

1 **Title:** The Relationship between State and Religion in Christianity and Islam to ISIS
2 State

3

4

Information removed to ensure blind peer review

5 **ABSTRACT**

6 The recent development of IS state is a fundamentalist development of the relation between
7 state and religion in Islam and a reaction to the relation of state and religion in the West. The
8 relation of state and Christianity has shaped and has been shaped by western history. In the
9 modern state a separation of state and religion has developed. A distinction exists between the
10 relation of state and religion in Islam, shaped by a tradition of Arabic history and the
11 fundamentalist relation of state and religion in the IS state, by a selective re-interpretation of
12 history. The relationship of religion and state in the west is explainable through social
13 philosophical models. A distinction exists between the relation of religion and state in
14 fundamentalist Islam, derived from a political philosophy, and Islam, explainable by societal
15 philosophical theory.

16

17

Presented at International conference on “Islamic extremism”
(March 9-10, 2010).

18

19

20

21

22 **Introduction**

23 There are two radical approaches to the relationship of state and religion. The first is to take
24 over civil authorities of which IS State¹ is a contemporary example. The second is the separation
25 of state and religion, as is the case in Western society. The separation of state and religion is
26 fertile ground for a totalitarian state. The structures of society (societal relationships) cannot be
27 separated from the religious direction of a society – the direction influences the structure (cf.
28 van der Walt 2010:425). In addressing the relationship of state and religion which in the Islamic
29 State have been completely fused - there is no separation of state and religion in the Islamic
30 State, the natural inclination is to argue that there should be a complete separation of religion
31 and state in Islam. In this article it will be demonstrated that Islam can learn from the - history
32 of Christianity and the historical journey of Christianity in the relation of state and religion and
33 Christianity can learn from Islam how to proactively address the potential threat of a complete

¹ IS state in the article refers to ISIS state, a recent fundamentalist development of the idea of Islamic state

34 separation of religion and state as is advocated by secularism. The secularist western culture “is
35 viewed by various religious groups as profoundly threatening because it enforces secularism on
36 society, overemphasizes individual rights at the expense of social responsibilities and deforms
37 social institutions and traditions” (Vorster 2007:118)². In order to prohibit the trajectory of this
38 article being a historical study of the separation of religion and church, it is necessary to begin
39 with the present models of relation between religion and state and then to trace these through
40 history.

41

42 **1.1. Problem statement**

43 The increasing close connection between Islam and Christianity in a globalized world has
44 brought about conflict. In order to resolve the religious conflict a separation of the public from
45 the private spheres has been introduced. Walls (1996:232, 234) identifies the separation of the
46 public and private spheres as a core element in the expression of American Christianity. The
47 separation is termed secularism. In American democracy religious affiliation is subordinate to
48 citizenship as the state is the final authority, a civil religion. “Secularism is itself a religion with
49 its own worldview” (van der Walt 2007:151)³. IS state is a reaction against secularism which “is
50 regarded as a foreign imposition that was imported by colonialism and as a tool of colonialism
51 to destroy the very foundations of Muslim faith and culture” (van der Walt 2007:162-163). The
52 historical models for the relation of state and religion have to be identified and systematic and
53 historical theories have to be explored.

54

55 **2. Models for the relation of state and religion**

56 **2.1. Religious state: the coalesce of politics and religion**

57 **2.1.1. The religious state in Islam**

58 A coalesce of state and religion results in a religious state or a state religion. Islam is based on
59 *din wa dawla*, the unity of state and religion. The coalesce of religion and politics in Islam can
60 result in politics and religion becoming mixed. The mixture of politics and religion is considered
61 a proper relationship in Islam, but not in secular states. The political and religious are merged
62 into a single unity and either works towards the same goals and direction or towards separate
63 goals. Generally, where the two are coalesced religion becomes sub-servient to politics. In the
64 merging of politics and religion the tendency is for either the political or the religious to be
65 dominant and to determine the goals. “It is not a matter of the one using the other” (Boer
66 2009:131). It is the dual nature of Islam as both political and religious that gives to Islamic
67 fundamentalism its distinctive character (cf. Boer 2009:128). It is the mixture of the political

² Western secular culture is based on “the enlightenment cultural force” (Vorster 2007:118).

³ Secularism has replaced the older world religions and the new dominant world-wide religion of our times (cf. van der Walt 2007:151).

68 and religious which establishes an Islamic State. The idea of an Islamic State is a historical
69 development and has to be distinguished from a fundamentalist concept of an Islamic State.
70 The Islamic State gives priority to Islamic religion, whereas a fundamentalist version of Islamic
71 State sugar coats political agendas with a religious veneer. Jihad is an instrument used by
72 fundamentalists in the establishment of IS State. The employment of jihad in the establishment
73 of a fundamentalist version of IS state is shaped primarily by socio-political and economic
74 conditions mixed with a fundamentalist religious ideology. In a fundamentalist concept of
75 Islamic State the meaning and practice of jihad is part of the establishment of an Islamic State.
76 The primary reasons for jihad in IS State are to be found in reaction to political and economic
77 oppression veiled as a “holy war” to institute *shari’a* and Islamic principles⁴. Jihad in IS state is
78 erroneously defined religious and justified on a distorted religious grounds⁵. “Religion then
79 serves as a means of justifying a struggle that has been declared holy. Usually the holy books of
80 religion are then interpreted in such a way as to sanction the “holy war” (van der Walt
81 2007:164). In a fundamentalist approach to Islamic State a hidden political agenda is skewed by
82 religion whereas in modern Islamic State a dialogue takes place between religion and politics
83 without there being an indiscriminate mixture of the two. “Muslim societies do have secular
84 states, but the process of separation is much more contentious than societies, which do not
85 have a codified religious law for society at the heart of their tradition” (Lim 2011:64).

86

87 **2.1.2. A historical overview of the coalesce of state and religion in Islam**

88 The historical coalesce of state and religion in Islam began with Abu Bakr, the successor of
89 Muhammed in 632. “The Prophet had not discussed political systems nor specified a political
90 order to take over after his death” (Sonn 2004:23). It was Abu Bakr who through a moral
91 commitment to monotheism and political unity referred to himself as the Prophet’s
92 representative (Khalifah or “caliph”) (cf. Sonn 2004:23). He united the state and religion
93 through the Qur’an:


94 “If they argue with you, say my followers and I have surrendered ourselves to God. And say to
95 those who have received the Scripture and to the illiterate: “Have you surrendered [to God]?” If
96 they surrender [to God], then they are rightly guided, and if they turn away, then it is your duty
97 only to preach. (3:20).

98 Under the administration of Umar, the second caliph, the term “Arab” was applied and was
99 Muslim; thus, religious and ethnic identities were joined (cf. Sonn 2004:27). The historical

⁴ “Whether religion contributes to violence, usually depends on the political, social and economic circumstances especially where these contribute to (a group of) people feeling frustrated or threatened” (van der Walt 2007:164).

⁵ “Jihad literally means “struggle”. The greater jihad is the internal struggle to submit to God in the life of the Muslim believer. The lesser jihad is the struggle to advance Islam politically and militarily” (Pratts, Sills, & Walters 2014:173).

100 period in which the caliph provided Islamic leadership and state and religion were
101 undifferentiated is known as the Abbasid period.



109 **2.1.2.1. The Islamic reaction to separation of the sacred and secular**

110 It is the relegation of religion to the private sphere and the consequent moral vacuum which is
111 a counter cultural force to Islam which fundamentalist Islam is in reaction against. Islamic State
112 is the chief alternative to secularist ideologies of Atatürk and ‘Abd al-Rāziq or the secularism of
113 default of Egypt, Pakistan, or Indonesia (cf. Brown 2004:214). Islam does not make a distinction
114 between the public and private spheres and the consequence is it tends towards totalitarian
115 states (cf. Volf 2011:141). The views advocated by Sayyid Qutb are employed by fundamentalist
116 Islamists in support of a fundamentalist state⁶. Qutab expresses the logical implications of Islam
117 as a monotheistic religion, the belief in one God and in one universal law, that there be only
118 one single authority, a political and religious authority (cf. Volf 2011:141-142). The argument of
119 fundamentalist Islam is that western democracy and Christianity all over the world have been
120 distorted by secularism. “The Islamic marriage of religion with the state is disapproved of in
121 most corners of the globe, even by many Muslims” (Meneses 2006:238). In Islam, however,
122 state and religion naturally belong together. At the other end of the spectrum is Al’Awwa⁷ who
123 has aligned Islam to the Western values as he has mistakenly assumed that Western values of
124 democracy are universal.

125 **2.1.2.2. The historical basis of fundamentalist Islam**

126 The idea of IS sate is a restoration of the golden age of Islam. It is a return to a pure,
127 unadulterated pattern of Islam reflected in the precedents set by the *salaf* (cf. Brown
128 2004:214). It is not so much the task of reintroducing Islamic law, the responsibility of all

⁶ “Qutb’s is not the Islamic position; indeed, his views have been explicitly condemned by many Muslims and do not represent the mainstream of Islam” (Volf 2011:142).

⁷ “Al-’Awwa is a respected lawyer in Cairo and one of the most significant leaders of the movement of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun/the Muslim Brethren” (Tibi 1998:164).

129 Muslim states, but a fundamental interpretation of these laws which is the basis of IS State⁸. It
130 is the radicalization of Islamic law with which the Muslim Brotherhood and IS state in IRAQ are
131 identified which sets the recent IS state apart. The single consistent theme among advocates of
132 IS state is a radicalization of the Law. Jihad and martyrdom in these movements have been
133 identified with such a radicalization of Islamic law⁹. Diverse groups are unified under IS state
134 through the re-identification with Abbasid period and a fundamentalist interpretation of
135 Quranic texts such as Qur'an 3:20 with the practice of jihad. IS State has taken the struggle for
136 Muslim states to a worldwide battle, and an enemy that is everywhere¹⁰. "Solidarity is not
137 based on national identity, but on religious ideology" (Brown 2004:216). In IS State religion and
138 state are completely fused with the result that there is no "critical solidarity"¹¹, which in non-
139 fundamentalist states are not indiscriminately fused.

140 **The Saudi concept of Islamic State**

141 "In 1740 Mohamed Ibn "Abd-al Wahhāb, launched a radical critique of contemporary religious
142 practices and began preaching a return to absolute, unadulterated monotheism" (Brown
143 2004:200). It is the insistence of Saudi-Arabia on "unadulterated monotheism" which makes it
144 sympathetic with the cause of the fundamentalist IS state. "Abd-Wahhāb and Wahhābi
145 polemics accuse the "ulamā" of blind adherence to their own authorities at the expense of the
146 pure teachings of the Qur'ān and Sunna" (Brown 2004:201). The "ulamā" are the Muslim
147 Scholars and the most famous school is found in Egypt. Saudi-Arabia was influenced by Ibn
148 Taymiyya (d. 1328) who said that legal authority was of primary importance; "the ruler can be
149 of a number of kinds, but as long as he makes sure an Islamic legal system is maintained, the
150 government is legitimate" (Sonn 2004:44). Saudi Arabia is a classic example of a fundamentalist
151 Islamic State¹², but it is to be distinguished from IS state which is characterized by a restoration
152 of the kalifah or "caliph" as the political and religious leader of the state. "The Saudi royal
153 family rules absolutely and publishes no accounts. The only consultative body, the majlis-al-
154 shurā, is appointed by the king, and 700 Saudi religious judges are a rigid self-protecting
155 priesthood" (Grieve 2006:242-243). Although the political structure of Saudi-Arabia and IS state

⁸Brown (2004:214) fails to make a distinction between an application of Islamic law by Muslim states and IS state. It is not simply that, "The chief mandate of such a state, what renders it Islamic, in fact, is the task of reintroducing Islamic law" as Brown (2004:214) asserts.

⁹ Brown (2004:215) incorrectly accredits jihad and martyrdom as an innovation of the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood revived and restated jihad and the Islamic ideology of martyrdom.

¹⁰ The fundamentalist IS state endeavors to restore the golden period of Islam, the Abbasid period. It is to be distinguished from essential Islam.

¹¹ "Critical solidarity contains three basic touchstones, namely resistance to injustice, the defense of human rights of all people and continuous self-critique" (Vorster 2007:63).

¹² "Saudi Arabia is one of the most undemocratic of all Islamic states" (Tibi 1998:185).

156 are diverse, an ideological affinity exists between the two which lends itself to unofficial
157 support of IS state by Saudi-Arabia¹³.

158 **2.2. A historical overview of the coalesce of state and religion in** 159 **Christianity**

160 **2.2.1. Plato, Aristotle and the city-state: totalitarian state**

161 Social structures were governed by the state so that, for example, the later marriage
162 relationship that came into existence between the state and church favoured the state. In this
163 later relationship religion was overshadowed by the state and the marriage which came into
164 existence was for the benefit of the state. The marriage of state and church was for the sake of
165 the continuation and well-being of society. The state for Plato and Aristotle was the center of
166 society.

167 **2.2.2. The relationship of church and state**

168 In the first century of Christianity there were not two separate spheres of authority of state and
169 religion. There was a mixture of spheres of religion and politics. The religious sphere did not
170 predominate the interaction nor did the state dominate. “The ancient world did not practice
171 divided sovereignties” (Noll 2012:53). It is with Christianity and the structure of the church that
172 two separate spheres were the eventual result.

173 **2.2.3. The historical beginning of the religious state in Christendom**

174 **2.2.3.1. Constantine and Christianity**

175 In the period of the emperor Constantine the state exercised authority over the church and the
176 interaction of Christianity and politics began. “Christianity became both a way to God and a way
177 to unite the empire” (Noll 2012:43). The state supported the Christian religion for its own
178 benefit. The emperor’s approach was that he saw himself as the protector of the church and
179 the religious served the political¹⁴. There was a demarcation of spheres of authority between
180 the state and religion. “The authority of the bishops was co-equal to the authority of the
181 empire¹⁵, with implication that the bishops were properly the chief authorities in matters
182 concerning the life of faith, while the emperor was supreme in the affairs of the world” (Noll
183 2012:53). The church had a degree of autonomy – “The life of the church had an independence
184 that no instrument of the state could transgress” (Noll 2012:54). Constantine did not exercise
185 authority over the church. He allowed the church to be the spiritual authority in matters of
186 religion. It was not a religious state i.e. the political agendas were not determined by religion.

¹³ The ideological affinity which exists is based on monotheism. “A true monotheist must act like a monotheist, and anyone who demonstrates devotion to any being other than God is, by definition, an idolater and a non-Muslim” (Brown 2004:201).

¹⁴ Constantine saw himself as the protector of religion. The debate over the divinity of Christ in which Christ was not only a creature was settled theologically by the council of Nicene. Constantine did not interfere but compelled the church to hold a council to decide the theological issues.

¹⁵ Separate spheres with its own offices and sphere of authority.

187 There was equality among bishops – no hierarchy. Hierarchy was introduced into the church
 188 when religions were infused by politics. The acceptance of Christianity was regarded as
 189 subservience to the State (cf. Bell 1968:1-2). This had a significant influence in forming
 190 Muhammed’s ideas of the relation of Islam and state. “If we sometimes feel ourselves brought
 191 up with a shock against the fact that Islam is apparently incurably political, it is, as we say, not
 192 only a religion but a state, we must remember what Muhammed saw in Christianity” (Bell
 193 1968:2).

194 **2.2.3.2. Charlemagne and Christianity**

195 The emperor became the head over the church. The coronation of Emperor Charlemagne in a
 196 symbolism in which Pope Leo III placed the crown on his head marked a turning point and the
 197 beginnings of a historical period in which church and the state were mixed, “an elaborate
 198 mixing of elements” (Noll 2012:108). “It represented a strategic alliance between the papacy’s
 199 gradually expanding influence and a political power that, like the Pope, was also expanding in
 200 influence” (Noll 1998:109)¹⁶.

201 **2.2.3.3. The origins of problem of the relation of state and religion in the West: The**
 202 **dualistic worldview**

203 One of the reasons that there was a political struggle between the Pope and Caesar was
 204 because of an underlying dualistic worldview. The result was that the norms of the gospel were
 205 not fully incorporated by the church. A political and moral chaos from around 850 to 1000
 206 plagued the church because of the mixture of church and state. The mixture influenced the
 207 religious convictions of Christendom and salvation and the sacraments were defined in the
 208 relation of church and state.

209	Pope	God	scripture	Faith	Church
210	Caesar	World	Sciences	Reason	State

211 **Fig.2. The dualistic worldview perpetuated in the relation of church and state**

212 **2.3. Implications of the relationship of church and state**

213 During the reign of Charlemagne there began to be political agenda’s which dominated over the
 214 religious – Charlemagne had supreme authority over the church. He used his authority to
 215 benefit certain bishops. Hierarchy within the church – Rise of the Papacy – political alliance
 216 between church and state means that the state supported the political agenda of the church
 217 and vice versa. “Valentian III, an edict that defined the superiority of the Pope over all other

¹⁶ The coronation of Emperor Charlemagne represented a strategic movement in that the emperor was sanctioned and appointed by the religious authority. “The symbolic import of their action – with the Pope providing a crown to the most powerful ruler in Europe while invoking the memory of imperial Rome – is, in the light of history, incredibly potent” (Noll 1998:117-118). It is, however, an erroneous inference that it was the relationship of state and church that secured the future dominance of Christianity.

218 Western bishops in matters relating to civic law” (Noll 2012:105) – no longer equality. The Pope
219 held primacy over the secular whenever the two conflicted. Ecclesiastical diplomacy and the
220 state served to further the agendas of the church. The church – state cooperation led to
221 Christendom enduring its darkest days. Monasticism was a reaction to separate the union of
222 church and state in which the church became political. “The rise of Monasticism was, after
223 Christ’s commission to his disciples, the most important – and in many ways the most beneficial
224 – institution event in the history of Christianity” (Noll 1997:84). “The missionary expansion of
225 Christianity was unthinkable apart from the activity of monks” (Noll 1997:99). It was, thus, not
226 the relationship of state and church which secured Christianity as a world religion, but its
227 reaction to the mixture of politics and religion, Christianity. This is an important observation
228 because in Islam the inseparableness of state and religion is believed to be essential to the
229 furtherance of Islam.

230 **2.3.1. The consequence of a mixing of politics and religion: the schism between** 231 **West and East**

232 The schism between the West and Eastern Church of 1054¹⁷, although doctrinally
233 substantiated¹⁸ was also over the relation of politics and religion¹⁹. In the schism between the
234 West and Eastern churches “a key issue was the exercise of authority, with the east dealing
235 collegially with a strong emperor and with the laity making significant theological contributions,
236 as opposed to the West approaching issues much more hierarchically in a context of
237 fragmented political leadership and with theology dominated by clerics” (Noll 1997:130). “It is a
238 sad reality that differences over this question of authority were often expressed from both East
239 and West in anything but a charitable spirit” (Noll 1998:130).

240 The second consequence of the indiscriminate mixture of religion and politics was that the
241 political was sugar-coated with the religious, political motivations were disguised as religious.
242 There was no longer clear separation of spheres of authority in society, between the political
243 and religious.

244 **2.3.2. Reformation – a response to the mixture of church and state**

245 The Reformation had the effect that Catholic church-state establishments in much of Germany,
246 Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, Wales and Scandinavian countries were replaced by
247 Protestant church-state establishments. The state and church relation continued, but the
248 church was reformed so that there was a separation on the spheres of authority of the state

¹⁷ “No event had greater impact on Eastern Christianity before the Muslim capture of Constantinople in 1453” (Noll 1998:130) than the schism of 1054.

¹⁸ The West added the word *filioque* to the Nicene Creed. The West inserted “and the Son” in the section of the creed that speaks of the Spirit’s procession from the Father. “The Eastern churches argued that the Western addition was a grievous theological error” (Noll 1998:128).

¹⁹ It was Eastern resentment at claims for papal supremacy which eventually crystallized the separation (cf. Noll 1998:128).

249 and church. “Although church and state were distinct, the church had an active role to call the
250 state to account” (Lim 2011:64).

251 The Reformation restored the independence of the political, social, economic and cultural
252 spheres and related all of life to the religious. The rediscovery of the Reformation was that all of
253 life was spiritual²⁰. In the Reformed view human existence is essentially spiritual.

254 The response of the Reformation to the mixture of church and state was to introduce the
255 fundamental idea of religious direction in which church and state had to evaluate its relation to
256 God in terms of the two directional choices, obedience and disobedience. The Reformed
257 principle is the sufficiency of scripture and it is scripture that provides the framework for this
258 directional choice.

259 The recurrent theme of Reformation was the absolute sovereignty of God and the complete
260 dependence of the created reality on God as the Creator, sustainer and Law-Giver. This was
261 intended to unify church and society in its obedience to God. The relation of church and state
262 was distinguished in terms of two realms or kingdoms. Service to the glory of God was possible
263 in all areas of life. In Calvin the biblical religious direction was intertwined with a structural
264 analysis, but without recognizing the deeper presuppositions and so not separating unbiblical
265 philosophies (cf. van der Walt 2010:229) i.e. dualism, in which the religious direction is not
266 discernable. A tension was thus maintained as a result of his mixing of biblical and unbiblical
267 philosophy.

268 Calvin recognized that each societal structure has a basic direction, and he identified the offices
269 and tasks which regulated each structure, the offices of prophet – (prophetic discernment and
270 imagination), priest – (sacrificial), king – (serve). The prophetic office is to speak in the name of
271 God, the priestly to sacrifice themselves for others which is for God and the kings are to serve.
272 “The nature of these offices and their authority is determined by the qualifying modality of the
273 specific societal relationship” (van der Walt 2010:354). The biblical norms, love, justice,
274 stewardship and mutual fidelity which govern these societal relationships or structures are
275 evaluated in terms of obedience or disobedience in direction to God.


276 **2.4. The points of departure of the Reformed model of society**

277 The Reformed model of society pursues the ideal of a diversity of equal relationships standing
278 next to one another (cf. van der Walt 2010:442). Societal relationships are not a mere human
279 invention or social contract, but are a capacity built into creation by God and subject to God’s
280 norms (cf. van der Walt 2010:442). “Every societal relationship has within its own sphere
281 particular competence and its own kind of authority and power” (van der Walt 2010:442). In
282 this approach there is no higher-lower scheme, according to which one relationship (e.g. the
283 state or church) has a higher status than the other. Authority and power are abused when the

²⁰ Luther’s church-state view was to regard the political order as an independent dimension (cf. Sanders 1964:48). The church-state relation “lost its relation to God’s sovereignty, justification, love and vocation” (Sanders 1964:48).

284 norms governing these social structures are disregarded. In Islam social institutions are
 285 identifiable to which certain universal norms are applicable²¹. In fundamentalist Islam
 286 represented by IS state the norms which govern each social institution are confused and
 287 infused with political norms. i.e. the loyalty to the “caliph” in IS state takes precedence over all
 288 other norms.


289 **Social institutions:**



296 **Fig.3. Diagrammatic representation of the Reformed model of society**

297 **2.4.1. Secular state: the separation between two spheres**

298 The reaction to the mixture of politics and religion in Europe was central to the Puritans’
 299 response in freeing themselves from political constraints of the establishment of a state-church
 300 relation. The separation of state and church in American society has its roots in the Puritans
 301 who founded a society in which state and religion would coalesce, yet each was not seen as
 302 sovereign in its own sphere but interfered with each other. It is the reason that “it was the
 303 Protestants in the U.S.A who first developed the separation of church and state” (Lim 2011:64).



308

309 **Fig. 4. A continual interaction exists between state and social structures in society**

²¹ The comparison of the Reformed model to the Islamic model and the IS state model on the three Principles for evaluation:

- 1) Identify the basic points of departure
- 2) Determine the social structures and office, and the authority, power and responsibility of these structures.
- 3) Establish the norms applicable to these societal relationships.

310 **2.4.2. The separation of church and state and the public and private sphere**

311 One of the core problems of the Western approach is that it makes a fundamental distinction
312 between the secular and sacred sphere, demarcating all religion as to the private sphere. The
313 only workable option given for a multi-religious and pluralistic society has been the secular
314 exclusion of religion from the public sphere (cf. Volf 2011:141). It is of vital importance to
315 recognize that the church and state move in different spheres. They may not interfere with
316 each other because each is sovereign in its own sphere (cf. Vorster 2007:91). Although church
317 and state are different spheres of authority, accountability and responsibility, these spheres
318 cover both the public and private spheres. If this is not so it leads to a cultural force of
319 immorality with the result that the state abdicates its authority and responsibility for
320 maintaining both a public and private moral order for the well-being of all its citizens. Morality
321 becomes the personal choice of the individual, a religious choice, if the public and private
322 spheres are separated. The separation is supported from within Christianity by a certain
323 hermeneutic. “Christians tend to give a dualistic interpretation to the Caesar parable that
324 separates God and king” (Boer 2006:89). This separation is the result of reading the Bible
325 through a dualistic worldview in which Scripture and science, faith and reason, state and
326 religion are separated. Jesus did not declare a separation of the secular and the sacred, but a
327 declaration of the unity of the two in one person. His answer to the question posed as a
328 dichotomy between the two loyalties of state, represented by Caesar, and religion show the
329 unity of the secular and religious. There is to be no complete separation of the public and
330 private spheres, but a priority of ownership²². “The very notion of the secular, it has often been
331 pointed out, originated in Christendom. The opposite of the secular is not the spiritual or the
332 sacred but the eternal” (Ramachandra 2006:224). “Both secular and spiritual are established by
333 God for the government of the world” (Boer 1998:90). The role of the government is that it has
334 the responsibility to curb evil and administer justice. The role of government is not to support
335 one religion, if it does so it mixes two institutions that ought to remain within their separate
336 spheres (cf. Boer 1998:90). Western Christianity has confined religion to ecclesiastical
337 institutions like the Church and private life and made morality a private matter. “The church has
338 always acknowledged the *tension* between loyalty to the state and loyalty to God, ever
339 reserving the right to listen to God rather than to human authorities (Acts 4:19)” (Ott & Netland
340 2006:232), but it now listens to two different voices, the state and religion and has to do a
341 balancing act.

342 **The Western state – a state without moral boundaries**

343 We live in the era of nation-states (Meneses 2006:233). “In nation-states, especially in those
344 that are democracies, there is understood to be no excuse for a lack of allegiance to the
345 government” (cf. 2006:234). The modern conception of the nation-state is characterized by

²²“Far from presenting a magnum opus on the subject of church and state, Jesus was eluding his enemies at the time. Readers of the passage who forget this political context will take the statement at face value and may be inclined to think that a separation of spheres, political and religious, is indicated” (Meneses 2006:246).

346 self-rule (vs. foreign rule), religious freedom, democracy, egalitarian justice, territorially based
347 citizenship, and ethnic pluralism (cf. Meneses 2006:238). These democratic values are “secular
348 values” to which individuals and the head of the state are held accountable by the state.
349 Western nations have demanded loyalty to these identified “democratic values” and in so doing
350 have ignored “religious values”. The West has made a distinction between the secular and the
351 sacred in order and so has separated public secular values from private religious values.
352 Western democracy comes at a high price, namely that of undermining religious values²³.
353 Secular values are individualistic in nature while the values of Islam and Christianity are
354 communal and collective in nature. One of the ways of addressing this problem is through the
355 identification of a set of universal values, values which are contributed to by both the state,
356 democratic values, and religions and moral values. Before there can be a common morality and
357 “common values” (Vorster 2007:177) both Islam and Christianity have to be clear as to what are
358 the universal values. Each religion can contribute to common values, which contribute to nation
359 building and a new national unity (cf. Vorster 2007:177).

360 **2.4.2.1. Thick and thin definition of faith**

361 “The political community cannot be separated from the religions of its citizens. A political community
362 encompasses everyone within its territory as citizens or subjects, but citizens are people who can never
363 be reduced to their civic identity alone” (Skillen 2004:12). For this reason the approach of Miroslav Volf
364 is that “religious people ought to be free to bring their visions of the good life into the public sphere”
365 (Volf 2011:x). He argues that the radical movements across the Muslim world have been exaggerated
366 (cf. Volf 2011:xi). He advocates for “an alternative both to the secular total exclusion of all religions from
367 the public life” and “total saturation of the public life with a single religion” (Volf 2011:xi). He negotiates
368 this by means of the definition of faith as thin and thick faith. The cure against violence is not less of
369 Christianity or Islam, as secularism advocates, but more of Christian or Islamic faith! The meaning of
370 thicker faith is that of “the obligations of unlimited loyalty, under God, to the principles of truth telling,
371 of justice, of loyalty to one another, of indissoluble union” (Niebuhr *in* Hanson 2010:72). A thick
372 definition has concrete definitions about creation and final consummation (cf. Volf 2011:44). It is a thin
373 definition which fosters violence²⁴. The thin faith is that of securing freedom and maintaining freedom,
374 human rights and maintaining state impartiality (cf. Fergusson 2004:78). The role of the state is “not
375 merely as a negative ordinance with the function of restraining evil, it has the potential to provide
376 various social goods in conformity with the gospel of Christ” (Fergusson 2004:39).

377 For Volf (2011:40) the solution lies in a stronger and more intelligent commitment to the Christian or
378 Islamic faith. It is a thin faith which lends itself to extremism. It is unsophisticated and mistaken to
379 assume that “more religion, more violence; less religion, less violence” (Volf 2011:40). It is the quality of
380 religious attachments that is the heart of the matter. In the relation between state and religion an
381 inherent conflict exists for “no humanly constructed political system, has ever been willing to permit its

²³ Christian liberalism is the result of the Church accepting these democratic values of the West as the universal values and relegating religious values to the private sphere.

²⁴ “The argument for inherent violence of Christianity’s monotheism works only if one illegitimately reduces the “thick” religious description of God to naked oneness and then postulates such abstract oneness to be of decisive social significance” (Volf 1998:43).

382 subjects freely to choose allegiance to God over allegiance to itself in matters that pertain to political
383 order” (Meneses 2006:232).

384 *Caritas in Verate* (2009) is a Roman Catholic contribution that reminds the church and “all people of
385 good will” of scriptural principles like justice, human dignity, community, God’s preferential option of
386 the poor, the common good and solidarity” (Hoksbergen 2011:102). It is as these “common values” to all
387 faiths are kept before the peoples of different faiths that a lively and productive conversation are
388 fostered and common values can be established.

389 **3. The relation of Western civilization and Islamic civilization**

390 Modern western civilization has tended towards an individualistic value system and individualistic self-
391 governance and the socio-philosophy of individualism whereas Islamic civilizations have tended towards
392 a group value system and the socio-philosophy of collectivism. The argument of Huntington, published
393 as the “Clash of Civilizations”, is that the differences between the West and the World of Islam are
394 because of a difference of worldviews of people belonging to different cultures and civilizations. He
395 “most unfortunately overlooked the crucial distinction between Islam, as a religion, and Islamic
396 fundamentalism, as an ideology” (Tibi 1998:181). The culture of collectivity is the antithesis of
397 democracy (cf. Tibi 1998:182). It is because of the collective nature of Islamic culture that
398 fundamentalism has proven to be more authentic in Islamic civilization than democracy. “Samuel
399 Huntington prematurely, was one of the first who announced a “Third Wave,” in the course of which
400 global democratization would come about (Tibi 1998:182)”. What we are seeing in IS state as a result of
401 the crises is not a new wave of democratization, but a new kind of authoritarianism. “Fundamentalism,
402 borne out of the crises of nation-state, is this new brand of authoritarianism, and indeed we are
403 witnessing its rise on a global scale” (Tibi 1998:181).

404

405 **3.1. The relation of state and religion in Islam**

406 **3.1.1. The separation of religion and state advocated by Al-‘Awwa**

407 In Islam religion and politics are not separated. “Al-‘Awwa claims that Islam provided the first
408 authentic political and legal system of state in the history of mankind” (Tibi 1998, 2000:159).
409 The reason is that shari’a/Islamic law has a legal underpinning in the state. Islam is a political
410 system as much as it is a religious one (cf. ‘Abdulmawala 1973). He argues that Islam is a *din wa*
411 *dawala*, unity of religion and state. Islamic scholars, however, are divided over this matter.
412 Hisham Qublan, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and others emphasize that Islam is a way of life, while not
413 denying the political character of Islam. ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq was dismissed as a professor and
414 Islamic judge for allegedly stating that Islam is a religious faith and not a system of government
415 (cf. Tibi 1998:161). ‘Abd al-Raziq is not simply an advocate for the separation of religion and
416 politics, as he has been stigmatized, but endeavors to provide a scientific critique for
417 alternatives to the view that state and religion in Islam are inseparable. Al-‘Awwa’s primary
418 contention is with the relation of the goal of the Islamic State and the establishment of the
419 Islamic religion. “He names five constitutional provisions of Islamic rule: shura/constitution,
420 al’adl/justice, al-hurriya/freedom, al-musawah/equality, and musa’alat ra’is al-

421 dawla/accountability of the head of the state” (Tibi 1998:164). The critique of Al-’Awwa is that
422 he is vague and projects modern concerns into Islamic history (cf. Tibi 1998:164). The
423 constitutional provisions of Al-’Awwa is part of his attempt to relate Islam to a Western
424 constitutional approach in which religion and state are completely separate. “Continuing to
425 impose the Western view of democracy and human rights in Islamic or any other non-Western
426 civilization affords little promise” (Tibi 1998:180).

427

428 **The use of violence to establish an IS state**

429 Shari’a has a significant function in unification of the state (cf. Turaki 2010:64). Jihad allows the
430 Islamic State to impose political, economic, religious, social and cultural institutions upon a
431 particular group of people (cf. Turaki 2010:64). It is the use of jihad which results in a
432 relationship between state and religion in which the violence, the sword, has to be used to
433 maintain a relation in which there is no separation between religion and state. “A successful
434 jihad creates the political power that results in Islam being made a state religion” (Turaki
435 2010:65). In terms of the use of violence to bring about a religious state Jesus warns his
436 disciples that “...all those who take up the sword shall perish by the sword” (Matt 26:52).

437

438 **3.1.2. Unity of state and religion advocated by Al-Najjar**


439 Al-Najjar separates politics and religion and argues that Islam is not based on a separation of
440 state and politics. For him the contention of *din wa dawla*, unity of religion and state, in Islam is
441 nothing but a recent tradition. For him the state is restricted to a limited and specific group of
442 people, the citizens (cf. Tibi 1998:165). Al-Najjar has postulated that the relation of state and
443 religion be vested in the *umma*, in the understanding of “the people,” as the source of all
444 powers Tibi (1998:167). He contends “that this idea has guided political thought in Islamic
445 history cannot be supported by any study of Islamic history of ideas, for it is, rather, a recent
446 addition”. For Al-Najjar Islam is unquestionably a political religion, although not providing a
447 concept for IS state, but in outlining a political ethic for governing a polity. Al-Najjar deploys the
448 classical notion of *umma* against the newly introduced notion of *din wa dawla*, the unity of
449 state and religion, and repeatedly argues that it is not the business of Islam to furnish a system
450 of government (cf. Tibi 1998:166). The separation of politics and religion leads to secularism. “It
451 reduces the entire worldview and way of life that Muslims are so proud of to a narrow religious
452 affair restricted to the mosque and to the personal” (van der Walt 2007:163). The secular state
453 and legislation are used by the West to check the Muslim jihad (cf. van der Walt 2007:163).

454 **4. The third way of structural pluralism and confessional pluralism**

455 **4.1. Structural Pluralism**

456 In structural pluralism different social structures exist independently side by side. All the structures are
457 equal in authority, power and responsibility. It is based on the recognition that no single societal

458 relationship can bear all the authority and be totally responsible. In structural pluralism unhealthy
 459 competition can result, as it does in African tribalistic contexts, in which a collective perceives itself to be
 460 in competition for limited resources which are state administered.




465 **Figure 10. The model of structural pluralism**

466 **4.1.1. The state and structural pluralism**

467 In the structural plural model the role of the state is to protect and ensure that each societal structure
 468 has only limited authority. “Every bearer of authority has only a restricted and specific responsibility”
 469 (van der Walt 2010:479). The state in this model also only has limited authority and responsibility. The
 470 role of the state is to ensure that each societal relationship is limited in its authority, power and
 471 responsibility. In structural pluralism the groups exist for the sake of the state. Structural pluralism is a
 472 compromise between individualism and collectivism.

473 **4.2. Confessional pluralism**

474 In the relation of religion and state an alternative is necessary in which the secular and sacred
 475 distinction is replaced by structural unity between the secular and sacred called confessional
 476 pluralism. Confessional pluralism allows for a multiplicity of religious views, each contributing
 477 to the welfare of the state. The constitution then of the state protects and upholds the
 478 multiplicity of religious views and provides a common value system to unite all religions for the
 479 common good. A common value system can only be based on universal values.



485 **Fig. 11. The model of confessional pluralism**

486 **4.2.1.1. Confessional pluralism**

487 Confessional pluralism is not a compromise between individualism and structural pluralism. It offers a
488 third alternative, a synthesis of two views. Confessional pluralism asserts that every society relationship
489 should have the right to publicly make known and live out its own religious convictions. “Jewish, Muslim,
490 Christian and parents should, for instance, have the right to found schools according to their own
491 religious convictions” (van der Walt 2010:480). The importance of confessional pluralism is that it
492 “prevents both religions anarchy and totalitarianism” (van der Walt 2010:480). Confessional pluralism
493 has the benefits of structural pluralism, under the submission of God. The principle of confessional
494 pluralism attempts to do justice to the diversity of religious beliefs.

495 **4.2.1.2. The impartiality and non-separateness of the state**

496 In confessional pluralism the impartiality of the state does not contradict or prohibit the
497 separate functioning of the state as a separate sphere of society from religious institutions
498 which function as a sphere in the same social space.

- 499 1. The state cannot be responsible for all justice - this results in a totalitarian state.
- 500 2. The absolute freedom of the state is limited by the voluntary accountability of the state to the
501 institutions of society. The state is to be accountable to all institutions and not favour one
502 particular institution. The task of every institution is to call the state to accountability.
- 503 3. Wolterstoff interprets the neutrality requirement of the state, namely, that the state be neutral
504 with respect to religious and other comprehensive perspectives present in society, as requiring
505 *impartiality* rather than *separation*” (Wolterstoff in Volf 2004:125).
- 506 4. The separation of state and religion is important in plural societies because “it creates a culture
507 of persuasion instead of persecution”, “it frees religion from state control”, “It frees the state
508 from control by the church” and “it manages religious diversity within pluralistic societies”
509 (Vorster 2007:117-118).

510

511 **4.2.1.3. The need for common political and religious values**

512 The essential point is that political realities are not external to the church’s sphere of
513 responsibility (cf. Meneses 2006:249). “With the United States at the center of global power,
514 Americans are given a false sense of confidence in their own perspective” (Meneses 2006:248).
515 All political structures, ideologies, and motivations are to be subordinated to common values
516 and a common morality. Christianity has at times confused allegiance to Christ with
517 nationalism. This allegiance is a personal allegiance, not to be imposed by the State on its
518 citizens. In the same way “religious law is at the heart of Islam, and to ignore it is to cut at the
519 heart of the religious authority of the Koran, the traditions, and the example of Muhammed”
520 (Lim 2011:64), but the state cannot impose religious laws on its citizens. The role of the church
521 is not that of Kuyper, to bring the State under the lordship of Christ, but to morally bring the

522 Church under the lordship of Christ²⁵. “Our Reformed mission in this century must include the
523 advocacy for the clear separation of church and state” (Lim 2011:64), but it is not a separation
524 in terms of public and private spheres. Confessional pluralism allows for a multiplicity of religious
525 views, each contributing to the welfare of the state. The constitution then of the state protects and
526 upholds the multiplicity of religious views and provides a common value system to unite all religions for
527 the common good. It is only a common value system of democratic and religious values in the public
528 sphere that can truly be considered to be universal in nature. Islam does not make a distinction between
529 the public and private spheres - a dualistic separation. In a multi-global world the western democratic
530 value system taken in isolation from moral values results in religious clashes, which is also a clash of
531 civilizations, between western and Islamic civilization because Islam does not make a distinction
532 between a public and private sphere and public and private moral values. In Islamic civilization a great
533 variety of local cultures are united by ethical standards related to similar norms and values, a pattern of
534 unity in diversity.

535 **5. Conclusion**

536 The relation between state and religion in the western society has developed historically in terms of the
537 relation of state and church. It has developed from the dominance of the state, in Aristotle, to a co-
538 existence of state and church, to coalesce of state and church in which the two were fused, to a
539 complete separation of state and church in the modern democratic state. The relation of state and
540 church in Western society has been shaped by the philosophy of dualism. The development of Islam
541 historically has been marked with the same tension between state and religion. The recent assurgency
542 of a fundamentalist Islamic State stands in stark contrast to the historical idea of Islamic State. The
543 fundamentalist IS state is based on attempts to restore Islam to the former golden period of Islamic
544 history of the Abbasid period. The western democratic separation of state and religion is a hostile
545 separation of “freedom from religion,” which stands in contrast to the Islamic idea of the inseparable
546 relation of state and religion. What is needed is a “freedom of religion,” universal ethical standards
547 related to similar norms and values as a pattern of unity in diversity. A philosophy of confessional
548 pluralism is the only way forward to avoid a world of greater polarization between civilizations.

549

550 **Bibliography**

551 Abdulmawala, M. 1973. The organization of society and state in Islam (Anzimat al-mujtama’ wa
552 al’dawla fi al-Islam). al-Sharika al-Tunisiyya: Tunis.

553 Bell, R. 1968. The origin of Islam in its Christian environment: the gunning lecturers Edinburg
554 University, 1925. First published Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. Macmillan & Co. Ltd: Abingdon, U.K.

555 Boer, J.H., 1998. Christians and Mobilization. Institute of Church & Society: Jos, Nigeria.

556 Boer, J.H., 2006. Christian: secularism-yes and no. Studies in Christian – Muslim relations. Vol. 5.
557 Essence Publishing: Belleville, Ontario, Canada.

²⁵Central to the Christian worldview is that God the Trinity is with us. “God-with-us creates covenantal communities, and where there is community, God is with us” (De Borst 2011:88).

- 558 Boer, J.H., 2009. Christians and Muslims: parameters for living together. Studies in Christian – Muslim
559 relations. Vol. 8-2. Essence Publishing: Belleville, Ontario, Canada.
- 560 Brown, D., 2004. A new introduction to Islam. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, USA. Carlton,
561 Victoria, Australia.
- 562 *Caritas in Veritate*, text available online at
563 http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-
564 [xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html).
- 565 De Borst, R. P., 2011. Men and woman: made by and for community. (In *Reformed mission in an age of*
566 *world Christianity: ideas for the 21st century*. Roels, S. J., & Nomi, S. The Calvin press: Grand Rapids,
567 Michigan. p. 85-90).
- 568 Fergusson, D., 2004. Church, state and civil society. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- 569 Geertz, C., 1973. The interpretation of cultures. Basic Books: New York.
- 570 Grieve, P., 2006. A brief guide to Islam: history, faith and politics – the complete introduction.
571 Constable & Robinson Ltd: London.
- 572 Hanson, P. D. 2010. Political engagement as biblical mandate. Cascade Books: Eugene, Oregon.
- 573 Hoksbergen, R., 2011. The global economy, injustice, and the church: on being Reformed in today's
574 world. (In *Reformed mission in an age of world Christianity: ideas for the 21st century*. Roels, S.J., &
575 Nomi, S. The Calvin press: Grand Rapids, Michigan. p. 93-103).
- 576 Huntington, S. P., 1968. Political order in changing societies. Yale university press: New Haven,
577 Connecticut.
- 578 Lim, D. S., 2011. Mission as transformation: holistic, ecumenical and contextual. (In *Reformed mission*
579 *in an age of world Christianity: ideas for the 21st century*. Roels, S.J., & Nomi, S. The Calvin press: Grand
580 Rapids, Michigan. p. 57-72).
- 581 Meneses, E. H., 2006. Bearing witness in Rome with theology from the whole church: globalization,
582 theology, and nationalism. (In *Globalizing theology: belief and practice in an era of world Christianity*.
583 eds, Ott, C., & Netland, H.A., Baker Academic: Grand Rapids, Michigan.p.231-249).
- 584 Niebuhr, E. W. 1986. God and his people: covenant theology in the Old Testament. Oxford: Clarendon.
- 585 Noll. M. A., 1998. Turning points: decisive moments in the history of Christianity. Baker: Grand Rapids.
- 586 Noll, M. A., 2012. The new shape of world Christianity: how American experience reflects global faith.
587 IVP Academic: Downers Grove, Illinois.
- 588 Ott, C., & Netland, H.A., 2006. The values of Islam and Christianity are corporate as opposed to
589 individual in nature. Baker Academic: Grand Rapids, Michigan.
- 590 Pratt, Z, Sills, M. P., & Walters, J. K., 2014. Introduction to global missions. B & H Publishing: Nashville,
591 Tennessee.
- 592 Qublan, H., 1986. Ma'al alQur'an fi al-din wa dawla. Manshurat 'Uwaidat: Beirut & Paris.

593 Ramachandra, V., 2006. Globalization, nationalism, and religious resurgence. (In *Globalizing theology: belief and practice in an era of world Christianity*. Eds, Ott, C., & Netland, H.A., Baker Academic: Grand
594 Rapids, Michigan. p. 213-230).

596 Sanders, T. G., 1964. Protestant concepts of church and state. Holy, Rinehart & Winston: New York.

597 Skillen, J. W., 2004. In pursuit of justice: Christian-democratic explorations. Rowman & Littlefield
598 Publishers, Inc.: Lanham, Maryland.

599 Sonn, T., 2004. A brief history of Islam. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, U.K., Carlton, Australia, Malden,
600 USA.

601 Tibi, B., 1998. The challenge of fundamentalism: political Islam and the new world disorder. Second
602 edition. University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

603 Turaki, Y. 2010. Tainted legacy: Islam, colonialism and slavery in northern Nigeria. Isaac Publishing:
604 Mclean, VA.

605 Van der Walt, B. J., 2007. Transforming power: challenging contemporary secular society.
606 Potchefstroom: Institute for contemporary Christianity in Africa.

607 Van der Walt, B. J., 2010. At home in God's world: a transforming paradigm for being human and for
608 social involvement. Potchefstroom: Institute for contemporary Christianity in Africa.

609 Volf, M., 2011. A public faith: how followers of Christ should serve the common good. Brazos Press:
610 Grand Rapids, Michigan.

611 Vorster, N., 2007. Restoring human dignity in South Africa: Christian anthropology in a new
612 dispensation. Potchefstroom Theological Publications: Potchefstroom.

613 Walls, A. F., 1996. The missionary movement in Christian history: studies in the transmission of faith.
614 Maryknoll, NY; Orbis.

615 Wolterstoff, N., 1997. The role of religion in decision and discussion. (In *Religion in the public square: the place of religious convictions in political debate*. ed. Audi, R., & Wolterstoff, N). Rowman &
616 Littlefield: Lanham, MD).

617
618