Glory-Spirit (Gen 2:2; cf 1 Kings 6:38). The Glory is the Sabbath reality present beforehand; it is the earnest and archetype that guarantees the Spirit's coming'',[887] or elsewhere ''… a downward projection of the holy sanctuary-domain of God already existent above''[888]

It looks forward to the Sabbath of the New Jerusalem that follows on God's victory in the final judgment over the Satanic hordes.[889] As Kline puts it:

''Mankind's endeavours were to move forward to and issue in a sabbatical rest. In fact man was to come by way of these works into God's own royal rest (Heb. 4:1 ff.).''[890]

But it is a consummation that the Holy Spirit will bring about, not an extrapolation of humanity's own endeavours. This has best been explicated in the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Robert Jenson, and Jürgen Moltmann, respectively. Common to them is the idea that it is through the distinctive work of the Spirit that the present is pulled forward towards its consummation in the last things.

For Pannenberg, drawing on the work of Ernst Bloch,[891] God is the power of the future.[892] For Pannenberg, the Spirit in community of the Son and the Father realises the history of reconciled creation.[893] He notes further that it is because of the relation of all life to its divine

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[887] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 34.

[888] See also Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 157, and also Kline's *The Structure of Biblical Authority*, Part 2, Chapter 3.

[889] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 36. See Kline's *Images of the Spirit* Ch. 4 for his discussion of the relationship of the Glory-Spirit and the Spirit in redemptive eschatology, particularly in the prophecy of Isaiah.

[890] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*,, p. 78. See Kline's further discussion of the gloss which Exodus 20:11 puts on Genesis 2:3 in describing the creation ordinance of the ''seventh day'' a ''Sabbath'' and Jesus' own gloss on both in Mk 2; 28//Mt 12:8//Lk 6:5 in the affirmation of his own [Spirit-attested] Lordship over the Sabbath. Kline points out the importance of the Hebrew term ''nwh'' used in Genesis [2?]: [3 or]4 as a pun on the name of Noah (see Gen. 5:28) but also in Exodus 20:11 for God's sabbatical resting on the seventh day of creation, and in Isaiah 25:10 for the coming to rest of the Glory-Spirit (''hand'') on Mount Zion on the Consummation-Sabbath. It is also used for the Lord's leading Israel to repose in the Sabbath-land of Canaan, e.g. in Isaiah 63:14, where it is the Glory-Spirit who brings them to rest [Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 229] See Kline, *Images of the Spirit*, pp. 39 ff.

[891] As indeed did Moltmann, not least in his *Theology of Hope*.

[892] Pannenberg; 'The God of Hope' in *Basic Questions in Theology*, vol. II, op. cit. p.242. This essay was written in 1965. With thanks to Marion Gray.

[893] See *ST* 3

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origin through the permeation of the Spirit that immortality is possible [894] and the new life of eschatological hope[895] is realised.[896]

In the growth of institutions and practices, the process of dialectical development takes place. In this way, Hegel's' dictum that history is the march of Spirit though the world[897] is pertinent, but, as Jenson points out, Hegel's fault was the he confused himself with history's last judge.[898]

Pannenberg argues for the ontological priority of the future, exemplified in Jesus' resurrection. For Pannenberg, the truth of revelation is grounded in the *objective* event that is the Resurrection of Jesus. As Pannenberg puts it:

> ''the Spirit is the creative origin of the new life of the [R]esurrection (Rom. 8:11)''
> Although he goes on to say: ''In this way, the Jewish view of the Spirit as the origin
> of all life is seen from the perspective of the eschatological future''.[899] He explains:
> ''we have to regard the dynamic of the Spirit in creation from the very outset in terms
> of the coming consummation, i.e. as an expression of the power of his future.''[900]

For Pannenberg, this power is exercised by the Spirit bringing about ''the force field of future possibility''[901] so that ''the working of the Spirit constantly encounters the creature as its future, which embraces its origin and its possible fulfilment.[902] The Spirit is the One who effected the raising of Jesus from the dead on the authority of the Father.[903] NT Wright comments:

> ''the main thrust of Romans 8 —marginalized, ironically, in much Protestant
> exegesis! — is the renewal of all creation by God's great act of new exodus. The

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[894] 1 Cor. 15:44 *soma pneumaticon.*
[895] Rom. 6:4
[896] *ST*, 2: 347
[897] 23rfg
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[899] *ST* 2:98. See Rabbi Eliezer μιθρπ (ch. 33), on Ezekiel 37 ''[Ezekiel] did not believe that the Holy Spirit was able to give life to those dry bones. Therefore his bones were not buried in the land of Israel'' [Tvi Nassi, *The Great Mystery*, pp. 86-88].
[900] *ST* 2:98.
[901] S*T* 2:100 f., also p. 110.
[902] *ST* 2:102, see also p. 109.
[903]Rom 1:4; 8:2,11; Eph 1:20; Phil. 3:10 (where the Holy Spirit is described as ''the power of the resurrection''); 2 Cor 4:14; 1 Peter 3:18 See Pannenberg, *JGM*, pp. 170, 172 and *ST* 2:102.

cosmos itself will be redeemed, set free from slavery, liberated to share the freedom of the glory of God's children. God's children in turn have their inheritance, the new covenant equivalent of the promised land, in this entire new world. They will therefore, as Romans 5 stresses, share the *reign* of Jesus over the whole new world.''[904]

Through the anointing of the Spirit (as Messiah) Jesus carries out his ministry, and the authority of the Father in the ministry of Jesus is attested to by works of power. As Calvin points out:

''It is by the power of the Spirit which shone out in the resurrection and ascension of Christ that the dignity of his priesthood is to be reckoned''[905]

And Hebrews 9:13-14 makes it clear that it is through ''the eternal Spirit'' that Christ offered himself to God (the Father).[906] As T.F. Torrance points out:

''It is only through the Holy Spirit, St Paul wrote to the Galatians, that the crucifixion of Jesus Christ placarded before them would be effectual in their lives''[907]

As Pannenberg notes:

''Awakening by the Father and his Spirit is always presupposed when we read of the 'rising' of Jesus''.[908]

In this work, the Spirit is dependent on the Father and the Son:

''The Spirit finally completes the work of redemption, not through the fact that he glorifies himself, but through the glorification of the Father and the Son in their reciprocal community''.[909]

Todd S. Labute states:

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[904] ''Paul and Caesar: A New Reading of Romans''(Originally published in *A Royal Priesthood: The Use of the Bible Ethically and Politically*, ed. C. Bartholemew, 2002, Carlisle: Paternoster, 173–193).
[905] *Com Hebrews* on 8:1; Butin, *RRR*, pp. 196-7, n. 47.
[906] I owe this point, in conversation, to Alec Motyr.
[907] Gal 3:1 f; 5:1 ff. *Christian Doctrine of God*, p. 64.
[908] e.g. 1 Thess. 4:14. Refer Pannenberg, *ST*, 2: 346.
[909] *GST*, 2:125. Reference in Greene, ''Pannenberg'', p. 192.

"in a careful investigation of Pannenberg's theological programme the central motif of anticipation emerges as the foundation on which his entire system is built"[910]

Pannenberg describes the life of Jesus, made possible and empowered by the Holy Spirit, as not just

"a preliminary disclosure of the future … The future of God has already dawned…. The future of God is not merely disclosed in advance with the coming of Jesus; it is already an event, although without ceasing to be future."[911]

Jenson most of all characterizes the Spirit by futurity: it is through the Holy Spirit that the past and present are opened up to the new possibilities that it creates. The transformation of the universe, as the bringing of the future into the present, is distinctively the work of the Holy Spirit. Through the Spirit, God "*anticipates* his future and so possesses it…".[912] The Spirit is "the novelty of a genuine narrative", the One who brings about the Resurrection, "the great occurrence of dramatic causality in God…".[913] The work of the Holy Spirit is what draws all things forward to their consummation.[914] The eschaton, or Kingdom, will be characterised by beauty, or as Jenson loves to refer to Jonathan Edwards' vision of perfect musical harmony into which the divine conversation finally resolves itself.[915] The Final Judgment brings God's people into "exact concert with the Triune community and its righteousness" as this is defined by Christ's death and Resurrection.[916] Thus will the great eschatological transformation take place whereby the people of God will be Christ's availability to the world, and Christ will be our availability to one another.[917]
Jürgen Moltmann sees the future in the coming of the Holy Spirit, the *venturus* of God. Moltmann distinguishes between two concepts of the future, *futurum* and *adventus*, or *futur*

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[910] "The Ontological Motif of Anticipation in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg", *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*, June 1994, 276-82..

[911] Pannenberg; ST1:247. See Molnar, Paul D; 'Some Problems with Pannenberg's Solution to Barth's 'Faith Subjectivism'; *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 48,(1995),315-339. Marion Gray notes that having argued for the objective nature of Barth's approach, Molnar attempts to undermine Pannenberg's position by stressing the subjective nature of the concept of anticipation in Pannenberg's theology. He does this by referring to the *experience* of anticipation, rather than to anticipation *per se* [Marion Gray, unpublished draft of thesis, 2004]

[912] *ST* 2:121.

[913] *ST* 1: 160; Ive, pp. 131-4.

[914] Ive, pp. 131-2.

[915] Ive, pp. 97, 133.

[916] *ST* 2:326. See 2:300-1.

[917] *ST* 2:240, See also 2:355. This raises all the problems of the direct identification of the church as the *totus Christus*, since it is in danger, as is suggested below, of reducing Christ to the outcome of the historical process rather than being constitutive of it.

and *Zukunft*. According to Moltmann, the future in the sense of *futurum* is that which arises out of the past, whereas *adventus* refers to the future coming of Jesus in the *parousia*, which will herald the beginning of eternal time, and as such will break into historical time from outside.[918]

It is not even merely what would have been had not humanity fallen. As Meredith Kline (quite independently) puts it:

> ''Metapolis [of which the specifically redemptive version is the New Jerusalem] is not just an enlarged Megapolis [the city which might have been had humanity not fallen] but is a Megapolis that has undergone eschatological metamorphosis at the hand of the Omega-Spirit ….The eternal city of glorified mankind in the Spirit is a temple of God's Presence … Metapolis is at once the people-temple and the cosmos-temple, together consummated in the Glory temple''[919] ''In Metapolis, there is a cosmic diffusion of the theophanic heavens from the focus throughout the fullness of the city, so that no longer is the human experience of the heavenly vision available only at the mountain of Eden but everywhere in creation men worship in Spirit, the true, eternal heavenly dimension (John 4:21-24). For the Glory of the Lord fills the earth as the waters cover the sea (Hab 2:14). The focal axis becomes the cuboid fullness of the heavenly dimension of the holy of holies, which is Metapolis''.[920]

The Mountain of the Lord established at Mount Zion (where the Triune Presence is revealed in altar, Angel/Tabernacle and Glory-Cloud) there is the pagan counterpart of the Canaanite Mount Zaphon (Psalm 48:2) revealed eschatologically as Har Magedon. As Gregory Nazianzus puts it:

> ''Everyone that is of high mind has one country, the heavenly Jerusalem, in which we store up our citizenship. All have one family – if you look at what is here below the dust – or if you look higher, that inbreathing of which we are partakers [the Holy Spirit], and which we are bidden to keep, and with which I have to stand before my Judge to give an account of my heavenly nobility, and of the divine image. Everyone, then, is noble who has guarded this through arête and through consent to the archetype''[921]

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[918] Moltmann, Jürgen; '*The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology*'; ET Margaret Kohl, London, SCM Press Limited, 1996; p.25f ..
[919] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, p. 100.
[920] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*, pp. 270-1; see also p. 328.
[921] Or 33.12 in *Sources Chretiennes*, 318:32 in Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture,* pp. 312-3.

This is the culmination of the work of the Spirit, as Schilder puts it:

> ''For who are they that sit at the table of the Great Supper? They are those prepared by *the Spirit* to be members of the bride of Christ. He equipped them with wonderful gifts; He ''brooded'' over them to bring forth all that was beautiful and purely human; He regenerated them and gifted them with [97] heavenly gifts and cleansed them. And He finally delivers them to the Christ.''[922]

The vision of global peace, when the earth shall be full of the glory of God as the waters cover the sea,[923] is a result of this manifold work of God in the world through the diversity of human relations. This vision is based on the nations coming to know God, and the end of all things as they are consummated in the return of Christ. This is embodied in the Messianic hope, expressed, for example, in Isaiah 11, where the close relationship of Christ and the Holy Spirit in bringing about justice, and perfect peace is described. Jesus did not (*pace* Barth) rise into the eternal present, but into the future that awaits us of a new heaven and earth patterned according to the personality of the risen Jesus. Heaven is no more and no less than that future towards which the Spirit draws all creation and in which Jesus is located at the right hand of his Father.[924]

The new heavens and the new earth are the result of the transformation not the destruction of the present order (2 Peter 3:10 which refers to the heavens and earth being burned up, refers not to their destruction but to their being refined[925]). The vision of a new order is not a mere metaphor. The material order is itself part of which God intends. Archetypically, this relationship is shown in the act of Jesus calming the storm, showing not just that the material order is no hindrance to God's plan (as the Gnostics would have it), but that it is part of the very substance of his purposes. As Schilder puts it:

> when Christ said, ''Heaven and earth shall pass away,'' He did not in the least imply annihilation. Scripture, particularly in the last Book, predicts a renewed *earth;* but not *another.* The existing order and scheme of the universe will change— both of heaven and of earth, because heaven is not outside the realm of things created. That this change will be drastic is evident from II Peter 3:10ff, where we are told that the day of the Lord, the day of final judgment, will come with rushing speed and heaven will

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[922] Schilder, *Heaven*, p. 51.
[923] Isa 11:9 Hab 2:14
[924] Jenson, *ST* 2:123.
[925] N.T. Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God* (SPCK, 2003), p. 462. See also Al Wolters, ''Worldview and Textual Criticism in 2 Peter 3:10'', *Westminster Theological Journal,* 49:405-13.

pass away. That is to say, it will pass from sight. In other words, the old order will be replaced by the new. Moreover, the elements will be dissolved; nothing will be able to resist the raging fire. But dissolution does not mean annihilation. The elements themselves are not wiped out of existence, so that God must once again call things into being out of nothing as in Genesis. The form and fashion of things will change; the appearance of heaven and earth, and their relationship to each other, will be new and glorious.[926]

Beauty for Jenson, is ''the cosmic actuality of Jesus' Spirit'', that is, it takes us forward to that final achievement which the Resurrection of Jesus has won.[927] As the very presence of the Spirit, Jenson agrees with Edwards that Beauty may not be reduced to being a secondary good; rather, it is the expression of the total final congruence of the life of the Trinity. Jenson takes up Edwards's argument that Beauty is a specifically Triune quality, with the Sprit providing the harmony between the Father and the Son.[928] The presence of the Spirit in worship gives ''spiritedness'' to the church's praise and petition. This praise and petition is grounded in the narrative of Jesus as it is opened by the Spirit who bears the promise in and through that narrative of the future where, as Jenson puts it, recollection is set within the context of anticipation.[929] Jenson adopts Edwards's contention that as Beauty is the defining character of God, through the movement of praise and the consciousness of God's Beauty, which is the operation of the Spirit, we enter into the very being of God as Beauty in our anticipation of the End, when, as Jenson puts it: ''worship and art will be one''.[930] Jenson reports with approval Edwards's suggestion that the ''final state'' of the moral universe will be a full participation by the world, as represented by the worshipping community, in the beauty that flows from the ultimate glorification of Christ.[931]

Edwards suggests that the coming of the Spirit, as the bringer of the End, is characterised by beauty. Beauty is the harmony between the Father and the Son. Like Augustine, Jenson sees the Spirit holding together the relationship of the Father and the Son. Using an argument suggested by Edwards, he argues that harmony always requires an other, because it requires self-consciousness for which the presence of an other is necessary. But Beauty cannot itself be the achievement of that harmony, since the achievement is neither the Subject nor the Object of the relationship so defined. It is through the Spirit that the achievement of that

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[926] Schilder, Heaven, p. 37.
[927] {Jenson, 1984 #2456} , p. 175. See Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' , p. 5.
[928] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , p. 176; Jenson, 'Beauty', pp. 251-2; Jenson, 'Theosis', p. 111
[929] ''Liturgy'', p. 191. See ''Drama'', p. 160.
[930] Jenson, 'Beauty', p. 254. See ''Protestant'', pp. 60-1.
[931] Jenson, *America's Theologian* , pp. 180-2.

harmony is brought about and made reliable. This is not a static act but one which constitutes God's own liveliness.[932]

In the context of the work of God in the world, it is the Spirit who realises the new creation to which belong all believers, among whom Jenson seems to include eventually the whole of humanity. Only the redeemed community of the End can truly name God. Our naming of God before this is through our foreshadowing or *mimesis* of the final reality, guided by our anticipation of their sight, rather than on the basis of our own presently imperfect vision.[933] This anticipation cannot be extrapolated from our present situation. Rather it is made possible through the guidance of the Spirit alone as we recollect his proleptic act of raising Jesus from the dead.[934]

Transposition, as C.S. Lewis points towards a hope which is yet unfulfilled. Is this pointing towards an a-temporal reality, or to perfections of the divine identity along the lines of the Thomist *analogia entis*, or might there be some other understanding? To get at this, we might first of all think of that which is being pointed to in eschatological terms. To be sure, we are not talking about the mere prolongation of the existing state of affairs, but we are not talking about its annihilation either. Rather what is anticipated is a transformation of heaven and earth, of our own bodies - the whole of our being and the our known environment will be made anew (not a new universe but the present one changed not beyond all recognition, but transcending the pains and sorrows of the present giving them a previously only dimly longed for and only imperfectly at best foreseen, weight and significance.

But this is not just about pie in the sky when we die. It isn't in the sky, in the sense than it will be a physical universe, more solid not less (this is beautifully brought out by C.S. Lewis in his book *The Great Divorce*, where the water is so solid that it can be walked upon). It will not be purely of significance ''when we die'', either, since, because of the continuity with the present, what we hope for has greater significance for us now. Trees will still be trees, but trees with a sap and pith such as that of which we can only dimly be aware of now. Gerard Manley Hopkins writes of the Binsey Poplars which have been ''unselved'' through their

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[932] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , pp. 173-5; Jenson, 'Beauty', pp. 251-2.
[933] Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' , p. 106.
[934] ''Proclamation'', p. 28; ''Futurist Option'', p. 24; Jenson, 'What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology' , pp. 16-18; Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' , pp. 106, 108. See also 3.1 where the shift in Jenson's thinking about the role of the Spirit *vis a vis* the Father and the Son is noted.

being cut down.[935]   But the 'self' of the trees is not linked to their future and the way the trees now lost will be restored and transferred in the eschaton.

The end of all things is the hope of all things through the work of the Holy Spirit and all things live out fully their given relationships in their individuality to the call of the Father, according to the measure of the fullness of the stature of Christ - the embodied reality of the Son. Because of our hope, we have what Cranfield calls, ''an incentive to moral earnestness''[936]

This can be seen in the eschatological character of Paul's understanding of Christian ethics. To say that Paul's ethics are eschatological in character is not to say that it they are to be understood as apocalyptic in nature as if Paul is advocating temporary measures in the light of an imminent Parousia. Indeed the Thessalonian correspondence and other passages in the Pauline corpus, such as I Corinthians have been read in this light; and this is often contrasted with what is seen as the less prominent, and imminent eschatology of what might be characterised as the ''eschatological reservation'' of Romans, Galatians and also Philippians', and even more so with the settled eschatological focus of the ''Deutero-Pauline'' corpus, namely Colossians, Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles. However, we shall argue, that the eschatological urgency does not proceed simply from the practical urgency of the situation (which we shall argue is distinguishable from the expectation of the ultimate Parousia). Rather, it flows directly from Paul's central theological concerns in a broader way.
1 and, more debatably, 2 Thessalonians are held to be the earliest and, it is argued, least mature reflection of the eschatological expectations of Paul and the early church. I Thessalonians especially is held to reflect Paul's early expectation that the promised return of Christ, and the ensuing judgment and resurrection would occur within his own lifetime - perhaps drawing on a promise of Jesus preserved in the Synoptic tradition that this event would take place within the lifetime of his hearers. However, with the passing of time and the growing realization of his own all too imminent death, Paul modified this expectation, as did the early church to at least seeing this promise as not immediately realizable (this shift partly, although not entirely, reflected in 2 Thessalonians). Increasingly, it is argued, the emphasis was shifted from an expectation of the imminence of Christ's return to an emphasis on how we are to live now; and with the eschatology taking the form more of a resurrection hope rather than a personal expectation of participation in the *parousia*.

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[935] Hopkins, Gerard Manley. *Poems.* London: Humphrey Milford, 1918; Bartleby.com, 1999. www.bartleby.com/122/. 19. Binsey Poplars.
[936]*Romans: a Shorter Commentary*, (Eerdmans, 1985), p. 330. This is with reference to Rom. 13:11, but also Phil.4:4-7; 1 Thess. 5:1-11, 23; Heb. 10:24 ff.; Jas. 5:7-11; 1 Pet. 4:7-11 and also Mt. 23:31-46 and Mk. 13:33-37

The Thessalonian correspondence reflects the precarious political situation within which Paul and the Early Church operated. The precariousness of that situation may have given rise to an anxiety and an expectation on the part of some that Jesus would quickly return to take them to safety. This expectation would have been heightened by the duality of the apocalyptic language in which the eschatological teaching of Jesus had been couched, drawing in turn from the different elements of Old Testament apocalyptic, and identifying God's imminent judgment with that which he himself decreed. Jesus was at once indicating the certainty of judgment on Jerusalem for its rejection of him, and, at the same time, setting this in contrast the wider expectation of his final return - and warning his hearers not to confuse the two. Paul was writing to mainly Gentile Christians, within the context of harassment by Jews, and of temporary restraint by the Roman authorities both of persecution by the Jews, and of measures by the Roman authorities themselves.

Within this context, they were to look beyond their present difficulties to the final coming of Jesus to take to himself both the living and the dead. But they were not to see this as something removed from the historical process, or something they could receive passively (perhaps understanding this eschatological perspective incorrectly in terms of millenarian expectations). Specifically, they were not to take this as an occasion to neglect their vocational responsibilities. On the contrary, the final coming was to be preceded by great tribulation and judgment, first of all on God's chosen people, the Jews. Through all this they were to maintain hope and integrity, so that, in and with Christ, they might be gathered up with him as sharers in his power and glory as the Lord of history. In 1 Thessalonians, Paul attempts to re-focus their expectations firstly by explaining to them the promise of the future resurrection. Death is not the end of the hope which we have but the beginning. We have the promise that we are to ''meet the Lord in the air'' (4;17), that is, building on the promise of Zechariah 14:5, we shall, in our resurrected state, participate with Jesus in the future rule of the world (the air or the clouds are the symbols of God's authority and power within history).

Negatively, he attempts to remove from them the idea that this coming of Jesus is something which they can predict. By reminding them of Jesus' words he shows them that this is the opposite of the case. Our eschatological expectation should not take the form of speculation about times and dates. Rather, it should be about living in a godly way in the here and now. Both positively and negatively, therefore, Paul is telling the Thessalonians that eschatology is indeed a hope for the future, but that it needs to be lived in the present. In 2 Thessalonians Paul warns of the dangers which the Jews they have in store for the Christians, their ''co-religionists'' in official Roman eyes. At present, there is a restraint in operation (κατεχων – ο κατεχον may even be a coded reference to the Emperor Claudius, from whose policy for the time being the Christians are enjoying a relative benefit). But this will not last for ever, and before long a violent outbreak by the Jews (*apostasia*) will result in a savage response by the a ''lawless'' local procurator, less benign than Gallio (such as Felix of

Judea), or perhaps the attempt by the previous emperor Gaius Caligula to desecrate the Temple in AD 40 may be brought into effect by the rise of another Caligula. These political changes may well be accompanied by religious manifestations, possibly demonic. In the light of these hard realities, the response of the Christian community should be to ensure that they maintain their integrity and self-discipline.

The Corinthian correspondence is the other source that is taken to reflect an expectation of the Parousia. Paul's eschatology in the Corinthian correspondence is primarily centred on his understanding of our common participation in Christ, as members of his body or temple (the two analogies which he uses there). There has been much discussion about what ''being-in-Christ'' means. Discussion had been divided in the earlier part of the century of an ''eschatological'' interpretation of this, represented notably by Albert Schweitzer, and the mythological interpretation by Rudolph Bultmann and his followers. In *The Mysticism of St Paul the Apostle*, Schweitzer saw this as arising out of Paul's mysticism, which he held, undergirded Paul's theology.   He argues that Paul moved beyond the purely future (and unfulfilled!) expectation which Jesus had of the imminence of the supernaturally-promised Kingdom of God. According to Schweitzer, Paul was essentially a pre-millenialist, (like the authors of the apocalypses of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch), while Jesus taught simply the imminent general resurrection from the dead. To reassure the believers about their state prior to the general resurrection at the end of the messianic age, Paul argues in I Cor. 15, according to Schweitzer, that there are two resurrections, experience of one being a necessary and sufficient condition for the other [p. 94]. This first resurrection ''in a mysterious fashion'' is a share in the dying and rising of Christ, through which believers come to share the resurrection life with Christ [p. 96].

Being-in-Christ for Paul is characterized,, argues Schweitzer, by possession of the Spirit, since it ''proves to believers that they are already removed out of the natural state of existence and transferred into the supernatural'' (p. 167). Possession of the Spirit is manifested in the exercise of spiritual gifts (I Cor. 12:4-11) [p. 169], including ecstatic speaking with tongues such as is described in I Cor. 14, where Paul is affirming the basic validity of the practices described there, despite laying down guidelines for their orderly expression, which he does on the grounds of superior revelation [pp. 170-1]. For Schweitzer, this understanding of our ''being-in-Christ'' through the possession of the Spirit (deriving in turn from Paul's eschatological perspective) formed the basis of Paul's understanding of the sacraments. According to Schweitzer, the ''Pauline form'' of the Lord's Supper as described in I Corinthians, is specifically a memorial of Jesus' death (as opposed to the community fellowship meal tradition instituted by Jesus himself). In the course of the meal, the ''mystical doctrine of the being-in-Christ'' is asserted (p. 269). Similarly, baptism, dealt with in 1 Corinthians in 12:13 and in the context of baptism for the dead (15:29) is understood as entering' into the mystical 'being-in-Christ'.

Schweitzer's understanding of the doctrines of possession of the Spirit, and its corporate expression in the sacraments has largely been taken up by E. P, Sanders in *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (1973), as his explanation of Paul's theology (although Sanders does not necessarily accept the eschatological schema which Schweitzer provides as the explanation for the doctrine), Sanders contrasts Paul's mystical participations soteriology with the ''covenantal monism'' of Judaism, which Paul rejects not because he finds it defective as such but because it conflicts with the ''exclusivism'' of his soteriology (p. 49). A different view of the nature of the operation of the Spirit and sacraments has been taken by Rudolph Bultmann in his *Theology of the New Testament,* taking up the view associated with Wilhelm Bousset in his *Kurios Christos* (1913) that the ideas of participation in Christ's death derived from the Hellenic mystery religions. Bultmann argues that Paul made use of the concept of ''being in Christ'' drawing an analogy with the identification of participants in mystery religions; with the dying and rising divinities - but Paul made use of this mystery motif to give them an entirely ethical content. Bultmann takes the line of seeing Paul's opponents as Gnostics who denied the resurrection altogether. Paul, he argues turned this around against his opponents to reinterpret Christ's death using the categories of Gnostic myth to reinterpret Christ's death and resurrection are ''cosmic occurrences'' by which the old aeon with its powers has been destroyed (I Cor. 15:21 ff, 44-49); but for Bultmann, the freedom thus won, in a figurative sense, is something which is to be appropriated by an individual act of faith, ''In Christ'' for Bultmann is not a mystical relationship to Christ, but a response to the divine deed of salvation, the giving of the Spirit Is not a mystical experience either, but quality of a standing in God's grace.

Schweitzer's contention (that Paul's belief that resurrection of the body takes place in the present), and Bultmann's (that it introduced extraneously on as analogy with a dying and rising deity in the Hellenistic mystery religions) have both been contested by A.J.M. Wedderburn in *Baptism and Resurrection* (1987), who argues that the Corinthian Christians are unlikely to have been of the view that the resurrection had already happened when Paul in 1 Cor. 15 is already proceeding on the assumption that they do not believe that there is any general resurrection. Rather, Wedderburn argues, the Corinthians believed that the heightened experiences they enjoyed were regarded as the supernatural gifts of life and wisdom, rather than being equivalent to an already appropriated ''resurrection'' in Schweitzer's sense or even a purely spiritual one, as Bultmann would argue his Gnosticising opponents were contending. In 1 Corinthians 4:8, where the ηδη might suggest that the Corinthians were claiming the possession of the new kingly order, it is more likely the possession of distinctive spiritual gifts rather than the possession of a ''realised'' resurrected existence.

In Corinthians 6:13, Wedderburn argues that the issue at stake was not so much a Gnostic denial of the ethical considerations to the material order, as a perhaps Hellenic influenced over-concentration on reception of the pneuma without drawing its implications for life in the body of Christ. The essence of Paul's concern in his rebuke to the Corinthians is not a ''mystical'' one as Schweitzer would have it, nor a purely ethical exhortation to live a moral life. Rather, he is calling the Corinthians to the deeper reality which should undergird their life together - he is calling them to an awareness of the reality of that which should bind them together; their corporate commitment to Christ. What lies at the root of the new status in Christ is no much a change of being (''mystical'' or otherwise) but a change of *Direction.* This change of Direction is expressed as a corporate reality, in the recognition of and living out by the community of believers of their cosmic purpose in Christ. One could put it epigrammatically by saying that the purpose of ''being in Christ'' is not so much an ecstatic state but an ek-static movement i.e. a corporate moving of the community of believers beyond themselves in recognition that the meaning of their community does not derive from themselves, or even from itself, but rather obtains its foundation (as temple) and coherence (as body) from Christ.

Paul uses the metaphor of the temple to apply to the problem of division that is afflicting the church.   Divisions had arisen because those responsible for them had focused their attention on leading apostolic or likewise influential figures rather than Christ (1:11; 11:18).   Even those who claimed to be focusing their vision on Christ, by doing so in a partisan way are belying their claims, since the temple founded on Christ is by its nature not a self-perpetuating clique seeking its own reputation and advantage, but is properly motivated by the same self-giving attitude which Christ showed on the cross, and based on that attitude (1:10-31; 3). The Spirit is given us as the one who opens our understanding to this reality, and, moreover, empowers us and moves us in that reality. Belonging to the body of Christ, and by corollary possessing the Spirit is not an alteration of mystical state as Schweitzer reads Paul, nor even as Bultmann reads Paul, is it a new experience of God's grace. Rather, as Paul describes it in I Corinthians 10-14, it is the sharing of what Dunn describes as the ''corporate dimension of religious experience''.

J.A.T. Robinson has pointed out that the body is primarily an expression of solidarity.[937] As an expression of solidarity our bodies are inescapably committed in one Direction or another; we can either have solidarity with the collective force and power of sin and death, or we can have solidarity with Christ, and by turning to him, become the beneficiaries of His redemptive act of death and resurrection. In 1 Corinthians 6, the sexual act is described as the quintessential act of physical commitment, an expression of the solidarity of the marriage

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[937] The Body (1952).

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bond. Paul links marital faithfulness to faithfulness to Christ, (and in 2 Corinthians 11:2 develops this idea of the church as Christ's bride further). Paul moves from describing our bodies as the members of Christ to describing our body, i.e. the objective expression of our corporate existence, as the temple of the Holy Spirit.

Our bodies are therefore ourselves for other people: our bodies are what makes community possible: *corporate* existence implies *corporeal* and vice versa. This consideration is what gives ground and necessity for the resurrection; since the Christian hope is a communal one, the Greek idea of the immortality of the soul has no place. It is only by being resurrected as physical beings that we can in the future be the body, the temple in which the Holy Spirit resides and be able, in the future order, be able to express that love for one another (demonstrated in the sacrifice of Christ for us in his body) which gives meaning (one might say ''embodiment'') to true spirituality (which is why the practice of baptism for the dead referred to in 15:29, although based on a misunderstanding of the nature of baptism, at least makes sense in that it demonstrates the necessary link between our love for those closest to us who have died, and our hope to see them again in physical form for that hope to have any meaning). The hope that we have is not merely for resurrection, but also for re-direct ion; the corporate corporality of the future life will be freed from its solidarity with sin and death, and re-directed (as σῶμα πνευματικόν. -15:44) to be fully the body of Christ and temple of the Holy Spirit.

The ''eschatological'' view of the future, therefore, reflected in the Thessalonian and Corinthian correspondence is not so much the expectation of an immanent parousia of Christ and Paul(like the Jesus tradition reflected in the Synoptic Gospels) is careful to distinguish between the political exigencies of the present - and the expectation of the future reality to be guaranteed by the present gift of the Holy Spirit. The former centred anxieties about the worsening situation in Jerusalem, and involved the worsening relationship between Jews and Christians both there, and in the Diaspora, by the hounding of the Paul's mission by the Jews, many attempting to confuse his converts with strange types of Hellenic syncretism. It also involved Paul personally in constant danger. This is set against the backdrop of the Jesus tradition, also reflected both in the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel, about the impending destruction of Jerusalem. The first signs of this were already apparent, and although, despite the restraint presently being shown by Claudius, the memory of Caligula and his attempt to erect his statue in the Jewish Temple not long before (with all the memories this aroused for the Jewish people from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes and the Maccabean revolt) was a constant reminder of the explosive nature of the situation and the threat hanging over the historical covenant people of God through whom God had revealed his Law - and who had largely rejected the basis of that Law. Paul is careful both to allow for the urgency of the present situation, but at the same time to have a disciplined and stewardly approach to the task which we have now in expectation of the glory which is to come.

Thus, far from arguing for its supercession, throughout, Paul is concerned to affirm the identity of Christ with the revelation of God in the context of the Jewish people.   This identification is a forward-looking one in that, unlike the situation of the Jews who have not accepted Christ, it is not a clinging to the revelation of the past. Rather, it is a stewarding of that revelation in the light of the transformative identification of Christ with the Law, and the receiving of the Holy Spirit as the power of the future and the present realisation of the hope of the glory that is to come. The eschatological expectation is focused both on Christ and on the work of the Holy Spirit.

Romans 10:4 locates the purpose of the Torah in Christ. Based on a study of the Pauline, biblical and extra-biblical use of the term Badenas argues that telos τέλος should be translated as ''object'', ''purpose'' or ''goal'', in other words, telos in Paul has a teleological denotation, rather than implying termination. He cites to back up this contention, namely: 6:21/22 (the telos ... is death/eternal life). This teleological denotation of τελος is reflected in all thirteen occurrences of the use of the word in the Pauline corpus. This is also true of the Deutero-Pauline corpus, such as is found in I Timothy 1:5, where the telos of the promises is love. In non-Pauline use, this is also reflected in 1Peter 1:9, where the telos of faith is salvation.[938] This reading of Romans 10:4 is at variance with the antinomian reading of the verse in Lutheran circles (but not Luther himself, who, like Calvin, read τελος primarily as ''fulfilment''). Even if it is not given an entirely antinomian thrust, it is interpreted periphrastically a ''the end of the law as a way of salvation'', or ''the end of the law aeon'', or perhaps ''the end of the law as an existential experience''. This reading of Romans 10:4 gained currency especially from the Eighteenth century onwards, with as rationalistic distrust at all tradition. F.C. Bauer followed by D.F. Strauss interpreted history as a movement away from what would be seen as outdated legalism. Adolph von Harnack in the quintessential statement of the liberal position stated that it indicated ''the merely temporary validity of the Law and therewith the subjugation of the Old Testament religion''.[939] For Albert Schweitzer, the verse means ''the logical conclusion from the fact that the law ceases when the Messianic Kingdom begins''.[940]

As has been discussed in the previous section, ''Law'' in Paul is not a general concept, as the Lutheran/liberal exegesis would have it. Rather, it is more specifically the *Jewish* Law that is

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[938] *Christ the end of the Law* (1985). pp. 38-79

[939] *History of Dogma* (tr. N. Buchanan, 1894), p. 87 quoted by Badenas p. 251

[940] The Mysticism of St. Paul. p. 1893 Rudolph Bultmann argued that the end of the law meant the existential liberation which takes place in the life of the believer when he surrenders to God in faith. and enters into a new relationship with God [''Christ the End of the Law*' quoted Badenas, p. 303

in question. This is clear from the context of Romans 10:4, where Deuteronomy 30 is brought forward as the basis of Christological confession. The Law here that we see in Christ is that truth which was entrusted to Moses and was preserved by the Jews, although ironically, it is peculiarly they who have rejected it. Therefore, contrary to the Lutheran/liberal exegesis, the point of Romans 10:4 is not whether the Law continues to be valid; rather, it is Christ who is its sole and transforming purpose.

As indeed the argument of Romans 9-11 indicates, this understanding of God's dealing with the Jewish people has a dual reference. In the short term, the Jews are to be judged for their rejection of Christ (manifested in their then persecution of the Christian mission being spearheaded by Paul). In the long-term, it laid the basis for a new community, neither Jew nor Gentile'': a new integrated Israel, which, as a comprehensive entity, would be the locus of God's saving work and purposes so that ''all Israel'' (i.e. this new entity'') would be saved.[941] In the context, of this new community, the Law itself takes on a new meaning. It is no longer primarily to be understood as a boundary marker, a token of God's electing purposes; rather, as the ''law of love'' (which is both implicit and explicit in the Jewish Law, notably in Leviticus 19:34 - see also Romans 13:8 and Matthew 22:3), it demonstrates the character of the new community in the inclusive quality of love as a direct reflection of the person of Christ.

This is the eschatological ethos of the new community, which, as J.C. Beker put it, makes the Christian's work transparent to God's redemptive purpose''.[942]   But Beker is wrong to say that Paul ''ruptured the connection between Torah and Christ''. Rather, as in the Gospel of Matthew, by affirming the validity of the Law,[943] Jesus transforms and makes radical its application. Rather than seeing the Law as marking out a secure and well-defined pattern of life, Jesus calls for total self-giving.[944] In Paul, the quality of love is that which draws the future into the present, as can be seen notably in 1 Corinthians 13. Again, as Beker points out, for Paul, the Law is primarily ''promise'', and more specifically the promise of Christ.[945] It is Christ who is the canon within the canon, so that by reference to Christ it is possible to see which way the Law is heading. The distinction between   γράμμα and πνεῦμα made in 2 Corinthians 3: 6 indicated this dynamic. As Beker suggests, γράμμα is primarily pejorative: it is contrasted in that chapter with γραφή, which signifies the promiser.. 253]. Unlike Beker, it might be suggested that this reflects not so much a disjunction between Christ and

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[941] Romans 11:26

[942] *Paul the Apostle*, p. 247

[943] notably in Matt. 5:17

[944] Matt.16:25

[945] p. 252

Law; but rather an opening out of the Law in a more explicitly Christological way. Here γράμμα should be understood not as referring to the Law itself, but rather to any attempt to read and apply the Law except on the transformative basis of Christ. Scripture (γραφή) is that which pointed to Christ's coming, and which promises his return. By the Law we are assured that the universe is not simply a game of chance but an ordered coherence in which all things are seen to have meaning in the promise of Christ to return and set all wrong right. Closely related to a Christological (and therefore eschatological) understanding of the Law, is the promise of the Spirit. In Christ we have the ''first fruits'' (ἀπαρχή) or ''down payment'' (ἀρραβών), which is the Holy Spirit (Rom. 6:23; 2 Cor. 1:22; 5;57) As Beker paints out [p. 278], the genitive ''of the Spirit'' should be understood appositionally, not partitively. The reality of the Spirit, like the reality of Christ, is an eschatological one; it is a taste of the fullness that is to be. It is the work of the Spirit that reveals Christ as the promise, but it is also through the Spirit that the present if that promise is made evident. This is the explanation of the paradox in Romans 8 where the Sprit is both presented as giving us present eschatological peace and joy,[946] and causes us to sigh with unfulfilled longing.[947] Far from lifting us out of history, the Spirit draws us forward within it.   Spiritual reality is not something which we possess (as if we can somehow ascend out of the troubles of this world); rather it posses us, and through which we interact prophetically with our situation discerning right from wrong. Paul does not generally talk of the Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Christ except in a number of isolated contexts.[948] Nevertheless, as can be seen from the wide scattering of references to it, is part of his world-view just as it was of the Synoptic Evangelists – or indeed the Fourth Evangelist. The Kingdom of God is the presence of God made evident among his covenant people for the transformation of the world.
The evidence of God's presence in the Old Testament took the form of the *kabod*. There it is the radiant light of God's presence in the cloud of his appearance, or, as the *shekina* is specifically revealed as being present at the centre of the cultus. For Israel in the wilderness, the *kabod* was a cultic representation of God's going ahead of his people either as a pillar of fire by night or as a pillar of smoke by day. In Second Isaiah (a favourite Scriptural source for Paul), the *kabod* is revealed eschatologically as the manifestation of God's victory.[949] Despite Paul's ''eschatological reservation'' in avoiding the triumphalistic identification (to which the Corinthian church was prone) of the presence of the gifts of the Spirit with the glory that is to come; nevertheless, Paul locates the presence of the Spirit, as the *kabod* among the believers. This can be seen in 2 Corinthians 3; but also lies behind Romans 8

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[946] vv. 1-16
[947] vv. 17-27
[948] Rom. 14il7; I Cor. 4s20; 6;9, 10; 15:24. 50; Gal. 5:21; Eph. 5:5, Col. 1:13; 4:11; I Thess, 2:12; II Thess. 4:1. 18
[949] Isaiah 40:4,5

where Paul in 8:30 seems to indicate a present state of glorification for justified believers. As Beker puts it:

> The Spirit as our new domain foreshadows our final freedom and glory; and the Spirit as the power of ethics pushes us toward that glory by overcoming the powers of this world.[950]

This still leaves us with the tension between the reality of our present status In the Spirit and the anticipation of the glory that is to come in the power of the Spirit - both of which we receive as it were as a reflection of the glory of Christ. As Beker puts it, there is a tension between Paul's ontological and his eschatological language. This is also mirrored in the tension between the indicative and the imperative mood of Christian ethics: we are already declared righteous, and yet we are charged to live righteously in accordance with that reality (a constant feature of Pauline paraenesis). If we are to take account of this tension, the reality of the present must not dull us to a true *ek*-spectancy: an appreciation of the pain of the present and a true hope in what is to come (unlike Kierkegaard's geese,[951] who considered the pain of the reality outside too profane for their sacred Sunday gatherings).

The covenant is a link between the past, present and future, which is not confined to the historical process but is transcendent from it. In this way, it is not historicist, the way that Oliver O' Donovan describes in *Resurrection and Moral Order* or, as M.C. Smit puts it, something which attempts to locate the meaning of history itself.[952]

The meaning of history is unfolded through the relationship of the Son and the Spirit. As Pannenberg puts it:

> ''... the Son, as the Logos of creation, is the principle of its order, by which all phenomena in their variety are related to one another ... the Spirit of God is the life-giving principle, to which all creatures owe life, movement and activity.'' [953]

Narrative can only take place in conjunction with the Direction and embodiment of the Son by the Father through the Holy Spirit.

There is a problem which M. C. Smit points out, namely, as he puts it:

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[950] p. 28.
[950] p. 28.
[951] Søren Kierkegaard, ''The Tame Geese,'' in *Kierkegaard's Writings*, Howard V. Hong, ed. (Princeton University Press, 1978-2000).
[952] Smit, *Towards*, p. 231
[953] *ST* 2:76. [has this been quoted already?]

> ''When a historical event is so heavily charged with divine judgment, and when God is the Sole Agent in history, Christ recedes into the background''[954]

Smit also identifies a related problem in the difficulty that people of the Early Middle Ages had with regarding history as an indivisible whole.[955] He points out that it was not until the Investiture Controversy that concepts of Providence or divine world-order began to emerge, namely, a dualistic conception distinguishing between God's direct and indirect actions.[956] Smit sees two fallacies that dog any attempt at a Christian conception of history: the first is to identify God's action as entirely supra historical; the second, conversely, is to identify God with the historical process itself and so to divinise the historical process.[957] But, as Smit points out, with reference both to the book of Job and Psalm 73:

> ''Not only the so-called 'acts of God' but the whole of human history displays its full, authentic meaning when God reveals himself in his fullness''[958]

If the story has no end ($\tau \acute{\varepsilon} \lambda o \varsigma$), there is no point to it. The end of the story, which the Holy Spirit brings, is the object of our longings. It is this hope that draws us forward and to which we are prisoners.[959] As with all good stories, there is the constant element of surprise combined with continuity with what went before it. This sense of ''eucatastrophe''[960] is central to the Trinitarian vision. The unexpected triumphs over that which is most feared and which seems otherwise invincible; and the power of goodness, truth and beauty is seen for what it is. It is the beatific vision which draws all things forward and which makes sense of all endeavours, however bleak and seemingly futile or cruelly destructive. George MacDonald has a striking passage to this effect, when the North Wind, who is about to sink a ship, says:

> ''I do not know exactly where it is, or what it means; and I don't hear much of it, only the odour of its music, as it were, flitting across the great billows of the ocean …but

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[954] ''The Divine Mystery in History'' (inaugural address of 27 September, 1955) in *Towards a Christian Conception of History*, p. 226.

[955] *Ibid,* p. 226.

[956] *Ibid*. p. 227.

[957] Smit, ''Meaning in History'' in *Towards*, p. 325.

[958] *Ibid*, p. 228

[959] As Moltmann strikingly put it, drawing on the Old Testament prophets, with specific reference to Isaiah, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God* .

[960] As J.R.R. Tolkien calls it in his essay ''On Fairy Stories'' in *The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays* (London: Harper Collins, 1997), pp. 109-161.

what I do hear, is quite enough to make me able to bear the cry from the drowning ship.''[961]

This is not to lessen the pain of the present, or to devalue the real burden and problematical nature of evil and suffering. But it is to put it in context.

Narrative is constituted by the work of the Holy Spirit, not adventitiously, but through the opening up of significant events. The key turning point is the event of the Resurrection (i.e. the Resurrection of Jesus). All things thereafter need to be seen *sub specie Resurrectionis*. In this respect, the Resurrection is not just a past event, but the concrete guarantee of a future hope.

If there is no embodiment in a story, there is nothing that can be said about it. Pure spirit lacks the temporal-spatial context for anything to be said about it narratively. The Resurrection above all is about embodiment. It is the embodiment of Jesus: on the cross he surrendered his body to the worst that sinful humanity could do to him. He did not just speak words of goodness, he put his whole-embodied self at our mercy - and we did not spare him. In the narrative of the unfolding of the Triune work in the world, there is true diachronicity: things are not simply repeated age after age, but there is genuine movement forward. This was the crucial insight of Augustine of Hippo in his *City of God* and is central to a Trinitarian understanding of history. Augustine made it clear that the Christian view of history could only be linear, not cyclical. Moreover, in contrast to the pagan view, history is not moving to an inevitable *Götterdämerung,* but to a joyful culmination. Even the Fall could be seen as part of the providential purpose of God – *O felix culpa!*

At the same time, in addition to the point of concentration (at the beginning, centre and end), M.C. Smit also identifies *points of concentration*, where ''the first history lays hold of the progression of time, sometimes for centuries''.[962] From the accounts of creation on, the grand narrative is not a mythic account, with purely ontological, a-temporal claims, but rather a purposive entity with a history.[963]

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[961] *At the Back of the North Wind,* Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1994, p. 84.
[962] Smit, ''The First and Second Histories'' in *Towards*, p. 378
[963] *ST* 2:10-11, 14, 318-9.

History is based on the grand narrative of the gospel centred on the person of Jesus Christ.[964] From the accounts of creation on, the grand narrative is not a mythic account, with purely ontological, a-temporal claims, but rather a purposive actuality with a history.[965]

(iv) The Work of the Persons in Perichoretic Interdependence

We see first the Father as he is known as the Origin of all things in and through the Son and through the agency and execution of the Holy Spirit. All persons and things have their distinctive individuality through the calling of the Father, and are named by the Father. This is made known to us in and through the Son and is effected by the Holy Spirit. Second, we see the Son, whose unbroken relationship with the Father and the Spirit assures us of his continuing transcendence, becoming a fully human individual; and through the anointing of the Spirit and declaration of the Father becoming 'the Christ' ('the Messiah' – the anointed one).[966] The many different aspects of the world are bound together harmoniously in the relationships made possible in and through the Son. As the Son is the one in whom all things hold together, so this allows us to comprehend the diversity of all things without reducing them to one another. He is the focus of all things, and yet he frees all things fully to fulfil the calling they have from the Father, as they are empowered by the Holy Spirit. Third, we see the Spirit sent by the Father and witnessing to the Son – indeed, bearing the latter's identity as the 'Spirit of Christ'. The Holy Spirit makes all things possible according to the will of the Father, as they are transformed according to the eschatological measure of the risen Son. This is true not just for each element considered separately, but also for the elements seen in combination. In all these dynamic interactions, dependence does not constitute a deficit but enables each of their distinctive work.

A perichoretic view sees the three Persons acting jointly and in mutual dependence at every juncture in the great narrative of the creation, redemption and final transformation of the world. While it is necessary to distinguish the role of each of the Persons, it is crucial not to see any of the great acts of creation, redemption and the transformation of humanity and the cosmos as pertaining solely or even primarily to any one of the Persons. While the Father has an initiating and commanding role in the act of creation, one needs to see at the same time that the Son an ordering and revealing role and the Spirit an effecting and transformative role in that action. Similarly, the act of redemption is carried out through the will of the Father, by

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[964] Ive, p. 76. In this sense, it cuts across the modernist and the post-modernist accounts alike. The best overall account of the grand narrative as Jenson sees it is in *Story and Promise: A Brief Theology of the Gospel about Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
[965] *ST* 2:10-11, 14, 318-9.
[966] Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 108-109.

the Spirit and in and through the Son (in whom all things hold together). Redemption is motivated by the love of the Father for the world and humanity, through the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Son as he was empowered in each of these through the Spirit. The transformation of the world is effected by the Spirit under the rule and anticipated return of the ascended Christ, in the authority and to the glory of the Father. Thus a perichoretic grounding for a Christian philosophy will need to take account alike of the common work and yet distinctive roles of all the three Persons in the creation, redemption and transformation of humanity and the cosmos.

(f) The Trinitarian Alternative to the Scholastic Dilemma

We have seen, in the previous section, that the Trinitarian worldview allows us to conceive of God as at once faithful in his dealing with the world, and yet not dependent on the world for his existence. Here there is a significant break between Reformational philosophy, conceived on a Trinitarian basis, and what is called 'scholasticism'.[967]

Although 'scholasticism' refers in the first instance to the philosophy developed by the medieval schoolmen, the term is used in this study to denote the influence from earliest times of Greek thought upon Christian thinkers as they attempted to present a coherent and intellectually credible Christian account of God and the world. However, in so doing, it is argued that Christian thought was seriously compromised in the categories it used to analyse and describe both God and the world. From a Reformational perspective, scholasticism attempts to understand the world (as 'nature') on the basis of reason, and then adds to this prior view, the insights and conceptions provided specifically by revelation ('grace'). From a Reformational perspective, reason as human beings is utterly tainted by the effects of one's

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[967] 'Scholasticism' for Reformational thinkers following Kuyper, refers not simply to the thinking of the most developed exponents of the approach in the medieval period, but also to a deeply ingJenson, *R.A.I.* ned tendency from before the earliest days of Christianity right up to the present day (see D.F.M. Strauss, 'Skolastiek en Gereformeerde Skolastiek kontra Reformatories-Christlike denke', *Ned. Geref. Theol. Tydskrif* (1969)). To compound the difficulty in using the term, Reformational thinkers tend to use 'scholasticism' not simply as a term of historical description (i.e., referring to the thought of the universities in distinction from medieval monastic thought), but also pervasively as a polemical term against one another, using it to describe tendencies of thought inconsistent with the tenor of biblical revelation, and, most specifically, the tendency to operate within the confines of a 'grace/nature' dualism (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 98-104). This critical-polemical use of the term 'scholastic' by those in the Reformational tradition needs to be distinguished from the strictly historical-sociological use to characterize the academic practice of the medieval schools rather than the theological reflection of the monasteries (Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*: 1.360-405; 4.391-403). That 'scholasticism' has a more 'neutral' historical-sociological usage, does not necessarily exclude its critical-polemical use.

sinfulness and therefore any capacity within us to function as reasoning beings either independently, or even semi-independently of one's basic orientation as human beings is impossible. Moreover, it is not simply that we do not have the capacity to function as religiously neutral reasoning beings. The very notion of an eternal law of reason is also deeply suspect in this regard, since to posit anything eternal apart from God compromises God's sovereignty as the Creator of all things. Associated with the ideal of eternity projected onto God himself, there is also the notion of an eternity or *aevum* between God and the universe, through which God reveals himself to humanity, and in which humanity participates through the progressive appropriation of eternity. In terms of this scholastic ideal, temporality is seen as a deficit.

Scholasticism has at its heart, a *via negativa*, i.e. a view of God as essentially unknowable. At the heart of this approach there is basic contradition. There can be no final via negativa. For example, to say that God is '*above* conceptualization', is not to make no claims about God, but, rather, to fall back into a spatial analogy as dominant in one's faith discourse. Scholasticism is not and cannot be consitent in this regard. It smuggles in a monadic deity through the back door, for example with talk of God as 'originating essence' or the like. In practice, scholasticism charactises this 'orignating essence' either in terms of God's intellect ('intellectualism') or God's will ('voluntarism').

The first scholastic way of approaching an understanding of God, then, is the 'intellectualist' approach. This proceeds from the idea of God as a supreme mind that gives the universe its character. Here we see the influence, albeit in different ways of the philosophical thinking of both Plato and Aristotle.[968] The intellectualist approach is evident in Boethius (c. 480- c. 525), who played a critical role in shaping the scholastic tradition. Boethius famously defined a person as a 'rational substance'.[969] God as the supreme person is thus the perfection of intellect, or as Boethius puts it: 'understanding alone is the property of the divine'.[970]

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[968] Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 42. Shults points out that Boethius was influenced heavily by Neoplatonic and Stoic influences transmitted especially through Augustine [Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 45]. Vollenhoven sees the influence of Alexander and Galen who equated the divine Logos with the universal intellect (Vollenhoven, 'Norm en natuurwet (51h)' /5 60-61; Aristotle, 'Metaphysica' : Bk. 12, Ch. 12, //1069b-1076a 1872-1888).

[969] Boethius, *De persona et duabus naturis* 3 (Patrologia Latina 64:1343) quoted in Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 42.

[970] Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Joel Relihan (Indianpolis: Hackett, 2001), 142 quoted in Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 42. Boethius holds in theology we need to proceed according to the mode of the intellect as study of the substance of God which is 'without matter and motion', as opposed to the mode of learning in mathematics, concerned with bodies with matter, and the mode of reason in the natural sciences, concerned with bodies with matter and motion. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*: 116 who quotes *De Trinitate*, c. 2.

Moreover, God cannot act except in accordance with his substance, that is to say pure reason. The intellectualist approach characterises the thinking of Thomas Aquinas especially.[971] The interpretation of Thomas is a vexed question, subject to a variety of different views, not least about the nature of analogy itself.[972] Nevertheless it can be suggested that through the *analogia entis*, Thomas argues for a certain continuity between the **B**eing of God, and the *b*eing of the world. The being of the world is suspended from God's Being, and in the process of redemption, one's mind is drawn to participate in the mind of God.[973] The divine nature is both the principle of all things, the Being from which all being derives, as well as that which subsists in itself and can only be made known by divine revelation.[974] However, God is a 'highest intelligible', free from matter and truly universal.[975] Through the eternal law (*lex aeterna*), all things are ordered, and there where God works in his actions in the world through secondary causes.[976] The *lex aeterna* springs directly from the mind of God, and is reflected in the *lex naturalis*, which can be known by human mind as a reflection of divine reason.[977] In sum, the intellectualist view sees God as the epitome of eternal universals.[978]

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[971] Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)' : 69.

[972] Here one might mention the debate between the Cajetanist interpretation seeing the analogy in proportional terms and those who see it as an 'analogy of relation' or an 'analogy of intrinsic attribution'(See Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas* (2004)).

[973] Smith, *Radical Orthodoxy*: 156-166. Gunton, *Triune Creator*: 99-102; Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 45-46. Paul Janz notes that according to Milbank, we can have 'participation in the mind of God' according to a certain kind of cognitive 'illumination' through reason and revelation, the latter being a heightened form of the former [Oliver Davies *et al.*, *Transformation Theology: Church in the World* (2007): 110, 112, n.131 who quotes John Milbank, 'The Theological Critique of Philosophy' (1999): 24].

[974] Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*: 120. For Thomas, the Trinity is in this second category. This supplements what can be known by natural reason (Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*: 122 Aertsen quotes from *In Boeth. De trin*. Q. 1.4, *sed contra: 'Deus esse trinum et unum est articulus fidei'*, and the *corpus articuli*).

[975] Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*: 124-125. Here the distinction between *ratio* (that which pertains to the world of sense experience, and that of *intellectus* (which pertains to the unchanging world of pure contemplation) comes in).

[976] Dooyeweerd, 'R.K. en A.R.S.' 9-10, 13.

[977] Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 356-357; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.* : 147-149; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* : 1.183-188.

[978] Roy Clouser in his trenchant exposition of the Reformational position identifies the 'A.A.A.' (Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas) with what is called here the 'intellectualist' position. As Roy Clouser points out, to identify God as the supreme perfection not only presupposes an independent measure of the God's perfections, but still requires there to be unconditional and infinite properties which God is required to possess. The notion of divine simplicity as developed by Anselm and Thomas Aquinas is designed to get around the problem that the perfections might be thought of existing independently of God and so compromise God's aseity; but this only reduces any discussion of God to complete unintelligibility since all the properties of God are identified with one another and with God himself (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 202-219). It might also be noted that an intellectualist scholasticism can also be discerned in the Mu'tazulite tradition following Wasil b. Ata' (700-748),

The alternative to the intellectualist approach is the voluntarist approach. Here God is seen primarily as the one who exercises sheer will, and things are as they are simply because God so decrees. From a voluntarist point of view, God is entirely unknowable and arbitrary; this view can be identified in both Epicurean and Stoic philosophy,[979] but it was chiefly through first Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308)[980] and William of Ockham (c. 1300-1349) that it came to prominence in scholastic thinking. William emphasized the absolute power of God (*potentia absoluta*) unconstrained by the divine ordering of the world (*potentia ordinata*).[981] The voluntarist view of God stresses the discontinuity between God and the world and unlike the intellectualist view, rejects any attempt to deduce the character of God from the character of the world.[982]

However, necessity and contingency are both bi-polar relationships. A unitarian understanding involves seeing the relationship between God and the world in bi-polar terms: God is represented by a single point of action of intellect or will.[983] Both the intellectualist

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and those Islamic theologians influenced by both Aristotle and the neo-Platonists (Majid Fakry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (1970): 56-204, 302-346).

[979] Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 43.

[980] Vollenhoven, 'Short Survey (56b)' : 69.

[981] Dooyeweerd, 'C.H. en A.R.P. 3': 63-64; Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 358-361; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.* : 147-148; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* :1.185-188; Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 44-47; D.F.M. Strauss, *Philosophy as the Discipline of Disciplines* (forthcoming): ms. 360-361. The foundations for William of Ockham's position were laid by John Duns Scotus, although for Scotus, unlike Ockham, the attributes of both divine and created being are real *per se*, not a matter of convention. See James F. Ross and Todd Bates, 'Duns Scotus on Natural Theology' (2003); Gunton, *Triune Creator*: 117-125; Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 146.

[982] As an alternative to the A.A.A. (mentioned above) position, Roy Clouser in effect puts forward what is called here the 'voluntarist' position. Clouser qualifies this voluntarist approach with the caution that that the term 'will' itself is an anthropomorphic term which should not be identified with the 'originating unknowable being of God'. In its place he seems to prefer to refer to God's 'unconditional being'[Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 361, n.318]. However, this only succeeds in replacing a personal description of God with an impersonal one (in Dooyeweerdian terms, he replaces a cultural-formatively qualified conception with a physically qualified one). See also Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 66-87. Voluntarist scholasticism can seen in the tradition which followed Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873- 935) and which is now dominant in Sunni Islam (Fakry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*: 228-261, 380-381). This was the anti-voluntarist point which I take Pope Benedict to have been making in his much misunderstood 'Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections' (University of Regensburg, Tuesday, 12 September 2006).

[983] A Trinitarian conception of creation (or redemption) is not bi-polar but Triune: each person is seen as immediately and distinctively engaged with the world in creation, redemption and in the bringing of all things to their final glory, in a way consistent with their relations to to one another Conversely, the world is not related to God as an entity over against God, but is the result of the joint action by the three Persons in its creation and redemption.

and the voluntarist views see the relationship between God and the world in correlative terms, be it of conjunction or disjunction.[984]

While the intellectualist view holds that the being of the world is linked with that of God (even if the 'Being', duly capitalized, of God, is only analogically related to the being of the world), the voluntarist view denies this. From the voluntarist perspective, all being is 'univocal': that is, it presents itself to us on its own terms not by virtue of its dependence on something else.[985] God takes on, sheerly by an act of will, those attributes that he chooses to assume, having first created those attributes similarly by sheer fiat. Scholasticism, whether in its intellectualist or voluntarist forms, presents us with a certain problematic. It tries to address the problem of explaining the relationship between God and the world, either as intrinsic, necessary, a priori, continuity (as in the intellectualist view): or as extrinsic, contingent, a posteriori, discontinuity (as in the voluntarist view).

At root, the scholastic problematic arises from attempting illegitimately to apply the categories of necessity and contingency to God, as it God were an entity within the causal structure of the world. But this is a category mistake, as is shown by the absurdity of the problem which then posed: God is seen either as subject to the laws which govern creation, or is seen as entirely arbitrary. Scholasticism leaves us with the question: 'How is it possible both to understand God as free and transcendent and as knowable and not arbitrary'?
F. LeRon Shults has pointed out the difficulty that arises from the conception of God as a single subject, either as a single intellect (as in the intellectualist view) or as a single will (as in the voluntarist view).[986] However the concerns which scholasticism addresses - safeguarding God's justice and truth on the one hand (as in the intellectualist view), or his sovereign aseity on the other hand (as in the voluntarist view) - are valid and genuine ones. A Trinitarian approach can affirm both God's involvement in the world and his transcendence of it, without reducing God to the world, or seeing God as entirely detached from it. In particular it allows us to understand the world as subject to God's law, without implying thereby that God himself is subject to that law.

By building his thinking on a Trinitarian foundation, Kuyper lays the basis for moving beyond the scholastic dilemma and for a radically new start. In doing so, he draws on the covenantal Trinitarian basis described previously.

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[984] Paul Janz ponts out that disjunction is no less a mechanism that brings entities into comparative relation than conjunction (Davies et al., *Transformation Theology*: 106-107).
[985] Smith, *Radical Orthodoxy*: 88-89, 93, 96-100.
[986] Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 41-65. See Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* :1.509.

The key break is with the medieval scholastic dichotomy between intellectualism and voluntarism. Calvin rejected both with his dictum '*deus solus legibus solutus est*' ('God alone is free of law' – against a intellectualist understanding of God) '*sed non exlex*' ('but is not arbitrary' – a rejection of the voluntarist position). God for Calvin can only be known as he reveals himself – that is, as Trinity. Any attempt to get 'behind' God's Triune reality or posit a non-Triune essence is vacuous speculation – an empty idea flitting around the brain.

How the dichotomy is overcome was not fully developed in Calvin, but is developed more elsewhere in Reformed tradition. God cannot be bound by forms outside of the Godhead – God binds himself, freely, in the eternal pact between the Three Persons which is the basis of our creation (Genesis 1:26) and redemption (John 17:2). In the Reformed tradition, this eternal pact is misleadingly called the 'covenant of redemption' but it not just about redemption, but about creation as well – it is according to the will/authority of the Father that all things are created, through the Son and by the Spirit. It finds its political expression in the federal ideal – not least in the thought of Johannes Althusius, the great German Reformed philosopher, and also more recently, in the thought of Abraham Kuyper, with his notion of sphere sovereignty. The covenant of redemption is also key to the thought of Jonathan Edwards, as well the theologians of 'Old Princeton', such as the Hodges and especially B.B. Warfield, as well as Bavinck in the Netherlands. However, the old scholasticism does tend to creep back, with the old scholastic lists of 'communicable' and 'incommunicable' attributes with which the old systematic theologies tended to be prefaced. God does not 'possess' attributes in this way – God simply *is* who he reveals himself to be – 'I am who I am'.

Van Til develops Kuyper's insights, and argues that the Trinity is the sole basis for understanding the unity and plurality of the world. He holds that relationality is only possible and intelligible in the light of the unity and diversity of the Trinity. In the Trinity, unity and diversity are equally ultimate. It is only through Christ, and illuminated by the Holy Spirit that relations a possible, and indeed knowable.[987] Any attempt to define the subject and object in relation to one another involves the relation and definition of both recognizing the equal ultimacy for their intelligibility (i.e. their subjection to a universal hermeneutic) and their particularity (i.e. that unique location and character distinct from all others). Moreover the relation itself cannot (pace Kuyper) be understood purely in universal terms (according to which change is impossible) or in purely particular ones (according to which nothing can truly be related to anything else – for who is to say that the entity to which we are now related now is the same as that to which I was related a moment ago), As for Van Til, the Persons of the Trinity are related to one another, so it is possible, and indeed certain, that any

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[987] *Van Til, 'An Introduction to Systematic Theology (1949D)' (1997):* Ch. 3, B.

relationship in the created order can properly be understood and spoken of. The original Adamic consciousness showed a full congruence between the covenantal relationship with God and the world, and the understanding and living out of relationships, and their delineation in terms of subject-subject or subject object.[988]

The Persons of the Trinity are bound solely by their mutual relationships, not by universals, the laws of creation, or anything outside their mutual love and commitment to one another. God as Trinity has in God's own constitution the ultimate principles of unity and diversity. Therefore, argues Van Til, there are no eternal universals which exist alongside God or to which God is subject: He does not need to refer to any principles beyond himself. God as Trinity is unity in diversity. God does not need to create the world in order to express his diversity. He exists prior to, and apart from, creation in the mutual and complete relationships between the eternal Persons. [989] As Van Til puts it:

> The immanent relations within the three Persons of the holy trinity are the foundation of the relations that the Triune God sustains to the world. It is, of course, true that we know nothing about the immanent relations within the Persons of the trinity except through the revelation of this trinity through Christ in the Scriptures. But since God himself has told us that he is Triune in his being, it is this Triune being that lies at the foundation of creation and redemption.[990]

Lane Tipton characterises Van Til's position as setting out the 'representational principle': inwardly ('immanently') in the relations of love between the three Persons, and outwardly ('economically') in the covenant arising from these relations, according to which the world is created and redeemed.[991] For Van Til, the covenant asserts the principle of personality at the heart of the universe, and places humanity in a person-to-person relationship with God.[992] This Trinitarian approach is different from an intellectualist one where God is subject to an eternal order of reason and from the voluntarist alternative where God acts purely arbitrarily. The commitment of the Persons to one another provides the settled basis for God's dealings

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[988] *Van Til, 'Systematic Theology' :* Ch. 3, B.

[989] Van Til, 'Christianity and Barthianism (1962 H)' (1997)10. 2: 'The Reformation View of Christ' where he draws on Herman Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* (1918). That the Christian faith describes God as Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' , 'Son' and Jenson, 'Holy Spirit' , in other words using figures of speech derived from creation ('father', 'son', 'wind' or 'breath'), does not mean that these relationships come into being after the act of creation. Rather, these created forms of expression are the means by which God authoritatively tells us how we are to speak of him.

[990] The Theology of James Daane (1959), Ch 3.1 in Van til, Cornelius, The Works of Cornelius Van til, (New York: Labels Army Co.) 1997.

[991] Lane G. Tipton, 'The Triune Personal God: Trinitarian Theology in the Thought of Cornelius Van Til' (2004): 114-142.

[992] John M. Frame, *Cornelius Van Til: an analysis of his thought* (1995): 59-60.

with the world, as well as showing us God's aseity. The order of the world is not correlative to God. God is neither subject to reason, as in the intellectualist schema, nor without reason, as in the voluntarist schema. The Trinitarian position offers a radical alternative: God's relationship with the world is not that of one entity to another. The world, rather, is where we see expressed the free and sovereign relationships of the Persons one with another. This last is a presuppostional belief made on the basis of Scriptural revelation, not something that can be extrapolated from one's experience of the world. Nevertheless, Van Til argues, it is necessary for one's true understanding of God's relationship to the world, and indeed for one's understanding of the world itself.

From a Trinitarian perspective, the character of the world the character of God but is neither necessary to nor contingent to the being of God. The order of the world is the expression of the free covenantal love of the Persons of the Trinity for one another, which is then expressed in the sovereign engagement of all three Persons jointly in the world. In terms of this understanding, God is not in the first instance Creator, but a divine, self-contained community of love. The world is not an extension of God, since he does not depend on the world in any way, even as creator. The Persons are fully self-contained in their relations with one another, and the world is created freely, not out of necessity. But God is genuinely engaged in the world through the universal action of the Holy Spirit and the embodiment of the Son.

Thus, God the Trinity is not dependent on creation or redemption, but is revealed 'economically' through creation and redemption. Of course we can only know God through creation, but in Christ, we have God's definitive revelation of himself as Triune.[993] There are no categories of being to which God needs to conform, but God reveals finally and authoritatively how we are to speak of him. Trinitarian belief holds that it is that truth which is the key to the universe. We know God directly and immediately, because we know Jesus, whose fully human personality is at the same time the personality of God.

In broad terms, the Kuyper-Van Til doctrine of the Trinity explains how God can be engaged with the world and yet not an extension of the world - or the world an extension of him. The Son is known in the world, but through his relationship with the Father is not reducible to it. Through the Spirit he has a transforming life that breaks through any apparently insuperable constraints. So we see God's complete identification with the world - and yet his transcendence of it. The Son is fully incarnate yet he does the Father's transcendent will, empowered by the unsurpassable liveliness of the Holy Spirit. Jesus is identifiable as entirely human, yet is defined by his relationships with Father and Holy Spirit.

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[993] The being (ontology) of the Trinity consists in the relations of the Persons – the Persons are mutually dependent (*pace* subordinationism) and eternally distinct (*pace* Monarchian Modalism).

The key Trinitarian insight is that only the inner-Triune relations, not anything external to God, bind the Persons. Accordingly, from a Trinitarian perspective, God is not subject to the order of the world, although he reveals himself to us sovereignty and definitively in the language of the created order. At the same time, the notion of a discontinuity between the sovereignty of God and the order of the world is also rejected: the order of the world is determined sovereignly by the Persons acting together, not by abstract fiat of an essentially unitary deity.[994] The constitution of the world is not arbitrary or *ad hoc*; it is consistent with the covenant settled eternally between the three Persons. The love between the three Persons of the Trinity and their joint love for the world is revealed as the basis for one's belief in the original goodness of the world, and holds out to us the hope of redemption.[995] In this way, and only so, can the scholastic dilemma be resolved. In this, Trinitarian basic religious belief is fully consistent with the concern of Reformational philosophy to find a genuine alternative to scholasticism.[996]

More specifically, the doctrine of the Trinity sets out for us why God is, as John Calvin puts it, both '*legibus solutus*' and equally '*non exlex*'.[997] Calvin's dictum decisively breaks with

[994] Calvin's own theology is often seen in these terms. It has voluntarist elements and was indeed presented as such by the voluntarist scholasticism of many of his followers. But this is to ignore the importance for Calvin of 'union with Christ' and the role of the Holy Spirit in the work of election (See Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God* ; and Richard B. Gaffin, 'Union with Christ: Some Biblical and Theological Reflections' (2006)).

[995] In terms of Dooyeweerdian/Vollenhovian modal analysis, love is ethically qualified. But the characterisation of the relations of the Trinity as loving involves all the modalities: the Persons proclaim divine status (pistical or faith modality), they give glory (aesthetic), they deal justly (juridical), effectively (economical), appropriately (social), truly (analytical), etc. with respect to one another. This is not to say that the Triune Persons are bound by laws. It affirms rather than, in their self-revelation, they provide a basis for seeing the world as law-governed and not merely arbitrary.

[996] This is not to say that there is not a reaching out to what is characterised as a genuinely Trinitarian approach during the medieval period. See Aquinas, *S.T.* ,1.32.1.3 where he argues that the knowledge of the divine Persons is necessary for right thinking about God as creator of the world, since to say that God produced all things by the Word by the procession of love excludes the possibility that he produced things by necessity. However, the dichotomy in Thomas' thought between grace and nature (or between revelation and reason) does not allow him to work this out fully in terms of one's overall understanding or the world, since from his perspective, God can only be known by reason in the world at large as single subject. Nevertheless, Denys Turner argues that distinction between '*intellectus*' and '*ratio*' (inherited from Augustine) points towards an understanding of God as at once transcendent of the world and yet engaged with it, and that, moreover, both *intellectus* and *ratio* are graced, i.e neither is is autonomous (Denys Turner, *Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God* (2004): 80-88; Oliver Davies, *The Creativity of God: World, Eucharist, Reason* (2004): 31-36).

[997] Calvin, *Institutes*: 3.23.22; John Calvin, *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God* (1961): 10.13, 179. Dooyeweerd quotes Calvin's dictum in Dooyeweerd, 'C.H. en A.R.P. 3': 64-65, 75-76; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W. :* 1.56-7 and *Dooyeweerd, N.C. :* 1.93, also Dooyeweerd, 'Kuyper's wetenschapsleer': 216 – but he does not develop the tinitarian insight implicit in it. In *Dooyeweerd, W.d.W. :* 1.56 he only quotes the first half of

the antithesis between metaphysical realism and nominalism (the epistemological counterpart of the distinction that has already been made between intellectualism and voluntarism).[998] God is '*legibus solutus*' because laws result from the mutual compact of the three Persons acting out of freedom and love, not out of submission to any external or impersonal law or principle. God is '*non exlex*', since the mutual love of the Father, Son and Spirit gives the universe both stability and settled character.

This account of God as Trinity is central to the thought of Kuyper and Van Til. Although both derive from the Reformed tradition, each saw the implications of the Trinitarian account for a philosophy deeply rooted in the self-revelation and actions of God as creator and redeemer. This Trinitarian account provides a genuine alternative to scholasticism in both its intellectualist or voluntarist forms. It is also consonant with the broad themes of Reformational philosophy:[999] the irreducible plurality of the world and of society under the rule of Christ; the integrity of the individual subject before God; and the purposiveness of the world through the work of the Spirit.

I have described how Kuyper and Van Til provide a framework of Trinitarian thinking and how a Trinitarian basic religious belief provides the basis for an integrated understanding of the world without sacrificing unity to diversity, or vice versa. From the covenantal Trinitarian

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Calvin's dictum '*Deus solus legibus solutus est*', but it is clear that he means both elements, since it is quoted in full in *Dooyeweerd, N.C. :* 1.93. He also quotes this to the Curators of the Free University during his interrogation (Dooyeweerd, '[Second Letter to the Curators]' in *Dooyeweerd Archives* (1937): 9). See also Vollenhoven, *C.R.W. (33a)*: 25; Vollenhoven, 'Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)': 22; Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §13, p. 15; *Divergentierapport I.*

[998]Dooyeweerd mentions the divergence between the intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas and the notion of the *potestas Dei absoluta* of William of Occam which the latter ranked above the *potestas Dei ordinata*. Dooyeweerd sees the *potestas absoluta* as rooted in the Greek matter principle whereby the divinity is seen as a lawless fluidum operating through blind Anagke, whereas in Thomas the rational form principle was absolutised (R&S 2, Chapter 6, Part A, section 16. See also Dooyeweerd, 'Calvinism and Natural Law' : 16-17; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.147-148; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* :1.186-187 ; Dooyeweerd, 'Kuyper's wetenschapsleer': 216). As Dooyeweerd puts it: 'not in a divinized reason', nor in a depostic nominalistic 'potestas absoluta' does the law find its Origin in the pluriform revelation in the temporal ordinances, but in God's holy Creatorly will, that which agrees with the whole fully salvific being of God, in the unbroken *unity* and *fullness* of His love, justice, omnipotence, beauty and holiness' ('Nòch in een vergoddelike 'rede', nòch in een despostische nomilatische '*potestas absoluta*' vindt de wet, in haar pluriforme openbaring in de tijdelijke ordening, haar Oorsprong, maar in Gods heiligen Schepperswil, die met het geheel volsalig wezen Gods, in de overbrekelijke eenheid en volheid van Zijn liefde, gerechtigheid, Wijsheid, almacht, schooheid en heiligheid te zamen stemt') (Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 370). Dooyeweerd's decription of God's will for creation locates it in love at the heart of who God is, i.e. the love of the Persons for one another, not a metaphysical principle on the one hand, or an impersonal, unknowable deity on the other.

[999] As identified in Chapter 1.

perspective developed by Kuyper and Van Til, God's relationship with the world is not a necessary one, since the Persons are already fully defined and have their being with respect to one another. On the other hand, it is not a contingent one, since it is not an arbitrary fact that the world is as it is; it flows from the settled belief of the Persons for one another.

It also allows us to see God's relationship with the world in terms which avoid the two horns of the scholastic dilemma: on the one hand, the intellectualist horn, which sees God as subject to eternal universals, and, the voluntarist horn which sees God as an agency in purely contingent relationship with the world. Both intellectualist and voluntarist views see the relationships between God and the world in correlative terms.

Consistent belief in God as Trinity avoids the false dilemma which scholasticism poses of having to see God in either primarily intellectualist or voluntarist terms. From a Trinitarian perspective, God is understood in terms, first of all, of the prior and self-contained relations of the Persons to one another. It is only on the basis of this prior recognition of God as the eternal, self-contained relations of love between the Persons that we can satisfactorily speak about God's relation to the world as creator or redeemer. One's relation to God as Trinity cannot be defined in purely theoretical terms, but addresses us at the core of one's being. God's Triune nature and one's relationship to him is the precondition for one's apprehension and fundamental trust in creator and redeemer.

Central to the Reformational vision is the creation and redemption of the world. Creation and redemption cannot be thought of in isolation from one's conception of the creator and redeemer.[1000] Some Reformational thinkers have tended to focus on God's action as creator and redeemer and have tended to play down the need to set this fully within the Trinitarian context. For example, Roy Clouser argues in his *Myth of Religious Neutrality* that the Trinity is properly a secondary belief, subordinate to one's understanding of God as creator.[1001]

[1000] This excludes the conception of creation and redemption as impersonal processes. Such a conception is not in discussion here, but even if it were, the point would still apply. In that case, we would talk of impersonal determinism, or alternatively the operation of sheer chance, rather than about the engagement of a personal creator and redeemer.

[1001] Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.* : 220, 364, n. 42. Clouser appeals to the Gregory of Nyssa via the exposition of Jaroslav Pelikan (Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (1993): 212, 231 ff., 235) that these are statements of the 'relationship' – of the relation of God to humanity and of the relation of the divine *hypostases* to one another, rather than the *ousia* of God. Drawing on a notion of eternal creation from Thomas Aquinas [Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.* :201, 361, n.16. See *ST:* 46.1. Note that this is a hypothetical question posed by Thomas]. Clouser concludes from this that these relations of Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' , 'Son' and 'Spirit' 'generated by Divine being and therefore [eternally created]' (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.* : 364, n. 42). Clouser's position thus finally resolves itself into one which gives primacy the divine unity over the diversity of the Persons. This can be contrasted with the statement of Gregory of Nazianzus, which John Calvin quotes with approval in several

However, if one's conception of the creator is a unitarian one, one is forced to conceive of God either in continuity or discontinuity with the world: either the world is an extension of God's being, or God is entirely separate from the world. The former conception, (often called 'panentheism' to distinguish it from 'pantheism' – an outright identification of the world with God) tends to accord divine status to elements of the world and compromises God's aseity.[1002] The latter conception of creation lays itself open to the sort of critique which Feuerbach makes of belief in God: the created order is seen in essentially impersonal terms, and the autonomous individual itself becomes, by default, the source of its own meaning and the measure of all value.[1003] Only if we conceive of creation in Trinitarian terms can we adequately take into account both God's transcendence of the world and his engagement with it.[1004]

Similarly, a unitarian approach (that is, any approach with starts off from the conception of God as a single subject, rather than as Trinity) will tend to see salvation either as participation in God's being, or at least somehow in God's intellect, or, alternatively, as the sheer implementation of a divine fiat. It cannot address the reality of the incarnation, or the divine self-sacrifice at the heart of the Christian gospel. The incarnation is thus seen either as the extension of God's being into the world, [1005] or God taking on properties of the created order and making them his own.[1006] But such a view either compromises either God's

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places, which stresses the equal ultimacy of the Triune unity and diversity: 'I cannot think of the One without immediately being surrounded by the radiance of the Three; nor can I discern the Three without at once being carried back to the One. When I think of the Three I think of him as a whole'(Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.* 40.41, NPNF, Series 2, Vol 7 712; John Calvin *Institutes*: 1.13.17; Calvin, *Commentary on the Gospel according to John* : 1.1; Epistle 607. See Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response* : 42-3, 124 161, n. 33; p. 206, n. 5.).

[1002] Vollenhoven, 'Realisme en nominalisme (38v)', *P.R.* 3 (1938): 74; Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.* ; Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 132. Shults refers to Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, ed., *In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheist Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World* (2004) but also notes the ambiguity in the use of the term 'panentheism'.

[1003] Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 56.

[1004] Gunton, *Triune Creator*: 134-145.

[1005] Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God* .

[1006] This is the position which is taken by Roy Clouser, who states that '*God anthropomorphized himself*' (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 230-231, Clouser's own italics]). But Clouser is not consistent, and states variously that God created Jesus (using all his three senses of the 'created', including as a timeless universal, or what Clouser calls 'created3'), the 'second person of the Trinity' became incarnated in the human Jesus, and God assumed to himself the whole person of Jesus becoming the divine side of Jesus just as Jesus is the human side of God (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 217). To sustain his position regarding God's creation of timeless universals, Clouser needs, ironically, to resort to Thomas Aquinas (Clouser, *Myth 2nd edn.*: 201, 216, 361, nn. 16 & 17. See Aquinas, *S.T.*: 1.46.41). Unlike Thomas, Clouser sees the universals as willed eternally by God rather than ideas in God's mind (see ST: 1.15.3). However, whether as known or willed by God, the mere positing of eternal universals is deeply problematical. Colin Gunton has pointed out the difficulties that there are with the

transcendence (holding in some way that it is the Father who is crucified in an act of cosmic self-immolation),[1007] or else it compromises Jesus' divinity (holding alternatively that in it is only the human Jesus who dies and is resurrected). Only on a Trinitarian basis can a proper account be made of the incarnation and the full significance of Jesus' redemptive act. The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325 and 381) affirms that it is the eternal Son of God (not the Father or the Spirit) who is incarnate.[1008] The eternal distinction of the Son from the Father and the Spirit combined with his full and equal status as God with the Father and the Spirit is critical here. The incarnate Son's unbroken relationship with the Father and the Spirit assures us of his continuing transcendence, while making possible his assumption of full humanity.[1009] By his mention of Son and Spirit, Dooyeweerd clearly indicates that it is to the Triune God of scripture, not to an unknown deity, that we are called to place one's ultimate religious belief.

When we speak of God as Trinity we are responding to God's self-revelation supremely and definitively in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and his incarnation, death, resurrection and ascension.[1010] In revealing himself to us, God does not speak to us in anything other than a creation-bound way, but he uses that language sovereignty and definitively to tell us how we are to speak of him.[1011] As Van Til points out, that we know God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit does not mean that these relationships come into being after the act of creation. Rather, these created forms of expression are the means by which God authoritatively reveals his own

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Augustinian-Thomist notion of the timeless universals. On one hand, it undercuts the sole eternity of God, since there are eternals alongside God, albeit created by him. On the other, paradoxically, the idea of God's eternal act of creation undercuts the idea of God's involvement in time and lays the foundations for deism. It also tends to see history as the playing out of what has already been decided from eternity, or as the interplay of pre-determined elements (Gunton, *Triune Creator*: 79-102). Dooyeweerd himself is highly critical of the notion of universals being accorded a hypostasized existence be it '*ante rem*' (from beforehand), in re (instantiated in individual things) or *post rem* (existing in one's mind), since it involves the detachment of the logical subject-object relation from the temporal meaning-coherence of reality (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.* :2.317-318; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* : 2.386-387). Thomas's position is but *in re* since for him the universal forms only become operative once they are individualted by matter (for Thomas, following the later Aristotle, the *principium individuationis* is located in the matter side of the form-matter schema). (ST 15.3.4). However, Thomas's 'moderate realism' still involves eternal universals as Ideas, albeit instantiated in individuals.

[1007] This recalls Tertullian's jibe against Praxeas that he 'crucified the Father' ['Against Praxeas', Ch 1 in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers,* Vol. 3, ed. A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (The Ages Digital Library Collections, Books For The Ages Albany, OR USA Version 2.0, 1997): 1082.

[1008] Philip Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom With a History and Critical Notes* (2007): 2:57-65.

[1009] Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 108-109.

[1010] Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.13.12; Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*: 1-72..

[1011] Vollenhoven, 'Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)': 82-83.For Van til, we are always 'thinking God's thoughts after him'[Van Til, 'A Survey of Christian Epistemology (1969 F)': Ch. 5]

nature and constitution to us, insofar as we can know anything of him at all.[1012] The fact that he is revealed in created terms does not compromise God's transcendence. As F. LeRon Shults points out, divine infinity should not be contrasted 'extensively' as marking out a boundary between God and creation but should properly be understood 'intensively' as comprehending creation within the all-surpassing liveliness of God's action.[1013]

It is meaningless for us to speak of a divine reality 'beyond' God's Triune self-revelation: the Trinity is God-in-himself not in the sense of giving us secret knowledge of God 'beyond' the language of creation, but in the sense of presenting us with a limiting idea. As a limiting idea, the doctrine of the Trinity presents us with an 'as if' in one's discussion of God: it is not an attempt to speak of God as a metaphysical object beyond one's senses. Rather, if, as Christians, we are to speak of God, it presents us with the way we are to speak of him to the exclusion of all other identifications of deity.[1014]

To begin with God's role as creator and redeemer before taking into account his revealed identity as Father, Son and Spirit leaves us with an inadequate account of creation and redemption. This is not to gloss over the fact that as creatures, we can only speak of God in created terms. This applies to the doctrine of the Trinity (which involves the use of terms such as unity/threeness, simultaneity, begetting, communion, mutuality etc), but it applies equally to the doctrine of creation (with the use of terms describing succession, formative action, beauty etc) and redemption (with terms indicating liberation, forensic acquittal, loving sacrifice etc). Talk about God as Trinity is no more or less creation-bound than talk about any other doctrine of God, or indeed than any other characterisation of God, be it in positive or

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[1012] Van Til, 'Christianity and Barthianism (1962 H)' 10. 2: 'The Reformation View of Christ' where he draws on Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* . While this is reminiscent of the position of Karl Barth, the conclusions drawn from that affirmation are very different. Instead of setting the revelation of God against God's self-revelation in the world, this affirms that God's self-revelation is explicitly or implicitly the basis for one's understanding of the world. However, for a re-reading of Barth in this respect, see Stanley Hauerwas, *With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and Natural Theology* (2001):141-171.

[1013] Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 22-40, 97-132. Shults describes how scholasticism attempts to present a notion of infinity exclusive of the created order. However, the biblical picture of God speaks rather of God who 'fills the earth itself', whose infinity is not set against creation but revealed in it. In particular, he cites Calvin, amongst others, as holding to such an 'intensive' understanding of God's infinity [Shults, *Reforming the Doctrine of God*: 107]. However infinity is understood, it needs to be understood in terms of the created order, not as something distinct from it. D.F.M. Strauss points out that in terms of (Dooyeweerdian/Vollenhovian) modal analysis, that of 'potential infinity' is derived from a conception of numerical succession, while 'actual infinity', such as that articulated by Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), is derived from a conception of spatial simultaneity (Strauss, 'Theology'; Strauss, *P.D.D.*: ms. 243, 252-255). Different forms of infinity could similarly be articulated appropriate to each of the other modalities.

[1014] As R.W. Jenson trenchantly puts it: 'Is God the void? Or the principle of concretion? Or the distinct Creator in whose occasional action the ancestors' wisdom was founded? Or the Father of Jesus? Or who? Or what?' (Robert W. Jenson, 'The Christian Doctrine of God' (1989): 31).

negative terms. It does, however, provide us with a rich and fruitful way of understanding God's relationship with the world, safeguarding both his transcendence of the world, and his engagement with it.

Thus, a Christian perspective needs to affirm first of all that we as human beings, as those made in God's image, are called by God to respond to his love for us and to love one another. This basic religious call needs to be expressed in the full range of the different kinds of relation in which we find ourselves This provides us with a different basis for our ontology (that is, for our understanding of what there is); and our epistemology (how we know what here is) of the world. The world is not the extension of God's being, but it reflects and bears the impress of God's Triune action, in its creation, redemption and transformation and indeed, God's presence in and through his incarnate Son.

(g) The Centrality of the Heart

The Bible speaks of the heart, the central concentration point of our deepest hopes and desires. In all things the heart is the centre of human orientation (whether or not they recognize themselves as 'religious'). For a Christian, it is in the heart that each person encounters, and responds to God. God speaks to all human beings, but the human response can be distorted by over focussing on one or other element or aspects of experience.

As we have seen in the previous sections, when we say that 'God is love', we are not making a theoretical statement (for God is love to be a theoretical statement, we should be trying to reduce our description of God to one type of modal discourse – e.g. we might be trying to say that God only functions as an ethical being. This is the error of the modernist theologians of the late 19th century (such as Scholten in the Netherlands) whom Kuyper came to find so unsatisfactory after his actual pastoral experience with the 'kleine leiden' in Beesd. The young Abraham Kuyper enrolled for theological studies at the University of Leiden in 1855. That university was dominated by figures from a liberal theological background such as J.N. Scholten (1811-85), or Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1888) in Germany who saw theology purely in terms of making theological generalisations.[1015] In contrast to this, in the exercise of his pastoral responsibilities in his first parish at Beesd in the province of Gelderland between 1863 and 1867, Kuyper came into contact with simple belief belief in God. His encounter

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[1015] Louis Praamsma, *Let Christ Be King: Reflections on the Life and Times of Abraham Kuyper* (1985): 35-38; James E. McGoldrick, *God's Renaissance Man: the Life and Work of Abraham Kuyper* (2000): 16-17, 32-13; Frank Vanden Berg, *Abraham Kuyper: a biography* (1978): 9-21; R.D. Henderson, 'How Abraham Kuyper Became a Kuyperian', *Christian Scholar's Review* 22 (1992): 24-25, 28-29, 33-34; Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 29-31; 'Modernism' in Bratt, ed., *Kuyper Reader*: 115.

with Pietje Baltus (1830-1914), a peasant woman in his congregation, led to his conversion and his adoption of orthodox Calvinism.[1016] Deeply influenced by this encounter, Kuyper came to stress the need for inner transformation through the work of the Holy Spirit in personal religious experience. This is inner rebirth, or '*palingenesis*' which takes place in the 'heart', the religious centre of human existence. Indeed it was his discovery of the centrality of the 'heart' that was later to influence both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd so deeply in their joint enterprise.[1017] This inner transformation or rebirth is not merely an emotional experience but involves the adoption of an entirely new worldview. It is a religious re-orientation of humanity in a cosmic context.[1018] Kuyper came to see that God is love is a religious and covenantal claim, which grounds naive experience and theoretical reflection alike – it is not the extrapolation of ethical ideals. Jesus came to be Lord of all areas of life – not purely a teacher of ethics.

We need to put our engagement with God in the context of the great story which we find in the Bible: the Bible is the story of the love among the Persons and their joint acts of creation, redemption and the transformation of the world. God acts as Trinity in this great story – implicitly in the Old Testament, and explicitly in the New Testament. The Bible is the story of God's self-revelation as a community of love, and the way in which humanity is drawn into that community of love. The Christian worldview flows from our response, as those created, redeemed and transformed by God revealed covenantally to us in the loving relations of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God and the community Paul affirmed 'In him we live and move and have our being' in Acts 17.

'God is love' is a religious and covenantal claim, which grounds naive experience and theoretical reflection alike – it is not the extrapolation of ethical ideals. Jesus came to be Lord of all areas of life – not purely a teacher of ethics. If a lover says to his or her beloved 'I love you', and his or her beloved replies 'OK, but I know you are much more than that' it would be an odd response. Does it mean that somehow the beloved thinks his or her beloved is holding something back? This is at the heart of Who God is and what God does. This is the covenantal basis for Christian life and thought.

[1016] Kuyper, 'Confidentially (1873)' (1998): 55-61; McGoldrick, *Kuyper*: 36-37; Vanden Berg, *Kuyper*: 31-40; Henderson, 'Kuyper': 31-33; Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 32-34; G. J. Schutte, 'Abraham Kuyper – vormer van een volksdeel' (1987): 10-14; Henderson, 'Kuyper': 31-32.

[1017] The insight is not a new one; see for example, Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*: §423 (Byrne, *Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment*: 87-88).

[1018] Note 174 in Kuyper, 'Blurring': 398 (n. 363); Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §§13, 20; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §§48, 55. Kuyper contrasts his view to that of Modernism, where *palingenesis* is conceived of in purely abstract terms (Kuyper, 'Confidentially': 107).

Whatever status we might give to the story of the creation of humanity in the first chapters of the book of Genesis, the key point in the coming to be of humanity is the encounter with God – so that the human race can be described not just as *homo sapiens* but *homo religiosus*. The Adam and Eve story in Genesis 2 and 3 marks a boundary in terms of the human response to God, albeit through a single act of disobedience. This in turn led to the whole story of judgement and redemption, in which humanity's relation to God is seen through the experience of key figures, such as Noah, Abraham, Moses and David. Each of these key figures has a covenant associated with his name – a progressive revelation of the judgement on humanity for its disobedience but, at the same time God's gracious provision for human beings to be restored to a right relationship with himself. This process culminates in the coming of Jesus Christ, the Son of God becoming fully human, and dying and rising to provide the sole basis for the redemption of human beings through the power of his Holy Spirit.

Thus human beings, as the Triune image-bearers, are *dramatis personae* in the world as the *theatrum dei gloriae* as they are called to present the whole of who they are, and to have their minds transformed in their world-and-life-view and philosophy, not as an optional extra, but as their appropriate service to their Lord. This does not reflect or argue for the explicit knowledge of God as Trinity as revealed in Scripture, although it can do; it rather suggests the response to the work of God as Trinity – a response which is common to all humanity, albeit suppressed and inchoate. This is an implicit sense of the Trinity common to all humanity – an implicit '*sensus trinitatis*'.[1019] Thus humanity, as the Triune image-bearers, are *dramatis personae* in this great task as they are called to present the whole of who they are, and to have their minds transformed in their world-and-life-view and philosophy, not as an optional extra, but as their appropriate service to their Lord

The great narrative is founded in the work of God in creation, redemption and consummation. There are two Great Commissions: that of creation, and the other of the Kingdom.[1020]

There is a direct correlation of the Trinitarian constitution of the world and of mission of the church (understood not so much as the institution but the universal body of all Christian believers). The church is properly a witness to the world of this constitution: that by being true to its own constitution, the church is calling the world to be true to its. This is the logic

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[1019] A development of the notion of the '*sensus divinitatis*' used by John Calvin See Edward Dowey, *The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology* (1994): 50-55, 124-147.

[1020] Ranald McCauley, ''The Great Commissions'', *Cambridge Papers,* Vol. 7, no. 2 (June 1998) -- also in Michael Schluter and the Cambridge Papers Group, *Christianity in a Changing World* (London, Marshall Pickering, 2000). See also M.C. Smit, ''Culture and Salvation'' in *Towards* pp. 260-80, esp. p. 275 ff.

of Colossians 1:15-20. From a Biblical perspective, there is no separation between ''grace'' and ''nature'', and the work of God in redemption is founded upon the work of God in creation. We are not called out of the world, but rather to participate more appropriately (in the sense of belonging to God and to one another) in it.

(i)   The Human Response to the Creational Covenant

The proper human response to the covenant of creation is obedience to the creational and revealed laws and norms. The Structure of creation is itself unaffected by the fall (i.e., no aspect of it is lost – the fall is not metaphysical but religious, i.e., not a change in the elements of the created order, only in their orientation), even though the different elements are now comprehensively subject to the misdirection brought about by sin and evil though the distortion and marring of the relationship with the absolute Origin.[1021]
'Religion' for Kuyper, in the first instance, is the assumption of communion with something that transcends the cosmos. More fully, religion needs to be understood in terms of the grounds and explanation of the subject and the object and the relation between them to a central power.[1022] The key characteristic of religion, what makes it to be such, is the placing of oneself in absolute dependence upon the central power, whose superiority is acknowledged. But the subject on the basis of deduction or observation cannot construe the central power itself, the knowledge by the subject of the central power needs to be entirely by revelation. God is univocus, that is, he cannot be treated as an object of analysis, or be dissected.[1023] However, Kuyper maintains, if God cannot be known archetypically, he can however be known in his ectypical revelation of himself, that is, the intentional and self-attesting traces which God gives us of how he would have us know him. Theology has a dependent character, that is, it is entirely dependent on God's self-revelation.[1024]
God reveals himself for this own sake – that is, we do not start from one's own dependence and sinfulness, or even from Creation, but from God's aseity. Revelation is not something added to creation – but is God's self-revelation. God's further revelation is ontologically and epistemologically continuous with what has already been revealed in creation (in other words, it is not a donum superadditum). Humanity is created specifically for this purpose, as the potential receiver of this revelation – the capacity to receive revelation is not added on by God as an auxiliary action to that of the creation of humanity itself – the capacity to interpret this revelation and so to relate to God is intrinsic to the human constitution (what Calvin calls the 'semen religionis'). The capacity of faith is exercised religiously in its 'primordial sense'

[1021] See Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 44 (n. 41)).
[1022] *ST* : 47-9; *E.H.G.*: 2.1.2.12.
[1023] *ST*: 81; *E.H.G.*: 2.15.19.
[1024] *ST*, pp. 81-2; *EHG* 2.1.5.19. See also *ST* p. 96 ff.; *EHG* 2.2.1.24.

in that the general capacity, which as have seen, is the essential link, binding together the self-consciousness and the ego in the faculty of judgment (as we shall see) with the created order, is now devastated to that central power upon which the created order is dependent. This is a common possession of all humanity, which makes it possible for us to receive revelation and to it into knowledge of God.[1025]

Religion does not add any new aspect to reality but is the relationship with the absolute Origin.[1026] the religious sphere is the central concentration of those structures, and is not to be confused with any of those structures themselves. It is also what both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven call 'Direction' [1027] Humanity is not to be detached from its creational context, otherwise the directness of God's dealings with human being as whole persons, as well as with the rest of creation, is attenuated.

The heart is the locus of the Direction of the whole human person towards or away from God. The heart's Direction, in other words, is the deepest and basic orientation of humanity: God calls each human being in the depth of who they are, in the midst of life, and in the living community of faith. Humanity encounters the Triune God through Scripture and the inner working of the Holy Spirit as these are accommodated to the conditions of experience, including that of time.

In Genesis 1, the charge is to participation in, and care of, creation.[1028]
It is important to see this act of creation as covenantal in structure. As Meredith Kline points out, although the term berith is not used directly, later references, for example Isaiah 24:5 and Hosea 6:7 have been suggested to apply to this. The ''everlasting covenant'' of Isaiah 24:5 deals with a desecration of the creation ordinances, while Hosea 6:7 refers to Adam as the breaker of the covenant. Kline also compares Jeremiah 33:20, 25 and Jeremiah 31: 33-37 to suggest that the form applied the term berith to God's ordering of the world of nature as described in Genesis 1 (although possibly via the post-deluvian situation in Genesis 9).[1029]
As Kline puts it:

[1025] *ST*, pp. 100-107; *EHG* 2.2.1.25. See also *DD* 1:50.

[1026] Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 44 (n. 41); see Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.1.1).

[1027] Strauss *D.D.*: 196-197, 640.

[1028]

[1029] Meredith Kline, *Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview* (Two Age Press, 2000).

Jeremiah interprets the establishment of the order of the heavenly luminaries with their control of the day-night cycle as a divine covenantal commitment (Jeremiah 31:35-7 and 33: 20, 21).[1030]

This is focused in the history of Israel with God's rule over the people of Israel, most specifically through the Davidic kingship established by an ''everlasting covenant'', where the constancy of God's rule over the heavens is linked to the justice that God expects to have implemented in the social structures of his people. This can be seen most specifically in 2 Samuel 23:1-7, in particular verses 3-4:

> When one rules over men in righteousness, when he rules in the fear of God, he is like the light of the morning at sunrise on a cloudless morning that brings the grass from the earth. (NIV)

This is mirrored in Psalm 72, especially verses 5-7, and counterfactually, in Psalm 89, where the rule of God is compared to his ordering of chaos (in verse 10 destroying Rahab, the chaos monster), and where the felt absence of God, with the seeming collapse of the covenant (verse 39) seems to presage a return to futility (verse 47).

This is to be worked out in our human task,

The notion of truth in Old and New Testaments is characterised by the quality of right commitment involving justice, perspicuity and integrity. Truth above all is a relational quality, of subject to object.[1031] It not purely structural however, for that would be rigid and static, and would neglect the existential force that it bears down on us. It also needs to be understood dynamically: the Holy Spirit applies it afresh within each situation.
Our understanding of truth cannot be reduced to any one theory (be it coherence, correspondence, pragmatic, conventualistic etc.) but needs to be understood in a multi-dimensional way.[1032] This reflects the work of God in the world.

[1030] Kline, *Kingdom Prologue*

[1031] See article by Anthony Thistelton in NDNTT who raises some caveats.

[1032] See also Verne Poythress, ''Reforming Ontology and Logic in the Light of the Trinity'', *Westminster Theological Journal* 57 (no. 1, Spring 1995), 203. ''Poythress aims at a trinitarian method. His categories, instantiation (the Father), classification (the Son), and association (the Spirit) are related to, but not identical with, the expressive (the Father), informational (the Son), and productive (the Spirit) aspects of communication''. [Ralph Smith, *Paradox and truth* Canon Press, Idaho, 2000, pp. 69-70,n. 15] .

(ii)   The Human Response to the Redemptive Covenant

Each human being stands before God as a unique creature, and as such, is responsible to God for his or her actions and indeed for the basic underlying orientation which gives rise to those actions. The original relationship of human beings with God, other human beings and their environment has become distorted through sin and rebellion. Humanity is in a state of disobedience, and creation as a whole has been distorted as a consequence. However, in the midst of the all-pervasiveness of sin and its consequences in the rest of creation, each individual human being still has the responsibility to turn to God in total dependence and covenantal obedience.[1033]

The proper human response to the covenant of redemption faith alone through grace, and so, and only so, are justified before God.

The work of the Holy Spirit in 'particular' grace concerns the work of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the human heart – the specific work of God in the elect, those who are beneficiaries of God's efficient grace.[1034] This is central to the account of election and saving grace in the theology of John Calvin.[1035]

We participate in the Great Narrative through conversation: the sharing of the self-giving of the God the Father in the person of the Son through the operation of the Holy Spirit. The incarnation of ministry of Christ is the joint work of the Three Persons, as Abraham Kuyper describes it:

> ''not the Holy Spirit alone, but the Triune God, prepared the body of the Mediator. The Father and even the Son cooperated in this divine act. However, as we have seen in Creation and Providence, in this cooperation the work of each Person bears its own distinctive mark. From the Father, of whom are all things, proceeded the material of the body of Christ, the creation of the human soul, and of all His gifts and powers,

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[1033] Kuyper, 'Blurring': 391. Here, despite Dooyeweerd's strictures about Von Stahl's conservative influence upon Kuyper (already mentioned), Kuyper is himself critical of Von Stahl's conservatism and his too ready identification of God's providence with the *status quo*.

[1034] Kuyper, *Particular Grace: A Defense of God's Sovereignty in Salvation* (2001); Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 'Locus de Foedere' §8, pp. 131-154. This is the standard Calvinist account, following the Synod of Dort or Dordt (1618-19), at Dordrecht (Schaff, *Creeds*: 3.550-597).

[1035] François Wendel, *Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought* (1978): 179-180; see especially John Calvin, 'Sermons on Election and Reprobation' in *Thirteen Sermons of Master John Calvine Entreating of the Free Election of God in Jacob and of Reprobation in Esau* (1998): John: 1: 9 ('It is the Spirit of God alone who opens the gate of heaven to the elect'); Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response*: 67, 176 (n. 145).

together with the whole plan of the Incarnation. From the Son, who is the wisdom of the Father, disposing and arranging all things in Creation, proceeded the holy disposition and arrangement with reference to the Incarnation. And as the correlated acts of the Father and the Son in Creation and Providence receive animation and perfection through the Holy Spirit, so there is in the Incarnation a peculiar act of the Holy Spirit through which the acts of Father and Son in this mystery receive completion and manifestation.[1036]

Through the gospel, we are placed interpretatively in the world, reoriented and given a new dynamic.[1037]

In Matthew 28 we see set out our calling to go out to the world with the good news of the redemption achieved in Christ.

The need for atonement arises in the first place because of the problem of sin: humanity is radically estranged from God through a fundamental disorientation. Because of this radical break (however exactly it might be characterised), there is the need for bringing together again of God and humanity. In English, this need lies at the root of the word, literally ''at-onement'': bringing together two estranged parties to be at one. In the New Testament, the key word is *καταλλαγή*, which is translated in the RSV generally as ''reconciliation''. The mission of the church as the body of Christ to the world is an incorporation of God's own mission to the world. All things, and all people have their calling from God and the task of the church is the proclamation of the work of God bringing all from diremption to redemption.

(iii)   The Human Response to the Transformational Covenant

The transformational covenant concerns both personal sanctification and the transformation of the world in anticipation of the eschaton.

In *palingenesis*, God's saving purposes are revealed at the centre of human experience, for each individual. *Palingenesis*, implies, if not a sudden conversion experience, at least the unfolding of the effects of the Spirit's work in the life of the person concerned and the transformation of his or her character. The Holy Spirit transforms the hearts of redeemed

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[1036] Abraham Kuyper*, Work of the Holy Spirit*, Ch 5, § 17

[1037] Here it would be useful to look at Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture* and see the ways in which the different relationships can be seen. ''Christ transforming culture'' comes closest to it, but there are elements of Christ and culture in paradox.

humanity it to the pattern of the Son, as they are directed to the Father in inner rebirth.[1038] It is through the power of the Holy Spirit and through the dynamic of prayer that the battle needs to be waged against the spirit of apostasy in human culture. The biblical ground-motive can be embraced and worked through in every area of life by building up a community which gives this corporate expression.[1039]

There are two 'main springs' that operate in human hearts, which orientate the whole person religiously. The first is the dynamic of the Holy Spirit re-directing creation, through Christ, to the Father as true Origin.[1040] The second is the spirit of apostasy in the human heart from the true God. The apostate main spring cannot itself provide anything new but only distort creational reality according to the '*law* of sin': the religious misdirection of the human heart towards a pretended rather than the true Origin.[1041] This involves the idolising absolutisation of an aspect, or combinations of aspects, of the created order. Since the whole of created reality is refracted through the human heart, the fall of humanity thus involves the diremption of the cosmos as a whole.[1042]

There is an underlying split or 'antithesis' that runs through humanity as the struggle between two dynamic *principles*: that of obedience to God, and that of disobedience to God and

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[1038] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.61, 175, 507 (none in *W.d.W.)*; Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought'*: 103; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 186-189; Geertsema, 'Transcendentale Openheid': 51.

[1039] Dooyeweerd*, R. & S 2*: 5; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 11; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 12; Dooyeweerd, *The Secularization of Science*: 4.

[1040] Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'*: 21 (n. 22); Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedia Introduction*: 44 (n. 41).

[1041] Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 137. There is a certain ambiguity in Dooyeweerd's position because he also states the fall means that the image of God was 'wiped out' (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.6 ('uitgewischt'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.4. Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin, *Épitre á tous amateurs de Jésus Christ (1535)*: 36 who uses the term '*effacée'*. However, this ambiguity is more apparent than real, because the image is not a metaphysical entity, but a reflection of the unity and coherence which communion with God means. Sin by contrast is characterised by a revolt against the Sovereign *Archè* by absolutising some aspects of the 'meaning' (by which Dooyeweerd means creatureliness) to the *B*eing of God (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.64-65; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.100; Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought'*: 103; Steen, *Structure*: 80-81. Steen argues that sin for Dooyeweerd involves a loss of meaning, and since meaning is basis of the existence of the cosmos for Dooyeweerd (in contrast to the Being of God) this involves a privation of its very existence (Dooyeweerd, 'Van Peursen's critische vragen bij *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought'*: 103; Steen, *Structure*: 80-81). See the discussion about 'Being' and 'meaning' in 2.2 and 5.2.1.

[1042] In *Der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* (but not in *A New Critique)* he states: 'Our cosmos fell in Adam; all the additional creatures in one's world order were cursed in Adam. According to Scripture!' (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.65 ('Onze kosmos viel in Adam: al het in onzen wereldsamenhang gevoegde schepsel werd in Adam vervloekt. Naar de Schriften!'); see also Dooyeweerd, 'Juridisch causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)': 26; Dooyeweerd, 'De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland': 11; Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2').

rebellion against him.[1043] The idea of this antithesis harks back to Augustine's influential vision of the continuing tension, from the time of the fall until the return of Christ, between the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas Terrena*.[1044] The two main springs of the human heart can be seen working out in the unfolding of humanity's response to God in the struggle between the '*civitas Dei*' and the '*civitas terrena*'.[1045] Participation in the *Civitas Dei* requires a thorough re-orientation of one's basic stance towards God. This orientation is reflected in, and underlies, a worldview. This underlying orientation cannot be arrived at by theorising, but is entirely the work of the Holy Spirit upon the human heart.

Through Christ we are directed to the true Origin of all things, the Creator of heaven and earth.[1046] In Christ, the root of life is renewed, not just with respect to the individual human being, but also the whole of creation, concentrated in humanity.[1047] By belonging to Christ, the Christian becomes engaged in a struggle with those tendencies which absolutise one or other aspect of the temporal order and which redirect it away from God, the Father as Origin.[1048] Through common grace the distortion of sin can be sufficiently corrected not only to make everyday life possible, but also to allow for the development of science, culture and general prosperity.[1049] The opening-process under the influence of apostate ground-motives has an 'inter-modal disharmony' resulting from the absolutisation of one law-sphere at the expense of others – it needs to be guided by faith in Christ, in Whom alone is the 'consummation of meaning'.[1050] The opening process is set against the struggle between the *Civitas Dei,* that is to say, God's rule in the hearts of redeemed humanity, and the *Civitas*

[1043] Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §14; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §49; Kuyper, *Near*: Ch. 104, p. 636; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 1, 'Locus de Deo' 3.6.3, pp. 177-178; René Van Woudenberg, 'Abraham Kuyper on Faith and Science' ; Arie L. Molendijk, 'Neocalvinisch cultuurprotestantisme. Abraham Kuyper's *Stone Lectures*', *Documentatieblad voor de Nedelandse Kerkgeskiedenis na 1800* 29 (2006). Kuyper's account of the twofold nature of science has been contested in Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'On Christian learning' (1989). See also George M. Marsden, 'The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia' (1983): 247-256.

[1044] Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans* (1998). From a Reformational perspective, Augustine's *Civitas Dei* is not to be identified with any institution (for example, the institutional church), but is a dynamic running through the whole of history.

[1045] As Dooyeweerd puts it, this struggle 'takes its *issue* in the history of the world' Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.32 (Dooyeweerd's italics), 57 (neither in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 172..

[1046] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.557; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.633.

[1047] Dooyeweerd, 'Calvijn als Bouwer 2'.

[1048] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.506.

[1049] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2: 30-34; 234-237; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2:.32-36, 306-309.

[1050] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.265-268 ('zin-voleindigheid'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2. 334-447.

Terrena, the dominance of apostate human tendencies which culminates in the 'definitive victory' of Christ's Kingdom.[1051]

There is thus a need for the tranformation of human consciousness within the temporal process of human experience, as a concentration point which unifies the diversity of that experience.[1052] Because it is only in Christ that the true connection with the Origin is possible, it is only through 'religious self-reflection on one's part with Christ' that one can discern the true and irreducible diversity of the created order.[1053] This diversity of meaning relates to the central unity of divine law revealed by Christ: to love God and one's neighbour.[1054] This is not an escape from temporality, but a call to bring about a 'concrete community of love' through right relationships with one's neighbour.[1055] So for the human being to be considered in religious terms, he or she cannot be removed from their context, because that would make the community necessary for the human being to be considered in those religious terms, impossible. But not only is temporality necessary for the community which makes religion possible, it is also necessary for human beings themselves to be considered as whole persons.

The work of the Holy Spirit takes place within the context of the covenant between God and the whole of the created order generally, and with humanity in particular. Further, it is seen in the in the work of the Holy Spirit in 'particular' and 'common' grace. The former concerns

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[1051]Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'*: 108 ('definitieve overwinning'). As mentioned earlier (1.1) these are terms employed by Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in his great work describing God's work through history especially with respect to the Roman Empire. Dooyeweerd is critical of Augustine for not adequately, in his view, distinguishing 'the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men' (which is how Dooyeweerd understands the *Civitas Terrena*) from the temporal Church institution (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.452; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.510).

[1052] Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.175; 2.52-53 (both not in *W.d.W.*);Fernhout, 'Man, faith and religion': 75.

[1053] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.421 ('de religieuze zelfbezinning op ons deelhebben aan Christus'); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.487. In the latter, Dooyeweerd refers to John 13.8, presumably comparing true knowledge in this respect with the participation of Peter and the other disciples in Christ. See also Dooyeweerd, 'De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.' VI; Dooyeweerd, *Theory of man* VI; Fernhout, 'Man, faith and religion': 77.

[1054] Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.98-100; 3.12; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.60-61 (not in *W.d.W.),* 506 (in the W.d.W.: 1:471, Dooyeweerd merely speaks of 'den dienst Gods met geheel het hart' with no mention of 'one's fellow man'); 2.151, 157-159; 3. 30, 29 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, 'De wijsbegeerte der wetsideee en de 'Barthianism'', *P. R.* 16 (1951): 153; Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 341-342; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 8,181-182; Cronjé, 'Eerste gedagtes rondom Dooyeweerd se etiek (liefdesleer)': 65-82; D.F.M. Strauss, 'The Many-sided Meaning of Love: Its Significance for Theology', *Ned. Geref. Teologiese Tydskrif* 50 (2009).

[1055] Dooyeweerd, 'De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner': 341-342 ('concrete liefdegemeenschap'). Here Dooyeweerd contrasts this with Brunner's antithesis of the eternal command of God and the ordinances of law as they are found in the pluriformity of one's temporal experience.

the work of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the human heart – the specific work of God in the elect, those who are beneficiaries of God's efficient grace.[1056] This is central to the account of election and saving grace in the theology of John Calvin.[1057] As we have seen, it is taken up in Kuyper's account of *palingenesis*: God's saving purposes are revealed at the centre of human experience, for each individual. Alongside this, the Holy Spirit restrains the effects of sin through his universal influence over all people. For Kuyper, this insight is expressed in his notion of 'common grace': the notion that the Spirit is not simply working in the hearts of individuals ('particular grace'), but also in the cultural development of creation and human society as a whole.[1058]

As we have seen, special grace and common grace presuppose one another – it is through common grace that special grace is possible and *vice versa*.[1059] Just as in particular grace the elect are brought to salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit with Christ as the mediator of salvation, a role for which he is fitted as mediator of creation, so the world at large is restored by the Holy Spirit on the basis of Christ as mediator of creation (common grace) and through the sideways implications of his work as redeemer of humanity (special grace). Thus, because special grace is centred on Christ, and because his Body shares in his honour, common grace is an 'emanation' of special grace and flows back into special grace, which has as its end and purpose the glorification of the Son. On the other hand, common grace can be seen as a preparation for the reception of special grace in that it holds open the sense of God, restrains entire human degeneracy and opens the way for the gospel to be received.[1060] Just as special or particular grace looks forward to the transformation of the elect through the particular work of the Holy Spirit, benefiting through the prior work of common grace in overcoming evil as an obstacle to the gospel, so common grace, through the sideways implications of special grace, looks forward towards the transformation of the entire universe. This transformation of the universe does not imply the destruction or supercession of its

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[1056] Kuyper, *Particular grace* ; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 'Locus de Foedere' §8, pp. 131-154. This is the standard Calvinist account, following the Synod of Dort or Dordt (1618-19), at Dordrecht (Schaff, *Creeds*: 3.550-597).

[1057] Wendel, *Calvin*: 179-180; see especially Calvin, 'Sermons on Election': John: 1: 9 ('It is the Spirit of God alone who opens the gate of heaven to the elect'); Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response*: 67, 176 (n. 145).

[1058] Wolters, 'Dooyeweerd': 7-8; Kuyper, 'Common Grace in Science': 441-460; Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 Locus de Foedere, §7, pp. 118-130; Kuyper, *E Voto Dordraceno*: 1.10.11, pp. 210-217; Dooyeweerd, 'R.K. en A.R.S.' see Klapwijk, 'Calvin and Neo-Calvinism on Non-Christian Philosophy': 47-58 on the relation between the formulations of Calvin, Kuyper and Dooyeweerd.

[1059] Zuidema, 'Common Grace and Christian Action' . D.F.M. Strauss argues that there is a problem in the way in which Kuyper sees Christ as Head of 'particular' grace and the 'church', but as such can only have a 'sideways' influence on civil life (Kuyper, *Gemeene Gratie*: 2.276 ('zijdelingschen' …'burgerlijke leven')).

[1060] Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §25; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §60.

material character, but rather its re-orientation towards God and the restoration of its original goodness.[1061] For Kuyper the destiny of the creation is, in Kuyper's words, '*the restoration of the entire cosmos*'.[1062] Thus, the account of God's providence brings together God's saving purposes for the elect, together with his intentions for creation as a whole.

Just as in particular grace the elect are brought to salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit with Christ as the mediator of salvation, a role for which he is fitted as mediator of creation, so the world at large is restored by the Holy Spirit on the basis of Christ as mediator of creation (common grace) and through the sideways implications of his work as redeemer of humanity (special grace). Thus, because special grace is centred on Christ, and because his Body shares in his honour, common grace is an 'emanation' of special grace and flows back into special grace, which has as its end and purpose the glorification of the Son. On the other hand, common grace can be seen as a preparation for the reception of special grace in that it holds open the sense of God, restrains entire human degeneracy and opens the way for the gospel to be received.[1063] Just as special or particular grace looks forward to the transformation of the elect through the particular work of the Holy Spirit, benefiting through the prior work of common grace in overcoming evil as an obstacle to the gospel, so common grace, through the sideways implications of special grace, looks forward towards the transformation of the entire universe. This transformation of the universe does not imply the destruction or supercession of its material character, but rather its re-orientation towards God and the restoration of its original goodness.[1064]

We need to be embodied one to another. Embodiment is necessary for the possibility of address and for the making of promises. Unless we are embodied, which means making ourselves vulnerable to one another, all that we can do is to utter law-like demands on one another, without the possibility of true community.[1065] Unless we do have true community, true conversation is not possible. For conversation to be possible, the participants in the conversation need to share its reality and to be embodied with respect to each other, directly or indirectly. If reality is not shared, there are no common categories in which communication can take place It is only as I recognise myself as spirit that I become aware of myself as one to whom promises can be made and to whom the future can be opened. But as

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[1061] Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 Locus de Peccato, §4, p. 35.
[1062] Kuyper, *Lectures*: 119-120 (Kuyper's italics); Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 175. Heslam points out that Kuyper sees the following passages (all alluded to in Kuyper, *Lectures*: 119-120) as teaching the cosmic significance of Christ's salvation: Jn. 1.1-4; Mt. 19.28; Rom. 8.19-23; Col. 1.16-20; Rev. 4.11 (Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 175 (n. 121)).
[1063] Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid 2*: §25; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §60.
[1064] Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 Locus de Peccato, §4, p. 35.
[1065] Jenson, 'Body' , see Ive, 'God of Faith' : 219]

spirit, I cannot live in the situation of pure spirit, since law without promise simply presents me with unfulfillable demands. A pure spirit cannot have promises made to it, since pure spirit can only be the addresser and not the one addressed. Moreover, to be able to receive a promise requires that the potential recipient be one to whom a promise can be significant, and if that promise is one of life out of death, then since a spirit cannot die, the promise of life out of death cannot be significant to it. The gospel permits me to hold penultimate hopes by freeing me in the confidence that ultimately my future is assured, to love rather than hate, or fear to love. To love means to live as spirit and body, since love as promise requires the personal embodiment of that promise.[1066]

To be embodied means to **be** body (not to 'have' a body, as it were to possess something which is distinct from myself). To be body means to be available to myself and to others.[1067] As such, it is that which establishes my identifiability to myself and to others,[1068] and my own continuity with who I was in the past.[1069] My address to the other can only be free, and therefore good, if I am available both as spirit and body to the other.[1070] A disembodied spirit, determinedly such, would be a universal tyrant (or perhaps the pretender to such a position). Such, Jenson suggests, is Satan, who wants to act purely as risen spirit, the promisor, or threatener, of things beyond death, who has not first accepted death for others which embodiment (and love) entails.[1071] True embodiment is made possible through the embodiment of God for us in the Resurrection of Jesus which gives hope and future to our embodiment, which, within the context of our experience, would leave us with simply the prospect of death and final futility. What we are otherwise left with is purely the expression of law-like demands on one another, without any true self-giving.[1072] the message of faith is that of hope with a narrative content.[1073] This hope needs to be distinguished from other events if the gospel is to be truly proclaimable. Otherwise it remains at best a 'hidden

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[1066] Jenson, *Story & Promise* 63-4; Robert W. Jenson, 'Can American Community Sustain Itself Without Common Faith', *dialog* 15 (1976) 275-6; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Church and Mass Electronic Media: The Hermeneutic Problem', *Religious Education* 82 (1987) 282.

[1067] Jenson, *Story & Promise*   141; Jenson, 'Body' 82-4; Jenson, *Visible Words* 21-2; Jenson, 'Praying Animal' 315-6; Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : 2; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Evil as Person', *Lutheran Theological Seminary Bulletin* 69 (1989) 37; Jenson, *Unbaptized God* 32, 96, 126.

[1068] Robert W. Jenson, 'Worship as Drama' (1970) 162; Jenson, *Story & Promise*   142-3, Jenson, 'Body' 84; Jenson, *Visible Words* 23; Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : 2.

[1069] Jenson, 'Eschatological Politics' : 162; Jenson, 'Body' : 83; Jenson, *Visible Words* : 23.

[1070] Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : 2.

[1071] Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : 2; Jenson, 'Evil as Person' 36-40.

[1072] Jenson, *Story & Promise* p. 52; Jenson, 'Beauty' 253.

[1073] Robert W. Jenson, 'Die Kontinuität von Alten und Neuen Testament als Problem für Kirche und Theologie Heute' (1970) 93.

proclamation', and therefore silence.[1074]

All Scripture presents us with the person of Jesus with whose ultimate claims we unavoidably have to do.[1075] Words can never be neutral, as he puts it, they are either the actuality of God's word to us, and so his presence, or the means by which we combat his presence.[1076] The narrative of Jesus comes to us as address: it confronts us as a word about our final future. The spoken word between Ascension and Return of the risen Jesus is the gospel.[1077] The life of Jesus, without his resurrection, would have no significant meaning for our future, as he would not be available to us to bring about what he has promised. Law-like statements only become promise if what is promised is unconditional.[1078] A promise is not made effective by the obedience of the hearer (as is the case with a law-like statement), but in the faithfulness of the one who speaks.[1079] To be unconditional, a promise must involve the prospective sharing of the world which that promise will bring into being, that is, it must involve a word of love.[1080] God's love is embodied in the person of Jesus of Nazareth in Whom is revealed the Triune community of Father, Son and Spirit, and through the unconditionality of the promise which the Resurrection makes to us.[1081]

The promise, as promise, can only be such as it is founded on the narrative pertaining to the ultimate promise given by the historical recollection of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. That Jesus can be coming ultimately beyond the normal expectation of the ultimacy of death, is only possible because he is risen, as attested by the text of the gospel narrative.[1082] The gospel is the story of Jesus told us as the promise of our last destiny.[1083] It is given us specifically in the form: 'I, Christ with death behind me, will guard your freedom'.[1084] As Jesus is risen from the dead, although removed from us in body, the spirit of the Church is presently the communal expectation of his final coming on the basis of the narrative of Jesus

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[1074] Jenson, *God after God* 31.
[1075] Jenson, 'The Preacher, the Text and Certain Dogmas' 109.
[1076] Jenson, 'The Father, He ...' 97.
[1077] Jenson, 'A Call to Faithfulness' 93.
[1078] Jenson, *Story & Promise* 52; Robert W. Jenson, 'Apostolicity in the Gospel' (1972) 54-5.
[1079] Jenson, 'Can American Community' 274.
[1080] Jenson, *Story & Promise* . pp. 54-7; Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : 1-2; Jenson, 'Can American Community', p 276.
[1081] Jenson, 'The Community of the Resurrection' : 2; Jenson, 'Story and Promise in Pastoral Care' 120.
[1082] Jenson, 'The Preacher, the Text and Certain Dogmas' 112; Robert W. Jenson, 'The Eye, the Ear and Lutheranism', *dialog* 29 (1990) 175.
[1083] Robert W. Jenson, 'Worship as Word and Tone' (1970) 179.
[1084] Jenson, *Visible Words* 6. See Jenson, 'Aspekte der Christologie' 114; Jenson, 'Story and Promise in Pastoral Care' 114-5.

of Nazareth.[1085] Community and the ethical life which belongs to it is made possible through the sharing of what he calls 'penultimate' hopes, that is hopes for outcomes short of the final outcome of the human enterprise.[1086]   But these penultimate hopes need in turn to be informed by hopes about the final outcome since only with the end in view is there a basis to persist in what we have promised to do, even when it seems to run against our immediate self-interest to do so; and to persevere in the face of disappointments. Present and future cohere because God as future is ahead of us interpreting all prior occurrence, and it is through this common interpretation, the work of God's Spirit that community exists.[1087]

(h) Conclusion

The truly biblical and Christian view of God is not a sort of a super-intelligence (as we get in Greek thought), nor an arbitrary will (as in the dominant philosophy of Islam) – even though both these views have influenced strands of Christian thinking, especially in the medieval period. Rather, God as revealed in the Bible and affirmed in the historic statements of Christian belief is first and foremost a loving community of eternal Persons: Father Son and Holy Spirit.

This loving community of Persons exists eternally, and out of sheer love created the universe
  * not as an extension of God's being, since God did not have to create,
  * nor in an arbitrary way, since the world come into being as a result of a covenant, flowing from the eternal love among the Persons.

In the act of creation, the Persons worked together: the Father called all things, and finally human being into existence – each in a distinct and individual way; the Son as Word holding all the different kinds of relation together in a coherent way; and the Holy Spirit brings all this about.

So the world was created entirely good – each creature a distinct gift of the Father, bound together in love by the Son and given exciting new possibilities by the Holy Spirit.

However, humanity turned against God – turning away from the call to absolute dependence upon the Father as their Origin, not walking with the Son and relating in a Logos-like way in

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[1085] Jenson, 'Holy Spirit'   144-5.
[1086] Jenson, *Story & Promise*   62; Jenson, 'Can American Community' 275.
[1087] Jenson, *Story & Promise*   178; Jenson, *T.I.*   177 (not in 'Triune God').

the special place in which God had set humanity, and depended on what they could do for themselves, rather on the possibilities which the Holy Spirit opened up for them.

In their act of disobedience, humanity could not make up something entirely new – they could only distort and misuse what God gave them. Instead of turning to the Father in absolute dependence, they put their trust in some feature of the created order; instead of walking in the way of the Son, the Word, they invented ways of living for themselves; instead being open to the Holy Spirit, they took what they had and tried twist the arms of 'the gods' by their own actions – even to the extent of sacrificing their own sons and daughters.

However while God brought judgment on humanity because of its disobedience, God did not leave humanity to its own self-created destruction. The same love according to which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit created the world is also the basis on which the Persons provided for its redemption – the redemption not just of human individuals, but eventually the restoration of the whole universe – not just back to what it was before, but with new, transforming possibilities.

The Father in his love sent the Son to become a fully human being, and to die on behalf of estranged humanity, and to be raised back to life – all this by the power of the Holy Spirit. Through trusting entirely in the sacrifice of the Son, human beings can be restored to their relationship with the Father and the work of the Holy Spirit in their lives – in each of our lives and in the world we share.

This is indeed of individual significance – it is nothing less than the restoration of humanity to fellowship with God, and, this time, to life without an end. However, it is not *just* of individual significance but is a restoring of all of life, and finally the entire universe, to the ways of the Word and the transforming work of the Holy Spirit. The bodily Resurrection of Jesus, and the bodily resurrection which is in store for each of us, will also be part of the resurrection of the entire universe.

The Christian hope, then, is a transforming vision: each human being – and also each human institution or social entity, each element of the wider creation – is unique and distinctive within the love of the Father; for all relationships, no matter how distorted or fragmented, there is a possibility of being restored according to the ways of the Word; for each seemingly impossible situation, there is future hope through the ever-surprising work of the Holy Spirit.

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