TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE IN G.C. BERKOUWER:
The Contours of his Epistemology

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

Questions regarding the traditionally linked problems of the nature of human knowing and the meaning of truth, both usually understood in terms of human reason, have been asked at least since the pre-Socratics. Pythagoras believed that theoretical, mathematical thought was a purifier of the soul since it liberated people from thinking about particulars to thinking about the permanent, ordered world of numbers. Heraclitus argued that change was the product of Reason since the soul's most important attribute was thought. Anaxagoras maintained that the mind was the rational principle that ordered the matter of creation, while Democritus held that thought could be explained as the movement of atoms. And of course the Sophist Protagoras believed that knowledge and truth were relative while Gorgias denied the existence of truth altogether.

The "problem of knowledge" still confronts us today as volumes are written exploring the nature of homo sapiens, intelligent man. One need only look as far as The Reformed Journal to see evidence of the continuing dialogue in Reformed Christian circles (see July, 1981 and January, 1982, issues for example). This paper is written in the context of such ongoing study, and is partially motivated by the vast importance of theories of knowledge not only in scholarship but also in the everyday life we encounter—for example, what it means to tell the truth or what theory of truth is used in a court of law, or what particular view of knowledge is implicit in the local school system.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to explore one particular epistemology, namely that of G.C Berkouwer, who is acknowledged as one of the foremost evangelical theologians of recent years. Berkouwer is of special interest because he stands in the tradition of Kuyper and Bavinck and thus shows great affinity with the particular strand of Reformed theology and philosophy that finds expression in the Reformational scholarship of the Institute for Christian Studies.

In this project I will first describe Berkouwer's theological method of co-relation. Then I will delineate and explicate the various clues, as to Berkouwer's views on reason, knowledge, truth, etc., in the attempt to identify the pieces of his epistemological puzzle. Following that I will trace the contours of his epistemology by putting the pieces of the puzzle together. I will conclude with an appraisal of this entire endeavor. My thesis is that Berkouwer's epistemology, while failing to answer certain important questions and at times inconsistent, nevertheless shows unmistakable signs of a biblical and integral position.

The purpose of this project is not only to give a conceptual overview of Berkouwer's epistemology but also to examine one aspect of his thought so as better to ascertain the shape and structure of his theology and theological methodology. In addition, I hope this study will provide impetus for further investigations of both epistemology
and Berkouwer's theology.

II. DESCRIPTION OF BERKOUWER'S THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY: THE PRINCIPLE OF CO-RELATION

From my reading of Berkouwer thus far, the concept of relation, specifically co-relation (or correlation) stands at the center of his whole theological method and is the linchpin of his theology. In fact, Lewis Smedes states that Berkouwer's "guiding principle" is that of correlation. Says Smedes, "Berkouwer does not set out his methodological guidelines in any formal prolegomena to this theology, but they are not hard to ferret out of his various volumes. They can be summed up in his word 'co-relationship'."

Since correlation has been an often misunderstood term, and since Berkouwer himself used it interchangeably with other words like 'connections' and 'relationship,' J.C. DeMoor in a recent study of Berkouwer's theological method coins another term to designate what Berkouwer was trying to capture with his use of 'correlation.' DeMoor describes "the one and only theme which characterizes Berkouwer's entire way of theologizing" as his "anti-polarity stance, his conviction that there is no competition, no rivalry, between the sovereign (re)-creative activity of God's gracious Word and Spirit and the free, responsive activity of human faith they evoke." Whichever term one prefers, Smedes points out that Berkouwer himself does not give the concept any systematic explanation. Likewise, in a recent review of DeMoor's book, R. Vanderink makes the same point, noting that while "complementary" or "non-polar" thinking is central to Berkouwer's thought, as for example in his faith-revelation correlation, "Berkouwer has never given a systematic account of his intuitively held method." DeMoor also notes the ambiguity surrounding the word "correlation" and the paucity of Berkouwer's own articulated expositions of what he meant by the term. DeMoor, however, proceeds in his study to explicate what he conceives Berkouwer's "deepest intentions" to be in his use of the term.

In my reading to date, I have found only one instance where Berkouwer deals with the meaning and nature of correlation as such. There he acknowledges his frequent use of correlation in an attempt to suggest the nature of the connection, in this case, between faith and justification, but states that

it [correlation] could be construed as a relation in which both sides are mutually dependent and reciprocally effective. This sense destroys everything true about the relationship between faith and justification. But the correlation of which we speak involves a relationship which is unique, sui generis, and which therefore must remain ultimately mysterious.

Thus Berkouwer describes that concept which he employs so frequently and which is so central to his theology as a mystery. It appears clear, however, that Berkouwer did not mean by his use of correlation what modern theologians denote, e.g., Tillich or Bultmann, but rather "used
it as a word to express the *sola fide* principle of the Reformation.*"5

While unable to define conclusively Berkouwer's notion of correlation, we can still delineate various ways in which he employs the concept. Most importantly, for Berkouwer, theology is correlated to faith, which is to say that "theology does not work according to its own inner-evolved principle, nor according to self-selected norms, nor for its own sake. Theology is in constant and dynamic relationship with faith."6 This means that theology is a "work of faith" and that its statements must be recognizable to the average believer as objects of faith, not esoteric, unintelligible intellectualisms.

Theology is not finished when it has produced abstract and profound thoughts about God that the simple believer can well dismiss from his own life of faith. Only those matters that the believer can and ought to confess as his personal faith and which the church can proclaim as the faith of the Gospel are the proper conclusions of theology.7

In this regard, Berkouwer's faith-theology correlation can be traced to his reaction against the rationalistic abstractions and systematization of Reformed scholastic thinking. As DeMoor states, there is a general consensus that Berkouwer's "revolutionary" theological methodology can be attributed to "his radically negative attitude toward speculative-scholasticism" and that therefore his chief accomplishment was to liberate "Reformed theology from its bondage to the tyranny of a speculative-scholastic kind of logic."8 In reacting against speculative scholasticism, Berkouwer wished to return to the more practical, pastoral, and biblical *sola Scriptura-sola fide* approach of the Reformers.

In so doing, Berkouwer has been accused of being too confessional and his way of theologizing labelled as too intuitive and subjective. Smedes notes that Berkouwer sometimes allows theology and faith to "fade into an identification."9 DeMoor, in recounting the debate over Berkouwer's theology among recent Dutch scholars, describes the same critique.10 In fact one cannot help but conclude upon reading Berkouwer that an overriding theme of his theology is that only in faith can one truly understand, i.e., only with the eyes of faith can one discern the way of truth. Hence this fundamental epistemological correlation has led to the questioning of the "scientific status" of Berkouwer's theology.

Concretely, Berkouwer's faith/theology correlation means that theology should be done in constant relation with and as a response to the Word of God, the Bible, and is hence "relative." However, this relativity, needless to say, is quite another thing than philosophical relativism; it refers simply to the relation of a thing to something other than itself. Theology is relative to the Word of God. This relativity is decisive for the method and significance of theology. It means that theology is occupied in continuous atten-
tive and obedient listening to the Word of God...

Theology is not a complex system constructed for their own entertainment by scholars in the quiet retreat of their ivory towers. It must have significance for the unquiet times; but it can achieve its proper relevance only in obedient attentiveness, not to the times first of all, but to the Word.11

The correlation of faith to theology also means that theology should be done in relation to the Church's confessions and creeds. While aware of the danger of compromising the authority of Scripture by placing undue emphasis on the confessions or creeds, and viewing them as a point of orientation within the framework of the correlation of theology to the Word, Berkouwer nonetheless is a committed confessional theologian who calls the Church to keep asking "what the creeds, in their human and fallible form and content, intended to teach regarding the Gospel."12 Time and again Berkouwer examines the confessions to see what was the original intent and meaning, usually finding them to be helpful if correctly understood.13

Thirdly, Berkouwer's correlation faith and theology concretely means that theology lives in relation to the pulpit of the church, which is to say that theology must be preachable. "Its only genuine vocation is to keep the message of the Word straight for the sake of the preacher."14 This also accounts for why Berkouwer refuses to engage in "abstract reasoning" and has such antipathy for scholastic, speculative approaches in theology. For Berkouwer, theology must not result in intellectual satisfaction in having solved a difficult mental exercise, but should eventuate in a song of praise, a doxology, in which the kerygma of God's grace is proclaimed to the Church.15 Thus by virtue of Berkouwer's correlation of faith with theology, theology is also implicitly correlated to Scripture, the confessions, and the pulpit.

With respect to specific theological problems and issues, Berkouwer methodically, consistently applies his correlation principle in his attempt to avoid false bifurcations, illegitimately posed problems, and abstract, speculative thinking. For example, Berkouwer co-relates faith with justification, grace, and salvation (Faith and Justification); faith with sanctification and law (Faith and Sanctification); faith with perseverance and God's faithfulness (Faith and Perseverance); justification with sanctification (Faith and Justification chap. 4, Faith and Sanctification, chap. 2); faith with knowledge of divine providence (Providence chaps. 2, 6); faith with revelation (Providence chap. 8, General Revelation chaps. 7, 8, 10, 11); and faith with true knowledge of humankind (Man chaps. 1, 2, 3, 6, 10). It can thus be clearly seen, even from this limited example of Berkouwer's writings, how prevalent and important his method of correlation is to his theology.

III. CLUES AS TO BERKOUWER'S EPISTEMOLOGY: IDENTIFYING THE PIECES OF THE PUZZLE

A. Critique of Rationalism

As stated in the previous section, Berkouwer's theological metho-
dology is a reaction to rationalistic, scholastic, speculative thinking. In many places this is evident as Berkouwer criticizes rationalism and the autonomy of reason. With respect to the eighteenth century Berkouwer criticizes the "Enlightenment-dominated intellectual life," as for example in Schleiermacher, in which there was a "reduction to essentials" in theology in order to eliminate the biblical witness to the reality of Satan, demonic forces, evil, etc. 16 Likewise in speaking of the nineteenth century Berkouwer states that,

It became more and more evident, however, that this neutrality was itself a form of prejudice and that the autonomy of reason was one of the main prejudices. They declared the world to be without God and without his sovereignty and without his law. But they were talking of the independent world and did not see that the world is not to be understood without the revelation of God. 17

Berkouwer also characterizes the twentieth century as an age of scientism and "the triumph of reason." He describes the real bias behind modern Protestantism as "the principle of autonomy, of the supremacy of human reason and of the synthesis of this principle and the fragments of the Christian faith," citing Tillich and Bultmann as prime examples. 18 Berkouwer criticizes the secularization of Western culture by pointing, like Dooyeweerd, to the influence of the science-motif, i.e., "the influence of modern natural science on man's faith in God," lamenting that "for man under the spell of popularized natural science the reality of God has been deftly relegated to the irrelevance of the pre-scientific age." 19

With respect to specific theological issues, this becomes more obvious. Berkouwer refutes the efficacy of a rationalistic approach in understanding the harmony and profundity of the correlation of faith and grace. 20 He also repudiates any "non-believing reasoned concept of Providence" in which human reason can independent of God's revelation know his working in creation and history. 21

With regard to the problem of evil Berkouwer declares that all theodicy is in principle unacceptable and worthless because it abstracts thought from revelation. Rather, Berkouwer states, "Contradicting all autonomy of thought, he [Paul] reminds us that the living God is not to be subjected to the judgment of man and not to be grasped in the compass of experiential reality." 22 Likewise Berkouwer disavows domination of scripture by "human reason and autonomy" in affirming its authority, trustworthiness, reliability, and importance. 23

In criticizing rationalism Berkouwer also wants to avoid the "abyss of irrationalism" and thus escape any ping-pong false dilemma. In reaction to rationalism, irrationalism has asserted that life cannot be understood by reason since there is no certainty to life. Says Berkouwer,

For that reason irrationalism is not less dangerous than rationalism for the Christian faith. We are therefore unable to choose between rationalism and irrationalism...
Not only rationalism but also this irrationalism is a serious foe of the Christian faith. For the Christian faith proclaims a wonderful certainty in the midst of all the uncertainties of human hearts, making men see beyond the ruins of time.\(^{24}\)

Thus it is plainly evident that Berkouwer is critical of the modern concept of reason and the overimportance given to it, particularly in theology.

B. The Limits of Reason

In contrast to the autonomy and unlimited nature of reason characteristic of rationalism—Berkouwer posits that reason rightly understood has definite limits beyond which one should not or cannot go. This comes across in manifold ways and contexts. With respect to general revelation Berkouwer warns against any speculation, asserting that "the Scriptures teach us to be modest in our thinking.... They limit us to the utterances of God to prevent us from going astray in our thinking."\(^{25}\)

In speaking of providence as sustenance Berkouwer criticizes Schilder for reasoning "in an abstract-hypothetical fashion about those things which are outside the bounds of Divine revelation. Such reasoning is certain to do injustice to Biblical revelation."\(^{26}\) Berkouwer maintains that one must stop at the limits of revelation and confess that the distinction between creation and sustenance is a mystery that is not conceivable. With respect to providence as concurrence Berkouwer also resists any "rational conclusion which staticizes His [God's] activity."\(^{27}\)

With regard to the problem of evil and attempts to articulate a theodicy Berkouwer likewise posits limitation to reason. "The problem of theodicy is insoluble outside of a faith that knows the limits of human reason."\(^{28}\) In this connection Berkouwer explores three "boundary" issues—God's wrath, human guilt, and the Church's doxology in the face of an evil world—and in each case affirms the Church's confessions in spite of supposed logical contradictions. According to Berkouwer, to go the route of autonomous reason one can resolve the problems posed by theodicy

only by summoning a rationalistically construed God before the judgment of human reason, or, in irrationalistic reaction; by submission to the arbitrariness of the whimsical god of fate.\(^{29}\)

Berkouwer follows a similar path in his discussion of the origin of sin. He calls it one of the "deepest mysteries of the whole Biblical witness" and "the heaviest cross of reason."\(^{30}\) Says Berkouwer, it is impossible for us to set forth the relation of God to human sin in a rationally clear system; but limits are always drawn and these eliminate certain solutions which are in conflict, no matter how logical they may appear, with the nature of divine revelation.\(^{31}\)
On this score Berkouwer also cites Calvin who "recognises here the limits of our thinking...and bows before revelation, which is perspicuous enough for him who will humbly listen to it." 32

Berkouwer also refers to the limits of intellectual understanding and the concomitant necessity of confessing the "mysteries of the faith" with respect to eternal life, the in-between state, the resurrection of the body, angels, humankind's inextricable relation to God, 33 the high priestly work of Christ, the doctrine of perseverance of the saints, 34 and the correlation of faith and grace. 35

Because of his view of reason as limited, Berkouwer is adamantly opposed to any "abstract" or "speculative" reasoning, i.e., reasoning beyond the proper bounds imposed by faith and revelation. He provides an example of the process of speculative reasoning in his discussion of the reality of perseverance. 36 Speculation begins, states Berkouwer, when perseverance is interpreted in terms of cause and effect, thereby implying a view of perseverance as an "ontic work of God that, because it once is, will always continue to be." Such a view makes perseverance "an abstract, objective thing, isolated from the full reality of God's work of preservation in its manifold connections." Such an "ontology of perseverance" tends furthermore, says Berkouwer, to foster the following kind of reasoning: "What is once present in human life never disappears; the leopard does not change his spots."

Because of such an approach, there is no profound gratitude for or amazement of God's faithfulness in spite of our stubborn backsliding. Berkouwer relates one of his most striking personal experiences from his days in the pastorate to illustrate his point. Having deduced what would happen from what was supposed to be already present, the parents of an alienated baptized member of his parish took for granted the eventual restoration of their child and hence could not be thankful for God's faithfulness and grace in perseverance. Concludes Berkouwer, "If we make perseverance the object of thought in the form of causal reasoning, we are doomed to corrupt it. Once this has been done, we can no longer comfort others with the doctrine of perseverance, or be comforted by it."

In contrast, Berkouwer begins his approach to the problem with the affirmation of the faithfulness of God's grace and his preservation of his saints. Perseverance and preservation, argues Berkouwer, are merely two sides of the same coin, intimately correlated. States Berkouwer,

it is an indication of the deeply religious attitude of the Reformed doctrine that it has not seen the constancy of God's faithfulness and the perseverance of the saints dualistically, as two separate, or at best two complementary things, but that it has seen them in a unique correlation. 37

Causal logic, divorced from the life of faith, may not "interpret this dogmatic insight [perseverance] as a new gnosis, a new piece of knowledge which is self-validating" since it is "something quite different."


than a logical theory." Then one "cannot demonstrate this constancy as an irrefutable certainty" for example in the form of an empirical proof, but one can grasp it in faith since "faith knows the prevenience of God's grace and the gift of perseverance." In summary, in affirming the doctrine of perseverance Berkouwer sharply defines the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate reasoning, maintaining that "all logistic systematization and speculation concerning this preservation by God are impossible." Berkouwer's opposition to abstract reasoning is also evident when with regard to providence as government he characterizes any antithesis between theocracy and Christocracy as the fruit of speculative thinking. So also Berkouwer closes *Faith and Justification* in the same manner in which he begins, namely by remonstrating to speculation which "emasculates theology, trades confession for system, and makes the theologian forget the incomprehensibility of God." Another implication of his view of reason as limited, similar to the above and stemming from his principle of correlation, is Berkouwer's refusal to accept false dilemmas, i.e., either/or dualisms in which the choice for one option necessarily excludes the other and both exclude any third option. As previously stated (see footnote 4) Berkouwer follows Dooyeweerd in distinguishing between a legitimate duality that is oriented toward harmony and unity and a dualism in which there is polar tension due to an inner separation of the dual poles. For Berkouwer, speculative and abstract thinking that refuses to acknowledge the bounds of reason leads to dualisms, for the way of independent speculation leads to a dualism between the practical and the theological, between the simplicity of faith and the systematics of reason—and this destroys the correlation given in the depth of divine revelation.

Likewise with respect to general revelation, "the question: either natural theology or Christo-monism—does not pose the problem soundly, but is rather the product of abstract and speculative thinking." Berkouwer follows a similar line in his discussion of the creationism/traducianism problem, the body/soul problem, the determinism/indeterminism problem, and the divine sovereignty/human sin problem. Berkouwer's view of the role and limits of reason and the dangers of dualism is succinctly stated when, in reference to *Phil.* 2:12-13, he says, "Paul cuts straight through the apparent dualism (though not the duality) between God's work and ours." In other words, while exceeding the bounds of reason leads to dualisms, respecting the limits imposed by revelation in accepting the scriptural witness preserves the duality and thereby avoids abstract and speculative thinking.

C. The Nature of Apologetics

Berkouwer's views on reason imply certain conclusions regarding the nature of apologetics. While not denying the possibility of a "believing apologetic," Berkouwer states that
an apologetic will have to begin with faith.... The apologetes will have to advance into the struggle with modern thought from a position of faith, profoundly convinced that the logic of modern empirical thought, of neutral analysis and induction is the corrupted logic of sinful thinking.\textsuperscript{49}

This does not mean a sacrifice of the intellect but a subjection of all reasoning in servitude to Christ.\textsuperscript{50}

Berkouwer reiterates this position in his last book, \textit{A Half Century of Theology}, particularly in his discussion of faith and reasonableness. He asserts that "the way of faith is not the route of argument and deductive reason, to be sure."\textsuperscript{51} Berkouwer affirms that there is no way to validate the Christian message through reason and likewise rejects an irrational "way of the leap" or "I believe because it is absurd" approach in which faith and reason are put in "severe tension." Berkouwer also carefully examines Pannenberg's rejection of revelational theology and attempt to provide verification of faith by positing the "question-answer correlation" with respect to anthropology, i.e., argue that the truth of Christian faith is verified in human experience due to the "questioningness of man."

Berkouwer critiques Pannenberg's approach by describing it as essentially a reduction of faith to intellectual knowledge, and contrasts it with Calvin who "refused to isolate aspects of faith (\textit{cognito, notitia, assensus}) from one another."\textsuperscript{52} Thus Berkouwer rejects both rationalist and irrationalist apologetics while denying that the only options left are to commit intellectual suicide or resort to a naive authoritarianism.

Berkouwer's gropings toward an alternate approach, a reasonable faith, hinge upon his contention that the content, the message, of the gospel must be kept in view in order to avoid abstraction. That is to say the content of faith is always part of the assumptions of an apologetic, instead of appealing to empirical evidence and an inductive methodology that operates under the illusion of neutrality and absence of \textit{a priori}.\textsuperscript{53} Other than that Berkouwer does not provide much guidance as to what such an apologetic would look like. True to form he provides more critique than offering positive solutions that go beyond mere suggestions.

This view of apologetics is evident when Berkouwer deals with specific theological issues. For example he notes that the cogency of the proofs for God's existence is not impressive and asserts with Scheler's conclusion that they are proofs only for people who are already committed to them.\textsuperscript{54} Berkouwer takes the same approach with respect to perseverance about which he claims "we cannot demonstrate this constancy [perseverance] as an irrefutable certainty, either in the lives of others or in our own lives."\textsuperscript{55} This same position is expounded with regard to theodicy when Berkouwer asserts that the righteousness and goodness of God are not \textit{a posteriori} conclusions but one's \textit{a priori} starting point founded on revelation.\textsuperscript{56} And in a similar way Berkouwer rejects miracles as evidence to the natural reason such that it supple-
ments faith, and the assertion that the authority of scripture can be proven by a rationalistic apologetic.57

In summary, Berkouwer affirms that the Church is called to witness to the Gospel in the world. This is not done by argumentation but by proclaiming the restoration of life through God's law of liberty and love.

D. Faith/Knowledge of Revelation Correlation

As mentioned in section II, Berkouwer's faith/revelation correlation is an important facet of his theology. He distinguishes between general and special revelation, describing general as the means through which we know God "by the creation, preservation, and government of the universe" and special as God's revelation in Christ as attested to us in scripture.58

Berkouwer's accent on the faith/knowledge of revelation correlation is found in all his works but obviously most articulate in General Revelation. There his main points are that: the relationship between general and special revelation is not a competitive one; the exclusiveness of salvation in Christ does not imply the exclusiveness of revelation in Christ, i.e., general revelation and natural theology are distinct; natural theology and natural law are to be rejected; and all revelation can only be known in faith.

Berkouwer states the last thesis in many ways. He quotes Calvin's famous line about true human self-knowledge being dependent on knowledge of God (Institutes, I,1,2), and also cites him to show that while God's glory is reflected in the "mirror of his works," i.e., creation, one cannot deduce the presence of real knowledge from this revelation (Institutes, I,V,11-15).59 In other words, as Berkouwer points out especially in critique of Barth, one should not confuse the ontic with the noetic, the reality of revelation with the knowledge of that revelation, such that a lack of knowledge leads to a denial of the reality.

Berkouwer reiterates the same theme by affirming that

an analysis of the essence of the cosmos without the benefit of the illumination of faith may indeed discover something of its unity and beauty, its organization and orderliness (het bestand en het wetmatige), but these are not understood in their most profound significance.60

Berkouwer asserts that divine revelation cannot be recognized without enlightenment, and such comes only in communion with God, "in the enlightenment of the eyes by the salvation of God."61 Berkouwer explicates the meaning of that salvation by declaring that "in the particular revelation in Jesus Christ the way is again opened to us whereby we know God, the Father of Jesus Christ, in his universal doings [general revelation]."62

Berkouwer explicitly refers to the faith/revelation correlation
numerous times. In contrast to any "nature as such" as an independent-of-faith revelation, Berkouwer asserts that there is "a correlation between the knowledge of faith and God's revelation." He also refers to general revelation as God's "divine orderings which are truly and correctly known only by faith." Berkouwer criticizes natural theology on the basis of this position, arguing that the faith/reason dualism is inadequate and erroneous since it posits knowledge of God through the natural light of reason alone.

In the closing chapter of General Revelation Berkouwer summarizes his views regarding this correlation by stating that,

no true knowledge of the revelation of God in the works of his hands is obtainable without faith in Christ. Calvin's reference to the glasses (of faith) as the only means whereby we can know God in this book of "nature" is of decisive significance for all reflection on general revelation.

E. Faith/Knowledge of Providence Correlation

As with revelation so also with providence Berkouwer applies his method of correlation to deny that the reality of providence can be proven outside of faith. Says Berkouwer,

Thus, this belief (in God's providence) can never be the consequence of empirical considerations and reasoned conclusions.... The Church knows that this victory is not the crown of autonomous thinking, but a gift of God's grace.

Berkouwer refuses to seek a rational basis for providence, i.e., a belief "dependent on human thought or science," and instead follows both Kuyper and Bavinck in repudiating any "epistemological dualism" or two-source theory of knowledge of reason and faith.

Over against any assertion of the knowledge of providence exclusive of faith Berkouwer affirms that only in knowing God can one see his working in history. States Berkouwer,

The fact is that no one can recognise God's finger without knowing Him, and that facts and events as such cannot become revelation, but can only be seen and understood in the light of Biblical revelation.

Therefore one can only know God's providence through the spectacles of faith in Christ, "through which alone the true meaning of God's hand and the works of His hand can be seen."

This is also evident when Berkouwer disclaims the rational apologetic efficacy of miracles. In contravening the belief that miracles render faith unnecessary while positing the "witness character of miracles" Berkouwer proclaims,
Miracles are not proofs addressed to the intellect that thereby man should be convinced. They do not make faith superfluous. On the contrary, they summon men to believe. Miracles are inscrutable acts of God, which can be accepted as acts of God only through faith.71

In summary, Berkouwer affirms that only in faith via revelation and according to the norm of scripture can the "facts" of history be seen in their true importance. "Only faith furnishes the foundation for a vision of history's significance. That is to say, there can be no place for intuition alongside of faith and apart from the word of revelation."72

F. Faith as Different than a Rational Acceptance of Truths

Another piece of the puzzle alluded to previously has to do with Berkouwer's concept of faith. For Berkouwer, "faith is not a reasonable acceptance of certain truths."73 Berkouwer says this so often and in so many different contexts that only a partial delineation is necessary here. In Faith and Justification Berkouwer states that faith "is not a tenuous function of thought"74 nor should it be "taken to be the human function of taking a certain position and accepting, or believing, given truths."75 Faith is "not something isolated, an abstract acceptance of something true"76 and "does not place a man before a certain number of accepted truths which he intellectually assents to."77

So also in Faith and Sanctification Berkouwer declares that faith "is not an intellectual affirmation of a distinct and alien righteousness."78 Likewise in Faith and Perseverance faith is not "an intellectual assent to the truth"79 nor "a system of intellectual concepts"80 nor simply "the knowledge of certain historical facts."81 Berkouwer contrasts speaking in terms of a "rationalistic theory" with speaking in "faith's universe of discourse" or the "sphere of faith."82

Berkouwer's other works give the same view. In General Revelation knowledge imparted by revelation, i.e., faith knowledge, "is not simply an intellectual knowing of a system of truths but the knowing of his [God's] grace and his judgment."83 In Man: The Image of God Berkouwer states that "Christian faith does not gravitate around an intellectual acceptance of a number of 'truths,' but centers in the encounter with a Person, Jesus Christ, who is the Truth."84 And in A Half Century of Theology, referring to the Reformation concept of faith, Berkouwer affirms that "a sum of truths could not be what faith was centered on, for faith was a personal relation of trust between a man and God."85 Thus one gains the strong impression that Berkouwer's notion of faith is quite different than an intellectual acceptance of truths or a rational assent to a body of beliefs. Rather as hinted at above, for Berkouwer faith is more a personal trust relation between a human being and God.
G. True Faith as a Form of Knowledge

The preceding section raises the question of the nature of Berkouwer's concept of faith. Of special interest for our purposes is Berkouwer's idea of true faith as a form of knowledge, particularly in light of his repudiating any rationalistic notion of faith. Berkouwer speaks often of true faith and designates it in various ways. He asserts that sola fide cannot be rationally clear or understandable but "makes sense only in the act of true faith."86 Similarly, Berkouwer declares that only true faith given by God knows that our contribution to our own justification amounts to zero and thereby "honors the sovereignty of grace."87

True faith, claims Berkouwer with respect to James, "is not dead, empty, or fruitless. It is experienced in the daily reality of human life."88 With regard to sanctification Berkouwer also concludes that "true faith is the key to good works" and the "foundation of good works."89 In fact, in the context of a discussion of faith and works Berkouwer points to the doing of God's will as "proof of whether faith is true faith or empty acknowledgement and conviction."90

In characterizing the opposite of true faith Berkouwer quotes Dooyeweerd and his description of false faith as "an apostacy in the 'subject, the direction, and the content of faith' [such that] it goes consistently down the way of devolution, of corruption and estrangement from the true nature of faith."91 In contrast, as stated above, true faith rests in Christ alone and thereby knows and confesses Him as Lord.92

For Berkouwer this true faith is a form of knowledge. A constantly recurring phrase in his Studies in Dogmatics is "faith knows." Referring to Calvin, Berkouwer asserts that,

Faith, for Calvin, was not a leap in the dark; it was a form of knowledge, the knowledge of God's benevolence toward us. It was not an assent to something pressed on us, nor a mere believing that something is true; it was a personal trust that negates blind obedience.

Faith is not ignorance; it is always in touch with what one knows.93

For example, about both the faith/justification correlation and the faith/sanctification correlation, Berkouwer declares "we can never fathom it, but faith understands and lives in it."94 And as noted previously with respect to perseverance (see footnote #55), Berkouwer asserts that

We cannot demonstrate this constancy [perseverance] as an irrefutable certainty, either in the lives of others or in our own lives... [however] faith knows the prevenience of God's grace and the gift of perseverance.95

Berkouwer fully recognizes and accepts the inherent circularity of faith-knowledge due to the "circle-reasoning" that is the essence
of revelation, i.e., the fact that "it is not possible to give a foundation to this revelation because it is itself foundation (sic)." Berkouwer states that it is impossible to prove with rational argumentation the revelatory nature of scripture. One must rather affirm that scripture is the "norm and source" for life on the basis of knowledge gained in faith through revelation.

This knowledge given through faith Berkouwer describes as "the understanding of faith...in and on the basis of the communion with God." It is a "knowledge of the heart" that originates from "a living, personal relationship of knowledge and trust." Berkouwer affirms that this faith-knowledge gives "unquestionable certainty," a certainty not derived from reason or intuition but due to the work of the Holy Spirit. He refers to this situation in which knowledge rests in revelation as the "defenselessness of faith," but does not apologize for it. Indeed he prefers it over any rationalistic apologetic that strives for certainty through evidential proof.

In summary, Berkouwer contrasts true with false faith, characterizing the former as a legitimate and necessary form of knowledge in which a person understands the mysteries of salvation, is given a foundation upon which to rely, and hence finds certainty amidst the vagaries of life.

H. Knowledge

While Berkouwer often refers to propositional knowledge with his use of the term "knowledge," i.e., "knowledge that" or "knowledge of logically qualified statements that are either true or false, as stated in the previous section he also designates with the term "knowledge" that kind of knowledge acquired in faith. In fact, Berkouwer draws a sharp antithesis between knowledge and ignorance when in his discussion of Romans 1 he denies that there are degrees of knowledge of God. Rather, says Berkouwer, "there is no halfway stop between the idolatry, foolishness, and darkness of heathendom and the knowledge of God" and refers to this contrast as a "life/death, either/or, knowledge/ignorance duality" thus reflecting the spiritual antithesis between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of darkness.

Berkouwer further elaborates this concept of knowledge by defining and describing it in atypical, i.e., non-rationalistic, ways. For example, he claims that true knowledge reveals itself in true service of God. Berkouwer also describes true knowledge as that which gives life, its "first principle" being "obedience to the commandments of God." In a similar way he depicts the evidence of knowing God as keeping his commandments and as a knowledge that gives one certainty of passing from death to life.

Another image that Berkouwer employs to designate what he means by knowledge centers around the Pauline notion of being 'in Christ.' In describing the way of salvation Berkouwer states that the New Testament "pictures walking on the way as the knowledge that one is in Christ who is the Way." He adds that such was also the way of salvation on which the Old Testament believers walked. Likewise with re-
ference to Christ Berkouwer affirms that "if one remains in Him, he knows Him; if he does not remain in Him, he does not know Him."

A similar image used to convey the meaning of knowledge is that of communion. In speaking about Bavinck's broad/narrow distinction of the image of God, Berkouwer says "the narrow sense of the image is used to stress the idea that man lost his communion with God—his knowledge, his righteousness, his holiness, his conformity (conformitas) to God's will." And later in the same book in reference to scripture's treatment of life and death, Berkouwer declares "Genuine and real life is, says Scripture, a life in communion with God."

Fellowship is the most prevalent image used by Berkouwer to portray his view of knowledge. With reference to the issue of theodicy he places knowledge of Christ in parallel with being in fellowship with Christ. In his discussion of the imitation of Christ, Berkouwer cites Paul in Philippians 3 when he equates knowing Christ with fellowship with Christ through conformity to his death. In defending the reality of general revelation Berkouwer describes the "doings of God" as "an activity within created reality which is directed toward fellowship with, and knowledge of, him who personally acts here in a divinely sovereign manner." In the same vein Berkouwer rhetorically asks, "And whereas revelation wishes to convey knowledge, is it plausible, then, that Scripture would want to call us to any other knowledge besides the one which is life eternal?" Thus Berkouwer identifies knowledge with eternal life and relates knowledge, fellowship, and eternal life when he states, "This knowledge is the fellowship of Christ, which at the same time is eternal life."

In summary, Berkouwer fills the content of his concept of knowledge with various images in order to convey that knowledge is much more and is different from having an intellectual grasp of a concept. Knowledge, rather, denotes true life in the service of God, eternal life, conformity to God's will, obedience to God's commands, and fellowship and communion with God by being in Christ. Berkouwer captures this well when he describes what it means to acknowledge Christ as eternal King. Says Berkouwer,

This recognition of the true headship of Christ is not a mere intellectual submission to an intellectual doctrine, but a joyful bowing under his sceptre. It is, according to the [Belgic] confession, a placing of all one's expectations on Jesus Christ and a knowing that Christ is the only Saviour. It is a fleeing from sin and a pursuing of righteousness, loving the true God and one's neighbour, not deviating to the right or to the left, and crucifying the flesh. That is the reality of the headship of Christ over his Church.

I. Truth

As Berkouwer often employs the term "knowledge" to signify propositional knowledge, so also he often uses truth as a noun to denote a statement or proposition. For example, Berkouwer speaks of this
truth, truth about, truth which, truth that, truth of, and the truths. He refers to "the fundamental truths of Christianity" and to human perseverance being a fruit of divine faithfulness as "a truth understood by faith." In a similar way, Berkouwer uses "true" as an adjective meaning "correct" or "right." For example, he refers to true religion, true imitation, true function, true character, true God, true relation, true sacrifice, and true meaning.

However, as with knowledge, Berkouwer employs another conception in which he means something different than propositional truth. In keeping with his antithesis regarding knowledge, Berkouwer draws a contrast between God's truth and human wisdom, characterizing this opposition as a religious conflict between the seeming foolishness of God and human intelligence. He states that non-Christian "truth" parasitically lives off the truth of God, distorting and opposing it and existing only by virtue of it, but witnessing to the truth even in its apostacy. Berkouwer cites the existentialist philosophies of Sartre, Heidegger, and Jaspers as examples of perversion and suppression of the truth.

Berkouwer illustrates this notion of truth when in reference to perseverance in the Heidelberg Catechism he says, "It does not infer from various 'truths' that, because of a previously accepted premise, everything will fall into place of itself." Likewise, in reference to justification, Berkouwer disavows any appeal to the "true, eternal idea" and instead claims that "the way of Christian truth is not the thin thread of speculation, but the concrete revelation of God in Word and Act." A few pages later Berkouwer again reacts against any notion of "truths" when he critiques the view of Christ as "only a teacher and a prophet of eternal truths." This reaction is also evident when Berkouwer speaks of the reliability of scripture:

The awareness that God did not reveal himself with a number of profound ideas or timeless truths, but in terms of history and in powerful and saving acts directed to the future, has always prevailed in the church.

This non-rationalistic concept of truth as reliability or authenticity is further exemplified when Berkouwer refers to the persons of the Trinity. One of the important attributes of God is his veracity or truthfulness. In affirming the confession of perseverance, Berkouwer states that

There is a basic connection between the veracity of God and the statement of James that God does not tempt anyone. Eternal life depends on that, on the knowledge of Him who is true.

God's ways are true, God knows all things truly, and God remains eternally true. Berkouwer asserts the same about the Son when he claims that "man never gets hold of Truth until he believes that Truth came in Jesus Christ." And Berkouwer identifies the Holy Spirit as "the Spirit of Truth, who will show the way to fullness of truth."
In contrast to the concept of truth as propositional, i.e., as statements that are correct, right, accurate, etc., Berkouwer posits a conception of truth as relational. That is to say, he puts forth a concept in which truth refers to the nature of the relationship between humankind and God. One image that Berkouwer uses is that of walking in the way of truth. For example, he interprets the focus of Psalm 26 to be the fact that the poet has walked in God's truth. Also, Berkouwer characterizes the way of salvation as the true way, the one way or road that Christ has already travelled. And citing 2 John, Berkouwer describes renewal, rebirth, and new life in Christ as "a walking in truth." 128

The other favorite image is that of being in the Truth. For example, Berkouwer speaks of "a participation in the One who is Truth," and "the correlation between God's love and man's being in the Truth (1 John 5:20)." 129 Likewise, in elaborating on the call to flee idolatry, Berkouwer states that "on the foundation of being in Him who is Truth, the children of God are called to abide only in Him." 130 And Berkouwer declares that we know the true God "because we are in Him who is true." 131

In summary, while Berkouwer employs a notion of truth as propositional, he also portrays an altogether different concept of truth in which it denotes the trustworthiness and reliability of God and describes the authentic relation between God and his creatures.

IV. CONTOURS OF BERKOUWER'S EPISTEMOLOGY: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

Having seen various motifs of Berkouwer's view of truth and knowledge, we can now see the shape of his epistemology better if the similar strands found within the clues identified above are woven together into a common fabric. Owing to the length of this project thus far, such an exercise will be relatively short and meant merely to highlight and reiterate the salient features.

As stated in Section II, Berkouwer's theological method of correlation can be traced to his reaction against rationalism and its "speculative-scholastic kind of logic." This reaction permeates virtually all of the themes delineated here. Berkouwer severely criticizes rationalism and the autonomy of reason, as well as its dialectical partner, irrationalism. Over against both he posits the limits of reason due to the bounds imposed by faith and revelation. This, claims Berkouwer, eliminates speculative thought because in bowing before the authority of scripture one must confess its message and not transgress beyond what it proclaims. Such a refusal to overstep the witness of scripture renders any attempt to build a rationally clear and neat system impossible, thereby precluding speculation. Such an approach, argues Berkouwer, also eliminates dualisms because the harmony of creational dualities is preserved, rather than destroyed by the tension induced by the polar subject-object approach of autonomous reason.

This "reason within the bounds of revelation" approach does not preclude a "believing apologetic," asserts Berkouwer, but rather
merely elucidates the proper place of reason, namely, in subjection to faith. One's faith commitment is an *a priori*, not a reasoned conclusion of a "neutral," "objective" investigation. Thus in rejecting both rationalism and irrationalism Berkouwer wishes to adopt a third way, the way of faith and confession in which reason is not eliminated or derogated, as, for example, in irrationalism, but plays a more modest role, in contrast to rationalism, in being directed by faith.

Berkouwer works this out when he posits his faith/knowledge correlations. As previously mentioned, for Berkouwer all knowledge of God--revelation, providence, miracles, etc.--can only be truly and fully known in faith. This true faith is not primarily rational but relational. That is to say, it is not an intellectual assent to true statements but a surrender, commitment, trust, orientation of one's whole self to God. Thus faith-knowledge is a form of knowledge not attainable through reason alone but an understanding available only from within a faith commitment.

Berkouwer explicates this knowledge by characterizing it in relational terms like obedience, communion, fellowship, and eternal life rather than as some Platonic, intellectual grasp of true propositions. And as previously shown Berkouwer does likewise with his adjectival definitions of truth as walking truthfully, faithfully, reliably on the way of obedience or as being in Christ, who is the Truth.

Thus there is evidence of a traditional view, as for example in his usage of truth and knowledge as primarily propositional. However, Berkouwer is critical of both rationalism and irrationalism, drawing upon Dooyeweerd for support on occasion. He essentially assumes a fideist position in asserting the primacy of faith in apologetics. He does not view knowledge as primarily or necessarily lingual-analytic, but posits faith-knowledge as a legitimate and absolutely necessary kind of knowing. He characterizes both truth and knowledge as more relational than abstract or formal, and hence portrays them in a more Hebraic and biblical way.

There are, however, a number of significant questions that remain for further examination, especially in connection with a full-scale critique of Berkouwer's epistemology. For example, how valid is the criticism that Berkouwer is too confessional, i.e., that he throws up the "limits of reason" defense prematurely? Does he sometimes hide behind his faith/knowledge correlation in order to avoid (unconsciously?) further analysis when there still is "room" for such legitimate reasoning before one reaches the bounds imposed by revelation? In other words, are the limits on reason that Berkouwer believes to exist too restrictive? Is he too cautious about moving beyond that which scripture explicitly confesses?

Another set of questions has to do with the range of Berkouwer's concept of knowledge. For example, does his notion of faith-knowledge engulf other forms of knowing? Does Berkouwer allow for or even recognize other modal ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge, or does he in reaction to rationalism place too much emphasis on faith-knowing? What exactly for Berkouwer is the relation of faith-knowing to con-
ceptual knowing? And what would a "reasonable faith" apologetic look like beyond being in touch with the message of the gospel?

Such questions as these, as well as others, deserve further exploration, more than the scope of this study is able to afford. However, as has hopefully been illustrated, the contours of Berkouwer's epistemology show a definite pattern towards a more biblical, non-rationalistic, and integral position in which human knowing encompasses more than merely one's rational capacities. For that reason alone Berkouwer not only deserves further investigation in order to answer the above-mentioned questions but merits a wide reading among theologians, ministers, and the educated laity.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have sought to delineate the contours of the epistemology of Reformed evangelical theologian G.C. Berkouwer. That process has included an introduction to his unique way of doing theology by the method of co-relation. The bulk of this study has been an elaboration and exposition of various motifs or clues of Berkouwer's epistemology, drawing upon his *Studies in Dogmatics* as well as other of his writings. The concluding section was a brief attempt to bring together the threads in an overall picture of Berkouwer's position, as well as raising various questions for further reflection. This paper has been an effort to present a basic understanding of Berkouwer's epistemology and also to explore one aspect of his thought so as to grasp better his theological methodology and the structure of his theology as a whole.
Footnotes


4 G.C. Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1954), p. 178. See also *Man: The Image of God*, pp. 211-212, for a discussion of the difference between duality and dualism. There Berkouwer follows Dooyeweerd in distinguishing between the two, characterizing a duality as oriented toward harmony and unity in contrast to a dualism in which there is polar tension and inner separation that destroys the polar unity.

5 DeMoor, *op. cit.*, p. 49.


8 DeMoor, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

9 Smedes, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

10 DeMoor, *op. cit.*, p. 54.


12 Smedes, *op. cit.*, p. 68.


14 Smedes, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

15 See, for example, *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 14, 239; *Faith and Justification*, pp. 56-57; *The Providence of God*, p. 266ff.


20 Berkouwer, *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 106. See also *Faith and Justification*, p. 189.


36 The quotes in this and the next paragraph are all found in *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 226.

37 Berkouwer, *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 233. See also p. 221.


41 Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, p. 21. See also p. 200.


43 Berkouwer, *General Revelation*, p. 314. See also pp. 292-293.


45 See *Man: The Image of God*, chaps. 4, 6, 7, 8.


47 See *Providence*, pp. 139-141; *Man: The Image of God*, pp. 342-343.


50 See *Holy Scripture*, p. 266 and *Faith and Justification*, p. 195.


Berkouwer, *General Revelation*, pp. 77-78. See also pp. 68, 88-89.


See also *Man: The Image of God*, pp. 20ff, 93ff.


See *General Revelation*, p. 72ff. Also *Faith and Justification*, pp. 27ff; *Faith and Perseverance*, pp. 46ff; *Providence*, chaps. 2, 7.


Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, p. 41.

75 Ibid., p. 133.
76 Ibid., p. 136.
77 Ibid., p. 183.
79 Berkouwer, *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 54.
80 Ibid., p. 60.
81 Ibid., p. 65.
82 Ibid., pp. 60, 116.
86 Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, p. 56. cf. pp. 87, 158. See also *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 98.
88 Ibid., p. 137.
89 Berkouwer, *Faith and Sanctification*, pp. 36, 40. See also pp. 163ff.
92 Berkouwer, *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 146.
95 Ibid., p. 237. See also pp. 29, 31, 140, 192-193, 213; *Faith and Sanctification*, p. 111.

Ibid., p. 259.

Ibid., p. 137 and *Faith and Justification*, p. 176. See also *General Revelation*, p. 318.


Ibid., pp. 147, 142.

Ibid., p. 150.

Ibid., p. 140.


Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, p. 35.


Ibid., p. 242.

Berkouwer, *Providence*, p. 266.


Ibid., p. 118.

Ibid., p. 147.


116 See *Faith and Sanatification*, pp. 120, 150, 175, 178, 185, 188; *Faith and Perseverance*, pp. 136, 215.


120 Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, p. 151.


122 Berkouwer, *Holy Scripture*, p. 245. See also p. 244.

123 Berkouwer, *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 173. See also pp. 174, 204, 225; *Faith and Justification*, pp. 93-94.

124 Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, p. 166. See also *Faith and Perseverance*, p. 173.


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